

Court File No. 31-2278723

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF XAGENIC INC., OF THE CITY OF  
TORONTO, IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO**

**FACTUM OF XAGENIC INC.  
(Motion Returnable August 8, 2017)**

August 6, 2017

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**PART I – THE APPLICATION**

1. This factum is filed in support of the application of Xagenic Inc. (“**Xagenic**”) for orders pursuant to sections 50.9(4), 50.6(1) and 64.2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. B-3 (the “**BIA**”):
  - (a) extending the time to file a proposal from August 30, 2017 to October 16, 2017, including extending the stay of proceedings for that period;
  - (b) approving the terms of the interim financing term sheet dated July 31, 2017, with an increase in the borrowing from \$500,000 to \$750,000 (the “**DIP Term Sheet**”) entered into between Xagenic as borrower and Shana Kelley, CTI Life Sciences Fund and BDC Capital (collectively, the “**Lenders**”) as lenders;
  - (c) granting the following priority charges over all of Xagenic’s assets, rights, undertakings and properties (collectively, the “**Xagenic Property**”):
    - i. a charge in favour of A. Farber & Partners Inc. (the “**Proposal Trustee**” or “**Farber**”) and the solicitors for each of the Proposal Trustee and Xagenic in the amount of \$40,000 (the “**Priority Administration Charge**”), ranking in priority to all existing charges over the Xagenic Property, including the charge in favour of Silicon Valley Bank (the “**SVB Charge**”);
    - ii. a charge in favour of the Lenders and such other parties that may provide additional funding (collectively, the “**DIP Lenders**”) in respect of the DIP Term Sheet in the amount of \$150,000 (the “**Priority DIP Charge**”) over the Xagenic Property ranking subordinate to the Priority Administration Charge, but in priority to all existing charges over the Xagenic Property, including the SVB Charge;
    - iii. a charge in favour of the Proposal Trustee and the solicitors for the Proposal Trustee and Xagenic in the amount of \$150,000 (the “**Subordinate Administration Charge**” and together with the Priority

Administration Charge, the “**Administration Charge**”), ranking subordinate to the SVB Charge (subject to review of the security in favour of Silicon Valley Bank), the Priority Administration Charge and the Priority DIP Charge, but in priority to all other existing charges over the Xagenic Property; and

- iv. a charge in favour of the DIP Lenders in respect of the DIP Term Sheet in the amount of \$600,000 (the “**Subordinate DIP Charge**” and together with the Priority DIP Charge, the “**DIP Charge**”) over the Xagenic Property, ranking subordinate to the SVB Charge (subject to review of the security in favour of Silicon Valley Bank), the Priority DIP Charge and the Administration Charge but in priority to all other existing charges over the Xagenic Property.

## **PART II – THE FACTS**

### **Xagenic’s Business and History**

2. Xagenic is a privately-held company that conducts its business in Toronto and is registered pursuant to the Ontario *Business Corporations Act*.

Affidavit of Edward Jonasson sworn August 4, 2017 (“**Jonasson Affidavit**”), paras. 4 and 5; Motion Record of Xagenic (“**Motion Record**”), Tab 2

3. Since its founding in 2010, Xagenic has been in the business of developing molecular diagnostic systems. These systems are used to analyse biological markers in genetic code in order to diagnose and monitor disease, detect risk and assess appropriate treatment steps.

Jonasson Affidavit, para. 6; Motion Record Tab 2

4. Xagenic is developing the Xagenic X1™ platform (“**X1**”), which is a platform with a time-to-result of 20 minutes that will allow doctors to complete tests in their offices in real time.

Jonasson Affidavit, para. 7; Motion Record Tab 2

**Capital Structure and Liquidity Crisis**

5. Since 2010, Xagenic has raised significant funds through debt and equity (primarily equity).

Jonasson Affidavit, para 8; Motion Record Tab 2

6. Since its technology is in the development stages, Xagenic is currently dependent on raising funds through debt and equity to fund its operations.

Jonasson Affidavit, para 9; Motion Record Tab 2  
First Report of A. Farber & Partners Inc. in its capacity as proposal trustee dated August 4, 2017 (the “**Report**”) at para 10; Motion Record Tab 3

7. Since September 2016, Xagenic has actively pursued new capital investors and strategic partners for a potential transaction (either an investment or a sale). Between February 2017 and late July 2017, Xagenic’s management was in active discussions for a potential transaction.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 10 and 12; Motion Record Tab 2

8. Since January 2017, Xagenic’s current investors funded its operations and capital requirements. In late July, those investors determined that they were unable or unwilling to continue to fund Xagenic’s operations outside of a formal process.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 11 and 13; Motion Record Tab 2  
Report, para 10; Motion Record Tab 3

9. On July 31, 2017, Xagenic and the Lenders entered into the DIP Term Sheet pursuant to which the Lenders would make interim financing available to Xagenic so that it could continue its work towards a potential transaction.

Jonasson Affidavit, Exhibit C; Motion Record Tab 2

10. On August 1, 2017, Xagenic filed a notice of intention to make a proposal (the “**NOI**”). Under the NOI, Farber was appointed as Proposal Trustee.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 12 and 14; Motion Record Tab 2  
Report, paras 11 and 12; Motion Record Tab 3

### **Secured Creditors**

11. Xagenic's primary secured creditors are Silicon Valley Bank ("SVB") and a group of debenture holders.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 16-21 and Exhibit B; Motion Record Tab 2

12. Xagenic's significant unsecured creditors include the Federal Economic Development Agency, MaRS Investment Accelerator Fund Inc. and Cooley LLP.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 22 and 23; Motion Record Tab 2

### **DIP Financing**

13. To facilitate these proceedings and to allow Xagenic to continue to pursue a transaction, the Lenders agreed to provide Xagenic with interim financing (the "**DIP Financing**").

Jonasson Affidavit, para 27; Motion Record Tab 2

14. The key terms of the DIP Term Sheet include:
- (a) the Lenders will provide a revolving demand facility up to \$500,000;
  - (b) additional lenders may participate with the consent of the Lenders;
  - (c) the Lenders will be granted a priority charge with bifurcated priority, with \$150,000 having priority over SVB and the balance being subordinate to SVB (subject to confirmation of the validity and perfection of SVB's security); and
  - (d) the Lenders' agreement to provide the funds is conditional upon the Court approving the DIP Term Sheet.

Jonasson Affidavit, Exhibit C; Motion Record Tab 2

15. The Lenders are debenture holders and secured creditors of Xagenic. Two other debenture holders may also agree to provide funds on the same terms set out in the DIP Term Sheet.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 30 and 31; Motion Record Tab 2

16. Xagenic seeks approval of the DIP Term Sheet with an increase in the permitted borrowing amount from \$500,000 to \$750,000. The total amount under the DIP Charge is \$750,000 (\$150,000 for the Priority DIP Charge and \$600,000 for the Subordinate DIP Charge). Xagenic seeks this higher charge in order to avoid a further motion in the near future if and when additional funds become available. The additional lenders would participate in the DIP Charge, with the increased borrowing amount reflected in the amount of the Subordinate DIP Charge, and are members of the secured creditor group that is most affected by the Subordinate DIP Charge.

Jonasson Affidavit, para 34 and 35; Motion Record Tab 2

### **Restructuring Plans**

17. Xagenic will continue to pursue a transaction. Management is optimistic that it will be able to conclude a transaction, but it does not expect to be able to do so prior to August 30, 2017.

Jonasson Affidavit, 41 and 42; Motion Record Tab 2  
Report, para 24; Motion Record Tab 3

18. Xagenic and the Proposal Trustee are of the view that this additional time is required for Xagenic to conclude a transaction for the benefit of all stakeholders.

Jonasson Affidavit, paras 43-45; Motion Record Tab 2  
Report, para 26 and 27 ; Motion Record Tab 3

### **Administration Charge**

19. Xagenic seeks the Administration Charge in favour of its counsel, the Proposal Trustee and counsel to the Proposal Trustee. Xagenic is of the view that these parties are

essential to its efforts to conclude a transaction for the benefit of its stakeholders. The proposed charge is supported by the Lenders.

Jonasson Affidavit, para 47; Motion Record Tab 2  
Report, para 22; Motion Record Tab 3

### **PART III – THE ISSUE**

20. Should this Court:
- (a) extend the time for Xagenic to file a proposal (and the stay of proceedings) from August 30, 2017 to October 16, 2017;
  - (b) approve the DIP Term Sheet (with increased borrowings from \$500,000 to \$750,000) and create the DIP Charge; and,
  - (c) create the Administration Charge?
21. Xagenic submits that the answer to each of the above questions is yes. Xagenic has the support of its primary secured creditors and the Proposal Trustee is of the view that continuing these proceedings and pursuing a transaction is in the best interests of Xagenic's stakeholders.

### **PART IV – THE LAW**

#### **The Extension is Appropriate to Allow Xagenic Time to Conclude a Transaction**

22. The BIA provides that, upon filing a notice of intention to make a proposal, the debtor company receives the benefit of a stay of proceedings. The company then has 30 days to file a proposal. This Court has may extend that time (up to a maximum of 45 days per motion) if it is satisfied that:
- (a) the company has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;
  - (b) the company is likely to be able to make a viable proposal if the extension is granted; and



- (c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted.

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c.B-3, section 50.4(9);  
Schedule “B”

23. This Court has held that where an extension is necessary so that a sales process can be carried out, and a bankruptcy avoided, that is an appropriate circumstance to extend the stay of proceedings.

*Mustang GP Ltd. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 6562, para 41 (“*Mustang*”); Tab 2

24. Xagenic is currently required to file a proposal on or before August 30, 2017. It seeks an extension to Monday, October 16, 2017. The 45 day extension will expire on a weekend, and so Xagenic seeks the extension to the next business day.
25. Typically, extensions of the time to file a proposal are sought close to the end of the existing deadline. In this case, Xagenic was required to make an immediate application for approval of the DIP Term Sheet so that it could access the funds necessary to pursue a transaction.
26. In order to avoid multiple motion, and increased expense, Xagenic has brought the motion to approve the financing and extend the stay of proceedings at the same time. Xagenic submits that this demonstrates its diligence and its intention to act prudently and in the best interests of its stakeholders.
27. Before these proceedings began, Xagenic was working towards finding a strategic partner to resolve its liquidity problems.
28. The Proposal Trustee is satisfied that Xagenic has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence in these proceedings and that if the extension sought is granted, this will allow Xagenic to continue discussions with strategic partners and formulate a proposal to its creditors. The Proposal Trustee is further of the view that the proposed extension will not materially prejudice any creditor.

29. Xagenic submits that extending the stay of proceedings will minimize the cost of these proceedings and ensure that it can focus on concluding a transaction for the benefit of all stakeholders. Xagenic also notes that it has the support of its primary secured creditors: SVB and the group of debenture holders.

**DIP Financing is Necessary to Pursue a Transaction and a Charge is Appropriate**

30. The BIA codifies this Court's authority to approve interim financing and create charges in favour of the interim financing lenders, including the factors to be considered:
- (a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to the proceedings;
  - (b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
  - (c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
  - (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made;
  - (e) the nature and value of the debtor's property;
  - (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced; and,
  - (g) the proposal trustee's report.

BIA, section 50.6(1) and 50.6(5); Schedule "B"

31. In assessing whether the DIP facility and the charge is appropriate, the Court weighs heavily the position of major creditors and whether the loan would enhance the company's ability to make a proposal.

*Mustang*, para 28-31; Tab 2

*P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing (Re)*, 2011 ONSC 7641, para 24 ("**Wallbank**"); Tab 3

32. As noted above, and in the Report and the Jonasson Affidavit, the DIP Financing is required in order to allow Xagenic to continue its discussions towards a transaction. Without these funds, Xagenic will be unable to formulate a proposal and a bankruptcy

would follow. Xagenic is of the view that this would be to the detriment of its stakeholders, and the Proposal Trustee agrees with that assessment.

33. This is analogous to the facts of the *Mustang* and *Wallbank* cases:
- (a) the evidence and cash flow demonstrates that Xagenic would cease operations if it is not able to access the DIP Financing;
  - (b) the borrowing and DIP Charge is supported by the affected creditors and the Proposal Trustee; and
  - (c) the funding enhances, rather than diminishes, the potential for creditor recovery by allowing Xagenic to continue to pursue a transaction.
34. Xagenic seeks approval of the DIP Term Sheet with an increased borrowing amount. The Lenders have committed \$500,000, but the DIP Term Sheet contemplates additional lenders participating with the Lenders consent. Xagenic may be able to secure \$250,000 in additional funding on the same terms as the DIP Term Sheet. This additional funding would be provided from the secured debenture holders whose security is primed by the DIP Charge.
35. The affected secured creditors and the Proposal Trustee support this increased borrowing amount. In particular, the secured creditors most affected by the increased borrowing (the debenture holders) are among the parties that would provide the additional borrowing.

**The Administration Charge is Necessary to Ensure the Efficient and Effective Conduct of These Proceedings**

36. The BIA allows this Court to create a super-priority charge to secure fees and disbursements of counsel to the debtor, the proposal trustee and the proposal trustee's counsel. In granting the charge, the Court must be satisfied that the affected secured creditors have been given notice, that the amount is appropriate and that the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

BIA, section 64.2; Schedule "B"

37. It is well established that professional advisors are critical to a successful restructuring and that where the debtor company has limited means to secure that assistance, a charge is appropriate to ensure the company has access to the resources and assistance it requires. This is consistent with the well-established position in insolvency proceedings that it would not be reasonable to expect professionals to assist insolvent companies while taking the risk of not being paid for those services.

*Mustang*, para 33; Tab 2  
*Colossus Minerals Inc. (Re)*, 2014 ONSC 514 (“*Colossus*”), paras 12-14; Tab 1  
*Timminco Ltd. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 506, para 66; Tab 4

38. The Proposal Trustee will act as trustee in these proceedings to ensure that the requirements of the BIA are met, as well as assisting Xagenic with preparation of cash flow projections and all other aspects of its proposal. Xagenic is of the view that the assistance of the Proposal Trustee will assist the Court and all stakeholders throughout these proceedings.
39. Similarly, Xagenic requires legal counsel to assist it with all aspects of these proceedings and its proposal, including conducting the sales process and concluding a transaction.
40. As noted above, Xagenic seeks to split the priority of the Administration. Since the SVB Charge will have priority over a portion of the Court-ordered charges, the Proposal Trustee will require legal counsel in order to confirm the validity and perfection of SVB’s security.
41. The assistance of the Proposal Trustee and Xagenic’s counsel will ensure that these proceedings and Xagenic’s efforts to find an investor or a buyer are conducted effectively and efficiently.

**PART V – ORDER REQUESTED**

42. Xagenic requests that this Court grant the relief sought in substantially the form of the draft Order at tab 4 of the Motion Record.

**ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.**

August 6, 2017

  
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**Alex MacFarlane/Roger Jaipargas**

**SCHEDULE “A” – AUTHORITIES CITED**

1. *Colossus Minerals Inc. (Re)*, 2014 ONSC 514
2. *Mustang GP Ltd. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 6562
3. *P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing (Re)*, 2011 ONSC 7641
4. *Timminco Ltd. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 506

**SCHEDULE “B” – STATUTES CITED**

***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3***

**Notice of intention**

**50.4 (1)** Before filing a copy of a proposal with a licensed trustee, an insolvent person may file a notice of intention, in the prescribed form, with the official receiver in the insolvent person’s locality, stating

(a) the insolvent person’s intention to make a proposal,

(b) the name and address of the licensed trustee who has consented, in writing, to act as the trustee under the proposal, and

(c) the names of the creditors with claims amounting to two hundred and fifty dollars or more and the amounts of their claims as known or shown by the debtor’s books,

and attaching thereto a copy of the consent referred to in paragraph (b).

**Certain things to be filed**

(2) Within ten days after filing a notice of intention under subsection (1), the insolvent person shall file with the official receiver

(a) a statement (in this section referred to as a “cash-flow statement”) indicating the projected cash-flow of the insolvent person on at least a monthly basis, prepared by the insolvent person, reviewed for its reasonableness by the trustee under the notice of intention and signed by the trustee and the insolvent person;

(b) a report on the reasonableness of the cash-flow statement, in the prescribed form, prepared and signed by the trustee; and

(c) a report containing prescribed representations by the insolvent person regarding the preparation of the cash-flow statement, in the prescribed form, prepared and signed by the insolvent person.

**Creditors may obtain statement**

(3) Subject to subsection (4), any creditor may obtain a copy of the cash-flow statement on request made to the trustee.

**Exception**

(4) The court may order that a cash-flow statement or any part thereof not be released to some or all of the creditors pursuant to subsection (3) where it is satisfied that

(a) such release would unduly prejudice the insolvent person; and

(b) non-release would not unduly prejudice the creditor or creditors in question.

**Trustee protected**

(5) If the trustee acts in good faith and takes reasonable care in reviewing the cash-flow statement, the trustee is not liable for loss or damage to any person resulting from that person's reliance on the cash-flow statement.

**Trustee to notify creditors**

(6) Within five days after the filing of a notice of intention under subsection (1), the trustee named in the notice shall send to every known creditor, in the prescribed manner, a copy of the notice including all of the information referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) to (c).

**Trustee to monitor and report**

(7) Subject to any direction of the court under paragraph 47.1(2)(a), the trustee under a notice of intention in respect of an insolvent person

(a) shall, for the purpose of monitoring the insolvent person's business and financial affairs, have access to and examine the insolvent person's property, including his premises, books, records and other financial documents, to the extent necessary to adequately assess the insolvent person's business and financial affairs, from the filing of the notice of intention until a proposal is filed or the insolvent person becomes bankrupt;

(b) shall file a report on the state of the insolvent person's business and financial affairs — containing the prescribed information, if any —

(i) with the official receiver without delay after ascertaining a material adverse change in the insolvent person's projected cash-flow or financial circumstances, and

(ii) with the court at or before the hearing by the court of any application under subsection (9) and at any other time that the court may order; and

(c) shall send a report about the material adverse change to the creditors without delay after ascertaining the change.

**Where assignment deemed to have been made**

(8) Where an insolvent person fails to comply with subsection (2), or where the trustee fails to file a proposal with the official receiver under subsection 62(1) within a period of thirty days after the day the notice of intention was filed under subsection (1), or within any extension of that period granted under subsection (9),

(a) the insolvent person is, on the expiration of that period or that extension, as the case may be, deemed to have thereupon made an assignment;



(b) the trustee shall, without delay, file with the official receiver, in the prescribed form, a report of the deemed assignment;

(b.1) the official receiver shall issue a certificate of assignment, in the prescribed form, which has the same effect for the purposes of this Act as an assignment filed under section 49; and

(c) the trustee shall, within five days after the day the certificate mentioned in paragraph (b) is issued, send notice of the meeting of creditors under section 102, at which meeting the creditors may by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding section 14, affirm the appointment of the trustee or appoint another licensed trustee in lieu of that trustee.

#### **Extension of time for filing proposal**

(9) The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

(a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and

(c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted.

#### **Court may not extend time**

(10) Subsection 187(11) does not apply in respect of time limitations imposed by subsection (9).

#### **Court may terminate period for making proposal**

(11) The court may, on application by the trustee, the interim receiver, if any, appointed under section 47.1, or a creditor, declare terminated, before its actual expiration, the thirty day period mentioned in subsection (8) or any extension thereof granted under subsection (9) if the court is satisfied that

(a) the insolvent person has not acted, or is not acting, in good faith and with due diligence,

(b) the insolvent person will not likely be able to make a viable proposal before the expiration of the period in question,

(c) the insolvent person will not likely be able to make a proposal, before the expiration of the period in question, that will be accepted by the creditors, or

(d) the creditors as a whole would be materially prejudiced were the application under this subsection rejected,

and where the court declares the period in question terminated, paragraphs (8)(a) to (c) thereupon apply as if that period had expired.

[...]

### **Order — interim financing**

**50.6 (1)** On application by a debtor in respect of whom a notice of intention was filed under section 50.4 or a proposal was filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the debtor's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the debtor an amount approved by the court as being required by the debtor, having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement referred to in paragraph 50(6)(a) or 50.4(2)(a), as the case may be. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

### **Individuals**

(2) In the case of an individual,

(a) they may not make an application under subsection (1) unless they are carrying on a business; and

(b) only property acquired for or used in relation to the business may be subject to a security or charge.

### **Priority**

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor.

### **Priority — previous orders**

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

### **Factors to be considered**

(5) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor;

- (e) the nature and value of the debtor's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the trustee's report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be.

[...]

**Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs**

**64.2 (1)** On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) is subject to a security or charge, in an amount that the court considers appropriate, in respect of the fees and expenses of

- (a) the trustee, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties;
- (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the person for the purpose of proceedings under this Division; and
- (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for the effective participation of that person in proceedings under this Division.

**Priority**

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the person.

**Individual**

(3) In the case of an individual,

- (a) the court may not make the order unless the individual is carrying on a business; and
- (b) only property acquired for or used in relation to the business may be subject to a security or charge.

# **TAB 1**

**CITATION:** Colossus Minerals Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 514  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-14-10401-00CL  
**DATE:** 20140207

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO**

**RE:** IN THE MATTER OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, As Amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION OF COLOSSUS MINERALS INC., OF THE CITY OF TORONTO IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

**BEFORE:** Mr. Justice H.J. Wilton-Siegel

**COUNSEL:** S. Brotman and D. Chochla, for the Applicant Colossus Minerals Inc.

L. Rogers and A. Shalviri, for the DIP Agent, Sandstorm Gold Inc.

H. Chaiton, for the Proposal Trustee

S. Zweig, for the Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders and Certain Lenders

**HEARD:** January 16, 2014

**ENDORSEMENT**

[1] The applicant, Colossus Minerals Inc. (the “applicant” or “Colossus”), seeks an order granting various relief under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the “BIA”). The principal secured creditors of Colossus were served and no objections were received regarding the relief sought. In view of the liquidity position of Colossus, the applicant was heard on an urgent basis and an order was issued on January 16, 2014 granting the relief sought. This endorsement sets out the Court’s reasons for granting the order.

**Background**

[2] The applicant filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under s. 50.4(1) of the BIA on January 13, 2014. Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. (the “Proposal Trustee”) has been named the Proposal Trustee in these proceedings. The Proposal Trustee has filed its first report dated January 14, 2014 addressing this application, among other things. The main asset of Colossus is a 75% interest in a gold and platinum project in Brazil (the “Project”), which is held by a subsidiary. The Project is nearly complete. However, there is a serious water control issue that urgently requires additional de-watering facilities to preserve the applicant’s interest in the Project. As none of the applicant’s mining interests, including the Project, are producing, it has

no revenue and has been accumulating losses. To date, the applicant has been unable to obtain the financing necessary to fund its cash flow requirements through to the commencement of production and it has exhausted its liquidity.

### **DIP Loan and DIP Charge**

[3] The applicant seeks approval of a Debtor-in-Possession Loan (the “DIP Loan”) and DIP Charge dated January 13, 2014 with Sandstorm Gold Inc. (“Sandstorm”) and certain holders of the applicant’s outstanding gold-linked notes (the “Notes”) in an amount up to \$4 million, subject to a first-ranking charge on the property of Colossus, being the DIP Charge. The Court has the authority under section 50.6(1) of the BIA to authorize the DIP Loan and DIP Charge, subject to a consideration of the factors under section 50.6(5). In this regard, the following matters are relevant.

[4] First, the DIP Loan is to last during the currency of the sale and investor solicitation process (“SISP”) discussed below and the applicant has sought an extension of the stay of proceedings under the BIA until March 7, 2014. The applicant’s cash flow statements show that the DIP Loan is necessary and sufficient to fund the applicant’s cash requirements until that time.

[5] Second, current management will continue to operate Colossus during the stay period to assist in the SISP. Because Sandstorm has significant rights under a product purchase agreement pertaining to the Project and the Notes represent the applicant’s largest debt obligation, the DIP Loan reflects the confidence of significant creditors in the applicant and its management.

[6] Third, the terms of the DIP Loan are consistent with the terms of DIP financing facilities in similar proceedings.

[7] Fourth, Colossus is facing an imminent liquidity crisis. It will need to cease operations if it does not receive funding. In such circumstances, there will be little likelihood of a viable proposal.

[8] Fifth, the DIP Loan is required to permit the SISP to proceed, which is necessary for any assessment of the options of a sale and a proposal under the BIA. It will also fund the care and maintenance of the Project without which the asset will deteriorate thereby seriously jeopardizing the applicant’s ability to make a proposal. This latter consideration also justifies the necessary adverse effect on creditors’ positions. The DIP Charge will, however, be subordinate to the secured interests of Dell Financial Services Canada Limited Partnership (“Dell”) and GE VFS Canada Limited Partnership (“GE”) who have received notice of this application and have not objected.

[9] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee has recommended that the Court approve the relief sought and supports the DIP Loan and DIP Charge.

[10] For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the Court should authorize the DIP Loan and the DIP Charge pursuant to s. 50.6(1) of the BIA.

**Administration Charge**

[11] Colossus seeks approval of a first-priority administration charge in the maximum amount of \$300,000 to secure the fees and disbursements of the Proposal Trustee, the counsel to the Proposal Trustee, and the counsel to the applicant in respect of these BIA proceedings.

[12] Section 64.2 of the BIA provides jurisdiction to grant a super-priority for such purposes. The Court is satisfied that such a charge is appropriate for the following reasons.

[13] First, the proposed services are essential both to a successful proceeding under the BIA as well as for the conduct of the SISP.

[14] Second, the quantum of the proposed charge is appropriate given the complexity of the applicant's business and of the SISP, both of which will require the supervision of the Proposal Trustee.

[15] Third, the proposed charge will be subordinate to the secured interests of GE and Dell.

**Directors' and Officers' Charge**

[16] Colossus seeks approval of an indemnity and priority charge to indemnify its directors and officers for obligations and liabilities they may incur in such capacities from and after the filing of the Notice of Intention (the "D&O Charge"). It is proposed that the D&O Charge be in the amount of \$200,000 and rank after the Administration Charge and prior to the DIP Charge.

[17] The Court has authority to grant such a charge under s. 64.1 of the BIA. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant such relief in the present circumstances for the following reasons.

[18] First, the Court has been advised that the existing directors' and officers' insurance policies contain certain limits and exclusions that create uncertainty as to coverage of all potential claims. The order sought provides that the benefit of the D&O Charge will be available only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under such insurance or such coverage is insufficient to pay the amounts indemnified.

[19] Second, the applicant's remaining directors and officers have advised that they are unwilling to continue their services and involvement with the applicant without the protection of the D&O Charge.

[20] Third, the continued involvement of the remaining directors and officers is critical to a successful SISP or any proposal under the BIA.

[21] Fourth, the Proposal Trustee has stated that the D&O Charge is reasonable and supports the D&O Charge.

### **The SISP**

[22] The Court has the authority to approve any proposed sale under s. 65.13(1) of the BIA subject to consideration of the factors in s. 65.13(4). At this time, Colossus seeks approval of its proposed sales process, being the SISP. In this regard, the following considerations are relevant.

[23] First, the SISP is necessary to permit the applicant to determine whether a sale transaction is available that would be more advantageous to the applicant and its stakeholders than a proposal under the BIA. It is also a condition of the DIP Loan. In these circumstances, a sales process is not only reasonable but also necessary.

[24] Second, it is not possible at this time to assess whether a sale under the SISP would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale under a bankruptcy. However, the conduct of the SISP will allow that assessment without any obligation on the part of the applicant to accept any offer under the SISP.

[25] Third, the Court retains the authority to approve any sale under s. 65.13 of the BIA.

[26] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the proposed SISP.

[27] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the SISP should be approved at this time.

### **Engagement Letter with the Financial Advisor**

[28] The applicant seeks approval of an engagement letter dated November 27, 2013 with Dundee Securities Limited (“Dundee”) (the “Engagement Letter”). Dundee was engaged at that time by the special committee of the board of directors of the applicant as its financial advisor for the purpose of identifying financing and/or merger and acquisition opportunities available to the applicant. It is proposed that Dundee will continue to be engaged pursuant to the Engagement Letter to run the SISP together with the applicant under the supervision of the Proposal Trustee.

[29] Under the Engagement Letter, Dundee will receive certain compensation including a success fee. The Engagement Letter also provides that amounts payable thereunder are claims that cannot be compromised in any proposal under the BIA or any plan of arrangement under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”).

[30] Courts have approved success fees in the context of restructurings under the CCAA. The reasoning in such cases is equally applicable in respect of restructurings conducted by means of proposal proceedings under the BIA. As the applicant notes, a success fee is both appropriate and necessary where the debtor lacks the financial resources to pay advisory fees on any other basis.

[31] For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Engagement Letter, including the success fee arrangement, should be approved by the Court and that the applicant should be authorized to continue to engage Dundee as its financial advisor in respect of the SISP.



[32] Dundee has considerable industry experience as well as familiarity with Colossus, based on its involvement with the company prior to the filing of the Notice of Intention.

[33] As mentioned, the SISP is necessary to permit an assessment of the best option for stakeholders.

[34] In addition, the success fee is necessary to incentivize Dundee but is reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with success fees in similar circumstances.

[35] Importantly, the success fee is only payable in the event of a successful outcome of the SISP.

[36] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the Engagement Letter, including the success fee arrangement.

### **Extension of the Stay**

[37] The applicant seeks an extension for the time to file a proposal under the BIA from the thirty-day period provided for in s. 50.4(8). The applicant seeks an extension to March 7, 2014 to permit it to pursue the SISP and assess whether a sale or a proposal under the BIA would be most beneficial to the applicant's stakeholders.

[38] The Court has authority to grant such relief under section 50.4(9) of the BIA. I am satisfied that such relief is appropriate in the present circumstances for the following reasons.

[39] First, the applicant is acting in good faith and with due diligence, with a view to maximizing value for the stakeholders, in seeking authorization for the SISP.

[40] Second, the applicant requires additional time to determine whether it could make a viable proposal to stakeholders. The extension of the stay will increase the likelihood of a feasible sale transaction or a proposal.

[41] Third, there is no material prejudice likely to result to creditors from the extension of the stay itself. Any adverse effect flowing from the DIP Loan and DIP Charge has been addressed above.

[42] Fourth, the applicant's cash flows indicate that it will be able to meet its financial obligations, including care and maintenance of the Project, during the extended period with the inclusion of the proceeds of the DIP Loan.

[43] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the requested relief.

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Wilton-Siegel J.

**Released:** February 7, 2014

# TAB 2

**CITATION:** Mustang GP Ltd. (Re), 2015 ONSC 6562  
**COURT FILE NOs.:** 35-2041153, 35-2041155, 35-2041157  
**DATE:** 2015/10/28

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – IN BANKRUPTCY

**RE:** IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF MUSTANG GP LTD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF HARVEST ONTARIO PARTNERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF HARVEST POWER MUSTANG GENERATION LTD.

**BEFORE:** Justice H. A. Rady

**COUNSEL:** Harvey Chaiton, for Mustang GP Ltd., Harvest Ontario Partners Limited Partnership and Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd.

Joseph Latham for Harvest Power Inc.

Jeremy Forrest for Proposal Trustee, Deloitte Restructuring Inc.

Robert Choi for Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership

Curtis Cleaver for StormFisher Ltd.

No one else appearing.

**HEARD:** October 19, 2015

## **ENDORSEMENT**

### **Introduction**

[1] This matter came before me as a time sensitive motion for the following relief:

- (a) abridging the time for service of the debtors' motion record so that the motion was properly returnable on October 19, 2015;

- (b) administratively consolidating the debtors' proposal proceeding;
- (c) authorizing the debtors to enter into an interim financing term sheet (the DIP term sheet) with StormFisher Environmental Ltd. (in this capacity, the DIP lender), approving the DIP term sheet and granting the DIP lender a super priority charge to secure all of the debtors' obligations to the DIP lender under the DIP term sheet;
- (d) granting a charge in an amount not to exceed \$150,000 in favour of the debtors' legal counsel, the proposal trustee and its legal counsel to secure payment of their reasonable fees and disbursements;
- (e) granting a charge in an amount not to exceed \$2,000,000 in favour of the debtors' directors and officers;
- (f) approving the process described herein for the sale and marketing of the debtors' business and assets;
- (g) approving the agreement of purchase and sale between StormFisher Environmental Ltd. and the debtors; and
- (h) granting the debtors an extension of time to make a proposal to their creditors.

### **Preliminary Matter**

[2] As a preliminary matter, Mr. Choi, who acts for a creditor of the debtors, Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership, requested an adjournment to permit him an opportunity to review and consider the material, which was late served on October 15, 2015. He sought only a brief adjournment and I was initially inclined to grant one. However, having heard counsel's submissions and considered the material, I was concerned that even a brief adjournment had the potential to cause mischief as

the debtors attempt to come to terms with their debt. Any delay might ultimately cause prejudice to the debtors and their stakeholders. Both Mr. Chaiton and Mr. Latham expressed concern about adverse environmental consequences if the case were delayed. No other stakeholders appeared to voice any objection. As a result, the request was denied and the motion proceeded.

- [3] Following submissions, I reserved my decision. On October 20, 2015, I released an endorsement granting the relief with reasons to follow.

### **Background**

- [4] The evidence is contained in the affidavit of Wayne Davis, the chief executive officer of Harvest Mustang GP Ltd. dated October 13, 2015. He sets out in considerable detail the background to the motion and what has led the debtors to seek the above described relief. The following is a summary of his evidence.
- [5] On September 29, 2015, the moving parties, which are referred to collectively as the debtors, each filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal pursuant to s. 50.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 as amended. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. was named proposal trustee.
- [6] The debtors are indirect subsidiaries of Harvest Power Inc., a privately owned Delaware corporation that develops, builds, owns and operates facilities that generate renewable energy, as well as soil and mulch products from waste organic materials.
- [7] Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. was established in July 2010 in order to acquire assets related to a development opportunity in London. In October 2010, it purchased a property located at 1087 Green Valley Road from London Biogas Generation Inc., a subsidiary of StormFisher Ltd. The intent was to design, build, own and operate a biogas electricity production facility.

- [8] In November 2011, a limited partnership was formed between Harvest Power Canada Ltd., Harvest Power Mustang GP Ltd. and Waste Management of Canada Corporation, referred to as Harvest Ontario Partners Limited Partnership or Harvest Ontario Partners. It was formed to permit the plant to accept organic waste to be used to generate renewable electricity. After the partnership was formed, Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. became a 100 percent owned subsidiary of the partnership. In June 2012, its personal property was transferred to the partnership. It remains the registered owner of 1087 Green Valley Road.
- [9] The plant employs twelve part and full time employees.
- [10] The debtors began operating the biogas electrical facility in London in April 2013. Unfortunately, the plant has never met its production expectations, had negative EBITDA from the outset and could not reach profitability without new investment. The debtors had experienced significant “launch challenges” due to construction delays, lower than expected feedstock acquisition, higher than anticipated labour costs, and delays in securing a necessary approval from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency for the marketing and sale of fertilizer produced at the facility.
- [11] Its difficulties were compounded by litigation with its general contractor, arising from the earlier construction of the facility. The lawsuit was ultimately resolved with the debtors paying \$1 million from a holdback held by Harvest Ontario Partners as well as a 24 percent limited partnership interest in the partnership. The litigation was costly and “caused a substantial drain on the debtors’ working capital resources”.
- [12] The debtors’ working capital and operating losses had been funded by its parent company, Harvest Power Inc. However, in early 2015 Harvest Power Inc. advised the debtors that it would not continue to do so. By the year ended September 2015, the debtors had an operating loss of approximately \$4.8 million.

- [13] In January 2015, the debtors defaulted on their obligations to Farm Credit Canada, its senior secured creditor, which had extended a demand credit facility to secure up to \$11 million in construction financing for the plant. The credit facility was converted to a twelve year term loan, secured by a mortgage, a first security interest and various guarantees. In February 2015, FCC began a process to locate a party to acquire its debt and security, with the cooperation of the debtors. FCC also advised the debtors that it would not fund any restructuring process or provide further financing. The marketing process failed to garner any offers from third parties that FCC found acceptable.
- [14] On July 9, 2015, FCC demanded payment of its term loan from Harvest Ontario Partners and served a Notice of Intention to Enforce Security pursuant to s. 244(1) of the *BIA*. In August 2015, an indirect subsidiary of Harvest Power Inc. – 2478223 Ontario Limited – purchased and took an assignment of FCC’s debt and security at a substantial discount.
- [15] Shortly thereafter, StormFisher Ltd., which is a competitor of Harvest Power Inc., advised 2478223 that it was interested in purchasing the FCC debt and security in the hopes of acquiring the debtors’ business. It was prepared to participate in the sale process as a stalking horse bidder and a DIP lender.
- [16] On September 25, 2015, 2478223 assigned the debt and security to StormFisher Environmental Ltd., a subsidiary of StormFisher Ltd., incorporated for the purpose of purchasing the debtors’ assets. The debt and security were purchased at a substantial discount from what 2478223 had paid and included cash, a promissory note and a minority equity interest. StormFisher Ltd. is described as having remained close to the Harvest Power group of companies in the time following its subsidiary’s sale of the property to Harvest Power Generation Ltd. Some of its employees worked under contract for Harvest Power Inc. It was aware of the



debtors' financial difficulties and had participated in FCC's earlier attempted sale process.

[17] On September 29, 2015, the debtors commenced these proceedings under the *BIA*, in order to carry out the sale of the debtors' business as a going concern to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. as a stalking horse bidder or another purchaser. Given the lack of success in the sale process earlier initiated by FCC, and concerns respecting the difficulties facing the renewable energy industry in general and for the debtors specifically, the debtors believe that a stalking horse process is appropriate and necessary.

[18] In consultation with the proposal trustee, the debtors developed a process for the marketing and sale of their business and assets. The following summary of the process is described by Mr. Davis in his affidavit:

- i. the sale process will be commenced immediately following the date of the order approving it;
- ii. starting immediately after the sale process approval date, the debtors and the proposal trustee will contact prospective purchasers and will provide a teaser summary of the debtors' business in order to solicit interest. The proposal trustee will obtain a non-disclosure agreement from interested parties who wish to receive a confidential information memorandum and undertake due diligence. Following the execution of a non-disclosure agreement, the proposal trustee will provide access to an electronic data room to prospective purchasers;
- iii. at the request of interested parties, the proposal trustee will facilitate plant tours and management meetings;

- iv. shortly following the sale process approval date, the proposal trustee will advertise the opportunity in the national edition of the Globe and Mail;
- v. the bid deadline for prospective purchasers will be 35 days following the sale process approval date. Any qualified bid must be accompanied by a cash deposit of 10% of the purchase price;
- vi. the debtors and the proposal trustee will review all superior bids received to determine which bid it considers to be the most favourable and will then notify the successful party that its bid has been selected as the winning bid. Upon the selection of the winning bidder, there shall be a binding agreement of purchase and sale between the winning bidder and the debtors;
- vii. if one or more superior bids is received, the debtors shall bring a motion to the Court within seven business days following the selection of the winning bidder for an order approving the agreement of purchase and sale between the winning bidder and the debtors and to vest the assets in the winning bidder;
- viii. the closing of the sale transaction will take place within one business day from the sale approval date;
- ix. in the event that a superior bid is not received by the bid deadline, the debtors will bring a motion as soon as possible following the bid deadline for an order approving the stalking horse agreement of purchase and sale.

[19] StormFisher Environmental Ltd. is prepared to purchase the business and assets of the debtors on a going-concern basis on the following terms:

A partial credit bid for a purchase price equal to: (i) \$250,000 of the debtors' total secured obligations to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. (plus the DIP loan described below); (ii) any amounts ranking in priority to StormFisher Environmental Ltd.'s security, including the amounts secured by: (a) the administration charge; (b) the D&O charge (both described below); and (c) the amount estimated by the proposal trustee to be the aggregate fees, disbursements and expenses for the period from and after closing of the transaction for the sale the debtors' business to the completion of the *BIA* proceedings and the discharge of Deloitte Restructuring Inc. as trustee in bankruptcy of estate of the debtors.

- [20] The debtors and the proposal trustee prepared a cash flow forecast for September 25, 2015 to December 25, 2015. It shows that the debtors will require additional funds in order to see them through this process, while still carrying on business.
- [21] StormFisher Environmental Ltd. has offered to make a DIP loan of up to \$1 million to fund the projected shortfall in cash flow. In return, the DIP lender requires a charge that ranks in priority to all other claims and encumbrances, except the administration and D&O charges. The administration charge protects the reasonable fees and expenses of the debtors' professional advisors. The D&O charge is to indemnify the debtors for possible liabilities such as wages, vacation pay, source deductions and environmental remedy issues. The latter may arise in the event of a wind-down or shut down of the plant and for which existing insurance policies may be inadequate. According to Mr. Davis, the risk if such a charge is not granted is that the debtors' directors and officers might resign, thereby jeopardizing the proceedings.
- [22] The debtors have other creditors. Harvest Power Partners had arranged for an irrevocable standby letter of credit, issued by the Bank of Montreal to fund the payment that might be required to the Ministry of Environment arising from any environment clean up that might become necessary.
- [23] Searches of the *PPSA* registry disclosed the following registrations:

(a) Harvest Ontario Partners:

- (i) FCC in respect of all collateral classifications other than consumer goods. On August 12, 2015, change statement filed to reflect the assignment of FCC's Debt and Security to 2478223;
- (ii) BMO in respect of accounts.

(b) Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd.

- (i) FCC in respect of all collateral classifications other than consumer goods. On August 12, 2015, change statement filed to reflect the assignment of FCC's Debt and Security to 2478223;
- (ii) BMO in respect of accounts; and
- (iii) Roynat Inc. in respect of certain equipment.

[24] There are two registrations on title to 1087 Green Valley Road. The first is for \$11 million in favour of FCC dated February 28, 2012 and transferred to 2478223 on October 8, 2015. The second is a construction lien registered by Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership on July 2, 2015 for \$239,191. The validity and priority of the lien claim is disputed by the debtors and 2478223.

## Analysis

### a) the administrative consolidation

[25] The administration order, consolidating the debtors' notice of intention proceedings is appropriate for a variety of reasons. First, it avoids a multiplicity of proceedings, the associated costs and the need to file three sets of motion

materials. There is no substantive merger of the bankruptcy estates but rather it provides a mechanism to achieve the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination mandated by the *BIA General Rules*. The three debtors are closely aligned and share accounting, administration, human resources and financial functions. The sale process contemplates that the debtors' assets will be marketed together and form a single purchase and sale transaction. Harvest Ontario Partners and Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. have substantially the same secured creditors and obligations. Finally, no prejudice is apparent. A similar order was granted in *Re Electro Sonic Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 942 (S.C.J.).

**b) the DIP agreement and charge**

[26] S. 50.6 of the *BIA* gives the court jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge and to grant it a super priority. It provides as follows:

**50.6(1) *Interim Financing:*** On application by a debtor in respect of whom a notice of intention was filed under section 50.4 or a proposal was filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the debtor's property is subject to a security or charge – in an amount that the court considers appropriate – in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the debtor an amount approved by the court as being required by the debtor, having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement referred to in paragraph 50(b)(a) or 50.4(2)(a), as the case may be. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

**50.6(3) *Priority:*** The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor.

[27] S. 50.6(5) enumerates a list of factors to guide the court's decision whether to grant DIP financing:

**50.6(5) *Factors to be considered:*** In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

- (c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor;
- (e) the nature and value of the debtor's property
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the trustee's report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be.

[28] This case bears some similarity to *Re P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing*, 2011 ONSC 7641 (S.C.J.). The court granted the DIP charge and approved the agreement where, as here, the evidence was that the debtors would cease operations if the relief were not granted. And, as here, the DIP facility is supported by the proposal trustee. The evidence is that the DIP lender will not participate otherwise.

[29] The Court in *Wallbank* also considered any prejudice to existing creditors. While it is true that the DIP loan and charge may affect creditors to a degree, it seems to me that any prejudice is outweighed by the benefit to all stakeholders in a sale of the business as a going concern. I would have thought that the potential for creditor recovery would be enhanced rather than diminished.

[30] In *Re Comstock Canada Ltd.*, 2013 ONSC 4756 (S.C.J.), Justice Morawetz was asked to grant a super priority DIP charge in the context of a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* proceeding. He referred to the moving party's factum, which quoted from *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers*, 2013 SCC 6 as follows:

[I]t is important to remember that the purpose of CCAA proceedings is not to disadvantage creditors but rather to try to provide a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent. As my colleague, Deschamps J. observed in *Century Services*, at para. 15:

...the purpose of the CCAA... is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets.

In the same decision, at para. 59, Deschamps J. also quoted with approval the following passage from the reasons of Doherty J.A. in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57 (dissenting):

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

...

Given that there was no alternative for a going-concern solution, it is difficult to accept the Court of Appeal's sweeping intimation that the DIP lenders would have accepted that their claim ranked below claims resulting from the deemed trust. There is no evidence in the record that gives credence to this suggestion. Not only is it contradicted by the CCAA judge's findings of fact, but case after case has shown that "the priming of the DIP facility is a key aspect of the debtor's ability to attempt a workout" (J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 97). The harsh reality is that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders, not by the interests of the plan members or the policy considerations that lead provincial governments to legislate in favour of pension fund beneficiaries. The reasons given by Morawetz J. in response to the first attempt of the Executive Plan's members to reserve their rights on June 12, 2009 are instructive. He indicated that any uncertainty as to whether the lenders would withhold advances or whether they would have priority if advances were made did "not represent a positive development". He found that, in the absence of any alternative, the relief sought was "necessary and appropriate".

[Emphasis in original]

[31] I recognize that in the *Comstock* decision, the court was dealing with a CCAA proceeding. However, the comments quoted above seem quite apposite to this case. After all, the CCAA is an analogous restructuring statute to the proposal provisions of the BIA.

**c) administration charge**

[32] The authority to grant this relief is found in s. 64.2 of the *BIA*.

**64.2 (1) *Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs:*** On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) is subject to a security or charge, in an amount that the court considers appropriate, in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the trustee, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the person for the purpose of proceedings under this Division; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for the effective participation of that person in proceedings under this Division.

**64.2 (2) *Priority:*** The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the person.

[33] In this case, notice was given although it may have been short. There can be no question that the involvement of professional advisors is critical to a successful restructuring. This process is reasonably complex and their assistance is self evidently necessary to navigate to completion. The debtors have limited means to obtain this professional assistance. See also *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 514 (S.C.J.) and the discussion in it.

**d) the D & O charge**

[34] The *BIA* confers the jurisdiction to grant such a charge at s. 64.1, which provides as follows:

**64.1 (1)** On application by a person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the person is subject to a security or charge – in an amount that the court considers appropriate in favour of any director or officer of the person to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer after the filing of the notice of intention or the proposal, as the case may be.



(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the person.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the person could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional default.

[35] I am satisfied that such an order is warranted in this case for the following reasons:

- the D & O charge is available only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under existing policies or to the extent that those policies are insufficient;
- it is required only in the event that a sale is not concluded and a wind down of the facility is required;
- there is a possibility that the directors and officers whose participation in the process is critical, may not continue their involvement if the relief were not granted;
- the proposal trustee and the proposed DIP lender are supportive;

**e) the sale process and the stalking horse agreement of purchaser sale**

[36] The court's power to approve a sale of assets in the context of a proposal is set out in s. 65.13 of the *BIA*. However, the section does not speak to the approval of a sale process.

[37] In *Re Brainhunter* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 41, Justice Morawetz considered the criteria to be applied on a motion to approve a stalking horse sale process in a restructuring application under the *CCAA* and in particular s. 36, which parallels s. 65.13 of the *BIA*. He observed:

13. The use of a stalking horse bid process has become quite popular in recent CCAA filings. In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), I approved a stalking horse sale process and set out four factors (the “Nortel Criteria”) the court should consider in the exercise of its general statutory discretion to determine whether to authorize a sale process:

- (a) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) Will the sale benefit the whole “economic community”?
- (c) Do any of the debtors’ creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) Is there a better viable alternative?

14. The Nortel decision predates the recent amendments to the CCAA. This application was filed December 2, 2009 which post-dates the amendments.

15. Section 36 of the CCAA expressly permits the sale of substantially all of the debtors’ assets in the absence of a plan. It also sets out certain factors to be considered on such a sale. However, the amendments do not directly assess the factors a court should consider when deciding to approve a sale process.

16. Counsel to the Applicants submitted that a distinction should be drawn between the approval of a sales process and the approval of an actual sale in that the Nortel Criteria is engaged when considering whether to approve a sales process, while s. 36 of the CCAA is engaged when determining whether to approve a sale. Counsel also submitted that s. 36 should also be considered indirectly when applying the Nortel Criteria.

17. I agree with these submissions. There is a distinction between the approval of the sales process and the approval of a sale. Issues can arise after approval of a sales process and prior to the approval of a sale that requires a review in the context of s. 36 of the CCAA. For example, it is only on a sale approval motion that the court can consider whether there has been any unfairness in the working out of the sales process.

[38] It occurs to me that the Nortel Criteria are of assistance in circumstances such as this – namely on a motion to approve a sale process in proposal proceedings under the *BIA*.

[39] In *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies* 2012 ONSC 175 (S.C.J.) the Court was asked to approve a sales process and bidding procedures, which included the use of a stalking horse credit bid. The court reasoned as follows:

6. Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties. Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

(i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;

(ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,

(iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

7. The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings, BIA proposals, and CCAA proceedings.

[40] I am satisfied that the sale process and stalking horse agreement should be approved. It permits the sale of the debtors' business as a going concern, with obvious benefit to them and it also maintains jobs, contracts and business relationships. The stalking horse bid establishes a floor price for the debtors' assets. It does not contain any compensation to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. in the event a superior bid is received, and as a result, a superior bid necessarily benefits the debtors' stakeholders rather than the stalking horse bidder. The process seems fair and transparent and there seems no viable alternative, particularly in light of FCC's earlier lack of success. Finally, the proposal trustee supports the process and agreement.

**f) Extension of time to file a proposal**

[41] It is desirable that an extension be granted under s. 50.4 (9) of the *BIA*. It appears the debtors are acting in good faith and with due diligence. Such an extension is

necessary so the sale process can be carried out. Otherwise, the debtors would be unable to formulate a proposal to their creditors and bankruptcy would follow.

[42] For these reasons, the relief sought is granted.

*Justice H.A. Rady*  
Justice H.A. Rady

**Date:** October 28, 2015

# TAB 3

**CITATION:** Re P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing Co. Limited, 2011 ONSC 7641  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-11-0123-OTCL  
**DATE:** 20111221

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO**

**COMMERCIAL LIST**

**RE:** IN THE MATTER OF THE Proposal of P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing Co. Limited

**BEFORE:** D. M. Brown J.

**COUNSEL:** J. Fogarty and S-A. Wilson, for the Applicant  
G. Moffat, for General Motors LLC  
T. Slahta, for TCE Capital Corporation

**HEARD:** December 21, 2011

**REASONS FOR DECISION**

**I. Overview of motion for approval of DIP financing**

[1] P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing Co. Limited, a manufacturer of springs and wireforms for automotive and other industrial customers, filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* on December 12, 2011. Doyle Salewski Inc. was appointed as Proposal Trustee. Wallbank moves under section 50.6 of the *BIA* for authorization to borrow under a DIP credit facility from General Motors LLC, as well as the granting of an Interim Financing Charge against its property in favour of GM.

[2] This motion was brought on less than 24 hours notice. From the affidavits of service filed, I am satisfied that notice was given to interested parties in accordance with my directions of yesterday.

**II. The Debtor and its creditors**

[3] Since 2008 Wallbank has experienced a downturn in its business linked, in part, to a slowdown in the automotive sector and, more recently, to the loss of a major customer this past summer.

[4] Wallbank has several secured creditors. It owes Danbury Financial Services Inc. about \$720,000.00 under a credit facility. Until September, 2011, TCE Capital Corporation factored

Wallbank's accounts receivable, but stopped as a result of a default on that facility. Wallbank owes TCE approximately \$700,000.00. Both Danbury and TCE have registered financing statements against Wallbank over all classes of collateral except "consumer goods". Wallbank owes P. & B. W. Holdings Inc., the trustee of a family trust, \$724,500; the Trust has subordinated its interest in Wallbank's property to each of Danbury and TCE. Wallbank owes \$74,180.53 to three remaining secured creditors: Xerox Canada Inc., Anthony Wallbank and Edward Wallbank. All three have subordinated their security in favour of Danbury and TCE.

[5] As of the date of the NOI Wallbank owed Canada Revenue Agency \$132,467.28 for unpaid source deductions, as well as approximately \$1.22 million to unsecured creditors.

### **III. The proposed DIP Facility**

[6] Danbury has terminated its credit facility with Wallbank, and TCE has ceased factoring the company's receivables. Neither firm is prepared to advance further funds to Wallbank.

[7] Wallbank is a key supplier to GE for springs. GE has agreed to provide immediate funding to Wallbank pursuant to the terms of an Accommodation Agreement dated December 12, 2011 and a DIP Facility Term Sheet.

[8] The Accommodation Agreement offers two types of interim financing. First, GE agreed to provide Initial Financing of up to \$160,450.00 to cover professional fees and to cover Wallbank's post-filing operations until a DIP order was obtained. According to the affidavit from Mr. Anthony Wallbank, the company's President, to date GE has advanced \$193,850 under this facility.

[9] GM is also prepared to make available additional DIP Financing up to a maximum of \$500,000.00, including the amounts advanced under the Initial Financing.<sup>1</sup> Such further advances are conditional on (i) an agreement between GM and Wallbank on a budget for the company's continued operations up until February 26, 2012 and (ii) obtaining an interim financing order consistent with the terms of the Accommodation Agreement. Under the proposed Interim Financing Charge, all advances made by GM under the Accommodation Agreement would be secured by (i) a first priority charge on Wallbank's inventory and post-filing accounts receivable and (ii) a lien on Wallbank's other pre-filing assets junior only to the liens of Danbury, TCE and Xerox, but senior to any other liens.

[10] Wallbank seeks an order that the DIP Facility would be on the terms, and subject to the conditions, set forth in the Accommodation Agreement and the DIP Facility Term Sheet, subject to some amendments reflected in a revised draft order, including certain provisions TCE wished included in the order. The Accommodation Agreement contains several important terms concerning Wallbank's operations:

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<sup>1</sup> DIP Facility Term Sheet.

- (i) absent an event of default, GM agrees to refrain from re-sourcing the component parts made by Wallbank for up to 60 days;
- (ii) GM agrees to pay for post-filing orders on a “net 7 days prox” basis;
- (iii) Wallbank agrees to build an inventory of GM-ordered component parts in accordance with an inventory bank production plan to be agreed upon with GM;
- (iv) The parties have identified which tools used by Wallbank belong to GM and to other parties; and,
- (v) Wallbank agrees not to manufacture products for other Large or Medium Customers without GM’s prior consent and without those customers agreeing to abide by all or some of the terms of the Accommodation Agreement, including terms governing the time for the payment of receivables and the price of the products

[11] Under the DIP Facility Term Sheet, the Facility will:

- (i) have a term of up to 60 days, mirroring the No Resource Period agreed to by GM under the Accommodation Agreement;
- (ii) bear interest at a rate of 13%, with interest payable monthly in arrears; and,
- (iii) be repaid upon the sale of any property of Wallbank out of the ordinary course of business.

#### **IV. Analysis**

##### **A. The statutory provisions**

[12] Section 50.6 of the *BIA* provides, in part, as follows:

50.6 (1) On application by a debtor in respect of whom a notice of intention was filed under section 50.4 or a proposal was filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the debtor’s property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the debtor an amount approved by the court as being required by the debtor, having regard to the debtor’s cash-flow statement referred to in paragraph 50(6)(a) or 50.4(2)(a), as the case may be. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

...

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor.



...

(5) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor;

(e) the nature and value of the debtor's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the trustee's report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be.

## **B. Consideration of the various factors**

### **B.1 Likely duration of NOI proceedings**

[13] The evidence indicates that Wallbank likely will not be subject to NOI proceedings past the end of February, 2012. It requires the DIP Facility to continue operating, and by its terms that facility has a maximum term of 60 days from the date of filing the NOI. The cash-flow statement filed by Wallbank projects that it will have drawn fully on the DIP Facility by the middle of next February.

### **B.2 Management of Wallbank's affairs**

[14] Although current management will continue to operate Wallbank, as described above the Accommodation Agreement places significant restrictions on the company's operations. Simply put, GM wants to use the next 45 days or so to build up an inventory of needed component parts and is insisting that any other customer who wishes to order product from Wallbank must do so on the credit and pricing terms set out in the Accommodation Agreement. Those terms require very prompt payment of receivables and an agreement to pay a higher price for Wallbank's products.

[15] The materials do not disclose how many employees presently work at Wallbank. Some employees are members of the Canadian Auto Workers. The Proposal Trustee reports that a dispute currently exists whereby the CAW is not permitting Wallbank to ship product to Gates Corporation, a result of which could be a reduction by \$40,000.00 in the opening accounts receivable forecast in the cash-flow statement.

### **B.3 Enhancement of prospects of a viable proposal**

[16] According to the Proposal Trustee Wallbank is developing a restructuring plan which would involve either (i) identifying a strategic partner, (ii) restructuring its debts, or (iii) an orderly liquidation of its assets.

[17] Wallbank filed a cash-flow projection for the period ending February 26, 2012. The projection was vetted by a DIP advisor appointed by GM. The cash-flow supports Mr. Wallbank's statement that without the proposed DIP Facility the company will be unable to fund its ongoing business operations and restructuring efforts during the NOI proceedings. The Proposal Trustee concurs with that assessment:

In the event that the DIP Loan is not approved by the Court, the Company may have no choice but to immediately cease operations, and the Company's ability to make a proposal to its creditors will be severely compromised.

[18] The evidence is clear that absent approval of the DIP Facility, Wallbank will close its doors and turn off its lights.

### **B.4 Report of the Proposal Trustee**

[19] In its December 20, 2011 report the Proposal Trustee stated that it was satisfied that Wallbank is proceeding in good faith with its proposal, supported the need for interim financing, and concluded that "the benefits of granting such an Order far outweigh the prejudice to the Company, the creditors, employees and customers that these stakeholders would experience if the Order were not granted."

### **B.5 Nature and value of Wallbank's property**

[20] Although Wallbank filed evidence about its current indebtedness, it did not file any detailed historical evidence about balance sheet or profit/loss position. The current value of its assets is unclear; the evidence suggests that Wallbank has operated at a loss for at least the past two years.

### **B.6 Confidence of major creditors**

[21] According to the Proposal Trustee certain customers support Wallbank's proposal efforts: GM, Omex, Dayco, Magna Corporation, Stacktole, 3M, Bontaz and Admiral Tool.

[22] As to creditors, GM, of course, supports Wallbank's motion. The Trust has indicated that it does not oppose the order, but without prejudice to its right to move to vary the order at some later date. In light of changes made to the proposed DIP Order as a result of negotiations amongst the parties, Danbury does not oppose the order sought. Xerox was served earlier today with the motion materials, but has not communicated any position to Wallbank's counsel.

[23] TCE does not oppose the order sought, as revised, provided the order is made subject to three conditions:

- (i) The order would be without prejudice to TCE's asserted position with respect to its ownership of factored receivables;
- (ii) Wallbank, TCE and GM will agree on a process for the collection and remittance of accounts receivable; and,
- (iii) GM waives its rights of set-off relating to pre-November 30, 2011 accounts receivable purchased by TCE, save and except for Allowed Set-Offs as defined in section 2.4(B) of the Accommodation Agreement.

Both Wallbank and GM are amenable to those conditions. I accept those conditions and make them part of my order.

#### **B.7 Prejudice to creditors as a result of the Interim Financing Charge**

[24] Although, like any charge, the Interim Financing Charge will impact all creditors' positions to some degree, the terms of the charge's priority have been negotiated to minimize the prejudice to Danbury and TEC. As well, given the immediate cessation of Wallbank's activities would result from the failure to approve the DIP Facility and Interim Financing Charge, on balance the benefit to all stakeholders of the proposed DIP Facility significantly outweighs any prejudice.

[25] Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the Accommodation Agreement contemplated that both components of the Initial Financing advanced by GM – professional fees and the funding of operations – would be secured by the Interim Financing Charge. Section 50.6(1) of the *BIA* provides that a charge “may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made”. Wallbank advised that all funds made available by GM for professional fees are unspent and remain in counsel's trust account. Wallbank intends to return those funds to GM which plans, in turn, to advance similar amounts to Wallbank in the event a DIP Order is made. GM confirmed that the amounts advanced to date under section 2.1(C) of the Accommodation Agreement would not be subject to the Interim Financing Charge, but would be secured by the security described in the opening language of section 2.1 of the Accommodation Agreement. In my view the proposed treatment of the funds relating to professional fees is consistent with the intent of section 50.6(1) of the *BIA* and I approve it.

#### **B.8 Conclusion**

[26] For these reasons I am satisfied that it is appropriate to authorize Wallbank to enter into the DIP Facility agreement and to grant the proposed Interim Financing Charge. Accordingly, an order shall go in the form submitted by the applicant, which I have signed.

(original signed by)

D. M. Brown J.

**Date:** December 21, 2011

# TAB 4

**CITATION:** Timminco Limited (Re), 2012 ONSC 506  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-12-9539-00CL  
**DATE:** 20120202

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO**  
**(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT*  
*ACT*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**RE:** **IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT  
OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC., Applicants**

**BEFORE:** **MORAWETZ J.**

**COUNSEL:** **A. J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova and K. Esaw, for the Applicants**

**D.W. Ellickson, for Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of  
Canada**

**C. Sinclair, for United Steelworkers' Union**

**K. Peters, for AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV**

**M. Bailey, for Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)**

**S. Weisz, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.**

**A. Kauffman, for Investissement Quebec**

**HEARD:** **January 12, 2012**

**RELEASED:** **January 16, 2012**

**REASONS:** **February 2, 2012**

**ENDORSEMENT**

[1] This motion was heard on January 12, 2012. On January 16, 2012, the following endorsement was released:

Motion granted. Reasons will follow. Order to go subject to proviso that the Sealing Order is subject to modification, if necessary, after reasons provided.

[2] These are those reasons.

### **Background**

[3] On January 3, 2012, Timminco Limited (“Timminco”) and Bécancour Silicon Inc. (“BSI”) (collectively, the “Timminco Entities”) applied for and obtained relief under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (the “CCAA”).

[4] In my endorsement of January 3, 2012, (*Timminco Limited (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 106), I stated at [11]: “I am satisfied that the record establishes that the Timminco Entities are insolvent and are ‘debtor companies’ to which the CCAA applies”.

[5] On the initial motion, the Applicants also requested an “Administration Charge” and a “Directors’ and Officers’ Charge” (“D&O Charge”), both of which were granted.

[6] The Timminco Entities requested that the Administration Charge rank ahead of the existing security interest of Investissement Quebec (“IQ”) but behind all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise, including any deemed trust created under the *Ontario Pension Benefit Act* (the “PBA”) or the *Quebec Supplemental Pensions Plans Act* (the “QSPPA”) (collectively, the “Encumbrances”) in favour of any persons that have not been served with this application.

[7] IQ had been served and did not object to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge.

[8] At [35] of my endorsement, I noted that the Timminco Entities had indicated their intention to return to court to seek an order granting super priority ranking for both the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge ahead of the Encumbrances.

[9] The Timminco Entities now bring this motion for an order:

- (a) suspending the Timminco Entities’ obligations to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);
- (b) granting super priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge;
- (c) approving key employee retention plans (the “KERPs”) offered by the Timminco Entities to certain employees deemed critical to a successful restructuring and a charge on the current and future assets, undertakings and properties of the Timminco Entities to secure the Timminco Entities’ obligations under the KERPs (the “KERP Charge”); and
- (d) sealing the confidential supplement (the “Confidential Supplement”) to the First Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the “Monitor”).

[10] If granted, the effect of the proposed Court-ordered charges in relation to each other would be:

- first, the Administration Charge to the maximum amount of \$1 million;
- second, the KERP Charge (in the maximum amount of \$269,000); and
- third, the D&O Charge (in the maximum amount of \$400,000).

[11] The requested relief was recommended and supported by the Monitor. IQ also supported the requested relief. It was, however, opposed by the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada ("CEP"). The position put forth by counsel to CEP was supported by counsel for the United Steelworkers' Union ("USW").

[12] The motion materials were served on all personal property security registrants in Ontario and in Quebec: the members of the Pension Plan Committees for the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan; the Financial Services Commission of Ontario; the Regie de Rentes du Quebec; the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Works International Union; and La Section Locale 184 de Syndicat Canadien des Communications, De L'Energie et du Papier; and various government entities, including Ontario and Quebec environmental agencies and federal and provincial taxing authorities.

[13] Counsel to the Applicants identified the issues on the motion as follows:

- (a) Should this court grant increased priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge?
- (b) Should this court grant an order suspending the Timminco Entities' obligations to make the pension contributions with respect to the pension plans?
- (c) Should this court approve the KERPs and grant the KERPs Charge?
- (d) Should this court seal the Confidential Supplement?

[14] It was not disputed that the court has the jurisdiction and discretion to order a super priority charge in the context of a CCAA proceeding. However, counsel to CEP submits that this is an extraordinary measure, and that the onus is on the party seeking such an order to satisfy the court that such an order ought to be awarded in the circumstances.

[15] The affidavit of Peter A.M. Kalins, sworn January 5, 2012, provides information relating to the request to suspend the payment of certain pension contributions. Paragraphs 14-28 read as follows:

14. The Timminco Entities sponsor the following three pension plans (collectively, the "**Pension Plans**"):



- (a) the Retirement Pension Plan for The Haley Plant Hourly Employees of Timminco Metals, A Division of Timminco Limited (Ontario Registration Number 0589648) (the “**Haley Pension Plan**”);
- (b) the Régime de rentes pour les employés non syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 26042) (the “**Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan**”); and
- (c) the Régime de rentes pour les employés syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 32063) (the “**Bécancour Union Pension Plan**”).

#### *Haley Pension Plan*

15. The Haley Pension plan, sponsored and administered by Timminco, applies to former hourly employees at Timminco’s magnesium facility in Haley, Ontario.

16. The Haley Pension Plan was terminated effective as of August 1, 2008 and accordingly, no normal cost contributions are payable in connection with the Haley Pension Plan. As required by the Ontario *Pension Benefits Act* (the “**PBA**”), a wind-up valuation in respect of the Haley Pension Plan was filed with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“**FSCO**”) detailing the plan’s funded status as of the wind-up date, and each year thereafter. As of August 1, 2008, the Haley Pension Plan was in a deficit position on a wind-up basis of \$5,606,700. The PBA requires that the wind-up deficit be paid down in equal annual installments payable annually in advance over a period of no more than five years.

17. As of August 1, 2010, the date of the most recently filed valuation report, the Haley Pension Plan had a wind-up deficit of \$3,922,700. Contributions to the Haley Pension Plan are payable annually in advance every August 1. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011 totalling \$4,712,400 were remitted to the plan. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2011 to July 31, 2012 were estimated to be \$1,598,500 and have not been remitted to the plan.

18. According to preliminary estimates calculated by the Haley Pension Plan’s actuaries, despite Timminco having made contributions of approximately \$4,712,400 during the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011, as of August 1, 2011, the deficit remaining in the Haley Pension Plan is \$3,102,900.

#### *Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan*

19. The Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan, sponsored by BSI, is an on-going pension plan with both defined benefit (“**DB**”) and defined contribution provisions. The plan has four active members and 32 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).

20. The most recently filed actuarial valuation of the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan was \$3,239,600.

21. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to this plan totaled approximately \$9,525 per month (or 16.8% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately \$41,710 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the Québec *Supplemental Pension Plans Act* (the “**QSPPA**”) and regulations.

#### *Bécancour Union Pension Plan*

22. The BSI-sponsored Bécancour Union Pension Plan is an on-going DB pension plan with two active members and 98 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).

23. The most recently filed actuarial valuation performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan was \$7,939,500.

24. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to the plan totaled approximately \$7,083 per month (or 14.7% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately \$95,300 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the QSPPA and regulations.

25. BSI unionized employees have the option to transfer their employment to QSLP, under the form of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In the event of such transfer, their pension membership in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan will be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). Also, in the event that any BSI non-union employees transfer employment to QSLP, their pension membership in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan would be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Non-Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). I am advised by Andrea Boctor of Stikeman Elliott LLP, counsel to the Timminco Entities, and do verily believe that if all of the active members of the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan transfer their employment to QSLP, the Régie des rentes du Québec would have the authority to order that the plans be wound up.

#### *Pension Plan Deficiencies and the Timminco Entities' CCAA Proceedings*

26. The assets of the Pension Plans have been severely impacted by market volatility and decreasing long-term interest rates in recent years, resulting in increased deficiencies in the Pension Plans. As a result, the special payments payable with respect to the Haley Plan also increased. As at 2010, total annual special payments for the final three years of the wind-up of the Haley Pension Plan were \$1,598,500 for 2010, \$1,397,000 for 2011 and \$1,162,000 for 2012, payable in advance annually every August 1. By contrast, in 2011 total annual special payments to the Haley Pension Plan for the remaining two years of the wind-up increased to \$1,728,700 for each of 2011 and 2012.

#### *Suspension of Certain Pension Contributions*

27. As is evident from the Cashflow Forecast, the Timminco Entities do not have the funds necessary to make any contributions to the Pension Plans other than (a) contributions in respect of normal cost, (b) contributions to the defined contribution provision of the BSI Non-Union Pension Plan, and (c) employee contributions deducted from pay (together, the “**Normal Cost Contributions**”). Timminco currently owes approximately \$1.6 million in respect of special payments to the Haley Pension Plan. In addition, assuming the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Union Pension Plan are not terminated, as at January 31, 2012, the Timminco Entities will owe approximately \$140,000 in respect of amortization payments under those plans. If the Timminco Entities are required to make the pension contributions other than Normal Cost Contributions (the “**Pension Contributions**”), they will not have sufficient funds to continue operating and will be forced to cease operating to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

28. The Timminco Entities intend to make all normal cost contributions when due. However, management of the Timminco Entities does not anticipate an improvement in their cashflows that would permit the making of Pension Contributions with respect to the Pension Plans during these CCAA proceedings.

#### **The Position of CEP and USW**

[16] Counsel to CEP submits that the super priority charge sought by the Timminco Entities would have the effect of subordinating the rights of, *inter alia*, the pension plans, including the statutory trusts that are created pursuant to the QSPPA. In considering this matter, I have proceeded on the basis that this submission extends to the PBA as well.

[17] In order to grant a super priority charge, counsel to CEP, supported by USW, submits that the Timminco Entities must show that the application of provincial legislation “would frustrate the company’s ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy”. (See *Indalex (Re)*, 2011 ONCA 265 at para. 181.)

[18] Counsel to CEP takes the position that the evidence provided by the Timminco Entities falls short of showing the necessity of the super priority charge. Presently, counsel contends that the Applicants have not provided any plan for the purpose of restructuring the Timminco Entities and, absent a restructuring proposal, the affected creditors, including the pension plans, have no

reason to believe that their interests will be protected through the issuance of the orders being sought.

[19] Counsel to CEP takes the position that the Timminco Entities are requesting extraordinary relief without providing the necessary facts to justify same. Counsel further contends that the Timminco Entities must “wear two hats” and act both in their corporate interest and in the best interest of the pension plan and cannot simply ignore their obligations to the pension plans in favour of the corporation. (See *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at para. 129.)

[20] Counsel to CEP goes on to submit that, where the “two hats” gives rise to a conflict of interest, if a corporation favours its corporate interest rather than its obligations to its fiduciaries, there will be consequences. In *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, the court found that the corporation seeking CCAA protection had acted in a manner that revealed a conflict with the duties it owed the beneficiaries of pension plans and ordered the corporation to pay the special payments it owed the plans (See *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at paras. 140 and 207.)

[21] In this case, counsel to CEP submits that, given the lack of evidentiary support for the super priority charge, the risk of conflicting interests and the importance of the Timminco Entities’ fiduciary duties to the pension plans, the super priority charge ought not to be granted.

[22] Although counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the discretion in the context of the CCAA to make orders that override provincial legislation, such discretion must be exercised through a careful weighing of the facts before the court. Only where the applicant proves it is necessary in the context and consistent with the objects of the CCAA may a judge make an order overriding provincial legislation. (See *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, at paras. 179 and 189.)

[23] In the circumstances of this case, counsel to CEP argues that the position of any super priority charge ordered by the court should rank after the pension plans.

[24] CEP also takes the position that the Timminco Entities’ obligations to the pension plans should not be suspended. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have contractual obligations through the collective agreement and pension plan documents to make contributions to the pension plans and, as well, the Timminco Entities owe statutory duties to the beneficiaries of the pension funds pursuant to the QSPPA. Counsel further points out that s. 49 of the QSPPA provides that any contributions and accrued interest not paid into the pension fund are deemed to be held in trust for the employer.

[25] In addition, counsel takes the position that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, confirmed that, in the context of Ontario legislation, all of the contributions an employee owes a pension fund, including the special payments, are subject to the deemed trust provision of the PBA.

[26] In this case, counsel to CEP points out that the special payments the Timminco Entities seek to suspend in the amount of \$95,300 per month to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan, and of \$47,743 to the Silicium Union Pension Plan, are payments that are to be held in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plans. Thus, they argue that the Timminco Entities have a fiduciary

obligation to the beneficiaries of the pension plans to hold the funds in trust. Further, the Timminco Entities' request to suspend the special payments to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan reveals that its interests are in conflict.

[27] Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities have not pointed to a particular reason, other than generalized liquidity problems, as to why they are unable to make special payments to their pension plans.

[28] With respect to the KERPs, counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the power to approve a KERP, but the court must only do so when it is convinced that it is necessary to make such an order. In this case, counsel contends that the Timminco Entities have not presented any meaningful evidence on the propriety of the proposed KERPs. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have not named the KERPs recipients, provided any specific information regarding their involvement with the CCAA proceeding, addressed their replaceability, or set out their individual bonuses. In the circumstances, counsel submits that it would be unfair and inequitable for the court to approve the KERPs requested by the Timminco Entities.

[29] Counsel to CEP's final submission is that, in the event the KERPs are approved, they should not be sealed, but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. Alternatively, counsel to CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

### **The Position of the Timminco Entities**

[30] At the time of the initial hearing, the Timminco Entities filed evidence establishing that they were facing severe liquidity issues as a result of, among other things, a low profit margin realized on their silicon metal sales due to a high volume, long-term supply contract at below market prices, a decrease in the demand and market price for solar grade silicon, failure to recoup their capital expenditures incurred in connection with the development of their solar grade operations, and the inability to secure additional funding. The Timminco Entities also face significant pension and environmental remediation legacy costs, and financial costs related to large outstanding debts.

[31] I accepted submissions to the effect that without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations was inevitable, which the Timminco Entities submitted would be extremely detrimental to the Timminco Entities' employees, pensioners, suppliers and customers.

[32] As at December 31, 2011, the Timminco Entities' cash balance was approximately \$2.4 million. The 30-day consolidated cash flow forecast filed at the time of the CCAA application projected that the Timminco Entities would have total receipts of approximately \$5.5 million and total operating disbursements of approximately \$7.7 million for net cash outflow of approximately \$2.2 million, leaving an ending cash position as at February 3, 2012 of an estimated \$157,000.

[33] The Timminco Entities approached their existing stakeholders and third party lenders in an effort to secure a suitable debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility. The Timminco Entities

existing stakeholders, Bank of America NA, IQ, and AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV, have declined to advance any funds to the Timminco Entities at this time. In addition, two third-party lenders have apparently refused to enter into negotiations regarding the provision of a DIP Facility.<sup>1</sup>

[34] The Monitor, in its Second Report, dated January 11, 2012, extended the cash forecast through to February 17, 2012. The Second Report provides explanations for the key variances in actual receipts and disbursements as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

[35] There are some timing differences but the Monitor concludes that there are no significant changes in the underlying assumptions in the January 10, 2012 forecast as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

[36] The January 10 forecast projects that the ending cash position goes from positive to negative in mid-February.

[37] Counsel to the Applicants submits that, based on the latest cash flow forecast, the Timminco Entities currently estimate that additional funding will be required by mid-February in order to avoid an interruption in operations.

[38] The Timminco Entities submit that this is an appropriate case in which to grant super priority to the Administration Charge. Counsel submits that each of the proposed beneficiaries will play a critical role in the Timminco Entities' restructuring and it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements.

[39] Statutory Authority to grant such a charge derives from s. 11.52(1) of the CCAA. Subsection 11.52(2) contains the authority to grant super-priority to such a charge:

11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs — On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

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<sup>1</sup> In a subsequent motion relating to approval of a DIP Facility, the Timminco Entities acknowledged they had reached an agreement with a third-party lender with respect to providing DIP financing, subject to court approval. Further argument on this motion will be heard on February 6, 2012.

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) Priority — This court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

[40] Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities require the continued involvement of their directors and officers in order to pursue a successful restructuring of their business and/or finances and, due to the significant personal exposure associated with the Timminco Entities' liabilities, it is unlikely that the directors and officers will continue their services with the Timminco Entities unless the D&O Charge is granted.

[41] Statutory authority for the granting of a D&O charge on a super priority basis derives from s. 11.51 of the CCAA:

11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification — On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

(2) Priority — The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) Restriction — indemnification insurance — The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) Negligence, misconduct or fault — The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

## **Analysis**

### **(i) Administration Charge and D&O Charge**

[42] It seems apparent that the position of the unions' is in direct conflict with the Applicants' positions.

[43] The position being put forth by counsel to the CEP and USW is clearly stated and is quite understandable. However, in my view, the position of the CEP and the USW has to be considered in the context of the practical circumstances facing the Timminco Entities. The Timminco Entities are clearly insolvent and do not have sufficient reserves to address the funding requirements of the pension plans.

[44] Counsel to the Applicants submits that without the relief requested, the Timminco Entities will be deprived of the services being provided by the beneficiaries of the charges, to the company's detriment. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements. I also accept the evidence of Mr. Kalins that the role of the advisors is critical to the efforts of the Timminco Entities to restructure. To expect that the advisors will take the business risk of participating in these proceedings without the security of the charge is neither reasonable nor realistic.

[45] Likewise, I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the directors and officers will not continue their service without the D&O Charge. Again, in circumstances such as those facing the Timminco Entities, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect directors and officers to continue without the requested form of protection.

[46] It logically follows, in my view, that without the assistance of the advisors, and in the anticipated void caused by the lack of a governance structure, the Timminco Entities will be directionless and unable to effectively proceed with any type or form of restructuring under the CCAA.

[47] The Applicants argue that the CCAA overrides any conflicting requirements of the QSPPA and the BPA.

[48] Counsel submits that the general paramountcy of the CCAA over provincial legislation was confirmed in *ATB Financial v. Metcalf & Mansfield Alternative Investment II Corp.*, (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 104. In addition, in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of paramountcy applies either where a provincial and a federal statutory position are in conflict and cannot both be complied with, or where complying with the provincial law will have the effect of frustrating the purpose of the federal law and therefore the intent of Parliament. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 23 (Ont. C.A.).

[49] It has long been stated that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors, with the purpose of allowing the business to continue. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in *Stelco Inc., (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5, at para. 36:



In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme...

[50] Further, as I indicated in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), this purpose continues to exist regardless of whether a company is actually restructuring or is continuing operations during a sales process in order to maintain maximum value and achieve the highest price for the benefit of all stakeholders. Based on this reasoning, the fact that Timminco has not provided any plan for restructuring at this time does not change the analysis.

[51] The Court of Appeal in *Indalex Ltd. (Re)* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 19 (Ont. C.A.) confirmed the CCAA court's ability to override conflicting provisions of provincial statutes where the application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. The Court stated, *inter alia*, as follows (beginning at paragraph 176):

The CCAA court has the authority to grant a super-priority charge to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings. I fully accept that the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation, including the PBA. ...

...

What of the contention that recognition of the deemed trust will cause DIP lenders to be unwilling to advance funds in CCAA proceedings? It is important to recognize that the conclusion I have reached does not mean that a finding of paramountcy will never be made. That determination must be made on a case by case basis. There may well be situations in which paramountcy is invoked and the record satisfies the CCAA judge that application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy.

[52] The Timminco Entities seek approval to suspend Special Payments in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to continue operations for the benefit of all stakeholders, including employees and pensioners. It is clear that based on the January 2 forecast, as modified by the Second Report, the Timminco Entities have insufficient liquidity to make the Special Payments at this time.

[53] Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA granting, in the present case, super priority over the Encumbrances for the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge, even if such an order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

[54] Further, the Timminco Entities submit that the doctrine of paramountcy is properly invoked in this case and that the court should order that the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge have super priority over the Encumbrances in order to ensure the continued participation of the beneficiaries of these charges in the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings.

[55] The Timminco Entities also submit that payment of the pension contributions should be suspended. These special (or amortization) payments are required to be made to liquidate a going concern or solvency deficiency in a pension plan as identified in the most recent funding valuation report for the plan that is filed with the applicable pension regulatory authority. The requirement for the employer to make such payments is provided for under applicable provincial pension minimum standards legislation.

[56] The courts have characterized special (or amortization) payments as pre-filing obligations which are stayed upon an initial order being granted under the CCAA. (See *AbitibiBowater Inc., (Re)* (2009) 57 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 285 (Q.S.C.); *Collins & Aikman Automotive Canada Inc.* (2007), 37 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 282 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Fraser Papers Inc. (Re)* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 217 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[57] I accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that courts in Ontario and Quebec have addressed the issue of suspending special (or amortization) payments in the context of a CCAA restructuring and have ordered the suspension of such payments where the failure to stay the obligation would jeopardize the business of the debtor company and the company's ability to restructure.

[58] The Timminco Entities also submit that there should be no director or officer liability incurred as a result of a court-ordered suspension of payment of pension contributions. Counsel references *Fraser Papers*, where Pepall J. stated:

Given that I am ordering that the special payments need not be made during the stay period pending further order of the Court, the Applicants and the officers and directors should not have any liability for failure to pay them in that same period. The latter should be encouraged to remain during the CCAA process so as to govern and assist with the restructuring effort and should be provided with protection without the need to have recourse to the Director's Charge.

[59] Importantly, *Fraser Papers* also notes that there is no priority for special payments in bankruptcy. In my view, it follows that the employees and former employees are not prejudiced by the relief requested since the likely outcome should these proceedings fail is bankruptcy, which would not produce a better result for them. Thus, the "two hats" doctrine from *Indalex (Re)*, *supra*, discussed earlier in these reasons at [20], would not be infringed by the relief requested. Because it would avoid bankruptcy, to the benefit of both the Timminco Entities and beneficiaries of the pension plans, the relief requested would not favour the interests of the corporate entity over its obligations to its fiduciaries.

[60] Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA

suspending the payment of the pension contributions, even if such order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

[61] The evidence has established that the Timminco Entities are in a severe liquidity crisis and, if required to make the pension contributions, will not have sufficient funds to continue operating. The Timminco Entities would then be forced to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

[62] On the facts before me, I am satisfied that the application of the QSPPA and the PBA would frustrate the Timminco Entities ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. Indeed, while the Timminco Entities continue to make Normal Cost Contributions to the pension plans, requiring them to pay what they owe in respect of special and amortization payments for those plans would deprive them of sufficient funds to continue operating, forcing them to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

[63] In my view, this is exactly the kind of result the CCAA is intended to avoid. Where the facts demonstrate that ordering a company to make special payments in accordance with provincial legislation would have the effect of forcing the company into bankruptcy, it seems to me that to make such an order would frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of the CCAA. In such circumstances, therefore, the doctrine of paramountcy is properly invoked, and an order suspending the requirement to make special payments is appropriate (see *ATB Financial and Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*).

[64] In my view, the circumstances are such that the position put forth by the Timminco Entities must prevail. I am satisfied that bankruptcy is not the answer and that, in order to ensure that the purpose and objective of the CCAA can be fulfilled, it is necessary to invoke the doctrine of paramountcy such that the provisions of the CCAA override those of QSPPA and the PBA.

[65] There is a clear inter-relationship between the granting of the Administration Charge, the granting of the D&O Charge and extension of protection for the directors and officers for the company's failure to pay the pension contributions.

[66] In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue CCAA proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the CCAA proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

[67] If bankruptcy results, the outcome for employees and pensioners is certain. This alternative will not provide a better result for the employees and pensioners. The lack of a desirable alternative to the relief requested only serves to strengthen my view that the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated if the relief requested was not granted.

[68] For these reasons, I have determined that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant super priority to both the Administrative Charge and D&O Charge.

[69] I have also concluded that it is both necessary and appropriate to suspend the Timminco Entities' obligations to make pension contributions with respect to the Pension Plans. In my view, this determination is necessary to allow the Timminco Entities to restructure or sell the business as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

[70] I am also satisfied that, in order to encourage the officers and directors to remain during the CCAA proceedings, an order should be granted relieving them from any liability for the Timminco Entities' failure to make pension contributions during the CCAA proceedings. At this point in the restructuring, the participation of its officers and directors is of vital importance to the Timminco Entities.

(ii) **The KERPs**

[71] Turning now to the issue of the employee retention plans (KERPs), the Timminco Entities seek an order approving the KERPs offered to certain employees who are considered critical to successful proceedings under the CCAA.

[72] In this case, the KERPs have been approved by the board of directors of Timminco. The record indicates that in the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer and the Special Committee of the Board, all of the KERPs participants are critical to the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings as they are experienced employees who have played central roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date and will play critical roles in the steps taken in the future. The total amount of the KERPs in question is \$269,000. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings where the retention of certain employees has been deemed critical to a successful restructuring. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009) O.J. No. 1044 (S.C.J.), *Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re)*, (2009) 57 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 128 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Commercial List], and *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, (2009) 59 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 72 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[73] In *Grant Forest Products*, Newbould J. noted that the business judgment of the board of directors of the debtor company and the monitor should rarely be ignored when it comes to approving a KERP charge.

[74] The Monitor also supports the approval of the KERPs and, following review of several court-approved retention plans in CCAA proceedings, is satisfied that the KERPs are consistent with the current practice for retention plans in the context of a CCAA proceeding and that the quantum of the proposed payments under the KERPs are reasonable in the circumstances.

[75] I accept the submissions of counsel to the Timminco Entities. I am satisfied that it is necessary, in these circumstances, that the KERPs participants be incentivized to remain in their current positions during the CCAA process. In my view, the continued participation of these experienced and necessary employees will assist the company in its objectives during its restructuring process. If these employees were not to remain with the company, it would be

necessary to replace them. It is reasonable to conclude that the replacement of such employees would not provide any substantial economic benefits to the company. The KERPs are approved.

[76] The Timminco Entities have also requested that the court seal the Confidential Supplement which contains copies of the unredacted KERPs, taking the position that the KERPs contain sensitive personal compensation information and that the disclosure of such information would compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and harm the KERPs participants. Further, the KERPs participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and salary information will be kept confidential. Counsel relies on *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 at para. 53 where Iacobucci J. adopted the following test to determine when a sealing order should be made:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh the deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[77] CEP argues that the CCAA process should be open and transparent to the greatest extent possible and that the KERPs should not be sealed but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. In the alternative, counsel to the CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

[78] In my view, at this point in time in the restructuring process, the disclosure of this personal information could compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and cause harm to the KERP participants. It is both necessary and important for the parties to focus on the restructuring efforts at hand rather than to get, in my view, potentially side-tracked on this issue. In my view, the Confidential Supplement should be and is ordered sealed with the proviso that this issue can be revisited in 45 days.

### **Disposition**

[79] In the result, the motion is granted. An order shall issue:

- (a) suspending the Timminco Entities' obligation to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);
- (b) granting super priority to the Administrative Charge and the D&O Charge;
- (c) approving the KERPs and the grant of the KERP Charge;

(d) authorizing the sealing of the Confidential Supplement to the First Report of the Monitor.

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MORAWETZ J.

**Date:** February 2, 2012

**IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF XAGENIC INC., OF THE CITY OF TORONTO, IN THE PROVINCE OF  
ONTARIO**

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**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)  
PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT TORONTO**

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**FACTUM OF XAGENIC INC.**

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