



Large Denial Of Service Attack Against Dyn

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What is DNS?

- “Internet Phone Book”. Translates human readable names into Internet Addresses:
 - Isc.sans.edu => 66.35.59.249, 2607:f1c0:846:9100::15c
- If you own a domain (“sans.edu”), then you need to provide DNS for this domain
- If DNS breaks, then customers can’t reach your web site. E-Mail service will likely be disrupted as well
- Companies like Dyn can run DNS for you

Who is Dyn? (pronounced ['dain])

- Company originally became known for providing DNS services for users with dynamic Internet Addresses (home users, small businesses)
- More recently, Dyn offers services to large enterprises that need a robust geographically diverse DNS infrastructure
- Dyn is one of the biggest, if not the biggest provider of such services. It maintains data centers around the globe and uses various techniques to provide redundancy

Why Did Dyn Fail

- A large network of compromised devices was used to flood Dyn's servers with traffic
- In particular servers used as part of Dyn's enterprise offerings were targeted
- Dyn wasn't able to handle the additional traffic, and its servers either stopped responding or responses were substantially delayed.

Who Did it and Why?

- It is unknown at this point who is behind the attack, or why they selected Dyn as a target.
- The “Mirai Botnet” is assumed to be responsible for the attack. This botnet uses hundred of thousands of compromised devices like security cameras and routers to launch these attacks
- DDoS attacks are often used to shut down web sites or companies for political reasons or for ransom. But at this point, nobody claimed responsibility
- It is possible that the target was a Dyn customer, not Dyn

Can This Affect Us?

- Yes. Even if we are not a Dyn customer, any DNS provider could be hit by the same attack and would likely have similar problems
- In house hosted DNS is likely more vulnerable, but it would prevent us from getting caught up in an attack targeting others.
- At this point, there is no bullet proof defense against these attacks. A temporary outage can likely not be avoided
- This botnet has been used to attack web servers as well, not just DNS

How can we minimize the risk?

- Use multiple DNS providers. This way, if one experiences problems, we can use the others as backup
- This requires additional tools and setup to make sure information is synchronized across different providers
- We can maintain some DNS servers in house to provide limited service to internal users and as a last resort if we are not targeted, but experience issues due to collateral damage
- Adjust our DNS configuration to allow for caching of our records (increase “Time to Live”)

What Should We Do In Response?

- Review your DNS infrastructure and configuration (e.g. Time to Live)
- Evaluate your dependency on DNS, specifically for your most critical domains
- Review existing agreements with DNS providers
- Review existing agreements with Anti-DDoS providers
- Investigate the use of multiple DNS providers
- Review monitoring capability. To minimize downtime, it is important to quickly identify the attack and characterize the attack traffic

What Can Be Done Against the Mirai Botnet?

- Most of the infected systems used in these attacks are owned by home users and small businesses with limited security capabilities
- ISPs are working on identifying infected users by disrupting the command and control infrastructure of the botnet
- This is a process that may take months if not years to show significant success

Conclusion

- You can't defend against large scale DDoS attacks without the help from others (anti-DDoS services)
- It is important to diversify critical infrastructure like DNS
- DDoS attacks need to be characterized quickly to direct effective defenses and to coordinate with anti-DDoS service providers
- IoT type devices need to be reviewed and deployed carefully to not contribute to problems like "Mirai"

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