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1 Individual differences in the acceptance
 2 of stereotyping ☆

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8 **Abstract**

9 Previous research has documented individual differences in a range of constructs relating to social
 10 stereotyping, prejudice, and intergroup attitudes. However, research has not sought specifically to
 11 measure a general acceptance of social stereotyping. In the present research, we explored attitudinal,
 12 cognitive, emotional, and personality correlates of a person's self-reported willingness to rely on ste-
 13 reotypical information when interacting with people of different social and cultural groups. In six
 14 studies ($N = 1080$) we found that more acceptance of stereotyping was associated with more explicit
 15 and implicit stereotyping of particular groups, less liberal gender-role values, more authoritarian atti-
 16 tudes, preference for hierarchies, higher social dominance orientation, less universal outlook, less
 17 complexity in describing others' emotions, less utilization of emotional information, and more utili-
 18 zation of social categories (gender and race) when rating the similarity of faces, less agreeable and
 19 more agentic personality, and more rigid and simplistic cognitive style (all independent of one's gen-
 20 der). Female and African-American participants were less accepting of stereotyping than male and

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21 Caucasian participants. The general tendency to accept stereotyping in daily life is a measurable indi-
22 vidual difference that may prove useful in social-personality research.

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25 Intergroup perception

26 1. Introduction

27 Many people would agree that because stereotypes about social groups may be inaccur-
28 rate and negative, relying on them in daily life may be inappropriate. However, even the
29 most liberal-minded people engage in stereotypical thinking, probably far more often than
30 they would like to admit. In daily life, we often feel that knowing something about another
31 person's social and cultural group memberships helps us to interact with that person, and
32 the lack of such knowledge can produce uncertainty about how to behave and undermine
33 our feeling that we know the other person. Furthermore, uncertainty about others' group
34 memberships (whether these relate to gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, social class, reli-
35 gion, political party, social clique, etc.) can make a person anxious about making social
36 gaffes.

37 Stereotype application may also seem to have a certain functionality to it, insofar as a
38 simplifying assumption is at least a starting point from which to plan behavior toward
39 another person. From the perspective of the person who has to make behavioral choices,
40 using stereotypes—that is, making assumptions about members of social and cultural
41 groups—may seem like a useful, sensible, and adaptive thing to do, and such a person
42 might, as a consequence, feel a strong need to know about others' social and cultural mem-
43 berships as a guide for his or her own behavior. On the other hand, another person may be
44 highly doubtful of the utility or validity of stereotypes and be more willing to build knowl-
45 edge of others from the ground up. Thus, any attempt to assess the extent to which stereo-
46 typing occurs must consider the issue of individual differences in stereotyping.

47 In the present research, we were interested in individual variation in the tendency to
48 accept stereotyping in daily life. Acceptance of stereotyping as a general tendency not
49 aimed at any particular group is an individual difference that could have considerable rele-
50 vance for research on personality and social behavior. Acceptance of stereotyping as a gen-
51 eral trait has been central to much theorizing (e.g., Allport, 1954), and there are numerous
52 measures of stereotype application and prejudice (e.g., Brigham, 1993; Glick & Fiske, 1996)
53 or willingness to show prejudices toward specific groups (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant &
54 Devine, 1998). Research also exists on personality types (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981) and other
55 individual difference variables associated with stereotyping (e.g., Moskowitz, 1993). How-
56 ever, no research that we have found has examined the extent to which individuals explic-
57 itly report their general willingness to use stereotypical information in the course of daily
58 life. Evidence does exist, however, to suggest that this might be a general trait among
59 adults, as indicated by positive correlations among prejudices towards several different
60 social groups (Bierly, 1985).

61 Stereotyping has been defined in numerous ways throughout the history of research
62 conducted on the topic (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). Thus, it is important to be clear
63 that in the current investigation we define acceptance of stereotyping as the belief that

64 social and cultural group differences exist, comfort with thinking about groups in abstract
65 terms, willingness to use information about group memberships in conducting interper-
66 sonal relations, and the belief that stereotypes are useful, essential, and relatively harmless
67 in daily life.

68 *1.1. Overview of present research and predictions*

69 Because no measure existed that captures the general tendency to accept stereotyping,
70 we developed one and administered it in six studies of college students along with other
71 measures that fell into five general categories: stereotyping and prejudice, social/interper-
72 sonal attitudes, cognitive style, emotion-related measures, and personality. In addition, the
73 participants' gender and ethnicity were measured. Following is a brief description of each
74 of these categories of measures and the predicted relationships with acceptance of stereo-
75 typing.

76 Members of social/cultural groups who have been the target of negative stereotypes and
77 prejudice have been found to be less likely to express prejudice or discrimination (Alte-
78 meyer, 1998; Whitley, 1999). Similarly, women have been shown to have less negative or
79 stereotypic attitudes toward women than men do (Bierly, 1985; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Swim,
80 Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) and less prejudice than men towards homosexuals, African
81 Americans, old people, Jews, and Catholics (Allport & Kramer, 1946; Bierly, 1985; Carter,
82 1948). We predicted that African Americans and women would score relatively low on
83 acceptance of stereotyping.

84 General willingness to endorse use of stereotypical information in making judgments
85 about others implies the tendency to think stereotypically about specific groups, specifi-
86 cally African Americans and women in the present research. Regarding racial attitudes, we
87 predicted that more acceptance of stereotyping would be associated with more negative
88 attitudes measured both explicitly (measured with paper-and-pencil scales) and implicitly
89 (measured with reaction times). Regarding sexist attitudes, we predicted that more accep-
90 tance of stereotyping would be associated with both negative and positive (idealizing)
91 forms of stereotyping, and also less liberal (i.e., favorable to women) gender-role values.

92 Acceptance of stereotyping was also predicted to be related to social/interpersonal atti-
93 tudes. We predicted that more acceptance of stereotyping would occur in people who believe
94 there should be hierarchies between social/cultural groups and among individuals, and who
95 endorse more authoritarian values, because such beliefs and values reflect the conviction that
96 group differences are real and important and also because stereotypes can be used in the ser-
97 vice of reinforcing social hierarchies (Moskowitz, 1993). We predicted that people scoring
98 higher on acceptance of stereotyping would have less trust in others and profess less faith in
99 the (positive) universalism of human nature, consistent with the possibility that holding many
100 stereotypes may reflect a generally misanthropic outlook. People scoring high on acceptance
101 of stereotyping were also expected to see personality as fixed rather than malleable, consistent
102 with the reasoning of Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck (1998) regarding the relation of entity
103 thinking to the endorsement of specific group stereotypes. Levy et al. proposed that an entity
104 approach to personality reflects the belief that individual traits are fixed, useful, and predic-
105 tive, just as the acceptance of stereotyping suggests similar beliefs about groups. Finally, we
106 predicted that people highly accepting of stereotyping would view their own outcomes as
107 more controlled by powerful other people, consistent with both the hierarchical and some-
108 what suspicious outlook hypothesized earlier.

109 Variables relating to cognitive style were also examined. People differ in how much they
110 prefer quick, simplistic ways of thought and rigid, structured rules for living. Stereotypes
111 have traditionally been defined as simplistic overgeneralizations (Lee et al., 1995), and
112 there is indeed evidence that a person with a rigid or simplistic way of thinking would also
113 be prone to use stereotypes (Fiske, 1998; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O'Brien, 1995; Web-
114 ster & Kruglanski, 1994). Therefore, it was expected that acceptance of stereotyping would
115 have a positive relationship with a cognitive processing style that is more simplistic (i.e.,
116 less elaborative) or categorical in nature. Another cognitive style variable we included was
117 the need to evaluate, an individual difference variable that Jarvis and Petty (1996) pre-
118 dicted might be related to stereotyping.

119 Another category of predicted correlates relates to attending to the emotional qualities of
120 people and objects. Because paying attention to others' emotions requires one to attend to
121 transient states in others, such attention runs logically counter to the notion that others are
122 homogeneous members of their category. Thus, attending to individuals' emotions can be
123 seen as intrinsically individuating and antithetical to the notion of stereotyping. Consistent
124 with this, it has been found that individuating outgroup members reduces outgroup bias (e.g.,
125 Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999). It has also been suggested that one way to denigrate out-
126 groups may be to deny that they experience subtle emotions (Leyens et al., 2000). We there-
127 fore speculated that there may be an inverse relation between acceptance of stereotyping and
128 several variables suggestive of an interest in others' emotions. We administered a behavioral
129 (not self-report) measure of how much a person used emotion (versus race and gender) as a
130 grouping dimension when rating the similarity of pairs of faces. We also administered ques-
131 tionnaire-based instruments that assessed how complexly a person described others' imag-
132 ined feelings and how much a person reported being able to get others to "open up" in
133 conversation (where "opening up" implies emotional disclosure). We also measured how
134 much participants projected emotion into interpretations of abstract drawings. If the pro-
135 posed reluctance of people high in acceptance of stereotyping to deal with emotions is a gen-
136 eral trait, we would predict a negative relation with this variable, but if their reluctance
137 pertains to people as targets (not abstract line drawings), then we would predict no relation.

138 Finally, to gain further insight into the personalities of people low versus high on accep-
139 tance of stereotyping, the Big-Five traits of extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, conscien-
140 tiousness, and openness to experience were measured, as well as self-esteem, agency, and
141 communion. No specific predictions were made regarding these personality variables. How-
142 ever, among men, traditional masculinity was associated with more negative attitudes about
143 race and gender equality in the research of Wade (2001) and Wade and Brittan-Powell (2001),
144 suggesting that an association might emerge between agency and acceptance of stereotyping.

145 Because the basic methodology and some of the instruments were the same across stud-
146 ies, we describe all methodology in one section rather than present each study separately,
147 and we group the studies' results together thematically. When the same measures were used
148 in more than one study, we report meta-analytic summaries (Rosenthal, 1991).

149 2. Method

150 2.1. Participants

151 Participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes at Northeastern Uni-
152 versity and received credit toward their course requirements. Sample sizes were: Study 1,

Table 1

Items on the acceptance of stereotyping questionnaire

1	Sometimes when I meet new people, I can predict their behavior or attitudes just from knowing what social/cultural groups they belong to
2	In daily life, there's so much to pay attention to, it helps if you can make a few assumptions about a person
3	When interacting with others it's very important to have a sense of what social/cultural groups they belong to
4	Stereotypes can be harmful but they are essential for interacting with members of real groups
5	People differ so much from one another, it is impossible to generalize about them (R)
6	You cannot get through life without generalizing about people, even though such generalizations may be overstated
7	It's impossible to know how a person will behave from knowing what social/cultural groups the person belongs to (R)
8	If you hold a stereotype about people you'll never be able to see them for who they really are (R)
9	Stereotypes have too much influence on our behavior toward others (R)
10	To hold a stereotype does not necessarily mean that you are looking down on someone
11	If we did not stereotype each other, there would be a lot less conflict in the world (R)
12	Stereotypes are useful in daily life even though they are not always correct

Note. R, item reversed in scoring.

153 $N = 205$, 49% male; Study 2, $N = 229$, 45% male; Study 3, $N = 424$, 48% male based on the
 154 414 who reported gender; Study 4, $N = 95$, 36% male of the 72 who were asked for their
 155 gender (by oversight, 23 participants were not asked about gender); Study 5, $N = 62$, 44%
 156 male; and Study 6, $N = 67$, 43% male.

157 In Studies 1, 2, and 4, no demographic data other than gender were collected. Data on
 158 ethnicity were gathered for 311 of the participants in Study 3, with the percentages being
 159 76% Caucasian, 6% African-American, 7% Asian, 3% Hispanic, and 8% "Other." Ethnicities
 160 in Study 5 were: 70% Caucasian, 13% African American, 3% Asian, 5% Hispanic, and
 161 9% "Other." In Study 6, participation was limited to Caucasian students (for unrelated
 162 research purposes).

163 2.2. Measures

164 Cronbach's α coefficients are based on the present studies.

165 2.2.1. Acceptance of stereotyping

166 To measure this construct, 20 items were developed and administered in Studies 1–3. In
 167 these three studies, the same 12 items occurred among the highest-loading 13 items on the
 168 first unrotated factor in principal components analyses. Further analysis revealed that
 169 shortening the scale to these 12 items (shown in Table 1) did not compromise internal con-
 170 sistency or the correlations with other scales. This 12-item scale, which we call the Accep-
 171 tance of Stereotyping Scale, was the basis for all analyses in the six studies reported here.⁴
 172 In Studies 1–5, items were responded to on a 6-point scale going from 0 (strongly disagree),
 173 1 (moderately disagree), 2 (slightly disagree), 3 (slightly agree), 4 (moderately agree), to 5

⁴ Some results for the preliminary 20-item version of the Acceptance of Stereotyping Scale were previously reported for Studies 1 and 2 (Hall & Carter, 1999). In the present article, we re-analyzed these two studies using the final 12-item version of the scale.

174 (strongly agree). In Study 6, the scale had 7 points going from strongly disagree to strongly
 175 agree. The scale is scored by averaging the items, after appropriate reversals, so that higher
 176 scores indicate greater acceptance of stereotyping.

177 Descriptive statistics for the six studies are given in Table 2. (The mean and variance for
 178 Study 6 are larger than in the other studies because it used the 7-point rather than 6-point
 179 scale.) Overall, levels of acceptance of stereotyping were not high, as the means corre-
 180 sponded roughly to “slightly disagree” on the scale. This may reflect the normative values
 181 present on an urban college campus. Cronbach’s α was good and very similar in all six
 182 studies (mean $\alpha = .78$). An additional group of 24 students was recruited to assess retest
 183 reliability. These students filled in the scale in the laboratory and then agreed to do an
 184 additional questionnaire over email in two weeks; students were not told that the second
 185 questionnaire would be the same one again. The retest correlation was $r = .70, p < .001$.

186 Examination of the structure of the 12 items was made with both exploratory and con-
 187 firmatory methods. In Studies 1–3, principal components analysis with varimax rotation
 188 was conducted separately for each study with nearly identical results. There was a strong
 189 first rotated factor (accounting for 54, 60, and 57 per cent of the total variance in Studies 1–
 190 3, respectively), as well as two additional, weaker factors (accounting for between 17 and
 191 26 per cent of the variance). Studies 4–6 were used for cross-validation. Principal compo-
 192 nents analysis replicated this same structure, and confirmatory factor analysis yielded an
 193 acceptable fit to the 3-factor model. Items on the first factor were concerned with the utility
 194 of knowing about others’ group memberships, with none of these items using the term
 195 “stereotype” (items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7); three of the four items on the second factor used the
 196 term “stereotype” and the content included the necessity and/or utility of generalizing
 197 about groups as well as a moral defense (stereotyping does not mean you are looking down
 198 on someone) (items 4, 6, 10, and 12); and the third factor’s three items all used the term
 199 “stereotype” and all represented blanket condemnation (all reversed items) (items 8, 9, and
 200 11). Thus, the three factors, though replicable, were not clearly different conceptually. This,
 201 plus the good internal consistency and retest reliability obtained with all 12 items and the
 202 fact that in the confirmatory factor analysis the three-factor model did not fit significantly
 203 better than the one-factor model, led us to use the full 12-item instrument in all subsequent
 204 analyses.

205 2.2.2. Gender-related attitudes

206 The 11-item *Benevolent Sexism Scale* (Glick & Fiske, 1996) was used in Studies 1–3 to
 207 measure the tendency to idealize and therefore positively stereotype women (mean $\alpha = .72$).

Table 2
 Descriptive statistics for the acceptance of stereotyping questionnaire

Study	Total N	Means (SD)			Cronbach’s α
		All	Men	Women	
1	205	2.00 (.75)	2.19 (.72)	1.81 (.73)	.76
2	229	2.07 (.77)	2.26 (.74)	1.92 (.76)	.80
3	424	2.02 (.70)	2.20 (.68)	1.85 (.68)	.76
4	95	2.03 (.79)	2.30 (.84)	1.86 (.73)	.79
5	62	2.16 (.76)	2.43 (.79)	1.94 (.67)	.77
6	67	3.40 (.94)	3.74 (.90)	3.15 (.90)	.80

Note. Higher scores indicate more acceptance of stereotyping.

208 The 11-item *Hostile Sexism Scale* (Glick & Fiske, 1996), which measures the tendency to
209 stereotype women in traditionally negative ways such as having less social status and being
210 incompetent in leadership roles, was given in Study 3 ($\alpha = .78$). In Study 3, we administered
211 the 8-item *Modern Sexism Scale* to measure the denial of discrimination, antagonism
212 toward women's demands, and lack of support for women's causes (Swim et al., 1995;
213 $\alpha = .77$) and the 10-item *Traditional Gender-Role Values Scale* (Peplau, 1976; $\alpha = .81$) to
214 measure the extent to which traditional gender-role attitudes are endorsed.

215 2.2.3. Racial attitudes

216 In Study 3 we gave the 7-item *Modern Racism Scale*, which measures the extent to which
217 subtle racist attitudes are endorsed that may not appear blatantly prejudicial, but do in fact
218 support discriminatory treatment toward African-Americans (McConahay, 1986; $\alpha = .77$).
219 In Study 6, we administered the 20-item *Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale* (Brigham, 1993),
220 which that asks questions explicitly about participants' attitudes towards Blacks ($\alpha = .88$),
221 and we administered the Black-White racial attitudes *Implicit Association Task* (Race-IAT;
222 Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). This instrument measures participants' reaction time
223 of categorizing faces (of Blacks and Whites) and words (positive and negative words) into
224 "Black-Bad" versus "White-Good" categories relative to their ability to categorize these
225 stimuli into "Black-Good" versus "White-Bad" categories. The extent to which partici-
226 pants make the former categorization more quickly than the latter categorization is indica-
227 tive of a stronger association between the concepts of "Black" and "Bad."

228 2.2.4. Social-interpersonal attitudes

229 The 14-item *Social Dominance Orientation Scale* was used in Studies 1–2 to measure the
230 belief that some groups are superior to, and deserve to dominate, others (Pratto, Sidanius,
231 Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; mean $\alpha = .82$). The 20-item *Universalism Scale* was used in Stud-
232 ies 1–2 to measure the belief that human beings are all basically similar in nature and value,
233 implying a resistance to stereotyping (Phillips & Ziller, 1997; mean $\alpha = .64$). On the original
234 scale, higher values indicated more universalistic values; however, we reverse-scored the
235 scale to make its polarity match the other stereotyping measures. In Study 3, we gave the
236 24-item *Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale* to measure the tendency to believe that laws
237 and individuals in positions of power should be respected and obeyed (Altemeyer, 1981;
238 $\alpha = .77$) and the 8-item *Implicit Theories Measure* to measure the degree to which human
239 behavior is perceived to be fixed or malleable (Levy and Dweck, 1997, as cited in Levy
240 et al., 1998; $\alpha = .87$). In Study 4, we used the 8-item *Interpersonal Hierarchy Expectation*
241 *Scale* to measure the expectation for hierarchy in interpersonal interaction (Schmid Mast,
242 2005; $\alpha = .74$), the 5-item *Faith in People Scale* to measure professed trust in other people
243 (Rosenberg, 1957; $\alpha = .59$) (on this scale, we reversed the polarity of the scores to be consis-
244 tent with the other measures, making high scores indicative of less trust in others), and
245 Levenson's (1974) 8-item *Powerful Others Scale* to measure the belief that other people
246 control one's outcomes ($\alpha = .71$).

247 2.2.5. Cognitive style measures

248 The 18-item *Need for Cognition Scale* was used in Studies 1–2 to measure liking for
249 intellectual stimulation and cognitive novelty (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; mean $\alpha = .86$). On
250 the original scale, higher values indicated higher need for cognition; however, in the pres-
251 ent research the scale was reversed to be consistent with the other cognitive style measures.

252 The 12-item *Personal Need for Structure Scale* was used in Studies 1, 2, and 4 to measure
253 the desire for predictable and rigid life routines and the avoidance of novelty (Thompson
254 et al., 1989, cited in Neuberger, Judice, & West, 1997; mean $\alpha = .74$). The 16-item *Need to*
255 *Evaluate Scale* was used in Study 3 to measure the tendency to engage in quick evaluation
256 of social stimuli (Jarvis & Petty, 1996; $\alpha = .80$).

257 2.2.6. Emotion-related measures

258 In Study 5, we used a behavioral measure of categorization preference that we devel-
259 oped in our laboratory. This task, called the *Similarity Rating Task*, is an ipsatively scored
260 measure of individual preference for using gender, race (Japanese vs. Caucasian), and emo-
261 tion (happy vs. sad expression) as categorization principles when rating the similarity of
262 pairs of faces (Carney, Hall, & Carmichael, 2005; see also Fazio & Dunton, 1997). Eight
263 photographs of adult faces varying on the dimensions of emotional expression (happy and
264 sad), gender (female and male), and race (Caucasian and Japanese) were randomly selected
265 from the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion slides (JACFEE; Mat-
266 sumoto & Ekman, 1988). All nonredundant pairings of the eight faces were made to pro-
267 duce a set of 28 face pairs. The face pairs were shown in a random order in a booklet and
268 participants were asked to rate each face pair from 1 (*not similar at all*) to 9 (*extremely sim-
269 ilar*). Each participant's use of emotion, race, and gender in making the similarity ratings
270 was calculated using INDSCAL (Carroll & Chang, 1970), and the importance placed on
271 each was expressed ipsatively as a ratio where a higher number represented more emphasis
272 on each category relative to the other two.

273 In Study 5, we also used the 10-item *Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale*, which mea-
274 sures the complexity of one's descriptions of others' imagined emotional experiences
275 (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990; $\alpha = .66$); the 32-item *Physiognomic Cue*
276 *Test*, which measures the tendency to attribute emotional meaning to abstract drawings
277 (Stein, 1983; $\alpha = .84$); and the 10-item *Opener Scale*, which measures the extent to which
278 one can elicit self-disclosure from another person (Miller, Berg, & Archer, 1983; $\alpha = .86$).

279 2.2.7. Other personality variables

280 Rosenberg's 10-item *Self-Esteem Scale* (Rosenberg, 1965) was used in Study 4 ($\alpha = .87$).
281 In Study 5, we administered the 44-item *Big Five Inventory* to assess extraversion ($\alpha = .83$),
282 agreeableness ($\alpha = .77$), conscientiousness ($\alpha = .72$), neuroticism ($\alpha = .76$), and openness
283 ($\alpha = .79$) (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), and the long form of the *Personal Attributes*
284 *Questionnaire* to measure masculinity (agency) and femininity (communion) on separate
285 scales (Spence & Helmreich, 1978; α s = .68 and .80, respectively).

286 2.2.8. Socially desirable responding

287 To assess relations with socially desirable responding, we administered the *Marlowe–
288 Crowne Social Desirability Scale* (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) in Study 3. In Study
289 5, we administered the *Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding* (Paulhus, 1984, 1998),
290 which has two subscales, Impression Management and Self-Deceptive Enhancement.

291 2.3. Procedure

292 In Studies 1–5, the Acceptance of Stereotyping Questionnaire was administered to par-
293 ticipants in small groups, in a packet of individual-difference measures that were

294 counterbalanced in their order. In Study 5, some instruments were administered to all partic-
295 ipants and others were counterbalanced across participants in the knowledge that not all
296 participants could complete all instruments in the experimental hour; therefore, sample
297 sizes varied across instruments. In Study 6, participants were run individually, with the
298 Acceptance of Stereotyping Questionnaire included in a packet of other measures.

299 Statistical tests are two-tailed unless stated otherwise.

300 3. Results

301 3.1. Gender differences

302 Men were significantly more accepting of stereotyping than women in all six studies
303 (Table 3). In the table, the difference is expressed as the point-biserial correlation between
304 gender and acceptance of stereotyping, which shows the magnitude of effect along with the
305 same p value that a t test between males and females would have (the male and female
306 means are shown in Table 2). Across the six studies, a meta-analytic summary (Rosenthal,
307 1991) found an unweighted mean correlation of .26, a weighted (by sample size) mean cor-
308 relation of .24, and a combined Z (Stouffer method; Rosenthal, 1991) of 7.72, $p < .001$.
309 Thus, the gender difference was of moderate magnitude, very consistent, and highly signifi-
310 cant statistically. All subsequent correlations shown in Table 3 controlled for gender using
311 partial correlation.

312 3.2. Ethnic group differences

313 In Study 3 (the only study large enough for such a comparison), acceptance of stereo-
314 typing was compared between African American ($n = 20$), Asian American ($n = 22$), and
315 Caucasian ($n = 235$) participants (other ethnic groups were too small to include). The over-
316 all effect for ethnicity was $F(2, 274) = 2.85$, $p = .059$ (M African American = 1.63, M Asian
317 American = 2.03, and M Caucasian = 2.03). Focused comparisons showed that African
318 Americans were less accepting of stereotyping than Caucasians, $t(253) = 2.38$, $p < .05$.

319 3.3. Gender-related attitudes

320 As shown in Table 3, people who were more accepting of stereotyping had significantly
321 more benevolent sexist attitudes toward women (Studies 1–3), with a meta-analytic sum-
322 mary showing an unweighted mean correlation of .19, a weighted (by sample size) mean
323 correlation of .19, and a combined Z of 5.28, $p < .001$. Also, people higher on acceptance of
324 stereotyping scored significantly higher on hostile sexist attitudes toward women, scored
325 higher on the modern sexism scale, and had more traditional (i.e., less favorable to women)
326 gender-role values (all Study 3).

327 3.4. Racial attitudes

328 Table 3 shows that people who were more accepting of stereotyping scored higher on
329 the modern racism scale and held more explicitly anti-black attitudes as assessed by the
330 Attitudes towards Blacks Scale. In addition, the implicit Race-IAT was marginally signifi-
331 cantly related, such that people holding more negative implicit associations toward Black

Table 3
Correlates of acceptance of stereotyping

Category and measure	Study	Pearson correlation	N
<i>I. Sociodemographic variables</i>			
Gender (male = 0, female = 1)	1	-.25***	205
	2	-.21***	229
	3	-.24***	412
	4	-.26*	72
	5	-.32**	62
	6	-.31*	67
Ethnicity (African American, 0; Caucasian, 1)	3	.14*	255
<i>II. Gender-related measures</i>			
Benevolent sexism	1	.21***	201
	2	.17**	228
	3	.19***	360
Hostile sexism	3	.30***	360
Modern sexism	3	.18***	360
Traditional gender-role values	3	.27***	360
<i>III. Race-related measures</i>			
Modern racism	3	.24***	360
Attitudes towards blacks	6	.51***	67
Implicit association task	6	.21 ⁺	67
<i>IV. General social/interpersonal attitudes</i>			
Authoritarianism	3	.15**	360
Social dominance orientation	1	.41***	201
	2	.52***	228
Preference for hierarchies	4	.45***	72
Lack of universalism	1	.31***	201
	2	.22***	228
Lack of trust in others	4	.33**	72
Fixed view of human nature	3	.11*	360
Control by powerful others	4	.35**	72
<i>V. Cognitive style</i>			
Low need for cognition	1	.14*	201
	2	.10	228
Need to evaluate	3	.13**	360
Need for structure	1	.08	201
	2	-.04	228
	4	.28*	72
<i>VI. Emotion-related measures</i>			
Use of emotion in rating similarity of faces ^a	5	-.27*	62
Complexity of describing others' feelings	5	-.43*	26
Sees emotion in abstract drawings	5	-.13	37
Gets others to "open up"	5	-.25	36
<i>VII. Personality</i>			
Self-esteem	4	-.01	72
Agreeableness	5	-.43**	33
Conscientiousness	5	-.22	33
Extraversion	5	.30 ⁺	33
Neuroticism	5	.29	33
Openness	5	-.04	33

(continued on next page)

Table 3 (continued)

Category and measure	Study	Pearson correlation	<i>N</i>
Agency	5	.56***	38
Communion	5	-.22	38

Note. All correlations are partial correlations that control for gender.

^a Correlation for use of gender in rating similarity of faces = .26, $p < .05$; correlation for use of race in rating similarity of faces = .26, $p < .05$.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

+ $p < .10$.

332 people tended to be more accepting of stereotyping. Most likely, there was not a more sig-
 333 nificant relationship between the two measures due to the Acceptance of Stereotyping
 334 Questionnaire assessing an explicit attitude reflecting an intentional preference to use ste-
 335 reotypes while the Race-IAT assesses an implicit tendency to make certain types of associ-
 336 ations. Since these measures are assessing different constructs, it is understandable that the
 337 correlation between them would not be greater. The explicit and implicit attitudes instru-
 338 ments were not significantly related to each other, controlling for gender, partial
 339 $r(65) = .14$, $p < .27$.

340 3.5. Social–interpersonal attitudes

341 Table 3 shows that people who were more accepting of stereotyping were significantly
 342 more likely to believe that certain groups deserve to be dominated (social dominance ori-
 343 entation, Studies 1–2), with a meta-analytic summary showing an unweighted mean corre-
 344 lation of .47, a weighted (by sample size) mean correlation of .47, and a combined *Z* of 9.60,
 345 $p < .001$. They were significantly more likely to believe that people are not all alike (univer-
 346 salism, Studies 1–2), with a meta-analytic summary showing an unweighted mean correla-
 347 tion of .26, a weighted (by sample size) mean correlation of .26, and a combined *Z* of 5.43,
 348 $p < .001$. They also scored significantly higher on authoritarianism, the fixed (entity) view of
 349 human nature, and preference for hierarchies; had significantly lower trust in others; and
 350 felt more controlled by powerful others.

351 3.6. Cognitive style

352 As shown in Table 3, need for cognition had an inconsistent relation to acceptance of
 353 stereotyping in terms of significance tests, but when the *p*-values of Study 1 and 2 were
 354 combined meta-analytically (Stouffer method; Rosenthal, 1991), the overall relation was
 355 significant in showing the greater acceptance of stereotyping was associated with lower
 356 need for cognition, combined $Z = -2.45$, $p < .01$, one-tail, unweighted mean
 357 correlation = .12, weighted (by sample size) mean correlation = .12. Personal need for struc-
 358 ture also had an inconsistent relation, but when combined meta-analytically across Studies
 359 1, 2, and 4, it was related to acceptance of stereotyping such that greater acceptance was
 360 associated with a greater personal need for structure, combined $Z = 1.68$, $p < .05$, one-tail,
 361 unweighted mean correlation = .11, weighted (by sample size) mean correlation = .05.
 362 Higher need to evaluate was also significantly related to greater acceptance of stereotyping
 363 (Study 3).

364 3.7. *Emotion-related measures*

365 The Similarity Rating Task (Study 5) measured participants' preference for using emotion,
366 gender, or race when rating the similarity of faces. Table 3 shows that greater use of emotion
367 was significantly negatively related to acceptance of stereotyping and, correspondingly,
368 greater use of gender and race was positively related to acceptance of stereotyping. Because of
369 the ipsative nature of the task (i.e., using one dimension more required using one or both of
370 the other dimensions less), scores on the similarity rating task were highly related to each
371 other: participants' use of emotion in the similarity rating task was negatively related to use
372 of gender, $r(60) = -.96, p < .001$, and to use of race, $r(60) = -.98, p < .001$, and use of gender
373 and use of race were positively related to each other, $r(60) = .87, p < .001$. Thus, use of the race
374 and gender categories was used to the exclusion of using emotion, and vice versa. The results
375 show that the tendency to use information about social categories (race and gender) and the
376 tendency to use emotion had opposite relations to acceptance of stereotyping.

377 People scoring higher on acceptance of stereotyping were significantly less likely to
378 describe the imagined emotions of others in a complex way than people scoring lower
379 (Table 3). The self-rated ability to get others to "open up" through self-disclosure was also
380 moderately negatively related, though not significantly so. The tendency to see emotions in
381 abstract drawings was not related to acceptance of stereotyping (all from Study 5).

382 3.8. *Other personality variables*

383 Self-esteem was not related to acceptance of stereotyping (Table 3, Study 4). Results
384 from Study 5 showed that less agreeable personality, more agentic personality, and to some
385 extent more extraverted and neurotic personality were associated with more acceptance of
386 stereotyping; agency was significantly related not only when gender was controlled for, but
387 also for men and women separately—for men, $r(14) = .59, p < .05$, and for women,
388 $r(20) = .52, p = .01$.

389 3.9. *Socially desirable responding*

390 In Study 3, the correlation between acceptance of stereotyping and the Marlowe–
391 Crowne Social Desirability Scale was $r(421) = -.28, p < .001$, suggesting that people who
392 endorsed stereotyping were less interested in looking good than people who did not (con-
393 versely, that people who disavowed stereotyping were more interested in looking good).
394 Importantly, when social desirability was partialled out of the Study 3 correlations shown
395 in Table 3 (along with gender), the results were indistinguishable from those shown in the
396 table. Thus, social desirability did not bias relations between acceptance of stereotyping
397 and other variables in Study 3.

398 Social desirability was examined in Study 5 as well. The correlations for the two sub-
399 scales of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding were as follows: Impression
400 Management, $r(55) = -.33, p < .05$, and Self-Deceptive Enhancement, $r(55) = -.17, ns$.
401 These correlations suggest that people who score high on acceptance of stereotyping are
402 less interested in manipulating others' impressions in a favorable way than people who
403 score low, who may be motivated to present a socially desirable image of themselves, but
404 those scoring high on acceptance of stereotyping do not differ appreciably in the extent to
405 which they have a falsely positive self-view.

406 **4. Discussion**

407 The goal of this research was to understand attitudinal, cognitive, emotional, and per-
408 sonality correlates of the general tendency to accept social stereotyping, that is, to believe
409 that making use of beliefs about group differences is both functional and relatively harm-
410 less in daily life. To measure this construct we devised a self-report instrument, which we
411 used in six studies. It was predicted that men and Caucasians would score as more accept-
412 ing of stereotyping than women and African Americans, respectively, and also that people
413 scoring as more accepting of stereotyping would hold more negative stereotypes of specific
414 groups, hold more hierarchical and more negative general social attitudes, see people as
415 differing more from one another and as having more fixed natures, have a more simplistic
416 and rigid cognitive style, and be less attuned to emotion in others. All of these predictions
417 were supported. Together these findings provide good construct validity evidence for the
418 instrument as a measure of the general tendency to find value and utility in stereotypes.

419 It was no surprise to find that general acceptance of stereotyping was associated with
420 prejudicial and categorical thinking (Levy, 1999). However, the findings regarding the
421 apparent willingness to process emotions in other people (though not in abstract line draw-
422 ings) are more subtle and suggest interesting implications for the acceptance of stereotyp-
423 ing trait. These findings suggest that the tendency to think in terms of social categories is
424 associated with reluctance to engage in the intrinsically individuating activity of attending
425 to emotions in others, a result also consistent with the Leyens et al. (2000) study described
426 earlier.⁵ Because emotions are transient states, attending to them can be considered anti-
427 thetical to the idea of thinking of people as exemplars of social categories. Thus, attending
428 to others' emotions and thinking of others in social categorical terms may be competing
429 response tendencies (indeed, they were strongly inversely related on the Similarity Rating
430 Task), consistent with the extensive literature on perceived outgroup homogeneity (e.g.,
431 Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993). In fact, researchers have begun to examine whether learn-
432 ing to be empathic (i.e., learning to attend to others' emotional cues or experiences) will
433 moderate the extent to which individuals perceive/hold outgroup members to be more like
434 each other relative to ingroup members (Finlay & Stephan, 2000). It makes sense, then,
435 that we found acceptance of stereotyping as a trait to be negatively related to the tendency
436 to notice or interpret the more unique emotional qualities expressed by individuals. Thus,
437 our findings indicate that relations between thinking in terms of groups and attention to
438 emotions are relevant within an individual differences as well as experimental framework.

439 Future research on correlates of acceptance of stereotyping should examine a wider
440 range of stereotypes, especially the more positive ones. Although we did find a positive cor-
441 relation with benevolent sexism, that scale is not entirely positive in that an overly idealiz-
442 ing view of women is construed as a negative attitude (Glick & Fiske, 1996). More
443 unambiguously positive stereotypes—for example, that Asians are excellent in mathemat-
444 ics, or that beautiful people have many positive social attributes—should also be examined.
445 If acceptance of stereotypes applies to all stereotypes, then positive ones should be pre-
446 dicted as strongly as negative ones. However, our finding that people high in acceptance of

⁵ A person can, of course, engage in stereotypical thinking with regard to emotions, by attributing certain emo-
tions to whole groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). What we are proposing is consistent with this notion in
that *attending to* others' emotions is antithetical to stereotyping them. A person who stereotypes a whole group in
terms of their likely emotions is not likely to attend to the emotions of individual group members.

447 stereotyping held somewhat negative and distrustful views of human beings, and reported
 448 themselves to be low on agreeableness, suggests that the trait might predict negative stereo-
 449 types more strongly than positive stereotypes.

450 Another domain of future research is related to interpersonal interaction style. It would
 451 be interesting to know whether a person high on acceptance of stereotyping has a discern-
 452 ible manner of engaging with others. Such a person may betray a lack of interest in, and
 453 may be relatively insensitive to, others' affective states and individuating qualities. On the
 454 other hand, acknowledging the existence of group-level characteristics may sometimes be a
 455 good thing. The notion of cultural sensitivity implies that one can, in a prosocial way, take
 456 group-level information into account when interacting with others.⁶ Future research could
 457 profitably explore prosocial and non-prosocial applications of acceptance of stereotyping.

458 Finally, considering the predominantly White composition of our samples, we should
 459 generalize the correlations found in the present research only to this group, and future
 460 studies should examine whether the pattern of correlates of acceptance of stereotyping that
 461 we found is also present within other ethnic groups. By the same token, developmental
 462 studies could examine the pattern of correlates in different age groups as well as describe
 463 the development of acceptance of stereotyping as a general trait. Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle,
 464 and White (1994) found evidence against such a general trait among elementary school
 465 children.

466 5. Uncited reference

467 Mayer and Gaschke (1988).

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⁶ We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing this out.

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