Too often we participate in the globalization of indifference. May we strive instead to live global solidarity

**Pope Francis**

The speed of light does not merely transform the world. It becomes the world. Globalization is the speed of light

**Paul Virilio**

We live in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect of what we do. For better or worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us

**Anthony Giddens**

It has been said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity

**Kofi Annan**

Globalisation is not spelt with a zed

**Warwick Murray**

Globalization is a fact, because of technology, because of an integrated global supply chain, because of changes in transportation. And we’re not going to be able to build a wall around that

**Barack Obama**
CAPA: The Global Education Network

Mission

CAPA: The Global Education Network is an international education organization (IEO) committed to empowering student learning through personal choice, academic integrity, and engagement in urban environments abroad.

Our mission is to provide meaningful learning abroad experiences that challenge and inspire students to analyze and explore complex issues within urban environments. Through our commitment to personalized learning, academic rigor, and community engagement, we prepare students to live and work in a globally interdependent and diverse world.

This mission is served by the creation of strategic and integrated learning opportunities. We believe that experiential education is a key pedagogy in that process. To that end, the development of mechanisms for critical engagement with host societies is crucial.

The CAPA learning experience is characterized by the integration of curriculum, formal and informal experiential education, and study environments conducive to the analysis and exploration of the global cities in which we are located: learning laboratories in which students are empowered to develop their academic skills. CAPA creates further opportunities for students through a virtual global network which enables transnational and multinational research and academic study across sites. In this way, CAPA creates innovative mechanisms for comparative global pedagogies.

Occasional Publications

CAPA’s publications are intended to create a forum in which the international education community, faculty, colleagues from a diverse variety of fields and disciplines can explore significant issues in a manner that goes further and deeper than customary administrative and practical imperatives allow. CAPA is committed to creating a habit of thought in which assumptions are challenged and deconstructed.
No publication offers a single thesis and the purpose is not to promote one view over another (or one program over another) but to enhance our collective discourse by going beyond orthodoxies.

The Occasional Paper series (in conjunction with our symposia) is part of CAPA’s efforts to contribute to the theoretical basis of our work so as to enrich the learning, teaching, and research experience for all of us aspiring to be thoughtful and curious students in a complex world.

The themes covered to date include urban studies, cosmopolitanism, nation and memory, war and study abroad, human rights, civil rights and inequalities, and globalization; in 2019 the focus will be on borders, mobility, and migration.

May 2018.
CAPA Occasional Publications Series

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The views represented within this volume represent those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CAPA or the editors. Publication does not imply agreement or endorsement. Dissent is central to our aims. This volume’s intention is to create a forum in which diverse views can coexist so as to demonstrate the potential for analysis and debate within the multi- and interdisciplinary context of globalization.
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Foreword

John J. Christian, CAPA: The Global Education Network

Education abroad is a curious profession in so far as we simultaneously juggle administrative, intellectual, and educational imperatives that do not always align easily. In recent years, we have become significantly more adept as administrators. Questions of “how” we construct our programs are necessarily and properly at the center of our agenda. In pursuing those imperatives, we nevertheless have a responsibility not to lose sight of educational and intellectual issues that direct us to focus on “why” we do what we do.

The seventh volume in CAPA’s series comes at a timely moment; the idea of the interconnectedness of nations and peoples is increasingly challenged by competing isolationist and nationalist impulses. The ideological tensions that shaped the twentieth century were driven by collectivism (socialism, Communism, community ideals etc.) versus individualism (neoliberalism, as an extreme example). In contrast, the key conflicts of our times seem increasingly to be framed around challenges to internationalist ideals. The choice that faces our civilization may be between an open, inclusive view of the world and a closed, protective, defensive reaction to the challenge of interconnection. Globalization, in this context, is deeply contested, welcomed by some and feared by many; a process that, while difficult to define, is the source of passionate commitment, unease, idealism, discontent, hope, and hate.

Globalization is at the core of CAPA’s learning objectives. Much of what we do derives from our belief that grappling with the complex resonances around this concept is critical for a comprehension of contemporary realities. We are also acutely aware that the concept is not simple but contains any number of ambiguities. Approaches to globalization can, as these essays demonstrate, derive from many diverse disciplines and perspectives. In short, we may not be able to define the meanings simply, but we can observe their impacts. Our explicit teaching ambition is that students learn to recognize, describe, and interpret examples of the global in the urban environments in which they study.
We have placed globalization at the heart of our academic agenda precisely because it raises a field of investigation that is necessarily multidisciplinary and contested. Our other learning objectives (urbanization, social dynamics, and diversity) are, in one way or another, related consequences. The study of these areas involves a challenge to traditional pedagogies in so far as classroom study needs to be extended into the wider environment to empower students to observe and analyze the impacts of global change in the streets, organizations, offices, and communities with which they engage.

The implications of globalization have been brought into sharper focus recently, particularly following the results of the recent US election and the Brexit vote in the UK. The political landscape is more divisive and contested at this point in our history than it has ever been in the living memories of most of us; the idea of globalization sustains realities, inventions, myths, ideals, and unease: perceptions that shape politics and society in profound ways.

As the President of CAPA, I have the pleasure and the responsibility for ensuring our students are exposed to this significant subject matter and are given frameworks for learning that go beyond the classroom. We are, therefore, pleased to offer CAPA’s Seventh Occasional Paper to our colleagues in the field of international education in the hope that it will stimulate further thought, debate, and research. We do so in the knowledge that it does not contain definitive answers to critical questions, but rather raises further questions, points us in diverse directions, and enriches an imperative debate. I am deeply committed to the view that teaching well is essential, but not sufficient. Without the kinds of thoughtful introspection demonstrated here we will not truly address our collective mission: to take students from parochialism towards an awareness of those transnational forces that create the realities we all inhabit.
I would like to thank all those who participated in the symposium in March 2017 and the student conference in November 2017. Some of the work generated by those events is represented here. These contributions reflect the worldwide significance of the topic; the volume includes perspectives from Australia, India, Italy, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Contributors include faculty, international education professionals, business practitioners, and students. The work draws upon a very wide range of disciplines with a prevailing sense that no single academic field alone can illuminate this complex and multifaceted phenomenon.

I therefore want to thank the editors, contributors, and participants involved in making this volume. I also want to thank all of those who will continue to explore this challenging and critical topic. That is a continuing imperative for our work.

May 2018
**Introduction: Globalization, Civilization, and Their Discontents**

*Catherine Colon, Anthony Gristwood, Michael Woolf*

CAPA: The Global Education Network

What do I think of Western civilization? I think it would be a very good idea
Mahatma Gandhi (attributed)

**Ease, unease, dis-ease**

In one of his final works, Freud contemplated the profound uneasiness of human existence from a perspective shaped by the turmoil of the early twentieth century: “Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of men towards one another” (Freud, [1930] 1994: 40). Much more recently, Joseph Stiglitz published his influential critique of economic globalization and its uneven impacts (2002).

In adapting Freud’s and Stiglitz’s titles to a discussion of the key dynamics of this century, we have sought to create a field of debate with multiple and contrasting perspectives. This volume engages with the proposition that “civilization” has been transformed and made problematic through the impact of globalization in its many and variously constructed manifestations. In a postcolonial, political context, the notion of civilization as a consensus of values may be seen as archaic or devalued; but, it may also represent a set of humane values (human and civil rights, for example) under assault by anti-humanistic barbarism.

As these essays demonstrate, globalization as an area of investigation transcends traditional academic boundaries. No single perspective is likely to be sufficient in scope or method to embrace the breadth of issues raised. Furthermore, whatever it is—or is not—the idea of globalization requires us to go beyond the particular characteristics of neighborhood, nation-state, or region. It implies that space beyond traditional borders is significant and impactful. This offers a metaphor for the intellectual processes involved in these discussions. Borders of disciplines, like borders of nations, are too constraining to allow us to analyze contemporary reality. The interaction of history, geography, ideologies, psychology, economics, and so on, shapes contemporary globalization, a process further complicated by the emotional frameworks through which we confront (fearfully or enthusiastically) this challenge to traditional ways of defining our identities and our knowledge.
For study abroad students, a focus on global perspectives disrupts their expectations. Furthermore, it subverts the language by which we promote our field. The student coming from the USA to another country rightly and properly will anticipate that they will study the habits, customs, and histories of a new place. In promoting study abroad, the focus is inevitably upon what may be learned by going to Italy, the UK, Spain, and so forth. CAPA’s focus on global dimensions and the works in this volume redirect attention beyond the nation-state and complicate the learning agenda. In short, a significant space of learning is paradoxically defined. We want students to analyze and explore their immediate environment in order to go beyond their boundaries and assumptions to consider transnational interactions on local, regional, and global scales.

As a means of demonstrating these realities, we might consider the clothes we wear and the food we eat. A shirt bought in Philadelphia may have been designed in London and manufactured in Kochi. Where were the jeans purchased in Minneapolis made, and how did they get to the store? Jackets, shoes, dresses all demonstrate the transcendence of place. Food, once limited to regional origins, now reflects a mobile world; seasonal availability belongs, largely, to the past. Our ancestors ate and wore what was available in their space and time. We have redefined space and eroded the limitations of time.

Study abroad has a complex and ambiguous sense of globalization. In the adjectival form, it has become a shorthand for positive values: global perspectives, global reach, the global university, global competence; these terms permeate the prevailing orthodoxy and imply aspirations and qualities that transcend the parochial.

However, when the process of globalization itself is brought into focus, it is located within the ambiguities and disturbances that challenge human existence in, for example, environmental, social, and political contexts. If global is good, why is globalization so troubling?

The years between 1930 and the present reveal a revolution in sensibility and society, as profound an upheaval as any experienced in our histories. These radical alterations might suggest a number of crucial questions, for example: what has been the impact of technological change on the way in which we perceive the world since Freud’s work? Since the Victorian era, technology has become an ambiguous presence in our history, with the potential to enslave and slaughter as well as to enlighten our minds and
lighten our collective burdens. Global warfare has been a significant catalyst for technological development. In this context, technology is a subject to be studied as well as a source of alternative pedagogies.

The degree to which globalization has increased inequality across the world is another area of potential debate, explored by several of our contributors. Joseph Stiglitz describes his motivation in writing *Globalization and its Discontents* as a consequence of direct experience at the World Bank:

I saw first-hand the devastating effect that globalization can have on developing countries, and especially the poor within these countries ([2002] 2003: ix)

Arundhati Roy supports that view:

Globalization means standardization. The very rich and the very poor must want the same things, but only the rich can have them (Barsamian and Roy, 2004: 40)

Thomas Friedman, in direct contrast, argues that the route to “a fairer, more compassionate, and more egalitarian society” requires governments to embrace globalization within what he describes, improbably, as “a flattening world” (2005: 364).

The most visible and probably the most measurable form of globalization is almost certainly in the transnational nature of commerce, trade, and industry. We may choose to teach courses in Global Business but, in many ways, the term “global” is redundant. Almost all business necessarily transcends national borders and brings measurable benefits to institutions and individuals, but not without negative consequences:

The benefits of globalization are proclaimed vociferously by the banks and corporations who are its prime beneficiaries: economies of scale mean that consumer products become cheaper and more widely available; bureaucracy crumbles in the face of corporate-directed efficiency; access to goods and services is more widespread, more democratic… But the darker side of the phenomenon, less readily observable, is what worries many. That the world is becoming increasingly ordered by unelected and faceless figures in distant (and most commonly American) corporate headquarters… That there are fewer and fewer controls on those global operators—for under whose law, exactly, do they operate? (Winchester, 2003: xiv)
Manfred Steger distinguishes two forms of globalization which he designates as the “humane form” and the “steamroller”:

Humane forms of globalization are more attuned to what are shaping up to be the most daunting tasks facing us in the 21st century: the reduction of global disparities in wealth and well-being and the preservation of our wondrous planet (2013: xiii)

In contrast he identifies:

This influential notion of globalization as a...steamroller flattening local, national, and regional scales also appeared as the spectre of “Americanization” haunting the rest of the world (1)

Another darker dimension to the globalization of trade is the basis of Max Daly and Steve Sampson’s study of the illegal drug trade in Narcomania (2012). The opium trade in the nineteenth century was the cause of two wars between China and Great Britain. Daly and Simpson also identify a direct connection in the contemporary environment between drug sales and the functioning of the global economy:

In a globalised world there was a new world order, with new winners and new losers; drug money was rebalancing the global economy (2012: 188)

The object of this collection of very diverse essays is to exchange perspectives that address the perplexing questions of globalization that have, in one way or another, become central to the discourse of education abroad. These discussions create opportunities to consider the world beyond a myopic focus on specific countries and the peculiarities of habit contained within them. This field of multidisciplinary teaching and research offers potentially profoundly enlightening enhancements to the curricula of education abroad.

**The constructions of globalization: politics and history**

Globalization has transformed access to information. The Internet, with its increased and immediate access to ideas, collaboration, and education across communities and borders, is one of the most obvious drivers of globalization and has modified the ways in which we know of each other to the degree that to be indifferent to the lives of others has become a
political choice. The global reach of technology can in fact have a profoundly positive impact for certain communities. An example of this was highlighted by Peter Tatchell:

I regularly hear from isolated LGBT people in countries like Pakistan, Ghana, and Papua New Guinea. They are learning that they deserve equal rights, not from their government or from any sources in their country, but from LGBT websites and through social media. They are able to see and learn what is happening in Britain, the United States, as well as many other countries and see that change is possible. This knowledge is incredibly psychologically empowering for isolated, vulnerable people. It gives them hope (Tatchell, 2017: 51)

However, while news is more accessible, it is also less reliable. Hitler foresaw what we have more recently characterized as “fake news,” asserting that “the victor will not be asked later on whether he told the truth or not” (Hitler, 1939).

The impact of globalization on educational and social mobility is not a new phenomenon, as demonstrated here by Michael Punter. Galileo Galilei held the chair of mathematics between 1592 and 1610 at the University of Padova in Italy. Students from Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland travelled to study with him. The Dutch Philosopher, Erasmus taught at Cambridge between 1510 and 1514. Between 1547 and 1550, the English mathematician and philosopher John Dee lectured on alchemy in Europe. In relative terms, educational mobility was a fact of life in Early Modern Europe. Global education has a very long history even if we tend to consider our situation as a unique consequence of modernity. The mobility of scholars is not new. Of course, there are significant differences of scale and ease of movement, but at any given point in history, societies looked beyond the nation or the immediate locality. For example, the Classical Greek Empire reached across much of the known world.

Globalization is also inevitably political. Keshia Abraham, for example, argues in this volume that globalization is intrinsically connected to colonization. Economic, political, religious, and ideological motivations were the basis of imperial ambitions from Classical Greece and Rome through the expansionist ambitions of Genghis Khan, founder of the Mongol Empire, to Napoleon and Hitler, and were manifest in all their contradictions in the day-to-day operation of the British Empire.
The British Empire was a particular articulation of globalization explicitly designed to enrich one particular nation—Great Britain—while also, simultaneously, constructed as a “civilizing mission” intended to bring enlightenment to the “benighted peoples” of the world. By 1913, the population of the British Empire was an estimated twenty-three percent of the world’s total, some 412 million people (Maddison, 2001: 97). This empire was the largest in history and, between 1815 and 1914, established a global dominance that, in one perspective at least, brought relative peace, stability, and order to the international environment, from the defeat of Napoleon to the outbreak of World War I, known as the *Pax Britannica* (“British Peace”). The Congress of Vienna (1815) established Britain as the dominant global power of its time, with the role of transnational peacekeeper of the status quo. The phrase “the empire on which the sun never sets” has been used in many contexts but it most clearly applies to the British Empire at the peak of its power and global territorial reach. Despite its ultimate dissolution, the legacies of the British Empire are considerable and wide-ranging, from the continuing dominance of the English language on a global scale to the cosmopolitan character of London’s streets. Sport is another such manifestation; cricket, for example, is played across the world in many former colonies. The Commonwealth is an institution rooted in that colonial legacy.

The predominance of the English language is not of course solely a consequence of British imperialism, but it is a symptom of a global process in which minority languages have progressively declined. By some measures, there were an estimated 14,500 languages in 1500; by 2012, less than 6,500 (Anderson, 2010).

**The constructions of globalization: ideology and religion**

*Most people in the world agree that most of the people in the world have false religious beliefs* (Kwame Anthony Appiah, 2016)

Globalization is also manifest in ideological and religious contexts through “grand narratives”: belief systems that offer an overarching explanation of history and a code for behaviors and beliefs that are inclusive and transcend borders.
The most obvious examples of global political ideologies are found in the great “isms” of Communism, capitalism, socialism, Fascism and so on. In the current century, these ideologies may have fragmented, but they represented attempts to establish global systems by which human relations are regulated: secular versions of global religions.

There are any number of examples that might illustrate the religious aspects of globalization. Indeed, it might be argued that all of the major world religions are intrinsically purveyors of a global vision, insofar as they express ideological commitments to faith that transcend borders, politics, customs, and habits of living. Among the dominant global religions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, only Christianity and Islam actively seek converts, but they offer sometimes aggressive examples of globalization through the power of the sword.

The most dramatic example is that of the Spanish Inquisition. From the late-fifteenth century for over 100 years, Spain combined political expansionism with religious ideology of imposed Catholicism in all the territories it progressively occupied. The synthesis of political aspiration and religious commitment was brutally manifest in the imposition of will in transnational contexts. The tools of globalization were torture and the auto-da-fé.

**The constructions of globalization: mobility and education**

In the context of study abroad, globalization has brought enhanced mobility with clearly positive consequences: over five million students are mobile annually (ICEF Monitor, 2017); interconnections between students enrich learning environments; the capacity to communicate across borders is profoundly enhanced; studying in a foreign place has a high impact on students, and so on. However, mobility is not simply or indeed primarily a matter of choice. By the end of 2016, the number of displaced people globally had risen to 65.6 million—more than the entire population of the UK—including various types of refugees, with 22.5 million people fleeing to another country (Edmond, 2017). In Iraq and Syria alone, there are more displaced persons than there will be study abroad students in 2018. At the same time, ease of mobility and the ability to become “a global citizen,” sometimes posited as an ideal in education abroad, is not equally accessed across communities and countries, as Edrif, Farnum, and Lansing illustrate—and even in the West remains a privilege for only a few.
In another view, communities have been eroded; we have lost personal and national identity; the world has become more uniform. Globalization is something that happens to us, beyond our control. As Michael Stohl, Kelly Brannan Trail, and Daniel Wheatley demonstrate in different contexts, globalization has led to resistance whereby (for good or ill) nationalism and sub-national identities are re-asserted. Such a view may be employed to explain a number of political events and phenomena including Islamic militancy, Scottish nationalism, the Occupy movement, Brexit, the election of President Trump, the rise of Right and Left-Wing anti-globalization movements, and so on.

Brian Whalen and Michael Woolf highlight the fact that globalization also functions in emotional and psychological contexts. Whalen contrasts the “pragmatic cosmopolitanism” of William James with a psychological search for “home,” more mental construct than concrete location. Globalization functions in an immeasurable context of human aspiration and fear. Giselda Beaudin and Anthony Gristwood explore the complex contradictions and paradoxes created in a globalizing world.

As Charlotte West indicates, questions of globalization directly and inevitably impact upon the functioning of higher education:

> International higher education increasingly finds itself operating at the turbulent nexus...of global dynamics, even as it grapples with increased competition, changing demographics, declining public funding, technological innovation (2017: 18)

Another apparent complication derives from a semantic paradox. In education abroad, the terms “global” and “globalization” are widely used without precision or specificity, both to indicate approval and to signify problematic realities. Global is also used (as in CAPA: The Global Education Network) to indicate a pedagogy that includes transnational teaching techniques and/or a focus on issues that transcend national contexts: such as human rights, cosmopolitanism, transnational institutions.

Clearly, and this is the essential rationale for this volume, education in global matters is a critical element in the education abroad environment. We have an obligation to our students to deconstruct what is otherwise a set of rhetorical assertions without substance.
Global education has two related dimensions: mobility into the world and knowledge of that world. In an ideal scenario, these two dimensions are integrated. However, that is not always or inevitably the case. Mobility, of itself, may have little impact. It is demonstrably possible to go into the world and learn nothing. Mobility is also not a necessary precondition for knowledge of the world which can be embedded into domestic learning (sometimes called internationalization at home). Within the USA, only a small percentage of students study abroad. Across the globe, there are nations and regions in which any form of higher education is a privilege; the idea of studying abroad is beyond realistic aspiration.

However, for good or ill, all students will experience the impact of globalization. It is the responsibility of educators to empower students to understand these realities. Marios Konstantinidis, Leonardo Lastilla, Lindsay Ortega, and Kalyani Unkule all engage explicitly with this challenging agenda for global education from different disciplinary perspectives. Our future is uncertain. The age of great ideological battles between the “isms” largely belongs to the past. We have witnessed the defeat of collectivism and the rise of individualism. Parochialism is a political stance. We face a critical choice in perilous circumstances, between closed and open views of the world.

A core belief in the field of international education is that our collective future depends on the propagation of open ideologies, however we choose to define them: cosmopolitanism, global awareness, international consciousness. Closed world ideologies threaten the existence of civil and civilized society.

Or, as Lyndon Baines Johnson said:

> Throughout my entire life I have taken seriously the warning that the world is engaged in a race between education and chaos. For the last 2 1/2 years I have lived here with the daily awareness that the fate of mankind really depends on the outcome of that race (July 12, 1966)
Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility

Kofi Annan

What we have now is a particular form of globalisation dominated by finance and multinational corporations... The terms of [this] globalisation have to be challenged politically

Doreen Massey

Where globalization means, as it so often does, that the rich and powerful now have new means to further enrich and empower themselves at the cost of the poorer and weaker, we have a responsibility to protest in the name of universal freedom

Nelson Mandela
Globalization and its (Dis)connections: Theories of Relativity

Michael Woolf, CAPA: The Global Education Network

Introduction: Royale with Cheese

Globalization is far from being one thing. We can observe the impact of globalization in the streets of our cities and in the lives of our populations. Airlines can prove that we are more transnationally mobile than ever before. The Internet and social media reach across the globe (albeit mostly through the medium of English). Statistics can demonstrate the global scale of trade and commerce. Nevertheless, definitions of globalization are partial and contested. Reactions to impacts are diverse, relative to experience, location, ideology, history, and a myriad of factors that are emotional as well as quantifiable. It is simultaneously a product of contemporary history and is ahistorical; globalization has created a sense of transnational connection and enforced subnational differences. The paradoxes of globalization enrich and disrupt the agendas of international education.

In some contexts, the notion is elusive. Vincent Vega reveals one such area to his fellow hitman Jules Winnfield in Quentin Tarantino’s *Pulp Fiction*:

Vincent But you know what the funniest thing about Europe is?
Jules What?
Vincent It’s the little differences. A lotta the same shit we got here, they got there, but there they’re a little different.
Jules Example?
Vincent Alright.... you know what they call a Quarter Pounder with Cheese in Paris?
Jules They don’t call it a Quarter Pounder with Cheese?
Vincent No, they got the metric system there, they wouldn’t know what the fuck a Quarter Pounder is.
Jules What’d they call it?
Vincent They call it Royale with Cheese (Tarantino, 1994)

Vincent’s observations precisely undermine the assumption that globalization eradicates difference.
The term “globalization” is of relatively recent origin, coming into common usage in the 1980s. What it describes is not new. Since the Greek and Roman Empires, nations and regions have been interconnected. What is new is the speed of connection (real and virtual) and the democratization of access to information about each other.

The Roman Empire at its most expansive peak ( territorially around the years 110 to 117 AD) represented a level of transnational integration comparable to that of the contemporary world. Lionel Casson illustrates this by reference to the ways in which daily Roman life drew upon global trade:

   The Roman man in the street ate bread baked with wheat grown in North Africa or Egypt, and fish that had been caught and dried near Gibraltar. He cooked with North African palm oil in pots and pans of copper mined in Spain, ate off dishes fired in French kilns, drank wine from Spain and France...his wife wore silks from China, adorned herself with diamonds and pearls from India, and made up with cosmetics from South Arabia (Casson, 1991: 198)

An extensive discussion of the connection between the Roman Empire and notions of globalization is also found, for example, in Globalisation and the Roman World (Pitts and Versluys, 2015).

Some 1900 years later, before the term globalization was in common use, Albert Einstein’s “Towards a World Government” (1950) represented the way in which broad synonyms for globalization such as interlinking and interdependence (as well as internationalization and the universal) are employed to express a sense that the world at a given point in time appears to be uniquely interconnected:

   The development of technology and of the implements of war has brought about something akin to the shrinking of the planet. Economic interlinking has made the destinies of nations interdependent to a degree far greater than in previous years (Einstein, 1950: 16)

The conditions that Einstein identifies in the immediate Post-World War II environment could stand for a contemporary definition of globalization.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Congress of Vienna (1815) also marked moments in history when the interdependence of European nations was embedded in treaties designed to avoid further cataclysmic wars. In terms of global realities, Europe was a dominant presence, at least half
of the political world. In 1648, the significance of India in a global context was at least 100 years ahead; African colonization, 150 years ahead; the political emergence of the Americas and Australasia, that expanded the boundaries of global interest, was still to come. The political globe (as distinct from the geographic globe) was divided between the Ottoman Empire and the deeply fractured world of Christendom where, broadly, Catholic and Protestant interests had been in protracted and disastrous war for thirty years. The Treaty of Westphalia, driven by Divine Will with the authority of the Trinity, addressed the critical state of European fragmentation:

In the name of the most holy and individual Trinity: Be it known to all, and every one whom it may concern, or to whom in any manner it may belong, That for many Years past, Discords and Civil Divisions being stir’d up in the Roman Empire, which increas’d to such a degree, that not only all Germany, but also the neighbouring Kingdoms, and France particularly, have been involv’d in the Disorders of a long and cruel War (Introduction, Treaty of Westphalia, 1648)

For the signatories, the treaty was more than just the settlement of a regional conflict; it represented “a Christian and Universal ¹ Peace” (Clause 1) and involved the participation of an unprecedented 194 states. In ending the war, establishing peaceful coexistence between two versions of Christianity, and recognizing national sovereignty, the signatories felt that they were addressing a “universal” issue. In short, “universal” in 1648 performs the same kind of meaning as “global.” Neither term represents an absolute reality but expresses a relative condition: that is, it is more universal or global than before.

Kevin O’Rourke argues that the Congress of Vienna in 1815 which ended the Napoleonic Wars can be seen in a similar context:

a key institutional innovation which ushered in the long nineteenth century, and helped make it the canonical period of globalization, was the international system instituted by the Congress of Vienna, which marked the end of an unusually bloody, lengthy, and worldwide conflict (O’Rourke, 2002: 77)

Globalization is, in this perspective, both historical and essentially ahistorical. It is the word we use now to describe a phenomenon that is neither unique to a given time nor absolute. The signatories of Westphalia and

¹ My emphasis.
Vienna were consciously establishing systems of nations and monarchies that aimed to reshape probably the most politically significant region of the world at that historical moment. It was a form of “globalization” of the time and for the time.

Globalization is a relative concept that reflects our perceptions at a given point in history. We have, unlike the Romans or the signatories of 1648 and 1815, the capacity to see the globe as a geographic entirety from the perspective of outer space. Previous generations used notions such as “universal” to encompass their particular environments. Perhaps future generations, bothered by the colonization of the Moon and Mars, might fret about the question of “cosmicization.” For now, as it was then and as it will be, terms like globalization reflect a relative condition shaped by context. Furthermore, the term implies an ongoing process; not “globalized” but in transition towards that condition, whatever that may mean.

We can measure the evidence of increasing transnational mobility and commerce, for example, but we also recognize that globalization is an elusive concept precisely because it can be measured in many different ways and, simultaneously, it cannot be measured at all.

**Seeing it: Mickey and Mona in China**

It can nevertheless be observed. At the gateway to the Great Wall of China, in the several souvenir shops that litter the environment, visitors can find mugs festooned with representations of Mickey Mouse next to tea towels bearing a portrait of the Mona Lisa. This unlikely conjunction suggests a number of meanings.

Mickey was created in 1928 in the Walt Disney studios. He embodies a stereotypical version of American values: positive, open, lovable, cheerful, and optimistic (if a bit superficial and simple e.g. a “Mickey Mouse idea”). In contrast, Mona Lisa signifies enigmatic and multi-layered complexity: a mystery to be interpreted and unraveled. Painted by Leonardo da Vinci in Florence, probably between 1503 and 1506, the portrait represents something at the opposite end of a spectrum of meaning from Mickey. In conjunction, they establish significant dichotomies, based on conflicting mythical, stereotypical constructs: popular culture and high art; modernity and history; simplicity and complexity; transparency and enigma; America and Europe.
The Great Wall of China suggests another set of meanings. It represents even greater longevity than Mona. It was begun sometime around 200 BCE and continued to be built and rebuilt over centuries. As an icon of Chinese civilization, it represents age, size, and impenetrability. A wall exists for two purposes—to keep things in and to keep things out, to protect and restrain. The Great Wall embodies a sense of mystery: a complex narrative based upon the vastness of time, space, and the question of what the wall protects and conceals.

These three icons signify variously an idea of America as simple, positive, and open; an idea of Europe as complex, enigmatic, and dense; and an idea of China as impenetrable, vast, and ancient. What does it mean, therefore, to find these diverse icons in intimate conjunction? Most obviously, they have commercial value; they also represent the global penetration and universal recognition of popular images. However, on the Great Wall, Mickey and Mona exist beyond iconic resonances. They belong to nowhere and everywhere, nobody and everybody—icons stripped of particularity; globalization reduces distinctive signifiers and creates new space in which the meaning of iconic images is transformed.

**Feeling it: environmental issues**

Globalization can also be felt. Global warming is a hot topic! Environmentalists identify imperatives in response to the assumption that human action has damaged the global environment. A dominant view, supported by the vast majority of scientists, offers a quasi-apocalyptic narrative. The development of anti-globalization protest movements, a very broad alliance of interests and ideologies, has focused around a number of issues including Third World debt, anti-capitalism, and opposition to multinationals. However, while these protests may aim at widely divergent targets, the issue of climate change has been a recurrent, urgent concern.

Nevertheless, the notion of global warming is contested, made complex by matters of scientific, political, and theological belief. Joe Weisenthal’s article in *Business Insider* (2009), “The 10 Most-Respected Global Warming Skeptics,” cites the views of, among less credible figures, Freeman Dyson, Princeton-based professor, and Ivar Giaever, a Nobel Prize winner in physics, “who believes that climate change orthodoxy has become a ‘new religion’ for scientists, and that the data isn’t nearly as compelling as it should be to get this kind of conformity.” He also describes Will Happer’s position, another Princeton physicist,
who compares the anti-CO$_2$ crowd to the prohibitionists prior to the passage of the 18th Amendment. While he does acknowledge long-term warming, he thinks the influence of CO$_2$ is vastly overstated, and that the benefits of a modest reduction in it will be negligible (2009: n. p.)

In short, Weisenthal suggests that “the media portrays climate scientists as having delivered a final verdict on global warming. They haven’t” (2009: n. p.). These scientists are not, for the most part, climate specialists; their views are almost ten years old and might be considered archaic. Nevertheless, skepticism concerning global warming is also the declared view of President Trump: “The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing non-competitive.”

On many occasions during the presidential debates of 2016, Trump reiterated his view that the dangers were a political exaggeration. Furthermore, global policies conflicted with national interests. This was not mere rhetoric but became government policy, as demonstrated by withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change in June 2017. The significance of climate change may have very wide scientific endorsement, but it does not have the weight of a universal consensus; it gains urgency or otherwise in relation to scientific belief, ideology, and political priorities.

It is indisputable, however, that the impact of the places we have built is palpable, in particular the implication of growing urbanization. Fifty-four percent of the world’s population lives in cities (UN, 2014); the scale and pace of urban construction impacts upon questions of architectural heritage, the unequal exploitation of resources, population mobility, and in particular, pollution. There are no frontiers that can contain this process or protect nations or regions. All feel, whether they accept it or not, in one way or another, the impact of this form of globalization.

**Suffering it: Greece and the IMF**

Globalization can also be suffered. That may be demonstrated by a brief analysis of the Greek economic crisis of 2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) made draconian demands upon the economy of the country based around intensification of already harsh austerity measures. In a

2 Trump tweeted his remarks on November 6, 2012. See, for further details, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385
referendum on July 5, 2015, over sixty percent of the Greek people rejected those demands, a decision that was overridden by transnational financial agencies (Wearden and Köllewe, 2015).

There is a standard explanation of the crisis that dominated the media both in Europe and the USA. In that version of events, the feckless Greeks refused to pay their debts despite the efforts of a fiscally responsible Germany who struggled to bring an ordered solution to chaos: voices of reason were ignored. This version of events ignores many profound complexities that disrupt and disturb that narrative. The prevailing view of the crisis in Greece fails to consider the power of national myths and disregards the significance of modern European history since 1939.

Germany has emerged as the voice of fiscal responsibility in Europe and has acquired a quasi-moral authority as an example of how reconstruction can happen within countries committed to values of economic restraint and hard work. In this moral parable, Germany emerges as a paragon of economic virtue. The roots of this reputation were made in the 1950s and 1960s, when West Germany achieved what is frequently called an economic “miracle.” From the tattered disasters of the post-war world, they achieved steady growth through selfless toil: a story that, on a national level, resonates with tales of self-made men who, by the sweat of their labors, achieve prosperity.

While we would not want to be disrespectful of German efficiency and effort, there are two factors that are oddly missing from that story: after World War II, the Germans benefited greatly through the reconstruction assistance given predominantly by America through the Marshall Plan (1948–1952). Most significantly, they were also beneficiaries of the 1953 London Agreement which reduced Germany’s national debt by an enormous sixty percent (Piketty, 2015). Political stability was seen as a greater priority than the interests of global capitalism. A similar scale of debt relief would, of course, profoundly alleviate the suffering of the Greek people and avoid the potentially hideous dangers of political instability.

Instead, the global financial establishment (in the guise of the IMF) overrode Greek democracy. In short, financial agencies representing a faceless, even menacing, quasi-global authority subverted national democratic choice and prioritized financial interest over human suffering. George Monbiot in The Guardian, July 7, 2015, describes the imposition of global power:
The IMF is controlled by the rich and governs the poor on their behalf. It’s now doing to Greece what it has done to one poor nation after another, from Argentina to Zambia. Its structural adjustment programmes have forced scores of elected governments to dismantle public spending, destroying health, education and all the means by which the wretched of the earth might improve their lives...

Consider the European Central Bank. Like most other central banks, it enjoys “political independence.” This does not mean that it is free from politics, only that it is free from democracy... All this is but a recent chapter in the long tradition of subordinating human welfare to financial power (Monbiot, 2015)

This version of globalization aligns with the idea that there exists a shadowy group that operates according to principles that have nothing to do with the interests of people or communities. I shall revisit this notion of a conspiracy of the malignant in the context of popular film and literature later in this discussion.

**Rhetoric and realities**

Meanwhile, Vincent reminds us that beyond the rhetoric there are some critical distinctions that subvert the notion that globalization creates transnational uniformity: a Quarter Pounder may become a Royale. There is a tendency to assume that the rhetoric of globalization is matched by reality, but there are numerous examples of disconnection, of dissonance rather than harmonization.

Educational systems are symptomatic of such disconnection. An example from the European context may serve to illustrate this. The “European” idea began with an economic objective: to create a common market. From that point, this evolved into a broader political concept of “Europe” conceived as unified space. As the nation-state had to be invented in the nineteenth century, so this concept had consciously to be created roughly a hundred years later.

One perceived mechanism for the creation of Europe was, and is, educational mobility. The true purpose of schemes to take students from one part of Europe to another, such as Erasmus and Socrates, was, at heart, the invention of place: the objective being to create a European consciousness in the minds of new generations. The creation of nation, as Italian and German history illustrates, is relatively recent in many parts of the world.
Nations have had to seek to create their identities and their national myths against forces that simultaneously seek to pull them apart. If this is a major challenge within the country, it becomes a titanic problem within the region, as Brexit dramatically demonstrates.

Regional, let alone global, alignment is no easy matter. Even in something as seemingly resolvable as the structure of the academic year, problems accumulate. National holidays are frequently shaped by either religious or historical events. They reflect, for example, the difference between Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Europe. A given set of holidays may, therefore, go to the heart of religious and political identity and may not easily be moved to serve some much less tangible notion of regional, let alone global, coherence. They reflect the significance of what Francis Fukuyama calls “inherited ethical habit” (Fukuyama, 1995: 34). The notion locates identity nationally, tribally, or regionally rather than in a global context. This is not, of course, to suggest that there is no global dimension but rather to present a more complex, relative, and conditional reality.

Universities, for further example, have increasingly taken upon themselves the notion that they are in some way or another “global.” There is no intention to be critical of what is a fairly common branding exercise that, nevertheless, compromises semantic reason. Like many other institutions, New York University declares itself to be “global.” Their outreach into the world is certainly extensive, but a degree from the university is accredited through an agency that is regional (not even national, let alone global). In an implicit oxymoron, University College London describes itself as “London’s Global University.” NYU and UCL demonstrate a commitment to transnational education. However, their authority to award degrees derives locally. The rhetoric of global education needs to be distinguished, at this technical level at least, from the realities. There is a clear and important distinction between global institutions and institutions with global interests.

There is also a context in which the world is less globalized now than it was some 500 years ago. There are few discernible or prevailing systems of religious belief that transcend the world as effectively as they did in that distant past. At the height of the power of the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire, Christianity and Islam represented ideological systems that shaped the global environment. Fragmentation of belief systems has perceptibly created increasing ideological divisions (between different versions of Islam, for example). Mechanisms to enforce world ethical standards, such as The Universal Treaty on Human Rights (1948) and The Geneva
Conventions on War (1949), may be cited as evidence of a global standard, but the application is problematic. National sovereignty and the realities of conflict have, more often than not, prevailed over these and other efforts to establish global standards.

Even “global” products need to be seen through a critical perspective. Mercedes-Benz makes cars that are sold worldwide. In almost every case, however, the model needs to be adapted to local needs and expectations: regulations concerning emission levels vary; the steering wheel may have to be moved. Expectations about the quality of interior furnishings vary from Germany (where certain models are seen as robust cars for working purposes) to the UK, for example, where the car is marketed as a luxury status symbol. We have already learned of the perils of assuming the quarter pounder is a global product. The golden arches may be a global icon, but a McDonald’s burger is not the same burger everywhere. In parts of Europe and South Korea, you may drink beer with your burger. In China or Japan, the burger represents access to a “Western” experience and the target audience is students and the young. In the UK, McDonald’s advertising is aimed at children and families. Thus, the product is reconstructed by context.

There is a tendency to assume that globalization is part of an inexorable momentum. Reading history backwards creates illusions of inevitability. However, political reaction against globalization is manifest in recurrent populist demonstrations against the IMF and G7, by President Trump’s slogan “America First,” in the UK by Brexit, and at the extremist margin by organizations such as ISIS which reject globalization, secularization, and, ultimately, modernity. In our context, undoubted trends toward increased student mobility should also be modified by recognition of resistance as demonstrated, for example, in the UK Government’s refusal to distinguish foreign students from immigrants. Travel may also be curtailed for political reasons as President Trump’s selective ban signifies. In terms of student mobility, there are regions largely excluded from participation through a lack of resources and/or restrictive political barriers. The idea that globalization equates to Westernization derives, at least in part, from international inequalities.
In international education, assumptions of globalization and transnational connection may also lead to an expectation of unhampered student mobility. Shusaku Endo reflects the fragility of this assumption in his introduction to *Foreign Studies*:

There will always be a great difference between the Oriental student who travels to Europe to pursue his studies and the French student who goes to Italy. It is my belief that if we ignore this difference, we shall never be able to achieve a true dialogue between East and West, a genuine harmony between Eastern Wisdom and Western ideas (Endo, 1989: 6)

The hazards inherent in the idea of educational alignment across borders and ideologies can be illustrated further through two theoretical models at either end of a spectrum of possibility: the “liberal” and the “theological.” The metaphor of a “theological” institution does not indicate a necessarily religious alignment, rather it designates a function in which the priority is to enforce a given orthodoxy. These are not specific institutions but tendencies apparent in different contexts.

In the liberal university, the curriculum demonstrates a non-unitary approach to identity or history. It draws upon oppositional versions of knowledge. The faculty express and encourage skepticism and inculcate values that permit disassociation from establishment values. At the other end of this imaginary spectrum, the theological institution functions as a guardian of traditional values, be they religious, political, moral, or whatever. The primary objective is to transmit “truth,” not to challenge the notion of truth itself.

This theoretical polarity raises issues relevant to globalized education. Conflicting notions of what constitutes acceptable classroom behavior may be a consequence. Students coming from a broadly liberal model may have an expectation that the objective of the class is to create a field of debate in which opinions are proposed and challenged. In some environments, this expectation leads to behavior that is seen as intimidating and inappropriate. The reverse experience is also common: students from a “theological” learning model may expect the professor to be the gatekeeper of the Holy Grail of learning. Instead, they are confronted by a bewildering figure performing the role of Devil’s Advocate or agitator. The processes of teaching and learning are shaped critically by profoundly different notions of the purpose of education.
The assumption of global alignment distorts the fact that realities are constructed through diverse and subjective perspectives. Globalization may be measurable somewhere or another and it may represent welcome ideals. However, globalization also creates unease and sometimes fear. It may find expression in notions of malign conspiracies.

**Invasion of the Body Snatchers and The Big Four: fear and loathing everywhere**

**Invasion of the Body Snatchers**

In popular literature and film, it is rare to find transnational or global phenomena represented as something positive. Two examples serve to illustrate the degree to which the unknown, alien, or foreign is perceived as a threat to individuals and communities. The 1956 version of the film *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* has generated many allegorical interpretations, most obviously (given the time of production) aimed at McCarthyism and, paradoxically, the threat of Soviet ideologies.

It is also, however, an archetypal narrative that, at one end of a spectrum, may be read as an extreme example of what Brian Whalen, in a brilliant essay in this volume, calls, “psychopathological expressions of globalization.” Alien forces arrive mysteriously and begin to colonize the human community by taking over identities and personalities. A prophetic warning falls on deaf ears:

> Look, you fools. You’re in danger. Can’t you see? They’re after you. They’re after all of us. Our wives, our children, everyone. They’re here already. YOU’RE NEXT! (Siegel, 1956)

Part of the essential narrative suggests that this is the beginning of a process that will engulf the world:

> First our town...then all the towns around us. It’s a malignant disease... spreading through the whole country (Siegel, 1956)

In works of popular imagination, globalization is rarely represented as benign. Science fiction offers recurrent metaphors of the world threatened by external forces. These do not come from places with which we are familiar or which we understand. We are aware that something is happening and that it is injurious to individuals and communities, but we cannot explain it. The outcome is anxiety in the present and fear for the future. We are victims of alien conspiracies.
The basic plot of *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* has been used repeatedly to represent the dangers of intrusions. At an allegorical level, it contradicts one of the core beliefs in international education and cosmopolitan ethics: that communities are enriched by engagement with those different from themselves.

The film clearly spoke to an instinctive fear of the unknown. It drew upon a recurrent trope in science fiction, was remade three times, and was an obvious influence upon numerous other distinguished and undistinguished movies.³

There is nothing intrinsically new in fear and distrust of strangers, but globalization has served to intensify that fear. Simply put, strangers are more among us; populations are more mobile (by design or necessity). They offer a convenient scapegoat for another symptom of globalization: threat to community and identity.

**The Big Four**

Agatha Christie’s *The Big Four* (1927) pits the considerable wits of Hercule Poirot against a devilish conspiracy to take over the world. The Big Four aim for nothing less than total global control. It is, of course, a version of a common myth found in *The Protocols of The Elders of Zion*, Ian Fleming’s SPECTRE, and many other fictions: a small group of figures, malignant, powerful, with a global reach, seek to impose their will upon the “civilized world.” At the top of Christie’s version of global conspiracy is the shadowy Li Chang Yen (closely related to the dastardly Dr Fu Manchu, of Sax Rohmer’s imagination, and Ian Fleming’s Dr No).

The Big Four’s allegiances transcend their individual nations. Their strategic objective is global:

> There is in the world today a vast organization—an organization of crime. It is controlled by four individuals, who are known and spoken of as the Big Four. Number One is a Chinaman, Li Chang Yen; Number Two is the American multi-millionaire, Abe Ryland; Number Three is a Frenchwoman; Number Four…is an obscure English actor…These four

are banded together to destroy the existing social order and to replace it with an anarchy in which they would reign as dictators (Christie, 2003 [1927]: 464)

The aspirations of the Big Four are anti-humanistic, disastrous for individuals and communities. They are essentially body snatchers from earth. Global (and extraterrestrial) organizations as criminal conspiracies are part of the collective imagination. They reflect an archetypal fear that “there is a force behind the scenes which aims at nothing less than the disintegration of civilization” (Christie, 2003 [1927]: 365). This is a version of the IMF reinvented in the form of a nightmare.

Conclusion: global is good; globalization is a big headache

In higher education, internationalization is a strategy. We approve of the term “global,” littering it throughout our materials, but, paradoxically, globalization is not something that we control. It happens to us. As far as we are able to discern and articulate, it is often complex and disturbing. As we identify aspects of globalization (with ease, unease, or something in between), we are also aware of a counter global impulse towards fragmentation.

There are other contexts, of course, in which it would be possible to discern the power of globalization. Drugs, crime, and the arms trade are successful global enterprises with effective supply chain mechanisms. Social media, the international appeal of artistic production, the Internet, the consequent democratization and dissemination of information (though not necessarily knowledge or wisdom) would collectively offer evidence of momentum towards globalization. A more comprehensive approach might also consider the globalization of major sports teams who build identities and support networks that far exceed their national contexts. In soccer, by way of example, the match between Manchester United and Manchester City on December 10, 2017 was broadcast live to 189 countries. The players in that match, and in all the leading teams in world soccer, reflect patterns of transnational labor mobility. Recruitment of talent occurs on a global scale.

4 Only four nations in the world did not transmit the match: North Korea, Cuba, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Moldova. An estimated one billion people watched the match (Ducker and Edwards, 2017). An estimated one billion also watched the FIFA World Cup Final in 2014 (FIFA, 2015). The global reach of soccer is a matter of clear record.
There are many ways in which reactions to globalization could be analyzed—as a threat and as a blessing—and all points in between. An economist might focus on trade and investment. Environmentalists raise questions relating to global warming, water resources, air pollution, and fishing rights. Social geographers offer perspectives around population movements.

However, what we can measure only reflects one dimension. What globalization does to people, communities, nations, regions is a matter of dispute and conjecture. We know that something is happening, has happened, and that it has altered the lives of many. It cannot simply be explained in traditional terms of politics, policy, or progress. Statistics create a quasi-scientific measurement that is insufficient to measure emotional realities or social disruptions. The word implies process—without discernible origin or end—not an event. Where it began and where it will end is unknown.

We cannot measure fear. A sense of this unease has led me to view these processes through lenses that are necessarily oblique. I have focused, firstly, upon the deviances and disconnections that are sometimes blurred in rhetorical orthodoxies. Finally, I have chosen to explore a psychological landscape in which globalization exists, somewhere in the troubled psyche, as a force that we do not understand. We do not see this thing clearly; it is shrouded in darkness, and we are, at some profound level, deeply afraid.
I am a self-professed postmodernist and familiar with the work of the seminal cultural theorists, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, etc.—who largely laid out the bones of their arguments in the 1960s and 70s. A couple of years ago, I read The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann; this book, again written in the 1960s, is generally cited as a foundational text for the theory of social constructivism. Last year, I read Freire’s The Pedagogy of the Oppressed and then William Perry’s Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years, both published in 1970. Reading these different texts, I realized that in the 1960s and 70s in the disparate fields of sociology, education, and cultural theory, different writers came to a similar conclusion: that we construct the worlds we live in (through language, or power structures, or community, or family, or all of the above), and therefore we can question these realities, question our assumptions and truths. These writers explored the evolution of our constructions, in part through an analysis of specific structures and institutions, and in part through a discussion of the concept of relativism, or cultural relativism. They embraced the concept of difference, since if you agree with the precept that we construct our own realities, you necessarily welcome difference. My reality will never be exactly your reality. My culture is not your culture. My understanding of freedom, or anger, or even tree or chair, will not be exactly your understanding of those concepts or objects. Furthermore, as I live my life, and accumulate moments and experiences, I become an active participant in the ongoing creation of my world.

While these conclusions are viewed as fairly important within the academic context, they did not have a significant impact on the world outside academia. Even within academia, the fact that most of these writers continued to articulate and rearticulate their central themes in later works suggests that they were not fully embraced. Something about the environment or world in the 1960s and 70s allowed for the emergence of these common ideas in diverse fields, and then something got in the way and prevented them from being fully realized, as I believe they should have been, as guiding principles for how to live in the contemporary world. Certainly, some of the blame for this lies in the fact that all of the works I have referenced were only accessible primarily to an academic, or at least a highly-educated, audience. However, I also think there was another problem. In their
discussions of our constructed realities, these writers acknowledged the shared constructions that allow us to live with one another in families, communities, cities, and states, the shared constructions that create culture. They also gestured towards the possibility of developing different shared constructions, of creating new or changed cultures. This is most clear in the texts of Perry and Freire, who both had an educational project at the heart of their work. I would argue, however, that they only gestured towards this direction and failed to lay out a clear path for negotiating this transition.

If you acknowledge a constructed world (with a multitude of realities and meaning in continuous flux) and adopt the perspective that we must constantly question those constructions, how do you live? What framework or institution or structure can you use as a guide when all frameworks and institutions and structures should be questioned? More importantly, how do you make moral choices? To live in a postmodern world is destabilizing; it is frightening. It asks us to engage every moment of every day in the construction of our world, to make active, ongoing choices about how we live and relate to our ecosystem, including the other beings with whom we share our world. There is a clear need for an ethical system in a socially constructed world—we have to find our way to a set of common values that inform our actions. The crucial problem is that these thinkers illuminated a key insight about our world but failed to provide a way to live ethically within it: they were descriptive when they ultimately needed to be prescriptive.

Since these postmodern ideas were initially articulated, the world has also become increasingly globalized. Of course, globalization has been occurring in various forms for much longer, particularly depending on how you define the term. What I want to focus on here is what we might refer to as the most recent phase of globalization, beginning around the same time that Foucault and Freire were writing their seminal works. This most recent phase of globalization involves three major shifts. First is the increased movement of people. The rise of accessible, commercial air travel; the emergence of a global economy that has allowed people to be trained and employed outside of their home countries; the opening of borders as in China and the European Union; and large-scale conflicts and natural disasters that created waves of migration: these are all among the multitude of factors contributing to and increasing human mobility. The second shift is the emergence of technology that allowed people across the globe to connect and communicate despite the barriers of distance and time. Technology has changed our economic systems in fundamental ways, allowing for new
chains of production that can run through multiple nations and touch people from literally and metaphorically distant communities. Technology has also contributed to immigration and mobility as it has made it significantly easier for migrants to communicate with and send capital back to family and friends in the home country. The third shift is the spread of capitalism, which is interwoven with the other two shifts and, in fact, can be considered the driver for this last phase of globalization. The growth of capital is the reason for many of the other changes, including the opening of borders, increased trade across nations, human mobility, technological progress etc. This last phase of globalization could be considered synonymous with so-called “turbo-capitalism.”

As global capital has transformed our world, it has created what I would call a “lived postmodern world.” The flat world that Thomas Friedman described in his 2005 book is a shifting landscape, where material, digital, and cultural changes happen more quickly and impact more people. As this process unfolds, it forces confrontations with difference. It is difficult in today’s developed world (and in many parts of the developing world as well) to reach the age of eighteen without gaining some understanding of relativism and, particularly, cultural relativity. At the very least, most people experience a variety of physical, virtual, and media worlds in their daily lives and have likely been confronted with a destabilizing of their version of “reality,” a sense that the values and structures they hold sacred may not be the values and structures others hold sacred, a sense that there may not be just one Truth, one perspective, or one right answer. Of course, there are many individuals and communities who have not benefited from globalization or from the global systems of capital. However, for the most part, these populations are still connected to, or impacted by, the globalizing world. As a result, even these communities and individuals experience a world that is defined by difference, speed, and movement. These experiences may be at a distance, via virtual or digital spaces, or more about a felt impact than an actual confrontation with difference, but they still serve to place the community within the globalized and diverse world: for example, job losses in rural or manufacturing communities, the trend of young people moving away from home to urban centers, hearing political rhetoric about immigrants, or turning on the television to see a show with a homosexual character, a cartoon that incorporates Spanish language, or a news program with images of African-Americans rioting in a town not that different from home. Ultimately, even the communities that remain truly homogenous or “traditional” still exist within a decentered world.
As we have either become more comfortable with a culturally relative reality, or have been forced to acknowledge some degree of cultural relativism, we have also learned to analyze the assumptions and institutions we take for granted. This has, of course, led to revelations about the underlying hierarchies and systems of power and privilege. A postmodern suspicion of institutions and, by extension, of grand or meta-narratives, is particularly strong among those populations most impacted by globalization and most likely to be immersed in a world where difference is a daily reality. Furthermore, in our globalized world, more and more of us can choose which identities to take on, which communities to enter, what cultures to ally with—this means that more institutions have become voluntary associations. This does not necessarily make these structures weaker, but it does make them more susceptible to change, as members come and go and as members who have chosen to participate also choose to participate on their own terms—potentially fueling changes to the institution itself. All of this has resulted in a generalized deinstitutionalizing of our world, with fewer meta-narratives offering broad frameworks for how to live. It is important to note that this process of deinstitutionalization also impacts ethical systems—including for example, different religions, humanism, etc. These systems fit uneasily into the lived postmodern world since they are largely born of institutions and structures whose fault lines of power and bias have been exposed. In addition, in a relativistic world, different ethical systems coexist simultaneously, which becomes a significant challenge as we confront global problems that require some consensus around values. Cultural relativity is posited as an end point, but from an ethical or even a practical standpoint, that makes no sense: if all we can agree on is that we value each other’s disparate values and ways of life, how do we move forward in a globalized world where problems and successes extend way beyond cultural and national borders?

We do, however, have one central and centralizing narrative, and it is the one I referenced as the driver for this last phase of globalization: capitalism itself. Capitalism emerges from the vacuum left by the collapse of other grand narratives and global systems. In many ways, this is no surprise, particularly given the meta-narrative of capitalism versus Communism that dominated global discourse and perceptions from Post-World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. By the time Communism collapses, the processes of capitalist globalization are well under way, so that even countries that remain Communist, notably China, adapt their Communism to allow for capitalism—at least as much as possible—without changes
in governance. Furthermore, by the 1980s and 1990s, we see the emergence of the concept of neoliberalism. Particularly in the United States, the neoliberal project depends heavily on the idea that capitalism is not only the dominant global system, but is, in fact, a common good. In a similar way, neoconservatives, particularly in the 2000s, have sought to export not just democracy but capitalist democracy, again relying on the idea that there is a moral imperative behind this movement. Essentially, in the absence of a global ethics, in a world increasingly marked by plurality and relativity, capitalism becomes the default ethics. The problem, of course, is that capitalism in of itself is a morally bankrupt system. The only value capitalism understands is monetary value, and thus the only acceptable definition of progress within capitalism is the sustained growth of capital, at the expense of any other value.

It is crucial to note here that the meta-narrative of capitalism is built within the lived postmodern world. It is the very fact that the world becomes postmodern that allows capitalism to step into the breach and emerge as the dominant global system. In a postmodern world, the only system or narrative that can survive and become dominant is a system that is extremely nimble: capitalism can and does function across diverse cultures, environments, and governance systems. Moreover, it is extremely adaptable and can accommodate within it myriad ethical systems and changes without disrupting the overarching desire for continuous growth (of capital). Take, for example, “green industry” which addresses environmentalism with a wealth of new products when a truly environmental stance would require a reduction of products. In his essay, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Gilles Deleuze compares the older systems of discipline described by Foucault (1975) with the contemporary capitalist régime:

Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” (Deleuze, 1992: 4)

Essentially the earlier versions of capitalism and other dominant institutions relied on fixed limits and definitions in order to maintain power structures. Contemporary capitalism, on the other hand, relies on its ability constantly to shift and evolve, absorbing new elements without ever disrupting the fundamental structure of capitalism itself. Capitalism has become a postmodern institution.
The most significant disruptions or resistances to the emergence of the lived postmodern world and the process of capitalist globalization have occurred since 1999 and have been triggered by a number of different factors. Chief among them are the economic recessions, the “War on Terror,” the increasingly visible impact of climate change, and several different conflicts across the globe. These events have drawn attention to a number of issues including the growing inequalities in both the developing, and, increasingly, the developed world; the crises of climate change; the challenges of supporting enormous refugee populations; the challenges of exporting capitalist democracy, etc. Ultimately, events across the globe since 1999 have revealed some of the holes within the capitalist “ethical framework.” In a column in the New York Times, Miya Tokumitsu writes:

> The popular myth that profit and social justice can go hand in hand underlies every would-be ethical business venture... The problem is that the market makes entrepreneurs choose between maximizing profit and transferring to workers the full returns of their productivity. All employers are forced into this choice, no matter how socially progressive (Tokumitsu, n. p., 2017)

Of course, as I already discussed, the capitalist system is remarkably effective at hiding its own problems so while attention has been drawn to a number of issues across the globe, the reactions vary, as does the placement of blame.

Ultimately, this complex series of changes is at the heart of the current polarization occurring in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. On one side, there is a culture that welcomes the postmodern and values change and the questioning of knowledge and beliefs—this culture consists largely of the communities who have benefited in some way from globalization, or diversity, or both. It is also a culture that is generally more urban and more mobile, with both factors contributing to the level of comfort with cultural relativity, instability, and change. On the other side there is a culture that values stability, and fixed knowledge and beliefs. This culture values meta-narratives because they provide consistent and coherent structures that cut through the complexities and instabilities of our world. We might perhaps call them both meta-cultures, as they extend across the globe and appear in many different national, regional, and identity-based cultures.
However, both of these meta-cultures operate within the lived postmodern world and thus can and do take advantage of the fluidity of a postmodern stance. For example, both meta-cultures have been strengthened by the manipulation of facts, opinions, and morals that can occur in an entirely culturally-relative world. The rise of fake news, the righteousness with which facts can be dismissed, and the hierarchizing of emotion and opinion over fact are all products of a postmodern framework. If reality is all constructed anyway, who is to say that my reality is not just as real as yours? Who is to say that my reality is not as—or more—moral than yours? Both meta-cultures also exhibit a desire for a simpler world, a nostalgia for the reliability of meta-narratives, of a dualistic worldview, where everything is black and white. On one side, this manifests as a return to nationalism, increasing interest in and defense of orthodox or extreme religions, or the demonizing of different Others. On the other side, it manifests in more subtle ways: identity politics, for example, proffers the safety of a specific identity, a reification of fixed categories, and by extension, an implied binary of me/you. These two responses or techniques—taking advantage of the fluidity of reality and values and taking advantage of the resistance to that fluidity—are two sides of the same coin.

To begin to address the current state of polarization in our lived postmodern world, we must first confront the core problem of capitalism. Capitalism as it exists now does not allow for an ethics based on anything other than capital itself, and, by extension, capitalism is ultimately unsustainable, at least for anyone who believes that other values, any values (environment, equality, etc.) should be at the very least as important as monetary growth. Once we have acknowledged this, we need to construct a new global ethics, one that takes as its foundational stance a postmodern or culturally-relative perspective. It must be an ethical system that allows for movement and change, a system that encourages difference and questioning. This new global ethics must also be an ethics of the Other, a moral order that is responsive to the living beings and ecosystems around us. In his developmental model, William Perry suggests a phase beyond cultural relativity—“commitment in relativity” (Perry, 1968). Yet Perry’s commitment seems more focused on self-actualization, and I would argue for a commitment to the Other in relativity, a commitment that understands the Other to include not just other humans but our environment as well, an ecocentric rather than an anthropocentric perspective. Similarly, I would argue for a new understanding of the concepts of Self, Other, and identity, an understanding that is more fluid and expansive than our current conceptualizations. In their book Common-
wealth, Hardt and Negri describe instead the singularity, which is defined by its relations with Others, its own internal multiplicity and difference, and the fact that it “is always engaged in a process of becoming different” (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 338-339). In a system of this type, values would only be able to be understood through dialogue between and among singularities. As Saul Newman states in his book *The Politics of Postanarchism*: “an individual’s freedom is only thinkable through the freedom of others; freedom is relational and communal” (Newman, 2010: 55). This same premise could be applied to other values and concepts, such that the system of ethics is premised on ongoing engagement within communities and ecosystems. I propose then, a new global ethics that is postmodern: an ethics that is continuously constructed through our own multiplicity and mutability, an ethics that arises from the commons, the shared spaces where a global future of equality, liberty, and solidarity might still be possible.
Psychopathological Expressions of Globalization

Brian Whalen, The Forum on Education Abroad

Depression and home

In the 1980s, I worked for several years in psychiatric settings: in a psychiatric hospital, a mental health clinic, and a county jail. In conducting many interviews and leading counseling sessions with mostly young adults, I observed that a majority of patients suffered from depression and anxiety characterized by a deep longing for an identity and a secure place in their lives that had somehow eluded them. This was especially true during the few years that I worked in a psychiatric hospital in Dallas, Texas during the J.R. Ewing boom years, when nearly everyone who lived in “Big D” was full of optimism for the future in a culture where people were brash and bigger than life.

Dallas was growing in population at an astounding rate during those years with people moving from the Northeast and the Midwest to follow their dreams in a boomtown that offered seemingly limitless opportunities. However, many young adults who accompanied their families expressed something wholly different. They appeared at the hospital suffering from depression, and a significant number were suicidal. A majority of these patients described their nostalgia for a lost time and place and a deep unease with their current life situation. Parents of these young adults were confused and upset about how their sons and daughters had not adjusted to the new lives and the fresh starts that these families were pursuing. This counseling work, in part, led to my doctoral research that examined the themes of home and homelessness, especially as they appear in American literature, which was later summarized in a book chapter (Romanyshyn and Whalen, 1987).

Depression has historically been linked to nostalgia for a lost literal or imagined home. In his sweeping history of depression, Stanley Jackson traces the syndrome as far back as the Ancient Greeks and finds that throughout history, the symptoms of depression remain remarkably consistent. One of these symptoms is nostalgia for a lost home or homeland, which, during the nineteenth century, became a common medical diagnosis (Jackson, 1986). My research argued that the question of home has been a central problem within the American experience, finding expression not only in the
psychiatric setting, but also as a primary theme in literature and culture. I probed the root relationship between Self and place by analyzing how they are, and how they are not, connected within individual experiences as well as within the US literary tradition. This work was informed by the Swiss psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, who viewed the American Self as perpetually coming to terms with a root psychological bifurcation: whether to remain at home, live on Main Street, and fashion a life at the writing desk, fireplace, and altar; or to traverse the open road and explore the vast frontier with all the freedom that it promises. Erikson lamented that Americans have to identify with either the “sedentary” or the “migratory” pole of experience, and he thought this had to be an either/or choice since there is no US cultural epic or narrative of the Self that tells the story of rhythmic psychological departures and returns. For Erikson, this explains individual pathologies of various forms that spring from the suffocating dreams of homes that entrap children or propel them to seek meaning and purpose far away from home (Erikson, 1978: 293).

Fifty years or so before Erikson, Freud tackled a similar question in his *Civilization and its Discontents*, a work that he preferred to have translated into English as “Man’s Discomfort in Civilization,” in order to emphasize the inner struggles that individuals face in an often hostile outer world (Garon and Maclachlan, 2006: 1). In this essay, Freud observed that civilization both comforts and destroys in often conflicting and ambiguous ways. He explores the inherent tension between people and the world that we create. Looking at this through the lens of Erickson’s theory, we might say that we create our home in the world only to be imprisoned by it or freed from it. For Freud, humanity’s creation of civilization yields the same self-inflicted, ironic pathologies. It provides the illusion of comfort, security, and identity, but reveals itself as foreign, threatening, and destructive; the Self seeks pleasure and happiness which is impeded by the civilization that humanity creates. Freud’s Self has little hope for adapting to civilization through innovating. It is static, either stuck within the confines of civilization, or it retreats from civilization to pursue its pleasures.

And now, one hundred years after Freud, and fifty years or so after Erikson’s landmark work, globalization has brought about a more complex and rapid clash of multiple civilizations, ideas, and threats to the individual than perhaps even Freud could have imagined. In his book, *Discontent and Its Civilizations*, Mohsin Hamid writes:
Globalization is a brutal phenomenon. It brings us mass displacement, wars, terrorism, unchecked financial capitalism, inequality, xenophobia, climate change (Hamid, 2015: 1)

These negative consequences of globalization have tested individuals seeking to find a secure place in the world and fashion a stable identity. Globalization has made the psychology of displacement identified by Freud a much more complex experience. While for Freud an individual was seen as being in conflict with a civilization with which he or she identifies, an increasing number of individuals in a globalized world have multiple cultures and civilizations that challenge their sense of Self and sense of place on an ongoing basis. We are more connected than ever before, yes, but also more disconnected and displaced.

**Psychopathologies of globalization**

Evidence for this can be seen in the results of a wide range of psychological research studies conducted over the past twenty years. We may view this research in two ways: first, it provides information about the psychological impacts of globalization; and, second, the research itself is a reflection or expression of globalization.

This research includes Arnett's work with adolescents. Arnett noted that “in a globalized world people have to face the challenge of adapting not only to their local culture but also to the global society” (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 34). As a consequence, we develop a bicultural identity, part of which is rooted in our local culture, and another that is attuned to and identified by the global situation. While some may achieve a hybrid identity that successfully combines elements of both, Arnett has observed an increase in identity confusion among young people in non-Western cultures. As Hermans and Dimaggio point out, “As local cultures are challenged and changed as a result of globalization, some young people feel themselves at home in neither the local situation nor the global situation.” Their research reveals that “globalization evokes localization as its counterforce” because of the uncertainties that globalization causes in the individual (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 34).

Other research on trends in psychopathology demonstrates a rapid increase in, and prevalence of, psychological illnesses that appear as responses to globalization. These so-called “identity disturbances” include borderline personality disorder and eating disorders, characterized by
“patients who are faced with a disorganizing instability of the Self and the impossibility of choosing a limited number of favorite and stable positions to help them to find a meaningful direction in their lives” (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 37). According to Hermans and Dimaggio, more extreme examples of a psychopathological response to globalization relate to personality or identity disorders, and these have become much more common with increased globalization:

psychiatrists maintain that we are facing an epidemic of multiple personality disorder (or, to use its more recent name, dissociative identity disorder). Whereas up until 1980, no more than 100 of these cases had been diagnosed...the number of multiple personality diagnoses have increased dramatically since then (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 37)

As defined by the American Psychiatric Association, these psychopathologies related to identity reveal a self in conflict with itself:

Dissociative Identity Disorder reflects a failure to integrate various aspects of identity, memory, and consciousness into a single multidimensional self. Usually, a primary identity carries the individual’s given name and is passive, dependent, guilty, and depressed. However, when in control, each personality state, or alter, may be experienced as if it has a distinct history, self-image and identity. The alters’ characteristics—including name, reported age and gender, vocabulary, general knowledge, and predominant mood—contrast with those of the primary identity. Certain circumstances or stressors can cause a particular alter to emerge. The various identities may deny knowledge of one another, be critical of one another or appear to be in open conflict (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 292)

It is interesting to note the ways that the manifestation of these illnesses has changed in an age of globalization. For example, the number of “alters,” or personality states, has increased over the past thirty years:

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the few patients with these kinds of troubles were simply “double personalities.” At the end of the same century, patients diagnosed with multiple personality disorder were frequently found to have a great variety of alters, at some extremes numbering in the hundreds. Not only the number but also the nature of alters have changed. In earlier diagnoses, typical symptoms
included alters that were ascribed to the etiology of the dysfunction: for example, childlike positions and persecutors, in case of a diagnosed history of child abuse. Today, however, alters show increasing variation. Frequently they have names of characters in soap operas, TV movies, and comedies, some of them being the opposite sex and differing in race, religion and age (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 37–38).

Hermans and Dimaggio point out that this kind of wide pathological variation is not seen in other pathologies such as schizophrenia, whose cause may be more of a more genetic nature. And they therefore observe that some psychologists propose that cultural changes in the realm of psychopathology reflect the increasing density and heterogeneity of identity positions in a globalized age. The various alters are acted out, to use a theater metaphor, because the stage of globalization has a multiplicity of roles for them (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 38).

Hermans and Dimaggio also review a significant body of research that documents emotional responses to globalization, identity formation, and place. For example, Kinnval has argued that global changes have intensified what he calls “ontological insecurity” and “existential uncertainty” (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 40). He notes that a primary way of responding to these experiences is to seek reaffirmation by drawing closer to any localized group that is seen as capable of reducing uncertainty and insecurity. In particular, institutionalized religion and nationalism are identity markers in times of rapid change and uncertain futures. Kinvall also points to the significance of “home” as a bearer of certainty and security and as constituting a spatial context in which daily routines can be reformed in rather stabilized circumstances. Whereas for many individuals, feeling at home in a family, neighborhood, workplace, or religious group may be a self-evident part of their life situation, for other people, particularly immigrants, refugees, and those living in diaspora, homes have to be actively created. In this context, Kinvall refers to the phenomenon of “homesteading” as a strategy for coping with homelessness:

In new and uncertain circumstances, people shape a political space for themselves in order to cope with the uneasiness and anxieties of homelessness. This may motivate people to become part of an exile community and to create common places of assembly. Of course, the tendency to create homes when separated from one’s homeland has been part of the (voluntary as well as forced) immigrant experience.
throughout history. However, the increasing global immigration gulfs have stimulated a process of homesteading on a larger scale than ever before in history (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 40)

These psychological responses to, and expressions of, globalization are perhaps more extreme than what most people experience on a daily basis. I suggest that it is best to view these not as two extreme possibilities: being either in psychological distress versus being psychologically healthy. Rather, most of us exist on a psychological spectrum and fall somewhere in between these two poles. From the perspective of identity, Self, and place, our lives have become more complex in an age of globalization. And all of us have to take up the challenge of negotiating who we are and where we belong in new ways. It is clear that the psychological experience of globalization varies widely. How do we remain psychologically healthy and balanced? How do we cope, and thrive, in a world that poses challenges to a stable Self? How is it possible to confront, and incorporate, these various voices and narratives in which we are engaged? In an age of dislocation, how do we embrace and make multiple places our homes in which we can live and function effectively? Psychological theories and research provide some answers.

**Reinventing Self in a global age**

It is particularly interesting that these answers are inspired by the theory of the Self as proposed by William James, especially his view that an individual is actually a collection of multiple selves engaged in a variety of roles that alternate to fit the situation at hand, what I have described elsewhere as James’ “pragmatic cosmopolitanism” (Whalen, 2013). James’ theory of the Self goes hand in hand with living in a globalized world. For James, the Self is perpetually engaged in dialogical relationships on multiple levels and in a myriad of ways, and because of this, always has the potential to reinvent itself. Hermans and Dimaggio call this the “innovative power of dialogues” which characterizes our relationships with other people, situations, places, information, thoughts, ideas, and imaginings, the steady stream of experience with which we come in daily contact, and what James famously called the “stream of consciousness” (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 49).

The idea here is that globalization creates novelty, contradictions, and ambiguities, challenging us continually to reorient ourselves, and in the process adapt to changing situations. According to this theory, “the most
straightforward way in which the [S]elf can be innovated is when new positions are introduced that lead to the reorganization of a person’s repertoire in such a way that the [S]elf becomes more adaptive and flexible in a variety of circumstances” (Hermans and Dimaggio, 2007: 49). The point is that globalization has brought about more opportunities for acting in a wider variety of roles in which we are challenged to rewrite our self-narratives and alter our identities. The conditions for innovating and re-creating the Self are greater now than ever before.

In this regard, James is a much more relevant psychological theorist than Freud for our globalized age. James envisioned the individual as a collection of selves playing various roles at various times on the stage of a “pluralistic universe” that is open-ended and full of possibilities. For contemporary theorists that find inspiration in James, the contented Self is able to create its place in the world by being open to new people and ideas, adjusting to new situations that arise. For many people, these adjustments are a matter of life and death, and their situations can be overwhelming. Others, however, have the freedom and opportunity to seek ways to reshape their identities by expanding and embracing the experiences brought about by globalization, opportunities that are afforded by the Internet, travel, forced or free mobility, and exposure to new people, ideas, and beliefs.

From a psychological perspective, globalization finds expression in the psychopathologies of people who find it difficult to adapt to our contemporary world. For them, globalization brings discontent. On the other end of the spectrum are those who are able to embrace the opportunities of globalization and create multiple selves that are at home in multiple places and in multiple roles. For them, globalization is a means to self-fulfillment.

**Conclusion**

The relevance of the psychological experience of globalization for education abroad is, I hope, obvious. For all of us living in this increasingly globalized world, we are confronted continuously with challenges both to our sense of Self and to our sense of place. The psychological stress caused by globalization is perhaps most acute during the international education experience, when one’s identity and one’s sense of place in the world are challenged the most.
Yet, it is precisely during these sojourns that the opportunities to reinvent oneself are most ripe. The question is, then, how can we best embrace these opportunities for ourselves and facilitate them for our students? Transcending the boundaries of Self, culture, and society through education abroad can lead to the discovery that Self and place are transient, relative, and more in flux than they seemed to be prior to departing on one’s sojourn. The realization that global forces and interactions shape personal identities and localities can be stressful, even terrifying for some.

However, this can also be liberating, and herein lies the paradox, as well as the opportunity, of education abroad. Beyond the experience of the stress of globalization lies the possibility to discover a newfound freedom to reinvent ourselves, to refashion who we are and where we belong in the world. How can we move beyond the stress of globalization to embrace these opportunities for ourselves and to facilitate them for our students?

At a minimum, we ought to focus more on opportunities for the reinvention of identity through education abroad. The refashioning of one’s sense of Self and one’s place in the world is a deep “value-added” dimension of education abroad that can be addressed explicitly in the education abroad curriculum and cocurriculum, as well as in student development approaches, programs, and services. Encouraging students through multiple means to reflect upon their sense of Self and place and to engage in new roles that challenge them will help students to achieve the pragmatic cosmopolitanism to keep them in step with our global age.
Revolt on the Right? Global Inequality, the Rise of Populism, and the Challenges to Globalization

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This short paper represents a modest attempt to articulate and explain the most significant political development of recent years in the UK to American students: the decision of the United Kingdom referendum to leave the European Union (referred to as Brexit). Many students, and indeed faculty, may connect the Brexit vote to the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America. Outside of the “Anglosphere,” these events are often viewed as part of a wider paradigm shift towards “populist” politics, variously held to be on the rise or to be waning, dependent on the fortunes of political parties across the democratic world, but principally in Europe. My title is to some degree a questioning of the terms of the debate set out in Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin’s 2014 work *Revolt on the Right*, albeit that the authors’ subtitle, *Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*, makes it clear that the focus of their study is exclusively the UK.

The parameters of this paper are limited to the ambition to review some of the emerging literature that may be of assistance in understanding the political, economic, and social shaping of our world. Beyond Ford and Goodwin’s analysis of the rise of anti-EU and anti-mass migration politics in the UK, David Goodhart’s *Road to Somewhere* (2017) proposes a thesis that political identities of Left versus Right, Liberal versus Conservative are giving way to a new and largely binary division between cosmopolitan “Anywheres” and the “Somewheres” who are more rooted in national and local identities.

Drawing back from partisan politics, Branko Milanovic’s 2016 study, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*, contextualizes recent political developments within a detailed framework of how the age of “peak globalization” has created widely different outcomes, creating winners and losers, across the last thirty years. Milanovic’s research draws the reader to the question of whether a spectrum of political movements termed as “populist” should be understood solely as Right-Wing, when the successes of movements of the Left in Greece, Italy, Spain, and even the UK, attest that the challenges to globalization may come from the Left as well as the Right.
Jonathan Haidt’s *The Righteous Mind* (2012) proposes six moral values that, he suggests, constitute the basis of political and religious beliefs, and which offer a helpful lens for understanding the mutual incomprehension and increasingly bitter tribalism that seems to be in evidence in democratic politics, media, and social media discourse. A similar culture may also be seen in the academy, for example controversies over free speech, “no-platforming,” and safe-space policies.

Haidt’s work is prefaced by a quote from Baruch Spinoza that may serve as a reminder for social scientists, whether seeking to facilitate education or hoping to influence processes of change: “I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, not to hate them, but to understand them” (Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus* (1676), as quoted in Haidt (2012)).

**The case of Brexit**

The city of Sunderland is located in the North West of England, with a population of 275,300 recorded in the 2011 UK Census, with 94.8 percent recorded as “white British.” Historically, it was a trading seaport with shipbuilding and coal industries. The collapse of shipbuilding in the mid-twentieth century was followed by substantial regeneration, and Sunderland is now home to Nissan’s UK manufacturing base which has the largest car production figures for the UK (BBC News, 2015). Politically the three Sunderland constituencies have been held by the UK Labour Party, on the political Left, with only Sunderland South having seen electoral success for the right-of-center Conservative Party once, in 1953.

In the early hours of June 24, 2016, the people of Sunderland returned a vote for the UK to leave the European Union. This had been anticipated by pollsters, who predicted a six percent majority for the Leave campaign. Yet the final vote in Sunderland was sixty-one to thirty-nine percent, a majority of twenty-two percent for Leave. This was an indication of what was to follow. Pollsters, for Remain and Leave, were evidently shocked as live TV coverage followed the subsequent referendum results, and the value of the pound sterling dropped by three percent in an instant response to this vote.

A reading of Ford and Goodwin’s study of the rise of what they term “the radical Right” in Britain offered signs that the shift inherent in the scale of Sunderland’s rejection of the EU had been developing within sections of the British electorate for many years. Their research explains how the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), having started as a pressure group
focused primarily on constitutional concerns, a hostility to European federalizing processes, and defense of British sovereignty, at first enjoyed only limited electoral success—mainly among former Conservative voters. Their research explains how the party evolved to build “a cross-partisan coalition of left-behind, working-class Britons” and grew from a fringe movement to a political force with meaningful influence (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 13). The party effectively migrated from its foundations in opposition to EU treaty law and defence of the pound sterling to capitalize on opposition to mass migration, a phenomenon accentuated by the UK decision to grant immediate access to its labor market for the ten EU “accession states,” notably Poland, which joined the EU in May 2004. Ford and Goodwin chronicle the success of this new approach in polling data: in May 2013, UKIP took 24.2 percent of the vote in South Shields, a post-industrial community blighted with one of the highest levels of unemployment in the UK, and less than five miles from the city of Sunderland (2014: 13).5

Ford and Goodwin suggest in their introduction that this new political force in the UK remains poorly understood (2014: 1-19). In the three years that have passed since their work was published, the Brexit result, the election of President Trump, and a number of other electoral outcomes, such as the 2017 Austrian elections with the entry into coalition of the Freedom Party, appear to vindicate their warnings. Most of these movements have been broadly defined as populist and many have been denounced as racist or xenophobic. The aim of this paper is to seek to comprehend these trends in the UK and other Western democracies and what implications they hold for the future of increasingly diverse societies in a highly globalized world.

In a radio interview for LBC, a London talk-radio station, on April 4, 2006, the then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, dismissed UKIP as “a bunch of fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists” (BBC News, 2006). A parallel might be drawn with Senator Hilary Clinton’s September 2016 speech in which she described half of Donald Trump’s supporters as “a basket of deplorables” (Chozick, 2016). In retrospect, and in view of the referendum majority for the Brexit vote and the election of Mr Trump, both speeches have been castigated for representing the views of “liberal elites” and denigrating large sections of the respective electorates of the UK and the US.

5 For more detailed analysis of the electoral progress of UKIP and breakdowns of UKIP’s share of the vote, constituency results, and voter concerns, see Chapter Two “Becoming A Serious Contender” and Chapter Six, especially data tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and Chapter Seven, particularly figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).
One area of criticism that might be leveled at Ford and Goodwin is that their focus on the alienation of largely white and older British citizens does not adequately explore the attitudes in other sections of the British population. The writer and journalist, Dreda Say Mitchell, was one of a number of black and ethnic minority Britons to support the Brexit vote openly, asserting that her concerns were not about “bent bananas or migrants on the take: it’s about democracy” (Say Mitchell, 2016).

In the aftermath of the vote, the British politician-turned-pollster, Lord Ashcroft, revealed research that suggested that twenty-seven percent of Black Britons, thirty-three percent of Mixed-Race Britons, and fifty-two percent of Sikh Britons supported Brexit (Lambert, 2016). Any assumption that Britons with ancestral heritage from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean would overwhelmingly support the campaign to remain within the EU might need to account for data that suggested many so-called “Black and Minority Ethnic” (BAME) citizens shared concerns over the European Union and/or the significant number of EU migrants entering the UK since 2004. Nevertheless, as with other Leave supporters, the reasons for Euroskepticism among Black Britons may owe more to socio-economic factors than the specific politics of the EU per se.

In March 2012, the Evening Standard newspaper ran a special report on the sharp decline in employment opportunities for young black men faced with the economic slowdown after the 2008 financial crisis, as well as increased competition from EU nationals in the UK labor market. One interviewee, a thirty-nine-year-old Black British plasterer who had been on and off “the dole”6 for some years, explained how his situation shifted when the EU expanded, bringing an influx of cheap Eastern European labor which had particularly impacted BAME laborers:

Even though white people were getting pushed out as well, it wasn’t at such a rate as black… [W]hite contractors have mostly moved to Essex and Kent, where there is a clique of white labourers (Evening Standard, 2012)

Beyond the cacophony of print and social media, or the bitter and divided views on the outcomes of such democratic exercises, the writing of David Goodhart offers one thesis for what might yet come to be seen as a paradigm shift in the politics of Britain and other democratic states. In

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6 A colloquial term used in the UK for unemployment benefit.
addition, a wider analysis of economic trends in the Western world and the perceived impact of globalization in wealth creation or stagnation across different demographics of the populations of such countries is provided by Branko Milanovic’s 2016 study, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*, which offers a broader framework to understand—and, perhaps eventually, to navigate—this new age of populist politics.

In *The Road to Somewhere* (2017), Goodhart builds on some of the themes of his previous work in *The British Dream* (2014), questioning the levels of migration in the UK and their impact on the social solidarity that underpins consensus on taxation for the welfare state. His main thesis is that established political divides of Right and Left are in decline and giving way to new identities that he categorizes as “Somewheres” and “Anywheres.” He argues that those who voted “Leave” were said to be Britain’s losers: the left behind, the white working class of the Midlands and the North, but supplemented by older people from everywhere and Conservative southerners. Their experiences and worldviews diverged dramatically from the core Remain voters, who were winners: optimistic, young, educated and middle class, living in the big metropolitan centres and university towns (Goodhart, 2017: 19).

Goodhart broadly defines the “Anywhere” identity as applying to “cognitive elites” and “cultural creatives,” those people who are better educated and more connected to the knowledge economy. Such people have more cosmopolitan identities and are enthusiasts for globalization in some form. He contrasts these with the “Somewheres,” those who are generally older, less-educated, and more rooted in local or national identities. Crucially, this theory of new political classes also suggests that the “Somewheres” tend to be employed in industries or services that are more susceptible to competition from outsourcing or migration. In short, these are the people who feel they are losing out from globalization. The author cites research from Ian Gordon of the London School of Economics that shows wages in the bottom twenty percent of the UK working population may have been depressed by at least fifteen percent in the period of peak migratory in-flows from 1997 onwards (2017: 140).
Goodhart’s work speaks almost entirely to the UK experience and his ideas focus closely on political outcomes and identities. He posits that the “Anywheres” account for roughly fifty percent of the population, whereas the “Somewheres,” despite being more politically influential, account for only around twenty to twenty-five percent with a further twenty-five percent who are not strongly associated with either camp. In view of how closely run the Brexit referendum was (a fifty-two to forty-eight percent outcome) for Goodhart’s estimate of figures to be true, those forces who were pro-EU and more open to globalization would have needed to outperform the Leave camp by an overwhelming margin. The Remain camp would have had to gain twenty-three out of twenty-five available percentage points of those not strongly committed one way or another. This somehow feels doubtful.

Therefore, I think that it is more helpful to situate the rise of anti-EU, anti-globalization political identities (and I specifically suggest that these are plural rather than monolithic) within the context of broader global trends. To this end, Branko Milanovic’s 2016 study, *Global Inequality*, offers a timely and informative account of the global dynamics of wealth and inequality. His focus on income growth in the twenty-year period from 1988 to 2008 illuminates some important data on where exactly incomes are rising, stagnating, or declining across key demographic groups around the world. Milanovic’s research builds on the work of Simon Kuznets who has analyzed the long-term waves of economic growth and income inequality as well as encompassing perspectives drawn from Fanon, Marx, and more recently, Thomas Picketty. One particular element of Milanovic’s book has captured the attention of newspaper editors, offering as it does a striking visual shorthand by which busy twenty-first century Internet browsers can locate a ready explanation for the comparatively recent and increasingly widespread alienation with our ever more interconnected global economy. His so-called “Elephant Curve” (figure 1) offers a breakdown of the relative gains in real per capita income across the percentiles of global income level in the years of “peak globalization,” defined as from 1988 (just one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall) to 2008 (immediately before the global financial crisis, widely regarded as the worst economic downturn since the 1930s).
As the curve clearly demonstrates, the gains from globalization are not evenly distributed. By showing relative percentage gains in real household per capita income across distribution points from the poorest global ventile, at five percent, to the richest at 100 percent, the graph shows incomes rising by fifty to eighty percent across the reporting period for those between the fifteenth percentile and seventieth percentile of global income. This is particularly attributed to the rising incomes of the middle classes in China and other emerging economies such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Yet the very poorest of the world remain locked out from income growth. The other notable winners are the global elite, the so-called “one percent,” although the graph indicates that in fact the top three or four percent of the world’s wealthiest people have enjoyed a thirty to sixty percent growth in income. However, we should be clear that similar proportional growth rates across the fifty-fifth and hundredth percentile translate to very different outcomes in terms of real wealth.

This graph thus offers a powerful explanation for the alienation of large sections of British and other developed economies’ electorates from the politics of a more open and interconnected world, as represented by the EU. It demonstrates unambiguously a trend of stark decline experienced

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7 Statistical term referring to one twentieth of a population distribution.
8 For example, thirty percent growth on US$ 100,000 income per annum is far greater than eighty percent growth on US$ 4755, the average Chinese private sector salary in 2012 (Trading Economics, 2018).
by those within the sixtieth and eightieth percentiles of global income distribution. The “trunk” of the inequality “Elephant Curve” shows that people falling within this band of the global economy experienced declining cumulative income gains ranging from seventy percent gains in income growth at the sixtieth percentile to effectively zero percent growth at the eightieth percentile. This represents a sharp downturn in the fortunes of the working and middle classes of the developed world. For Milanovic, this group is defined as the “lower middle class of the rich world,” and their experience of relative decline demonstrates that they are certainly not winners of globalization (Milanovic, 2016).

The political implications of such disparities, particularly of relative economic decline, are complex, indicating the intersection of socio-economic and intergenerational forces which are currently re-shaping the British political landscape. For example, in the wider debate about political “Populism” it is sometimes overlooked that movements loosely defined under this term may be on the political Left as much as the Right. In the UK, the close focus on an emergent “Revolt on the Right,” as discussed by Ford and Goodwin, may now be giving way to greater attention to the emergence of a political Left which openly acknowledges ideological links to socialism or Marxism. For example, Rosa Prince’s Comrade Corbyn (2016) is one of several recent studies of the meteoric rise of the UK Leader of the Opposition and veteran Left-Wing politician Jeremy Corbyn, whose popular appeal, particularly among young Britons, closely resembles that of Bernie Sanders in the USA. The growth of the Momentum movement in the British Labour Party is a new political force notable for youthful membership, strong online presence, and support for policies much further to the Left than Tony Blair’s “New Labour” which became dominant in the 1990s and openly embraced aspects of free-market liberalism.

This picture of economic decline among many of the working populations in the developed world appears to resonate with much of David Goodhart’s analysis of the knowledge economy and what he terms “economic demoralization” in The Road to Somewhere. For Goodhart, the deindustrialization of the UK economy reflects “the grand bargain of globalization,” the assumption that as physically-demanding manufacturing jobs were exported or “outsourced” to countries where labor costs were cheaper, redundant workforces would be re-equipped to move up the skill chain. Crucially, he notes that in reality this promise simply did not materialize for many. Goodhart draws here on the insight of economists such as Bob Rowthorne who argue that what has emerged in practice is a polarized “dual economy”
in which thirty-five to forty percent of people work in high productivity, high income jobs, while another thirty-five percent work in low productivity, poorly-paid service employment (Goodhart, 2017: 147-162). The UK’s income distribution resembles an hour-glass, with a bulge at the top and bottom, both in terms of pay and esteem.

A report issued in December 2017 by Tony Blair’s think-tank, the Institute for Global Change, found that the vote share of populist parties of both Right and Left across Europe had almost trebled since the year 2000, rising from 8.5 to 24.1 percent of the electorate. In addition, the report noted that populist parties have doubled their rate of participation in government (often in coalition), up from seven to fourteen states, creating a “Populist Belt” from the Baltic to the Aegean (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017).

As Goodhart reminds us, there are a wide variety of “Populist” parties on offer to electorates across Europe, ranging from UKIP, to the Dutch Freedom Party led by Geert Wilders, Jobbik in Hungary, Podemos in Spain, and the Five Star Movement in Italy, among others. Commentators and academics may define these respective political forces as being Far-Right, Far-Left, Fascist, Neo-Fascist, Marxist, and other terms. Goodhart sets aside the question of defining these groups’ political identity, instead exploring the means by which they actually “do” their politics, noting how all of these insurgent populist movements have readily adopted social media with its new political currency of posts, shares, likes, and retweets. Such new technologies are proving instrumental in advancing the fortunes of these movements.

Politics has now, in some part, migrated to cyberspace, where the creativity, egalitarian access, and openness afforded by new technological platforms may be seen as positive. Yet, to a significant degree, these advantages have been offset by a hardening of partisan positions which have become more bellicose and estranged from one another. Online anonymity is misused to direct abuse and threats against others, and even when online debate is moderated, there is a tendency to shrill, emotive, and more extreme language.

Social media and the rise of silos of mutual incomprehension and vitriol are also central to Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012). Haidt’s research led him to suggest that there are various moral foundations of politics, which he lists as care and harm, fairness and cheating, loyalty and betrayal, authority and
subversion, and finally sanctity and degradation. Goodhart draws on Haidt’s research, and his interpretation might be open to the charge of confirmation bias, but his reading of these ideas is that the balance of these pillars of moral reasoning translates to an inherent dominance for the “Somewhere” view over those he defines as “Anywheres,” an aspect which Haidt terms the “Conservative Advantage” (Haidt, 2012: 180-218).

Haidt’s ideas on sanctity are not confined to the purely religious. They can also apply to wider actions that lead human beings to feel that something is being stained or polluted, requiring purification. Repugnance at such perceived “acts of degradation” can be found in human reaction to extreme acts, such as cannibalism, or to recent innovations, such as the advances in science that have made the cloning of animals possible. Feelings of disgust as well as anger can be aroused by the destruction of, or transgression against, artifacts that people hold to be sacred, whether they be religious (such as a crucifix), or secular (such as a national flag). Beyond economic inequality, people are also influenced and motivated politically by what we might define as “cultural capital” and tradition. Nevertheless, Haidt does not necessarily see his foundations as immutable barriers to the further advance of globalization and associated progressive ideas, such as diversity and multiculturalism. He suggests that a solution is to make people care less about race and group identities “by drowning them in a sea of similarities, shared goals and mutual interdependencies” (Haidt, 2012: 39).

UK Census data from both 2001 and 2011 shows the remarkable growth in racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity that is taking place in metropolitan cities such as London, Birmingham, and Manchester. Steve Vertovec has described this process as the emergence of “super-diversity,” most simply defined as “the diversification of diversity” (Vertovec, 2006). Whatever the political trajectory of the UK and other European states, diversity is here to stay.

In the aftermath of the Brexit vote and subsequent failures in 2016 of polls to predict correctly major outcomes in democratic votes in the UK and the USA, there was speculation that rising populism would accelerate in 2017 with successes for the National Front in the French presidential elections and the Dutch Freedom Party in parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. In the end, however, neither of these Far-Right parties gained power. Likewise, in the 2017 snap general election in Britain, UKIP saw its share of the vote decrease by 10.8 percent and the party has had five different leaders since the 2016 referendum. This might be interpreted
as meaning that populism has peaked and is now in retreat. However, we should note that while such forces have not made breakthroughs of the magnitude of Brexit, the figures from the Dutch elections for example still saw the Freedom Party increase its parliamentary delegation from fifteen to twenty, a significant advance of thirty-three percent. Later in 2017, the Austrian Freedom Party, also categorized as Far-Right and populist, gained eleven seats in legislative elections and has now entered into coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party. Elsewhere in Europe, the rapid escalation of Catalan nationalist secessionism, as well as the resistance of several Eastern European states to accept EU migrant quotas, are other indications that populism is far from a spent force. Indeed, Ford and Goodwin’s study states that the alienation of those who have moved to the radical or populist Right runs too deep for the main political parties to offer a quick fix, warning that this development “has been a long time coming, and it has a long way yet to run” (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 330).

According to an apocryphal and disputed account, in 1972 Chinese leader Zhou En Lai responded to a question about the significance of the French Revolution by saying, “It is too soon to tell.”9 It may simply be too early to comprehend the implications of the 2016 Brexit vote or the other electoral advances for populist forces (many on the Right, some on the Left) to date. The populist surge across various states has provoked feelings of consternation, despair, and anger among those people and places which appear most open to various aspects of globalization and internationalism. In London, for example, sixty percent of the electorate voted to remain in the EU. As an academic, these developments give rise to two feelings: the first is that of humility. The second is curiosity. In my teaching, research, and writing, therefore, I shall remember Spinoza’s guidance to neither laugh, nor weep, not hate, but to seek to understand.

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9 Subsequent accounts suggest that Zhou was commenting on the 1968 student protests, and that the true meaning of his comment is attributable to an error in translation rather than a sagacious and witty long view of history (Nicholas, 2011).
I recognize that globalization has helped many people rise out of poverty, but it has also damned many others to starve to death

Pope Francis

Globalization means standardization. The very rich and the very poor must want the same things, but only the rich can have them

Arundhati Roy

Like the rest of my generation, I have had to learn again and again the terrible truth...that no life is really private, or isolated, or self-sufficient. People's lives were entirely their own, perhaps — and more justifiably — when the world seemed enormous, and all its comings and goings were slow and deliberate. But this is so no longer, and never will be again, since man’s inventions have eliminated so much of distance and time; for better, for worse, we are now each of us part of the surge and swell of great economic and political movements, and whatever we do, as individuals or as nations, deeply affects everyone else

Vera Brittain
Heightened Nationalism as a Response to Cultural Globalization and the Implications for International Education

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Introduction
The assertion of national identity is often a response to encounters with an “Other.” By definition, cultural globalization brings people into closer contact with the “Other,” either through direct contact with people or the sharing of ideas and products. Theorists have debated the impact that cultural globalization may have on identity in terms of whether one identifies with the local, national, or global. However, there seems to have been a potential shift in the intensity of the impact of globalization on nationalism. Events such as Donald Trump’s presidential victory and Brexit in 2016, as well as the relative success of Marie Le Pen in France, the extreme Right in Germany, and the conservatives in Austria in 2017 are potentially evidence of increased nationalism. Is the success of “nationalist” candidates and ideas a response to cultural globalization? In the field of education abroad, this question is particularly relevant as we promote the notion of global citizens. One cannot assume that globalization or even the internationalization of campuses is leading to a cosmopolitan view. Can this be better understood through a skeptical approach to globalization?

Many people around the world—among them, scholars, activists, and laypeople—view globalization as a force that is destroying local and national cultures through the distribution of mass media, the English language, and secularization. Hebron and Stack (2001) describe this negative view as follows:

This foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with its materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and fraternizing of nationalities is a prescription of cultural genocide because of the process’ potential to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human civilizations (quoted in Skipper (2016: 15))

Certain world events, such as the recession of 2008, Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the increase of jihadist-inspired terrorism, and what some consider the McDonaldization of society (Barber, 1996) have contributed to an adverse reaction to
globalization. However, proponents of globalization point to the increased diversity of products, the benefits of global trade, and the possibilities of peace caused by increased personal interactions.

Very little research has focused on whether increased globalization leads to increased nationalism. Patriotism, or pride in one’s country, can morph into extreme nationalism if people feel that their culture is being threatened. Could globalization activate people’s underlying fears about losing their own culture? To what extent is nationalism increasing as a response to globalization?

**Cultural globalization**

It is widely accepted that “culture” is pervasive and important and is something that affects many aspects of the world and individual lives, but there is not a clear, concise consensus on what culture truly is. At its core, though, culture is our way of being, something learned, that can evolve and change over time (Geertz, 1973). For the purposes of this essay, Schweder’s (2000) definition of culture is appropriate:

> Community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient. To be “cultural,” those ideas about truth, goodness, beauty, and efficiency must be socially inherited and customary; and they must actually be constitutive of different ways of life (Schweder, 2000: 163)

In other words, culture refers to goals, values, and pictures of the world that manifest themselves in speech, laws, and routine practices. However, Wilson’s (1997) view that anthropological definitions of culture tend to ignore global influences leads towards an understanding that culture is not static or immune to outside influences. Cultures are constantly evolving, both naturally and as a result of global interactions. As Hopper has noted, “we often only become aware of our cultures when we encounter otherness or difference” (2007: 42).

As culture is affected by global interactions, it is only appropriate to address further what is meant by the term globalization. Simply stated, globalization refers to “multiple forms of global interconnectedness” (Hopper, 2007: 10). More specifically, cultural globalization can be defined as the “increased flows of people, images, sounds and symbols” (Hopper, 2007: 3). However, it is critical to note that various areas of globalization are intertwined and cannot be studied without considering economic, political, and security processes. As Osterhammel and Petersson argue,
“Globalization” implies more than just the existence of relations between distant places on earth... Relations have to crystallize into institutions in order to gain permanence (2005: viii)

Rothschild (1999) has also noted that globalization moves beyond the exchange of goods or comparative history.

Hopper (2007) outlines the history of globalization in three phases: 1. Pre-Modern (prior to 1500); 2. Modern (1500-1945); 3. Contemporary (1945 onwards) (2007: 13- 21). The Pre-Modern phase consisted of early human migration, the emergence of world religions, early imperial systems, and the development of transregional trade networks. The Modern period included European imperialism, an emerging international economy, international migration and development outside the West, the spread of modernity, the rise of the nation-state, and industrialization. The nation-state paved the way for imperial expansion, but it also led to:

greater emphasis upon maintaining national borders, a development that inhibited freedom of movement and cultural diffusion...the consolidation of national cultures frequently entailed excluding those who were perceived as not belonging and the dismissal of other cultures as inferior. Thus the modern era witnessed the construction of ideologies of exclusion...other ideologies emerged opposing all forms of cultural mixing and miscegenation...which paved the way for fascism and Nazism (Hopper, 2007: 27)

The Modern era of globalization was predicated on building up national cultures with an emphasis on the superiority of one’s own.

The Contemporary period has been

marked not only by the greater intensity and extensity of cultural flows, in the form of the movement of peoples, ideas, goods, symbols and images, but also by the greater velocity with which they travel from place to place, and is in turn serving to deepen forms of global cultural interconnectedness (Hopper, 2007: 29)

Prior phases were limited primarily to interactions among elites. In the past, globalizing elements were “thin,” in that they mainly touched the upper classes (Rosendorf, 2000: 114). Despite the contention that the current era of globalization deepens global cultural connections, it may be that we are returning to a resurgence of national cultures and the exclusion of others.
There are three primary approaches to globalization: globalists (first wave theorists); skeptics (second wave); and transformationalists (third wave). In summary, the globalists consider globalization to be a force that increases global markets and diminishes national borders. This restricts the autonomy of national governments in terms of economic, political, and even cultural issues. Some of the primary globalist theorists include Greider (1997), Guehenno (1995), and Ohmae (1990). Transformationalists, on the other hand, view this era as unprecedented in terms of the level of global interconnectedness and the extent of economic, political, and cultural flows. Debates within the transformationalist community have focused on the relationship between modernity and globalization with some viewing globalization as an outcome of modernity bringing new forms of interdependence (Giddens, 1990). Others view globalization as predating modernity, though modernization has helped to accelerate globalization (Robertson, 1992).

My argument aligns with the skeptics who are highly critical of the globalist position. Scholars, such as Hirst and Thompson (1996; 2000), note that global trade and finance is really in a triad of North America, Japan, and Europe, and is far from “global.” They acknowledge economic internationalization but refute the idea of fully developed globalization. They go as far as to suggest that the period of 1870 to 1914 was more globalized than the current epoch. The skeptics’ perspective raises “doubts about the extent of contemporary cultural change” (Hopper, 2007: 7). Without truly globalized infrastructures, nothing can sustain global cultural formations. Even “global music” is a marketing tactic representing diverse styles and not a distinct style in and of itself. In short, we are not moving towards a global identity or a monoculture; if anything, national identities are being reinforced.

**National identity and nationalism**

Identity is a complex term. Hofstede et al. provide a fairly extensive definition of “identity.” Simply put, “Identity answers the question: ‘To which group do I belong?’” (2010: 22). It differs from culture in that the base of identity is in practices, rather than values, and there can be many identities within a culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). It is less about our values and our beliefs and more about how those values are portrayed to the outside world. People with shared values can present those in very different ways and contexts based on their identities. Identity is who we are, how others represent us, and how that representation impacts our self-image.
National identity derives from a negotiation between Selbstbild (the image citizens have of their own nation) and Fremdbild (a nation’s perceived or actual international image in world opinion) (Rusciano, 2003). Thus, national identity can be shaped and influenced by encounters with an “Other,” encounters which increase with extensive globalization. When people perceive globalization as a threat to their culture, it may increase their connection to their national identity. Those who “identify strongly with their nation-state” can be defined as nationalists (Norris, 2000: 159). Nationalists are positioned in opposition to globalization. Nationalism is not a synonym for patriotism. Patriotism is love for or pride in one’s country, whereas nationalism is the state of being in which the nation is favored over international, multilateral initiatives. Nationalism may be actively promoted by the nation-state, as in China, or it may be a sentiment that individuals within a nation-state have developed. It is important to note that “nation” may refer to a territorial area and one’s citizenship or it may refer to ethnic ties based on religion and/or language.

**Globalization and nationalism**

Mann (1997) supports the idea that “far from weakening nationalism, a reaction to globalization may have served to strengthen national identities” (as quoted in Norris (2000: 157)). Norris argues that even if structures have emerged to allow for world economies and governance, this does not equate with the erosion of nationalism (2000). Tomlinson (2003) has noted that a pervasive response to globalization has been the strong stand that many have taken in asserting their own cultures and identities, often strengthening their presence, rather than seeing them subdued under a global culture. As Barber (1996) argued, the homogenization of the world (which is an arguable stance) in the areas of business and economics has led to jihad, or the resistance of homogenization by asserting one’s own national identity and culture. In many ways, this connects to Bennett’s (2012) development theory of intercultural learning. As people are confronted with cultural differences, a common reaction is “Defense,” in which a person experiences their own culture as the only viable one. This experience helps explain the jihad reaction to globalization that Barber (1996) described.

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Editors’ note: Barber uses the term jihad to describe a range of movements, not just those inspired by Islamist radicalism.
Norris (2000) conducted a study to determine the extent to which identities may shift as a result of globalization. She utilized the 1990–91 and 1995–97 World Values Survey which included seventy countries. She found that people identified more strongly with their nation or locality (thirty-eight percent) or region (forty-seven percent) than with the world as a whole (fifteen percent). However, she also found a generational divide; if a person was born after World War II, then they were more likely to identify with the “world.” This implies the potential for a major shift towards further identification with the world over one’s nation or region. Additional divisions were found along lines of education, life experience, and social background, implying that the experience of globalization is complex and uneven (Hopper, 2007).

Although Inglehart predicted that traditional societies, in times of insecurity, may experience an increase in nationalism, Norris’ (2000) study refuted this claim. She found few differences among postindustrial, Post-Communist, and developing societies in terms of their level of cosmopolitan orientation. All societies have a stronger identification with their nation or region than with the world. Fears or hopes (depending on the person) that we are evolving into a global society and culture, despite the current wave of globalization, are exaggerated at present.

Thirteen years later, Bekhuis, Meuleman, and Lubbers (2013) addressed a similar question to Norris. They essentially questioned which view of globalization was more prominent: as something to fear because of the threat it presents to one’s own culture or as something positive that presents increased options in terms of products and experiences. (The answer may, again, relate back to the intercultural learning continuum, presented by Bennett in 2012). One of their hypotheses was that people who are exposed to new experiences and products, providing increased choice, will view globalization favorably and will be less protective of their own culture (less nationalist) (based on research by Bauman (1998) and Beck, Szaider, and Winter (2003)). Bekhuis, Meuleman, and Lubbers (2013) identified the European Union as a good case study for cultural globalization because of the specific efforts towards exchange and open borders. They view EU integration as an intense model of globalization.

Two important concepts addressed in their study include chauvinism and patriotism. Chauvinism is the view of uniqueness and superiority of one’s own national in-group and country, while patriotism is the expression of love and pride of the nation (based on a critical assessment) (Bekhuis,
Meuleman, and Lubbers, 2013: 1043). Chauvinists may be apt to always favor cultural protectionism and nationalism, while patriots are typically only inclined to support protectionism when they feel their culture is being threatened, as during times of intense globalization. As globalization increases, patriots worry about losing the culture they love, so they support protectionism. As globalization remains steady or is predominantly an export of their country’s culture (rather than cultural influences coming in), they are less concerned.

The question remains as to which is stronger—the allure of global influences or the comfort of national ties? One theory that addresses this question is reflexive modernization. This theory follows the logic that globalization will lead to a loss of the authority of traditional institutions, which will lead to an increase in individuation in which people choose their own labels, identities, values, and cultural associations rather than blindly adopting those of their parents (Hopper, 2007). A greater individuation can lead to less attachment to the nation (traditional institution) and a greater connection to the world as a whole. This theory implies that an increase in globalization will lead to an increase in “world citizens” (and consequently a decline in nationalism).

Some scholars challenge reflexive modernization theory because it underestimates the strength of the identities with which we are born and the cultures in which we are raised, and how they impact our outlook and behaviors. For example, Alexander (1996) argues that national identities exert a strong hold over individuals and other identities struggle to generate the same strength of allegiance. Hutchinson (2005) emphasizes the importance of shared myths and memories that bind people of the same nation. However, proponents of reflexive modernization argue that a nation makes inconvenient demands upon us, including taxation and emotional commitments, so the weaker obligations of non-national identities are appealing (Hopper, 2007). If this is the case, in the future, identities may be formed by common interests, rather than nationhood. Globalization presents an opportunity for people to create community based on ideas, whether those ideas are related to the environment, religion, human rights, etc. An additional consideration is that people may not have an overwhelming draw towards the nation or towards the world, but rather may lean one way or another depending upon the issue at hand (Everts, 1995).

11 See Giddens (1990: 36-45) for further analysis of the “reflexivity” of modernity.
I would suggest that the skeptics—Hirst and Thompson (1996; 2000), Smith (1995), and Mann (1997)—are correct. Despite structural developments that have allowed for the global economy and governance to grow, nationalism has not been eroded. Because national identity is typically a response to an “Other,” increased interactions may lead to increased identification with national identity. Globalization creates uncertainty and, according to Inglehart (1997), uncertainty and insecurity can lead to increased levels of nationalism.

**Implications for international education**

Study abroad (a form of globalization) has the potential to reinforce existing stereotypes of the host culture if proper guidance, reflection, and support are not offered (Vande Berg, Paige, and Hemming Lou, 2012). It could also serve to reinforce national identity and a sense of superiority of one’s own culture over the “Other.” During a recent debriefing with American students who had studied abroad in Italy, one student responded that he learned how hard-working American businessmen are, especially compared to the Italians. He noted that he saw how “lazy” Italians were during some company visits and he realized how great it is that Americans are driven to be successful. His encounters reinforced his sense of cultural superiority.

This is just an isolated response and hopefully not representative of the larger group. However, we cannot assume that increasing the number of students who are studying abroad or having cross-cultural interactions on campus will lead to the creation of global citizens. It may, in fact, reinforce national identity. At least within international education, we have a somewhat controlled setting and can strive to mitigate this potentially undesired outcome. As educators, we need to provide space for the development of students’ national identity and even patriotism, while preventing that from morphing into chauvinism or extreme nationalism.
Conclusion

Globalization is not a new phenomenon, but this particular period of globalization differs from previous ones in its extent, velocity, and intensity. Previous waves of globalization primarily impacted the higher classes of society; the present wave of globalization is unique, partly because of the extent of impact. Concurrently with discussions surrounding globalization, there is a rise in the focus on nationalism. However, there is no conclusive evidence as to whether or not an increase in globalization may be creating an increase in nationalist sentiments. Could increasing cultural globalization be causing people to respond with fear and a need to protect their own culture; or, does it break down barriers and move us towards a global society? Based on the skeptics’ theory, cultural globalization is not currently creating a global culture or minimizing national ties. Rather, globalization may strengthen national identity and reinforce existing values. Perhaps this means that we are entering a “post-contemporary” era of globalization with a return to the emphasis on national boundaries and ties at the exclusion of others. International educators need to be prepared for this possibility when pushing for increased cultural interactions for their students.
On Globalization and Colonization: When and Where We Enter

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Several years ago I participated in a Global Seminar in Austria entitled “Education for Global Citizenship: What, Why, and How?” The participants were tasked with contemplating global citizenship discourse within the context of globalization studies, defined using a model based on a European political scientist’s perspective. As the presentations got underway, it quickly became clear that we would be working from a paradigm that was exclusively Eurocentric and framed in such a way that left no place for people of African descent as contributors to globalization studies. In the readings we were given, and in the presentations offered, Europe was at the center of this discourse and there were no mentions of Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean, or the work of any scholars of color who have contributed to this field, as if globalization could have happened without colonization. The examples presented were all centered on how white men of power worked within systems of commerce and international engagement as if these were the only people and the only places involved in, or impacted by, globalization, and as if only these men had written about or imagined it. Each of the presentations we heard, and all the texts we were given to read in preparation, framed the world in such a way that I had no place in it and seemed to suggest that how I came to be was somehow far outside of the imagination of globalization.

I found myself searching the room for signs of understanding of what and who was missing and found it in the faces of four women. First, a woman from Vermont, born in Israel, with a PhD in Geography, whose mother was living in Palestine; she needed to check in with her as often as possible during this globalization conversation because bombs were blasting her mother’s neighborhood each day (yet this war and its effects were not part of how globalization was being framed). Second, a woman from Atlanta, who was a practicing sociologist heading to Ghana to study indigenous African empires after the seminar and who would end up giving me sanctuary in Vienna with a Somali friend married to a German Austrian; we cheered for both Germany and Argentina during the World Cup finals a few days later. None of the nuances of her lived experience and deep research into how indigenous cultures make sense of the world were a part of this take on globalization and education. The third woman was my former French pro-
fessor who fought in the Algerian army before coming to teach at Spelman College, bringing nuanced Maghrebian feminisms to us while simultaneously challenging the Atlanta establishment and an abusive husband. Yet, the nuances of international feminisms were not being addressed as intersecting with globalization. Our cohort was rounded out by a Black woman with a PhD in Education, working at a sister HBCU and trying to make mandatory the study of Spanish or Arabic in her School of Education even though most US states do not require any foreign language to get an education degree.

Here, embedded in a program which would also include presentations on jazz as a pedagogical framework, we were being taught that the study of globalization began in Europe at the onset of World War I and was devoid of any of the complications spoken to by our identities and scholarship. In this minefield, we scholars of African Diaspora Studies, Comparative Literature, Geography, Sociology, Gender Studies, and Education all found ourselves sharing deep concerns about the potential dangers of such a framing of history and the tacit erasure of how we know the world to be. What was immediately clear was that this approach was both ahistorical and Eurocentrically hegemonic, prompting our rebellious thematic group to choose as our focus the dangers, implications, and opportunities to teach transgressively by putting colonization into dialogue with globalization studies. It was something in the diversity within our backgrounds and perspectives that united us in our critique and our need to challenge this erasure as we thought about the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality and how they affect the way our students learn about themselves as global citizens. Collectively we found ourselves calling out the names of authors and texts that subvert the paradigm and that we use when we teach transgressively. Now, nearly five years later, I am moved to think back to this seminar, to these wonderfully critical educators, and how by the end of the program it had become clear to everyone sharing this experience with us that globalization is inextricably linked to colonization. My current focus is where, when, and how we enter globalization discourse using the opportunities international education offers us to “create dangerously,” as author Edwidge Danticat has posited (2011).

When I read the term globalization, my thoughts immediately turn to colonization. The act of globalizing, extending to all parts of the world, has the impact that colonization has had and the same seemingly innocuous, but really quite insidious, presumptions that are inherent in how we speak about, teach, and live with globalization frameworks. Globalization may predate colonization and might not have all of the dangers we now see in
its inception, but colonization was a by-product of globalization unchecked and infused with greed, racism, sexism, and atrocious consequences with long-lasting effects. When we think about international education from this vantage point for example, early foreign-language programs went to places that did the colonizing—places which received early waves of globalization in which the world brought things to them, rather than taking things from them. These programs did not go to those places colonized and impacted by globalization, places being acted upon, but to places where educational power was seen and valued. Globalization could mean that knowledge systems from around the world would be regarded with equal value and significance, that the people producing knowledge and contributing to it from all over the world would be on a level playing field, and that their artistic and intellectual production would all be valued equally, but colonization has ensured that this is not the case. The impact of colonization on education means that particular places and people remain underrepresented in study abroad.

In the aforementioned Global Seminar in Austria and in texts I have since read, the onset of globalization has been framed within the context of the World Wars or the Marshall Plan and geopolitical events of the 1940s, as if the slave trade and all the international collisions therein did not happen—and as if all of this did not create whole new peoples and cultures all over the world. Most of what we have come to know about globalization was set in motion by the exchange of people for goods, people to work land for goods, and a panoply of power that determined who entered that system, how, where, and when. Globalization, like colonization, is not a fixed historical, “one way” event but an ongoing “roundtrip” process with multiple “layovers” layered with implications requiring critical deconstruction.

Reckmeyer discussed globalization as transnational interconnectedness starting from the West and its expansion, but there would be no West as we know it without the East, without Africa (on multiple levels for multiple reasons). Similarly, when we discuss Marx’s perspectives on capitalism (see, for example, Marx, 1849; 1964), some scholars continue to argue that globalization was over a century in the future, but my ancestors would beg to differ. By 1841, most of the power players in Western Europe, South America, and the European colonies had already begun to abolish slavery and world economies had already been forever impacted. For people of African descent, the places they came from, the people who were responsible for moving them, and for all of the places they landed in, globalization
was created through a rather wretched international exchange program. It was an exchange of goods, ideas, art, people, wealth, language, religion... unequal but an exchange none the less.12

I am intrigued by what happens when we shift paradigms reconstructing historical narratives so that the invisible stand at the center and take center stage in how we see the world and its intersections. I am thinking here of Paul Gilroy’s *There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack* (1991) and his later book, *The Black Atlantic* (1993), in which he positions globalization as having been elsewhere framed as a situation about white males in white countries dealing with a colored world. But what happens when we begin to see the world in terms of influences and connections that have become embedded in the fabric of nations? Consider also Sheila Rowbotham’s important work in *Hidden from History: Rediscovering Women in History from the 17th Century to the Present* (1974) in which she raises the question of what a feminist approach to the past might involve. I also think here of the novel *Small Island* (2004) by Black British author Andrea Levy which is set in 1948 but goes back in time to explore the formative experiences of the protagonists. The novel is constructed around the intersections of cultures living in England and shifts the point of view to that of immigrants from the West Indies and to British nationals from the countryside living among each other in London in the immediate post-war years. This perspective demonstrates how war affected people impacted by colonization and globalization with regard to a shared history. It is interactions like those described by Levy and by Sam Selvon in his masterful *The Lonely Londoners* ([1956] 2006) that remind us of how people shaped and reshaped their worlds through migrations and cultural exchanges that fundamentally altered their sense of nation and national identity. Here I also think of the example of bunny chow. In Durban, South Africa, this is a staple street food eaten by multiple ethnicities as a generally South African thing. Even though it is a raised bread filled with Indian curry and originally eaten by Black mine workers, it is such a part of “South African” cuisine that is not Indian, nor African, but a thing created out of the conditions of globalization that cannot be put back—cannot be separated from the dual impact of colonization and globalization because it is a product constructed in three parts by three nations now permanently linked: Britain, India, and South Africa.

12 At the time of editing this essay, a comic popped up on my Facebook feed speaking to this very issue in a very contemporary way—it was an advertisement for a “Black Friday sale” in Libya with three black children each holding a sign. The first sign read “Black Friday,” the next “50% off Everyone,” the third “Massive Sale,” all referencing contemporary slavery using a global platform to bring awareness.
This discussion brings to the fore the relationship between privilege and power, access and change. A consideration of multiple perspectives of globalization, global consciousness versus the ideology of globalization, is where it seems diaspora consciousness enters the discourse. Globalization as we have known it sustains capitalism, controls women, and marginalizes populations. Other views of globalization emerge from the formation of the European Union and an approach to journalism where comparisons are seen as absolute (past), relative (across), and ideal (shoulds). While we get the “dangers of the single story” (Adichie, 2009) that suggest the absolute versions of what globalization is as a thing with a particular “past,” when considered as relative or across (as in “across the nation” or “on the opposite side of”), we begin to create oppositional frameworks that suggest ideals or “shoulds”: beliefs that flatten out our truly complex, intersectional globalized encounters.

The K-12 system in the USA is a prime example of how global citizenship education has been systematically Eurocentric. Globalization has come to mean global consciousness, but this is hegemony at its best (or worst), especially if one of our goals as educators is to help students to see the world from an/other perspective. Miami, Florida as a global city fascinates me for these reasons: the places Miami residents teach or study are not the places from which they come. This could be said of many cities around the world, but I am using this place because of the myriad mental images it invokes of those who live there. In this place where people from all over the world reside, there is no historically or globally contextualized history to teach them about each other with regard to language, to art, to politics, to...well anything... Argentinian history is not covered in the basic Floridian curriculum, nor is Ghanaian, or Italian, or Bahamian, or Jamaican, or even Cuban... nor are there suggestions about how to consider where, and how, people and cultures intersect or enter, how they got there, what staying there means for the family members back home. And this lack of contextualized history sits firmly at the intersection of colonization and globalization because in the same way that this teaching is not happening there, it is also not happening in the places from which the people of Miami came (or London or Chicago or Cape Town...). Shifting this paradigm allows for a consideration of worldwide interconnectedness of extensity: stretching; intensity: growing in strength; velocity: speed; and IMPACT.
So, who is the “We” and when and where do we enter globalization discourse? The title of this essay borrows from Paula J. Giddings’ classic, *Where and When I Enter: The Impact of Race and Sex in America* (1996). The first history of Black women activists in America traces their work from the seventeenth to the twentieth century and intentionally invokes those untold stories and the ways in which such narratives remain marginalized in the framing of who and what is global. To view from below necessitates a paradigm shift. Usually, when thinking about globalization and/or colonization, we are working from an A over B proposition. Giyatri Spivak’s (1988) work, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, suggests that we hear/listen, elevate, and give space to B (which could, for the purposes of this discussion, position the subaltern as representative of the Global South). As international educators working with students and cultures around the world, re-examining one’s positioning vis-à-vis globalization, considering A and B, A together with B, is crucial. Here I am thinking of a re-examination of Du Bois’ “Double Consciousness” presented in *The Souls of Black Folk* together with Baldwin’s “A Talk to Teachers” in *The Price of the Ticket* (1985). Du Bois describes “double consciousness” as follows:

> It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity (1903 [1994]: 2–3)

This shift in paradigm, in which neither A or B dominate but function in a multidirectional relationship, speaks to Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) wherein he redefines the otherwise unequal distribution of power inherent in A over B in education. The assumption or argument being that A and B are equally informed by experiences which are equally valuable and which must be the basis of an educational system that no longer replicates the inequities in society.

Performing diasporic revolutionary thinking requires actively becoming aware of the scripts we inherited individually and collectively to which we pay attention; recognizing scripts that differ from ours, that we listen to others and work together on constructing educational opportunities, A together
with B, with the values of harmony, *Ubuntu*: 13 “I am because you are,” order, respect, individual and collective realization of something that is, as Du Bois would explain, “beyond the veil” ([1947] 1985).

Globalization is then what lies between our imagination and our intentions. It is what happens to us. Globalization seems to have haves and have nots; actors and “happened-tos”; authors and subjects; places and non-places... A thing from which we need to be cured. Something to circumvent, to find our way out of... So how do we frame refugeeism, questionable citizenship, and landlessness within the context of globalization? This, to me, is where Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s *Decolonising the Mind* comes in. He explains of colonialism:

> Its most important area of domination was the mental universe of the colonized, the control, through culture, of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world. Economic and political control can never be complete or effective without mental control. To control a peoples’ culture is to control their tools of self-definition in relationship to others (1986: 390)

Students I have had the pleasure to teach in Postcolonial Literature classes have been fascinated with the question of how one truly becomes decolonized and if this is even possible. What does it take to get to a state of post-colonization that is really free from it, a complete sense of decolonization? If decolonization is possible so must be deglobalization—an unpacking, a rethinking of how and who and why we engage. What does it look like when it stops being A over B or B over A, or A and B dominating over the whole alphabet as if each letter did not play a part in the viability of a language? How does A talk to B, what does B hear when A speaks, how can A and B stand side by side with no hierarchy, maintaining their uniqueness without compromising each other’s beingness?

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13 *Ubuntu* is a South African term that is used in Xhosa and Zulu. Definitions vary but it is most commonly described as a notion that encompasses the essential human virtues of compassion and humanity. Archbishop Desmond Tutu described *Ubuntu* as follows: “One of the sayings in our country is *Ubuntu*—the essence of being human. *Ubuntu* speaks particularly about the fact that you can’t exist as a human being in isolation. It speaks about our interconnectedness. You can’t be human all by yourself, and when you have this quality—*Ubuntu*—you are known for your generosity. We think of ourselves far too frequently as just individuals, separated from one another, whereas you are connected and what you do affects the whole world. When you do well, it spreads out; it is for the whole of humanity” (Tutu, 1999).
What I am suggesting is that we involve the wisdom, agency, and creativity that comes from disciplines like African Studies, Postcolonial Studies, Women’s Studies, and Subaltern Studies\textsuperscript{14} in conceptualizing global citizens and challenging notions of globalization. I think that the clash between globalization and global citizenship education has to do with trying to place or consider our students in the world after we have thought of, or imagined the world. Rethinking it allows for the possibility of educating for global collaboration rather than being academically “competitive.” Global citizenship education, for example, could mean invoking a pedagogy of jazz to teach math. If we build programs in Europe as if they are only about Europe, not Europe’s collisions and connections with the rest of the world, we miss an opportunity to consider the making of the world from the perspective of all who live in it, using a non-hierarchical framework. Why not study diasporas in global cities at the center of a program’s design for all students, not just ethnic minorities or as an add on? Until this happens, we continue to replay the us and them, A over B, master-slave dialectic. We could in fact create culturally literate environments that are globally relevant, rather than globalizing, and which would invite people to engage the world in new terms, considering aspirations about the world rather than the current condition. This would entail encouraging students to become more active agents in history-making and its narration.

In closing, I offer another narrative. Years ago, I helped create a coalition of social justice organizers called Root Cause to produce a three-day, thirty-four-mile march in February 2004 against the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), replete with teach-ins all along the march route stretching across two counties, about five cities, involving numerous nationalities, spanning race, class, and culture.\textsuperscript{15} Working on this event stands out for me as a highlight of the dichotomies discussed here in that the march, put together by the Coalition of Immokolee Farm Workers, Power U Center for Social Change, and the Miami Workers Center, intended to teach people about the dangers of globalization from the perspective of the workers

\textsuperscript{14} Editors’ note: This definition is from California State University, Long Beach: “Subaltern Studies emerged around 1982 as a series of journal articles published by Oxford University Press in India. A group of Indian scholars trained in the west wanted to reclaim their history. Its main goal was to retake history for the underclasses, for the voices that had not been heard previous. Scholars of the subaltern hoped to break away from histories of the elites and the Eurocentric bias of current imperial history. … Thus, subaltern history will help to lay bare previously covered histories, previously ignored events, previously purposeful hidden secrets of the past.” See, for further details, http://web.csulb.edu/~ssayeghc/theory/subalternstudies.htm

\textsuperscript{15} For further details about Root Cause and the People’s March to Miami, see: http://www.ciw-online.org/blog/2004/02/rootcause
and the communities who would be most impacted if the FTAA agreement was enacted. This meant that the movement was deliberately shifting the paradigm and was created from a vantage point not covered in mainstream media, but from the “Bs,” the grassroots. It was a peaceful protest, with DJs, a soundtrack, puppets, babies, and elderly riding on floats high above the city, sleeping in parks, in synagogues, and in churches at night, singing, dancing, and educating as we walked in sunlight. We were met with full-on riot police who were flown in from all over the country to line the streets, put up barricades, and stand ten rows deep with assault weapons trained on us each day, each mile, throughout the three days and thirty-four miles, with the heaviest concentrations of military force policing, of all places, the Immigration Building and the Board of Education headquarters. The city, with the support of the nation, took a stand on globalization directly against the people, directly against the values we intend when we speak of global citizenship.

This brings me finally to Nestor Canclini’s questions in his impeccably translated book, *Imagined Globalizations*, where he asks

> can citizens consider alternatives to prevailing arrangements and decide what would work better, without taking into account intercultural ties? Old histories of rivalries and prejudiced viewpoints burden these conversations about a future that is more imagined than actually possible (2014: 37)

Perhaps then, just as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o has inspired generations to decolonize the mind, and as Marie Battiste seems to be suggesting in her recent book, *Decolonizing Education: Nourishing the Learning Spirit* (2016), it is up to us international educators to decolonize global citizenship education such that future generations of learners have answers to the questions of “when and where we enter.”
In 1587, the Admiral’s Men presented a new play at the Rose Theatre on Bankside. It was called Tamburlaine the Great and its author was the son of a Kentish cobbler who had recently arrived from Cambridge: Christopher Marlowe. Marlowe made the crowd wait for the arrival of his astonishing hero, an Asian tyrant of whom many of his audience had scarcely heard. When Tamburlaine finally enters in scene two, he woos the daughter of the defeated King of Egypt:

Tamburlaine I am a Lord, for so my deeds shall prove.  
And yet a shepherd by my parentage  
But, Lady, this fair face and heavenly hue  
Must grace his bed that conquers Asia.  
And means to be a terror to the world.  
Measuring the limits of his empery  
By east and west, as Phoebus doth his course  
(1.2.24 – 30)

The play became hugely influential upon Marlowe’s contemporaries, including William Shakespeare, and subsequently spawned a sequel. Marlowe’s plays were popular, and his leading characters usually came from humble origins. They were motivated by powerful desires for change and self-improvement. As Tamburlaine sought to control the world, so Doctor Faustus pursued secret knowledge at the cost of his immortal soul. Marlowe’s dramas captured a restlessness for social transformation that was at the heart of Early Modern English culture (Steane, 1973; Healy, 1994).

How did Marlowe come to know of Tamburlaine? His name had become semi-legendary since his death in the early fifteenth century, and tales of his achievements and fabled brutality had made their way westwards along the plurality of trade routes that connected China to Venice: the Silk Road. In Seville in 1543, the Spanish author Pedro Mexía published his work Silva de varia lección, which contained an account of Tamburlaine’s conquests. This was translated and dispersed across Europe. In England, Thomas Fortescue’s translation The Foreste or a Collection of Histories (1571) is a likely source for Marlowe’s plays. Another is The English Myrrowr by George
Whetstone (1586) which uses the cases of several world rulers to illustrate the failings of tyranny. It is possible that Marlowe sought to capitalize on the popularity of this work.

Tamburlaine’s extraordinarily poetic voice introduces the beauty of a world vanished in terms of time and largely inaccessible in terms of place. It is hard to know how many of those standing in the Yard at the Rose Theatre could read works such as The Foreste or The Myrrore, but all could listen and imagine the astonishing journey of a former shepherd who had ascended to a throne that overlooked half the world. The poorest member of the audience could see this humble man transformed, using language as a weapon to woo, cajole, threaten, and mock. Marlowe’s plays armed their audiences with language and provided them with outrageous examples of social transformation.

This threatened certain interest groups, particularly the Puritan community running the City of London, just across the Thames from the Rose. As Thomas Healey has written:

One of the features which some of the City of London elite disliked about the Elizabethan theatre was that it was seen as promoting ideas of instant rank and wealth to its audiences (Healey, 1994: 49)

The theater, therefore, represented a space in which aspiration could be seen and absorbed. Tamburlaine and Faustus met their fates upon the stage, but they had risen from nowhere to embark upon stunning journeys of experience. Drama represented a challenge to the various régimes of the Tudor period. Indeed, Henry VIII had created a new government office, The Master of the Revels, to monitor and control it. As Louis A. Montrose has written:

The expansion of the role of this court office to include the licensing of public dramatic performances as well as the provision of courtly ones indicates that the Elizabethan régime was attempting to subject the symbolic and interpretative activities of its subjects to increasing scrutiny and regulation—at the same time that it was inventing new sources of revenue for itself and its clients (Montrose, 2001: 228)

During Elizabeth I’s reign, theatrical representation in the playhouses and at court grew in richness and diversity, both linguistic and visual. The monarch herself possessed a strong sense of theatricality, styling herself as a virgin warrior queen at Tilbury before the battle with the Spanish Armada in 1588
and adopting multiple associations in her painted portraits. In the *Ditchley Portrait* of 1590, she can be seen bestriding the world, rather Tamburlaine-like. Thomas Healey connects this directly to Richard Hakluyt’s 1589 publication *The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* but points out the English were hardly yet a dominant global force:

What Hakluyt’s celebration reveals, though, is that reality and fantasy were closely associated when it came to representing the world to Elizabethan readers (Healey, 1994: 47)

In the Elizabethan era, working Londoners had the opportunity to travel far, but only in an imaginative sense. A paradigm was being created by their governing elite that suggested English success in its missions across the world that few could profit from or witness. However, from written accounts of travel, dramatists created elaborate and exotic stage worlds. To the theatergoer, these worlds were within reach from the pit of the playhouse. In this paper, I am going to discuss Shakespeare’s use of fairies in his play *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and consider their deployment as objects of fantasy and agents of exotic aspiration in the imaginative lives of those witnessing them.

The date of the first performance of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* is uncertain. It first appears in the Stationer’s Register in an entry dated October 8, 1600 by the bookseller Thomas Foster. This first quarto edition informs us that the play was “sundry times publicly performed.” The first recorded performance took place on New Year’s Day, 1605 at court, which demonstrates the play’s appeal as a festive entertainment. The best means of dating the play’s first performance is a consideration of its style and structure. As R.A. Foulkes has written:

> It shares with a group of plays written about 1594–7 the mastery of lyrical drama achieved by Shakespeare in the mid-1590s (Foulkes, 2003: 1)

The speculative date is usually given as 1595–6, placing the play after *Romeo and Juliet* and before *The Merchant of Venice*. *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* possesses three distinct subplots within the frame of a wedding, that of the Athenian Duke Theseus and the recently-conquered Hippolyta. This has led to speculation that the play was specifically written as the evening entertainment for an aristocratic wedding, although a commission
from within the rising mercantile or legal communities is equally likely, as I will demonstrate.

The play’s use of fantasy elements—the fairy community—suggests a powerful visual presence. This may have required an indoor performance, possibly within the Inns of Court. In the rehearsal of the supposed tragedy *Pyramus and Thisbe*—a play within the play—there is much concern among the actors about the use of light:

**Snug** Doth the moon shine that night we play our play?  
**Bottom** A calendar! A calendar! Look in the almanac—find out moonshine, find out moonshine!  
**Quince** Yes it doth shine that night.  
**Bottom** Why, then may you leave a casement of the great chamber window, where we play, open, and the moon may shine in at the casement (3.1.24)

Indeed, the play’s meta-theatrical nature suggests that the audience was familiar with the process of putting on a play and that these sections containing the rehearsal of *Pyramus and Thisbe* were “in-jokes.” The play is, first and foremost, a dazzling work of construction, displaying a wide range of linguistic and dramaturgical skills; perhaps a self-conscious appeal for further commissions. An analogy might be with Hans Holbein the Younger’s paintings of merchants from the early part of the century in which he displayed the wide range of objects, figures, and surfaces he was able to represent to potential patrons.

There is evidence to suggest that, by the mid-1590s, the rise of areas in the City of London known as “Liberties” were challenging the authority of the Puritan elite, and it is interesting to note that the lovers Hermia and Lysander in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* are planning to flee “the sharp Athenian law” via an escape into a distinctly theatrical and transformative forest. Was this another “in joke,” a sly reference to the City régime and its unforgiving nature? Egeus, Hermia’s father, is a cold and ruthless patriarch, an advocate of the letter of the law who connects Lysander’s wooing of his daughter directly to witchcraft and performance:

**Egeus** …This man hath bewitched the bosom of my child.  
Thou, thou, Lysander, thou hast given her rhymes,  
And inter-changed love-tokens with my child.  
Thou hast by moonlight at her window sung  
With feigning voice verses of feigning love (1.1.27–31)
The play’s mythological frame and range of classical references suggests that the audience would have some awareness of the significance of ancient Athens so we might assume a university-level of education for many of them. There are references to law and trade which is described with much poetry in the fairy subplot: Oberon and Titania argue over an Indian boy they have turned into a jealously-guarded commodity. The key point is that A Midsummer Night’s Dream is a brilliantly constructed entertainment to be consumed by a knowing and educated audience who were probably not aristocratic but were certainly ambitious. In this sense, the play’s fairy subplot represents an aspirational fantasy of free class movement within the frame of a dream. This playful aspect made its more controversial ideas easy to dismiss, or to overlook entirely. Its humor may have been most relevant to those who had acquired their education recently: the immediate descendants of glovers and shoe-makers.

Shakespeare’s use of fairy lore in the play enables a series of extraordinary interactions between individuals of different status and demonstrates an expanding public consciousness regarding the world beyond London and beyond England. Just as Marlowe’s play Tamburlaine begins in Persia, so A Midsummer Night’s Dream introduces the audience to the possibilities of Oriental trade in merchandise and people. Both scenarios create a fantasy of speculative travel and increase the imaginative resources of the audience. The fairies allow for time to be condensed and for large areas of territory to be connected briefly and theatrically. As Puck, ever-willing to please his master Oberon, states:

Puck I’ll put a girdle round about the earth  
In forty minutes! (2.1.175)

We can assume that Shakespeare would have grown up in Warwickshire knowing of fairy lore. The levels of belief in such phenomena in Early Modern England are not entirely clear and the data somewhat contradictory. On one hand, Reginald Scot in his The Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584) dismissed the existence of the fairy “Robin Goodfellow” (Puck’s more formal name) as a kind of legend common to a previous generation of “our mother’s maids.” But Scot’s views on witchcraft and on fairy lore, which can seem to us to be quite progressive, were probably not the norm. The ascendancy of James I in 1605, and his well-documented belief in malicious magic, saw a rise in accusations of witchcraft in England and trials such as those held in Pendle, Lancashire in 1612. In Rye, Sussex, two women were accused of consorting with fairies in order to attain treasure in 1607. The court account
of Susan Swaffer (or Sawyer) reveals the fairies as a very palpable threat and temptation. Swaffer saw spirits including “a Tall Man.” They were later joined by a woman:

And he said the woman in green is the Queen of the Fayries, and that if she would kneel to her, she would give her a living (Gregory, 2013: 21)

In this remarkable case, reference was made both to Oberon and Titania as fairy monarchs, and both appear as powerful figures in the Rye narrative, not to be crossed lightly. It is possible that within London such beliefs were considered unsophisticated or rural, but Shakespeare’s fairies granted him an opportunity to unite worlds. In the words of Sumona Marik:

The play illustrates Shakespeare’s close acquaintance with the fairy tradition of his time and his attempt to combine folk elements with classical mythology and medieval romances (Marik, 2013: 35)

Indeed, medieval romance may have been the most familiar context for fairy appearances as far as the educated audience of A Midsummer Night’s Dream was concerned. There may have been a fashionable rediscovering of these images, a phenomenon reflected in Edmund Spenser’s epic allegorical poem, The Faerie Queene. The first three books were published in 1590 with the complete poem following (interestingly) in 1596. This suggests that both works drew upon the same material and revived traditions previously considered inappropriate or old-fashioned. Spenser’s work certainly found favor with the Queen, who subsequently granted him a living: a pension of £50 per year! In reviving the literary idea of the fairies, both works look back to Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales. Chaucer’s Wife of Bath argues that the fairies were driven out by unruly and ungodly friars. Perhaps the fairies returned with the Reformation as Richard Frith Green suggests: “so thoroughly does the fairy ethos permeate late-sixteenth-and early-seventeenth-century courtly verse” (Frith Green, 2016: 202).

It is perfectly possible that there had been a request for some magical element in the play by those commissioning it, or that something about the venue for the first production particularly lent itself to the use of the supernatural. Perhaps the venue had a walled garden or other outside space that could be lit effectively? What is particularly striking about Shakespeare’s use of the fairies is their location. They are encountered in the wood outside Athens, yet the pastoral world they describe is distinctly English. It has
been laid waste by the ongoing dispute between Oberon and Titania. As she describes:

**Titania** The nine men’s-morris is filled up with mud,
And the quaint mazes in the wanton green
For lack of tread are indistinguishable (2.1.98–100)

It could be argued that this devastated world is not that of Shakespeare’s London in the 1590s, but that of his childhood, with the religious changes of Elizabeth’s Protestant government taking effect. It seems to locate the play in a situation that is decidedly not Mediterranean, and yet both Oberon and Titania are connected to Theseus and Hippolyta and have assisted them during their own mythological adventures. This confusion of time and space is further clouded by the matter at the heart of the fairy dispute:

**Oberon** I do but beg a little changeling boy
To be my henchman (2.1.118–119)

The boy was taken from India, where a group of priestesses worshipped the fairy queen. Titania defends her position to her sovereign:

**Titania** His mother was a votress of my order,
And in the spiced Indian air by night
Full often hath she gossiped by my side,
And sat with me on Neptune’s yellow sands
Marking th’ embarkéd traders on the flood,
When we have laughed to see the sails conceive
And grow big-bellied with the wanton wind;
Which she, with pretty and with swimming gait
Following (her womb then rich with my young squire),
Would imitate, and sail upon the land
To fetch me trifles and return again
As from a voyage rich with merchandise (2.1.123–135)

The fairies are transformed into agents of international activity, far removed from the kind of low-level and local mischief described in witchcraft cases of the Late-Elizabethan and Early-Jacobean period. They are witnesses of, and occasional agents in, mercantile activity. The sense of wonder in the presentation of this world again suggests a non-aristocratic audience, one at a remove from the immediate spoils of such travel, and supports the argument for a rising, aspirational professional class as the intended, initial consumers. Just as the son of a Warwickshire glove-maker—William Shakespeare—had risen to participate in a form of cultural production
that brought him close to the royal court, so other sons of artisans had used their education to negotiate roles that brought them close to matters of international significance, particularly in the areas of diplomacy and intelligence gathering. To them, this journey of significant social movement in a single generation might have seemed miraculous, or even magical. In grammar schools and at universities, they had gained access to a body of Pre-Christian, classical texts that offered very different ideas about desire, the body, social structure and worship. Elizabeth I—a scholar of classical languages herself—undeniably enjoyed the visual processes of re-invention and the rich bank of mythological images to which education gave her access. As we have seen, the Ditchley Portrait links her personal image to those of ancient virgin goddesses and possibly to Theseus’s bride, Hippolyta. During this period, those attaining at least a grammar school education had their eyes opened to worlds both fictitious and factual. Those working in cultural production not only had the opportunity to write stories inspired by such material, but to show it dramatically on the stage to large and diverse audiences.

The play mystifies travel, and especially England’s relationship with India, making it a territory of fantasy and imagination in which the traffic of people is somehow made more palatable. Fairies stealing English children was a thing to be dreaded, but to appropriate them from the East was made acceptable by poetic practices. As Swati Roychowdhury has written in “The Fairies and Elizabethan World Politics”:

The Occident’s relation with the Orient being one from which the former not only derived economic but social benefits as well, the latter came to be viewed by the West as a repository of economic and human resources—such nomenclatures often implying commodification of human beings (Roychowdhury, 2013: 40)

If A Midsummer Night’s Dream engages fantasticaly with the East, it also does so with the idea of the West. With Oberon unable to force Titania to relinquish ownership of the Indian child, he turns to magic to assist him. Having told Puck of an arrow loosed by Cupid, Oberon describes its destination and the effect it has had:

Oberon …It fell upon a little western flower,  
Before, milk-white; now purple with love’s wound:  
And maidens call it ‘love in idleness’.  
Fetch me that flower, the herb I showed thee once;
The juice of it on sleeping eyelids laid
Will make man or woman madly dote
Upon the next live creature that it sees.
Fetch me this herb, and be thou here again
Ere the leviathan can swim a league (2.1.166–174)

Puck promises to “put a girdle round about the earth in forty minutes.” It is clear that this fairy, a creature of traditional English folklore, has gained the power of international travel. It appears the antidote to a problem created in the East is a flower that grows somewhere in the West. But how far west? The description of the speed at which the fairy travels suggests this flower is to be picked in the Americas. When Puck returns with it, we can assume that it had a suitably exotic appearance. Exotic phenomena—theatrically created, of course—were given form and substance on the Early-Modern stage for an audience of professional class, whose fathers would have developed their own artisan businesses through the growth of their domestic markets, and perhaps even via the possibility of export further afield into Europe. The world of the professional classes was expanding, and this is reflected in the entertainment they were willing to commission from theatrical professionals. A Midsummer Night’s Dream places a world on the stage that is exotic in both time and space, journeying to mythical places outside of the English folk and religious traditions, producing artificial and magical evidence of a world of commercial opportunity opening up to English adventurers. The reality, as we have seen, was something very different, and Shakespeare’s play can therefore be viewed as a particularly heady and intoxicating piece of fantasy for his aspirational audience.

Among the other subplots of the play, Shakespeare presents a group of Athenian working men attempting to put on a play that they really do not understand very well. This group is held in disdain by the fairies, as Puck demonstrates on first seeing them:

Puck What hempen homespuns have we swaggering here
So near the cradle of the Fairy Queen?
What, a play toward? I’ll be an auditor,
An actor too perhaps, if I see cause
(3.1.60–63)

In performance, it has generally been the preferred mode to offer these characters as foolish and the focus of comic attention. It is certainly true that they offer a great deal of comedic opportunity as we discover how ill-fitted they are to the task of interpreting the tragedy of Pyramus and
Thisbe, a story Shakespeare knew from his reading of the Roman poet Ovid. But it would not be correct to reduce the status of these characters on account of their manual or “mechanical” professions.

The fact that James Burbage, the entertainment entrepreneur who built the Theatre playhouse in 1576 at Shoreditch, was a carpenter by trade ought to be borne in mind here. James Burbage’s success in his trade led to his son, Richard, attending grammar school and Oxford University. Richard Burbage would go on to play the role of Hamlet, probably in 1601. In a single generation, a family with considerable craft skills also obtained intellectual ones in writing and rhetoric, creating the ingredients for sharing and inter-generational building. This resulted in new kinds of playhouses and new kinds of stories to unfold upon their stages.

The craftsmen of the subplot may seem foolish, but that is because they are ambitious. Their leader, Peter Quince, does not choose Morris dancing or mummery to answer Theseus’s call for entertainments (and we discover the places for such things have been ruined by the fairy dispute). Instead, he attempts to adapt and stage mythology. Again, this takes us into the realm of speculation, but it is worth considering that if A Midsummer Night’s Dream were offered for production in 1596, then that would be twenty years after James Burbage opened the Theatre playhouse north of the Thames. Is it possible that the entire mechanicals subplot is an affectionate spoof of early attempts to place a richer and more diverse range of entertainments upon the stage by craftsmen who did not quite have the confidence to complete the task satisfactorily? Were the sons of these craftsmen wittily honoring their fathers with the story of Pyramus and Thisbe? The mechanicals—whose number include a carpenter named Snug the Joiner—know that Pyramus and Thisbe is important, but they do not understand its genre or how to deliver it successfully before an audience of aristocrats. As Louis A. Montrose writes in his description of Bottom the Weaver:

He is not the voice of the dispossessed or the indigent but of the middling sort, in whose artisanal, civic and guild-centred ethos Shakespeare had his own roots. He represents the particular socio-economic and cultural origins of William Shakespeare (Montrose, 2001: 220)

Far from mocking the ambitions of the artisan class, A Midsummer Night’s Dream celebrates their capacity to embrace a challenge. Most of the group can read well and are capable of learning their parts in a short space of
time—an essential skill in the fast-changing world of Elizabethan stage production. They make errors and interpret poetical matters too literally, and yet they are prepared to rise to the task commanded by Theseus and enacted by his own Master of the Revels, Philostrate, to “Awake the pert and nimble spirit of mirth” (1.1.13). The principal source of their errors resides in their desire for clarity storytelling and to not unduly alarm the audience. When Bottom volunteers to appear as the lion in Pyramus and Thisbe, Peter Quince is quick to check him:

**Quince** And you should do it too terribly, you would fright the Duchess and the ladies that they would shriek; and that were enough to hang us all.

**All** That would hang us, every mother’s son (1.2.60–63)

The danger to the players is that they might be misunderstood by a capricious and possibly intoxicated social elite, something to be feared by professional performers invited to act at court during the period. What the subplot shows us is the danger of a performance that fails to please those in power. Again, the fact that the play appears to have fun with this idea suggests that those watching it for the first time were not of the aristocratic class but closer to the artisanal traditions described by Montrose. As we have seen, the first recorded performance took place at the court of James I, but this was nine or ten years after its probable first production. Perhaps, during this time, the play’s reputation grew alongside that of its author, diminishing the more subversive elements or neutralizing them through familiarity.

By 1605, Elizabeth I was dead. Performance of the play in the Jacobean era may have benefitted from the decoupling of the actual queen from her equivalent in the fairy realm of the play. This, I believe, is the most radical aspect of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and the part that most actively demonstrates and plays with ideas of aspiration. Whilst the mechanicals are rehearsing in the woods outside Athens, Puck intervenes, mocking their lowly appearance. During Bottom’s exit from a scene, Puck replaces his head with that of an ass. His re-appearance terrifies his comrades who react to this perceived act of witchcraft in a way that demonstrates an active belief in fairy power:

**Quince** O monstrous! O strange! We are haunted! Pray, masters, fly, masters! Help! (3.1.86–7)
However, Bottom’s theatrical transformation does not render him monstrous in his manners, which become increasingly courtly. Puck’s action grants Bottom access to a world that his peers cannot perceive: the fairy kingdom and, most importantly, to its queen: Titania. Under the influence of the “western flower” she falls in love with the transformed artisan. She is particularly attracted by his ability to perform:

**Titania**

_I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again;
Mine ear is much enamoured of thy note.
So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape,
And thy fair virtue’s force perforce doth move me
On the first view to say, to swear, I love thee (3.1.114–118)_

Bottom is promoted by Titania to the rank of gentleman (3.1.142) and given his own entourage of fairies. The artisan/actor’s ability to perform has not only allowed him access to a world beyond his own ambitions but goes on to grant him access to the body of the queen. Given the connections between the fairy queen and the actual monarch established by Edmund Spenser, this might be seen as a dangerous provocation. Bottom is, after all, a commoner and far below the social level of any monarch, even a supernatural one. In this sense, the fairy subplot represents a fantasy of ambition to match the images of the exotic narratives earlier described. This is social mobility to an astonishing level. What renders the situation acceptable are the same fantasy elements we have seen deployed previously: the framework of a dream. As Stephen Greenblatt has written:

_The whole experience produces the somatic effect that is, as we have seen, the hallmark of wonder (Greenblatt, 1991: 21)_

Bottom’s experience places the audience in that state, too. If the play exists in a hinterland between myth, folklore, and imaginative history, then it contains an element of deniability that can be activated if needed: It is all just an illusion. Bottom’s encounter with the fairy and mythical monarchies is, paradoxically, both daring and conservative. As Louis A. Montrose has written of Bottom:

_His interactions with the Queen of the Fairies and with the Duke of Athens represent distinct modes of relationship to the sovereign: in the former, that relationship is figured as erotic intimacy: in the latter, it is figured as collective homage (Montrose, 2001: 220)"
Bottom’s relationship with Titania is not real. She is under the influence of a drug, and on waking, the artisan/actor is quickly removed from her bower, never to see the fairy world again. And yet his naïve daring and the nature of his performance has allowed a glimpse of an astonishing possibility: the mixing of the common with the royal. This is the aspiration reflected at the heart of the play: that artisans, or rather their children, will achieve intimacy (not necessarily physically of course) with the monarch. Bottom’s ejection from fairyland does not result in anger or cynicism but in a desire instead to chronicle and show the astounding experiences he has had:

**Bottom** I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream; it shall be called “Bottom’s Dream” because it hath no bottom; and I will sing it in the latter end of a play, before the Duke. Peradventure, to make it the more gracious, I shall sing it at her death (4.1.197-211–211)

His response is to make a work of art because he is a maker by trade: an artisan. Bottom’s experience can be viewed as another form of travelogue, an exotic experience to share with audiences. If Titania is intended in some way to overlap with the persona of Elizabeth I, then we see her, potentially, as a loving or lethal patron of the world of the playhouses. Approval could lead to aspirational upward journeys. Disapproval could lead to alienation and even worse.

In conclusion, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* is an astonishing, aspirational text that dramatizes many of the key tensions in Elizabethan society. Whereas Christopher Marlowe’s plays present shepherds and scholars translated into agents of extraordinary power, Shakespeare’s characters operate in a more complex and ambiguous world of shifting status relationships. This directly reflected the ambitions of aspiring artisans and their descendants in a time of increased access to knowledge of both the semi-historical past and of the world beyond their own immediate frontiers. Shakespeare’s play demonstrates movement beyond one’s own territory—geographical and intellectual—as a rich and valuable experience. Although the Elizabethan social elites created an idea of global success, celebrated in the painted image of the Queen standing triumphant over the world, the artisan classes and their educated children prepared for the possibility of social advancement and change via an exotic interplay of mythic image, folklore, and imaginative transformation.
TEACHING AND LEARNING IN A GLOBAL WORLD

If you’re totally illiterate and living on one dollar a day, the benefits of globalization never come to you
Jimmy Carter

Globalization is good
Johan Norberg

We must create a kind of globalization that works for everyone...and not just for a few
Nestor Kirchner

Today’s terrorism is not the product of a traditional history of anarchism, nihilism, or fanaticism. It is instead the contemporary partner of globalization
Jean Baudrillard

In today’s interconnected and globalized world, it is now commonplace for people of dissimilar world views, faiths, and races to live side by side. It is a matter of great urgency, therefore, that we find ways to cooperate with one another in a spirit of mutual acceptance and respect
Dalai Lama
Studying (Un)civilized States: Drawing the Borders of Globalization in Study Abroad

Salma Edrif, Dar Si Hmad for Development, Education and Culture and École nationale de commerce et de gestion d’Agadir

Rebecca L. Farnum, Dar Si Hmad for Development, Education and Culture and Department of Geography, King’s College London

Jade Lansing, Dar Si Hmad for Development, Education and Culture

Introduction

New technologies and the spread of the internet have created the possibility to virtually “visit” a country down to the street. Our expectations of a country and/or a people are shaped by the clichés exposed on the web. Prior to my visit to London, I pictured my interactions during my UK experience to be only with British people, yet my first interaction on British soil was in fact with an Iraqi Uber driver who also happens to own multiple car service businesses in Morocco and knew of my hometown. Globalization both narrowed my expectations of the UK and broadened them at the same time.

(Salma Edrif, reflecting on globalization following an academic trip to London)

Globalization is generally assumed to undermine the Westphalian system dominated by nation-states, erasing national boundaries and giving birth to a new, global form of citizenship. Practitioners and politicians alike herald study abroad as vital to preparing the next generation to succeed in an interconnected world and champion social justice for all of the world’s citizens. Students are sent away from home universities for education abroad with promises of gaining new and invaluable global perspectives, making lifelong friends from around the world, and learning more about themselves.

In practice, though, American and European study abroad programs often reify states—rather than local or transnational contexts and communities—as the central framework of global education, especially in developing contexts. In marketing and implementation, study abroad is generally framed as experiencing a national reality, affirming states and state imaginaries as the appropriate lens for encounters with the foreign “rather than
the geohistorical and political making and re-making of (already hybrid) cultures” (Andreotti et al., 2010). Participants “discover Morocco” rather than exploring middle-class Marrakechi culture or investigating Mediterranean continuities and variances.

This state-centric approach results in study abroad destinations being classified as “civilized” (or, all too frequently, “uncivilized”) through the lens of state power rather than more local realities. Few programs explicitly address the different experiences of globalization encountered around the world—experiences that vary between members within the same household and even more across an entire nation. The language of study abroad is itself bound in disparate geographies. “Study abroad” generally denotes North American and European students going overseas for coursework, while individuals from the Global South enrolled in Western universities are simply “pursuing education” (Handler, 2016).

This framing is harmful to both participants and hosting communities, tacitly supporting global inequalities (Andreotti et al., 2010; Andreotti and de Souza, 2012; Jefferess, 2008) and constraining possibilities for local practitioners based on neocolonial expectations. Research shows that intentionality (Pedersen, 2010), pedagogy (Engle and Engle, 2002; Vande Berg, Connor-Linton, and Paige, 2009), and program duration (Vande Berg, Paige, and Hemming Lou, 2012) affect whether engaging in study abroad has transformative impacts on participants’ intercultural competencies. When these factors are not considered, program takeaways may be negligible or negative—despite the good faith efforts of practitioners.

Study abroad marketing and programming both shape and are shaped by discourses of globalization, particularly in the absence of critical reflection on how borders, institutions, and ideas come to be packaged together. Via checkpoints, legal régimes, funding packages, and diplomatic representatives, states continue to be substantial actors and stakeholders in American and European study abroad industries. Bundles of notions about common cultures and characteristics that form state imaginaries likewise construct and constrain the possibilities of study abroad, especially as they impact student experiences and assumptions. Both overlapping and divergent, the state and state imaginary are thus foundational to mainstream study abroad as presently practiced.
The necessity of applying for a visa, the physical infrastructure of border control, and potential restrictions for non-citizens (on rights to work, rent property, access services, etc.) all serve as overt reminders of the state’s power and position. These approaches to education abroad shape students’ perspectives, implying dichotomies and boundaries, constructing sameness and difference, and leaving a lasting impression on student minds (Douglas and Jones-Rikkers, 2001; Paige et al., 2009). Subsequent experiences and interactions become embodiments of the “Other,” suggested and reinforced by study abroad programs.

This piece is based on a recently published article in the *International Journal of Development Education and Global Learning* exploring how study abroad has become a form of statecraft in the Westphalian system (Lansing and Farnum, 2017). Here, we highlight some of the diverse ways in which globalization plays out in education abroad for various parties. Insights are drawn primarily from an Ethnographic Field School based in Agadir and Sidi Ifni (Southwest Morocco). Our primary author, Salma Edrif, is a Moroccan university student who serves as a Speaking Partner for the School and has traveled overseas herself for academic conferences. In addition to her theoretical contributions to the main text, first person narratives of her particular experiences with globalization are given in italics to exemplify arguments.

**The borders of cultural exchange**

Morocco has become an increasingly popular destination for students from the USA, Europe, and Western Africa, particularly in the wake of instabilities making study in other regional destinations less accessible. For a relatively small country (both in terms of geography and demography), Morocco is a major study abroad destination: in 2015, more American students studied in Morocco than any other Arabic-speaking country (Institute for International Education, 2016). Of the roughly sixty-eight countries in the Middle East and Africa, only Israel and South Africa receive more study abroad participants annually (IIE, 2016).

Students from North America, Europe, and the UK are permitted to enter Morocco without a visa for stays up to three months. Both of this paper’s American authors regularly enter and exit the country with little hassle. Moroccan students, on the other hand, cannot travel or study in these countries without going through a costly and exacting visa process.
The world being a small village implies a theoretical abolition of borders between states. International citizenship is supposed to guarantee ease of mobility for the citizens of the world, regardless of origin or destination. However, as a Moroccan, attending an environmental conference at Oxford University proved no such ease of travel or exchange.

Applying for a visa to visit the UK as a Moroccan involves a complicated process of paperwork, several trips across the country, and significant non-refundable fees, paid whether the visa is granted or rejected. The process begins with an online application that requires the disclosure of information regarding the applicant’s personal life, marital and family situation, travel history, criminal record, parents’ names and nationalities, employment and/or academic situation, income statements and annual expenditures, accommodation and extended family liaisons in the UK, visit purpose and plans and intention, and any affiliation with terrorist groups, etc. Subsequently, a physical file submission appointment at the British consulate in Rabat is set to assess the applicant’s financial and personal stability and ability to support themselves while in the UK. At this stage, there is a nonrefundable fee of ~$150 US [the equivalent of 100 hours of work at Morocco’s minimum wage]. Two weeks later, a second appointment is set to retrieve the applicant’s passport, which may or may not contain the visa stamp. For applicants coming from the South or East of the country, these appointments require overnight accommodation and at least twenty hours of public bus transit each way.

Going through Moroccan borders, I was required to narrate the contents of my visa documents at every stage of the security process and explain the purpose of a “Conservation Optimism” conference. Upon arrival in London, the exact purpose, itinerary, and duration of my visit were likewise of utmost interest to a mass of security personnel.

Globalization has made the world smaller in some senses, but not everyone encounters distances shrunk to the same degree. For most Moroccans, the distance between them and the UK is far greater than the distance between London and Agadir for a British national. Borders, boundaries, and barriers remain unequal—perhaps even more so than they were previously. Globalization is not singular in experience or impact, and to ignore this undermines the very premises of equitable exchange.
Globalization and civilization’s Others

A central tenet of globalization is that today the fates of citizens across the globe are more interconnected than they have ever been. Within this reality, study abroad has been posited as a “bridge” between disparate cultures and contexts, equipping students with the skills and sensitivities needed to facilitate a peaceful and prosperous international ecosystem. Yet, the bridge of international study often tilts one-way, projecting American and British educational models and expectations onto developing contexts. At times blatantly and elsewhere inadvertently, these contexts and the diverse communities within them are framed as recipients of, rather than active players in, a linear progression toward civilization.

Local practitioners in Morocco, for example, frequently confront students, faculty, and university administrators committed to the imaginaries of Morocco highlighted in marketing; satisfying “customers” requires making concessions to appeal to these narratives (Lansing and Farnum, 2017). For example, a 2015–2016 Fulbright English Teaching Assistant (ETA) recalled how stakeholders engaged in this marketing during their placement in Morocco:

*Host families get paid by study abroad programs who are paid by wide-eyed American students looking for an “authentic” Moroccan experience... The placement in the medina [historic walled sector of the city] and the emphasis that the host family is where we’re guaranteed to have a “true Moroccan experience” perpetuate the image of Morocco as “exotic” or “different.” I’m wondering if [the program provider] would have pressed this image as much if, say, we were staying in a trendy apartment next to the Morocco Mall...*

*I have felt the effects of these study abroad expectations. In my work with Dar Si Hmad’s Ethnographic Field School as an assistant and speaking partner, I’ve spent some time with visiting North American student groups. Program orientation sessions for students visiting the country for the first time unfold the exotic expectations students have of Morocco, mainly fueled by marketing campaigns for study abroad. On personal hygiene conditions, I have been asked if “Moroccans know about washing machines.”*
Even though it is the obvious consequence of globalization, visitors often express their surprise as to how advanced my English skills are, and bigger is their surprise when I say that I acquired a further two foreign languages independently using open source materials online. They forget that globalization has the global aspect and is not something entirely exclusive to North Americans and Europeans.

However, this somewhat stereotypical point of view is not entirely wrong: thirty-two percent of Moroccans are illiterate (HCP, 2017). In my community, many aspects of globalization are a privilege accessible only to the educated and young who are able to a) access and use digital communication tools and b) speak foreign languages. While Dar Si Hmad’s Field School seeks to engage local community members in equitable exchange, local university students must engage with international visitors using a foreign tongue rather than their native Tachelhit or Darija; experiencing this form of globalization is thus exclusive to the educated youth able to communicate in English.

Study abroad programming in/for a globalized world

Study abroad has been heralded by practitioners, participants, and politicians alike as a critical component of university education. The sentiment that globalization “makes it imperative that more students study abroad” is widely accepted (Institute for International Education, 2017). Many in the study abroad industry portray the experience as a unique “milestone along the way to developing the all-important global mindset necessary to thrive in today’s global world,” enhancing skillsets and career opportunities (IIE, 2017). Many researchers reiterate this rhetoric, with findings suggesting that even short-term programs have “lasting educational effects on students” (Ritz, 2011; Ismail et al., 2006).

A growing counter-narrative pushes for greater clarity on how the specifics of program structure and curriculum are impacting students’ learning abroad and dialogue about the core aims of sending students overseas for study (Vande Berg, Paige, and Hemming Lou, 2012; Coleman, 2013). In this narrative, the value of study abroad lies in challenging students to interpret critically how their localized experiences fit into broader global trends and “question the very structure and processes that have afforded them the opportunity to participate in the study experience” (Davies and Pike, 2009: 74).
Unfortunately, with noteworthy exceptions, too few programs encourage this critical approach. Part of the presumed worth of study abroad is in teaching students to adapt to foreign and multicultural environments (Haddad, 1997), yet much of programming is structured in ways that reflect sending universities’ expectations more than local contexts. Limited or unnuanced exposure to other cultures may cause substantial bias when interacting with host communities (Lee and Krugly-Smolska, 1999). Study abroad practitioners must provide the context and theory necessary for students to turn base observations into thoughtful questions and reflections that nourish critical analysis of the inherent assumptions and biases that frame worldviews. Critical approaches to global education should encourage students to deconstruct their own experiences, presenting a dynamic—rather than self-evident—world.

Too often in study abroad and global education curricula, well-intended discourses serve to Other, control, demonize, or flatten dynamic regions (Andreotti et al., 2010; Andreotti and de Souza, 2012; Jefferess, 2008). Instead of making local hosts recognizably individual in narrations of time abroad, they become stand-ins for state poverty and the ugly underbelly of global inequalities (Lewin, 2009: XV; Woolf, 2013). In order to live up to their potential, study abroad programs must avoid these missteps by giving further voice to host communities in the narration of their cultures and livelihoods: via program schedules, yes, but just as critically through their naming, framing, and underlying value systems.

**Conclusion**

If practitioners truly intend to meet the stated goals of study abroad, it is not enough to push students out the door with a “just do it” attitude assuming any international experience will positively impact students’ values and behaviors. At its best, the experience of living and studying surrounded by a different way of life, under a different legal system, perhaps in a different language, is humbling. It is interdisciplinary and reflexive, pushing students to reflect on their communities of origin, mainstream narratives of other cultures portrayed in the media, and the predetermined categories that have hitherto shaped how they see the world. At its worst, though, study abroad reinforces biases and stereotypes and reproduces global power imbalances (see Andreotti et al., 2010; Bochner and Furnham, 1986; Boatler, 1992; Jefferess, 2008; Lee and Krugly-Smolska, 1999; Vande Berg, Connor-Linton, and Paige, 2009).
International study practitioners must think critically about how to frame student experiences and encourage students to question those framings. As Vande Berg suggests, “Students learn effectively only if we intervene before, during and after their experiences abroad” (quoted in Lederman (2007); see also Rowan-Kenyon and Niehaus (2012)). Further critical reflection is needed on the powerful and problematic possibilities of state-centric study abroad and the lasting impact of particular framings on all stakeholders.

Additional consideration should also be given to who makes decisions about program curriculum, activities, and scheduling (Davies and Pike, 2009: 73). Study abroad sector realities mean that practitioners are often pressured to build programs based on the interests of foreign students, the administrative requirements of home universities, and foreign policy agendas. Inclusive discussion among study abroad providers, educational administrators, host communities, and participants is vital to maximizing potential and ensuring that practices and takeaways are in dialogue with host communities. Such programs would push young learners beyond affirmations of existing narratives to seek new questions and break down hegemonic centers of knowledge production.

Study abroad gives cause for cautious optimism (Vande Berg, Paige, and Hemming Lou, 2012: xii). As the world becomes increasingly globalized and the fates of the world’s citizens ever more connected, the need for pedagogy exposing students to different cultures, languages, and ways of life is pressing. But exposure in and of itself does not challenge the global hierarchies, inequalities, biases, and hostilities that face today’s world. Creating programs that allow students to confront these realities with openness and authenticity is difficult and “must be earned, not purchased” (Engle and Engle, 2002: 37). For the impact of study abroad on students and the societies in which they live to be truly transformative, programs must shift from packaging and selling “states” to encouraging participants to challenge the very borders and categorizations shaping their experiences.
These programs do carry with them the potential of creating more critically thinking and accepting generations by breaking barriers between groups from different cultures and inviting us all to discover authenticities beyond assumed stereotypes — including within ourselves. By assisting student groups in their travels and classes here in Morocco, I have discovered places in and facts about my country I would not have otherwise encountered.

However, these positive opportunities are only realized when programs are specific, intentionally engaged with local realities, and non-generalizing in their content. Such initiatives encourage mutual understanding and bear benefits to both visitors and locals, making the most of globalization and cosmopolitan ideals without ignoring systemic injustices.

Study abroad has the potential to stimulate the kind of questions and actions necessary to move toward a more equitable and peaceful global future; they simply need be asked.
Globalization has permeated the study of social sciences and been the subject of extensive interdisciplinary investigation. Much attention has been focused on the polemics surrounding its impact—desirable or otherwise. However, there are two developments which have received relatively less attention. Firstly, the study of globalization has had an impact on the very disciplines within which it has been conducted. For instance, it has denationalized history through the emergence of new streams like Global History. Secondly, this research has led us to the realization that globalization is not a phenomenon of recent vintage but in fact has been witnessed in various iterations in the past. This is an important conclusion; being attentive to recurring patterns holds clues to curing the current malaise surrounding the negative fallout of globalization. In the pages that follow, I have shared my experience teaching a course that foregrounded these two aspects, using the familiar rubrics of “East” and “West” as the point of departure.

Having the possibility of teaching an elective can be rare, and when one does have it, there is the challenge of convincing a committee of departmental colleagues that your idea is of adequate academic merit and sufficiently well developed. And while getting your peers’ support for your idea is often an uphill struggle, it can pale in comparison to getting students to sign up and sustaining their interest through the length of the course. Occasionally, it all comes together, and one comes as close as one ever will to a learning and teaching experience that leaves both student and teacher in some way altered and inspired.

I had been teaching compulsory courses in Political Theory, Political Economy, and International Relations to first year undergraduates, courses with content heavily tilted towards concepts and theories developed in the West. While I did my best to convey that the origins and evolution of these perspectives were closely linked to the history and social context of a specific part of the world, it soon became clear that this did not go far enough towards encouraging an interest in theory, let alone critical thinking. Outside the classroom, I was constantly confronted with deep-seated conviction in the intellectual superiority of the “Western” world, not uncommon on campuses across India.
This inspired me to dig deep into my somewhat eclectic social sciences training to find something that might at least momentarily free students’ minds from this straitjacket of sorts: something that would invite students to question the element of received wisdom inherent within the same concepts I had insisted they master only a couple of terms ago, something that would force them out of the familiar paradigms attached to their experience growing up in a post-liberalization India, where globalization was not the “After” to a starkly different “Before,” but the very backdrop of everyday life. It was at this juncture that I introduced an elective called *The East-West Encounter: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*.

The course aimed to explore how applying various disciplinary perspectives transforms popular notions about the West and the East—their alleged differences and shared history. However, more significantly, it sought to convey how the disciplines themselves have evolved through a consistent, critical interest in the question of the East/West divide. I had initially titled it *East/West Compared* but before long realized that the very problem was that the two had been particularized and seen in comparison, leading to pervasive notions of a consequent hierarchy. It was important to study their meeting points, their encounter as it were, to break this pattern. The key intended learning outcome was to develop critical analytical skills that challenge the dominance of Eurocentric perspectives in popular discourse and scholarship. In addition, students were expected to appreciate how different disciplinary traditions and approaches can be harnessed towards enlightening different aspects of a debate.

Focusing respectively on the works of Edward Said, and Buruma and Margalit, the introductory module was designed to introduce students to the concepts of Orientalism (Said, 1977) and Occidentalism. The intention here was to establish that the “West” was just as much a constructed idea as the “East,” as a prelude to encouraging students to think about the purposes and implication of such construction. In preparation for the next module, “The Great Divergence Debate,” the class briefly reviewed Braudel’s *durée* approach to historical analysis. The *longue durée* approach seeks to de-emphasize the common tendency to study events in history.

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16 Students currently at undergraduate level in India belong to the generation born in the late 1990s, years after reforms at aimed economic liberalization were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They will not therefore have any recollection of life in pre-reform India, characterized by a planned economy, elaborate state intervention and bureaucratic presence in business, a rather marginal private sector and very limited variety in the consumer goods market. For instance, my family’s first car when I was growing up was the Ambassador, one of only two cars available in the market at the time—the other being the Fiat Premier Padmini.
and instead shifts the focus to the long run as a more useful way of understanding the nature and causes of change. This module addressed the question “at what juncture and for what reasons did the East fall behind?” in developmental terms. Competing understandings of “falling behind” and reasons for its occurrence were drawn out of economic and global history to challenge the conventional/textbook story of the Industrial Revolution being the primary cause. A review of the work of various scholars on the question revealed that the causes to which they attributed this divergence were closely linked to the moment in time they identified as its starting point.

Having discussed competing explanations, the next couple of weeks were dedicated to the theme of empire. The focus of our enquiry was the question: Did imperialism play a decisive role in bringing about the Great Divergence? In addition to examining both sides of the debate, this module also drew on the material previously studied by examining sociological and economic justifications for, and consequences of, empire. I rediscovered the work of Patrick O’Brien who had taught me at the London School of Economics and wished I had paid closer attention when he explained his thesis that the divergence was in fact a direct outcome of the positioning of Europe and the rest in the global trading system. O’Brien (2004) argues that the key difference between the colonial regions in Asia and Africa on the one hand and colonial settlements in the Americas on the other was that the former failed to diversify out of production of primary commodities dependent on local natural endowments, while the latter were able to attract skilled labor and capital investment from Europe. Had I understood the full import of this argument back then, I might have expressed my reservations about his implicit conclusion that “development” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was unrelated to whether one was under democratic or imperialist rule.

The next two modules—“The History of European Integration” and “The Role of Religion in Politics”—were to serve as case studies to apply the concepts and perspectives thus far learnt. Europe was a deliberate choice aimed at urging students not to view it as the West but to understand that any region can have its own East/West, its own carefully crafted binaries and perpetuated hierarchies. Traced through the decades, the history of European integration casts Europe as landscape for both East and West to sidestep the simplistic associations we make with these categories. The literature prescribed was work describing the writing of history in Eastern Europe and the wider politics of commemoration on the continent to understand its implications for ensuring peace and assisting integration.
The class noted how the history of Western Europe has dominated what is considered “European history” and the histories of the rest have either been muted or amplified depending on the dictates of political expediency. Many students, whose only exposure to history are the (often) nationalist histories taught in school, found it both challenging and enlightening to appreciate the unbiased nature of history itself. Another startling message here was that global hierarchies sometimes reproduce themselves at regional, national, and local levels. The other case study on religion and politics posed the question: Is religion characteristic of political institutions and processes exclusively in the East? This common (mis)conception was addressed by examining the role of religion in US politics. The potential of religion to contribute towards peacebuilding was also considered as a way of rethinking the prevailing mainstream narrative.

The course culminated in a summative discussion on the politics of knowledge creation, almost coming back full circle to Said. Shiv Visvanathan’s work on human rights as a Western conception and on Eastern approaches to alternative science as a challenge to the mainstream discourse on growth and development was used as the basis for discussion. This final module was intended to encourage students to seek out counter-hegemonic discourses in the quest for disciplinary evolution and practical solutions.

In the concluding lines of this essay, I would like to share the impact of this course, both on students and myself as a teacher. A student who had taken the course recently sent me a thank you note close to graduation. In this note she described the class as one of the “pivotal moments of my life” and then went on to summarize the contents and lessons better than I could ever have, in the following words:

I have, since that year, revisited the course materials numerous times. It later struck me that, not only was the course full of what was (at least to me) exciting new ideas, but it was also structured in a way that really led the class to see and engage with the East-West binary from all angles—the course began by breaking down the East-West distinction and demonstrated how the binary was nothing beyond a political construct. Then the course went on to show how the political and geographical spaces that this binary operated in were not fixed. It then went on to call attention to the differential treatment that existed when “Western” and “Eastern” religions were spoken of in context of modernity in general and the modern State in particular. This then progressed to the discussion on Eastern and Western knowledge politics to finally
conclude by exploring the idea of the “East” in the “West” through how the children of first generation “Eastern” immigrants interacted with a “Western” society. In that, the course ended in almost the same place where it began, by reasserting the extent to which the “East” and the “West” were political constructs.

Elsewhere in the note she remarks;

*Through the course, I was forced to confront and pay closer attention to the way in which I thought about the world.*

Immensely encouraged by these dynamics in a global classroom somewhere in post-liberalization India, I have found myself looking for places to revisit these themes in courses I have subsequently designed and taught. For instance, in my elective called *The Idea of Europe*, I have devoted a section to the concept of “Eurocentrism.” Going a step further, I once asked students taking this course to reflect on the extent, if any, of Eurocentrism in their own law school curriculum. Once again, the ability of students to express themselves with clarity and poignancy was astounding. One student wrote:

*Instances of Eurocentrism are rampant in the Global Law School. A student was asked in one class what word came to his mind when he thought of Europe and he said “Ideas” and went ahead to explain how philosophy and political science developed in Europe. A lesser human would have cringed (real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance—Confucius), but one should understand that this ignorance is symptomatic of an inherent flaw that exists in the curriculum that is being taught there. While they are being taught in great detail about Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Bentham, a blind eye has been turned towards the philosophers and theorists of this continent be it Chanakya, Gargi, or Buddha (trivia: European philosophers are recognized by this word processor, while the latter ones are underlined in red). There are times when commonsense becomes the casualty of Eurocentrism, especially when seminars like Internal and External Dynamics in the Middle East Post-Arab Spring or The Middle East in Upheaval are conducted in a country where “Middle East” is actually West. This is the textbook example of Eurocentrism and it literally puts Europe in the center of the world, which leads to places being labeled as “Middle East,” “East,” or “Far East.” Should it be acceptable to sacrifice commonsense at the altar of convenience? Global education would in an ordinary sense*
mean studying from a perspective of a person who is not bound by predispositions and biases, and being able to take into consideration different perspectives, all of this while understanding the greater values of justice and equity. In this academic era of deconstructionism and critical theory, Global Law School is teaching students how to think and then asks them to question everything; these students take this as it is given, therefore failing to learn the lesson. How can one be expected to reimage a concept if that individual’s imagination has been limited by the same system of linear thinking? This has led to creation of a cookie-cutter army of faux-highbrows who emulate intelligence and hence “global education” = “think like a white man.”

This pedagogical experience has taught me, above all, that our attempts to understand and problematize globalization have only just begun. Conversations between the past and the so-called Millennials that have unfolded in my East-West class have left me inspired to seek similar encounters in future.
Globalization and Backlash: Consequences for Academic Collaboration and Student and Faculty Flows Across Borders

Michael Stohl, University of California, Santa Barbara

My starting point is two observations from Senator J. William Fulbright. The first is the uplifting one that we often point to when discussing international education:

The essence of intercultural education is the acquisition of empathy—the ability to see the world as others see it, and to allow for the possibility that others may see something we have failed to see, or may see it more accurately. The simple purpose of the exchange program... is to erode the culturally rooted mistrust that sets nations against one another. The exchange program is not a panacea but an avenue of hope.... (Fulbright, 1989: 217)

The second more readily speaks to where we are today: “We have the power to do any damn fool thing we want to do, and we seem to do it about every ten minutes” (Fulbright, Time Magazine, February 4, 1952, quoted in Goodman (2016)).

If we look back to the dawn of the twenty-first century, the international exchange and education world had just experienced a decade of optimism which began with the declaration of a Post-Cold War World and the promise and reality of increasing globalization which was accompanied by the extension of all forms of free movement of people, students, tourists, and immigrants. There had been an expansion of the number and scope of

17 James William Fulbright was a United States Senator representing Arkansas from January 1945 until his resignation in December 1974. In his early career, he was a signatory to the notorious segregationist document The Southern Manifesto (1956). He is best known, however, for the internationalist positions he took in support of the idea of the United Nations and, above all, the Fulbright Act, which established an influential international educational exchange program. He took strongly liberal positions opposing McCarthyism and America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Fulbright was a visionary, but his roots were in the deep south of Jim Crow discrimination. As Tom Healy has noted, he used his own history to illustrate the need for alterations in our sensibilities:

Senator Fulbright is probably known to most people as the founder of the Fulbright Program, which is the State Department’s leading international exchange program, sending our best students, scholars and professionals in almost every field to study, teach and engage with people around the world in return for the world’s best students, scholars and professionals spending time studying, teaching and living in the United States...There’s nothing else like it—building tolerance, mutual understanding and shared knowledge, all to create a more peaceful, more connected world (Healy, 2013).
cooperative trade agreements; the growth in membership of the European Union; and not only improvements in the life chances of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also optimism that these changes were just the beginning of the promised benefits that globalization would bring.

However, looking back, we now know that our collective excitement about the future led to a failure to understand or even recognize the importance of many of the disruptive forces that globalization had unleashed: new real and perceived winners and losers, both within and among nations. A consequence has been the emergence of numerous backlashes across the globe, not only in the Post-9/11 fear of terrorism and over-reactive military responses and militarization of international relations, but also in the decline of social democrats and democracy across Europe.

We have also seen the rise of various forms of nationalist movements celebrating a mythical past of nations, a distortion of Benedict Anderson’s characterization of nations as imagined communities (1983), which now declare that they were and should in the future be composed only of the “rightful” members. Allied to those realities, we are aware of the increasing move to the nationalist Right by many democratic governments, illustrated by a common anger across Europe directed against the faceless bureaucrats in Brussels. This is further demonstrated by more generalized anger about the interference of government in the marketplace.

There has also been an increasing backlash against universities which focus on learning, research, and the creation of educated elites (who often support the cosmopolitan rather than national perspective) rather than vocational training which prepares students for specific jobs upon graduation. While we were all aware of, and concerned with, the drop in public support for higher education at the state level in the USA, and as more and more private universities found it increasingly difficult to navigate the fiscal waters, many of us simply focused on the financial challenges and ignored many of the underlying political and social forces as we went about our business. Then came Brexit and Trump and the threat of more of the same in other parts of Europe and elsewhere.

In addition to the symbolic threat that the Trump administration represents, it is important to recognize the specific changes which have already occurred. For our purposes, the most important are the denigration of diplomacy through both an “America First” stance, and even more damaging,
the end of the idea of the United States as the “indispensable nation”\textsuperscript{18} and of the US as a \textit{global leader} as opposed to a \textit{global power}. This was a recognition of the importance of not only the \textit{hard power} of the military, and the carrot and sticks associated with finance, but also the \textit{soft power} that projected from the “ideas” of the United States as a defender of democracy and “beacon of liberty,” as well as the central tenets of the American Dream. This soft power enabled the United States to “command” more power than the simple differences in military might would suggest. Other important Trumpian positions which have implications for international education include:

\textbf{Military:} a more aggressive stance and the diminution of civilian oversight in the executive branch. A call for a thirty-seven percent cut in the State Department, accompanied by the denigration of soft power, foreign assistance, and human rights.

\textbf{Economic:} attacks against free trade and multilateral trade institutions and agreements.

\textbf{Scientific:} Attacks on the Paris Climate Agreement and announced withdrawal allied with the denigration of professionalism, expertise, science, and scientific method.

Further evidence of anti-internationalism was manifest in the Muslim travel ban and extreme vetting. Of course, it is not simply the tourists or scholars from the directly affected countries or religious groups that these “bans” and extreme vetting affect. They alter the interest and attitudes of everyone in terms of coming to the United States or collaborating with US institutions. They impact on all visitors, but some high-profile examples have made headlines. For example, on his way to the National Prayer Breakfast, Kjell Magne Bondevik, former Norwegian Prime Minister, a Lutheran Minister and a frequent visitor to the USA, was detained at Dulles Airport for an hour because of a passport stamp. It showed a trip to Iran in 2014 where he had attended a human rights conference. Others are known to all of us who host international visitors. For example, I have invited a distinguished Danish scholar to collaborate on a project in May 2018; he has been coming to the USA yearly for the past thirty years and has spent a year in the country

\textsuperscript{18} As Madeline Albright asserted on NBC’s \textit{Today Show}, “…we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us” (February 19, 1998).
on sabbatical as well. He is now worried that, because he accompanied the Danish Foreign Ministry to Somalia last year, he will not gain easy entry or perhaps entry at all. He has had to schedule an interview with the US Embassy in Copenhagen to discover if he will gain admission.

**Tourism**

The Travel Press is reporting the “Trump Slump,” a devastating drop in tourism to the United States. Experts across the travel industry are warning that masses of tourists are being scared away from visiting the United States; the loss of tourism jobs could be devastating. The decline in foreign tourism is at 6.8 percent overall and that includes an eighty percent decline in flight passengers from the seven Muslim-majority nations named by President Trump in the last week of January and first week of February 2017, according to Forward Keys, a well-known firm of travel statisticians (Forward Keys, 2017). Web searches for flights to the USA out of all international locations were recently down by seventeen percent. According to NYC and Company, New York’s marketing tourism agency, the city could expect some 300,000 fewer international travelers in 2017 (Talty, 2017).

This of course does not just impact tourists. Scholarly associations have also felt the impact. For example, the International Studies Association and the International Communication Association are now in discussions with the hotel chains with which they have contracts for meetings extending out for the next five or more years about the possibilities of moving their US-based meetings to Canada or Europe because of fears that their international members would not have free access to the forthcoming meetings. Because scholars could not or would not attend, both organizations have been forced to arrange for scholars to participate in conference panels through Skype rather than in person in their recent and forthcoming annual meetings.

**International student flows**

A survey effort commissioned by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, in partnership with the Institute of International Education, suggests that we could see a sharp decline in enrollment of international students in 2018 if the survey results are consistent with final figures. Nearly forty percent of responding US institutions are reporting a drop in international student applications, particularly from students in the Middle East, according to the survey of 250 schools. De-
clines are also reported for students from China and India at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Farrugia and Andrejko, 2017).

In addition, there are some universities that could be particularly hard hit by the Muslim ban. The ten universities that had the highest number of student visas from the seven countries (with the number of students impacted) are: Texas A&M University (271); University of Southern California (252); Northeastern University (249); The Pennsylvania State University (227); University of Central Florida (224); University of Houston-System (221); Kaplan International Centers (219); The University of Texas at Arlington (219); Arizona State University (199); Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (197) (Jackson, 2017: 2).

So, it is clear that there are enormous challenges in front of us. What should we do? To answer, I want to look backward to discuss creating strategies for going forward.

In the 1980s, US universities witnessed a great wave of “internationalization.” Of course, some universities like Michigan State University had done so much earlier; MSU had already established a Dean of International Programs in 1956. I was involved in the establishment of the office of International Programs at Purdue. We began a multi-year process of strategic planning to discuss how we could and would “internationalize” the campus. Our goal was to think of moving through three phases of learning about the world. This had been adapted from a presentation by the sociologist Bradley Simcock relating to negotiations between the United States and Japan with respect to trade in the 1980s (Simcock, 1989). Learning about was the old National Geographic approach of finding out what was beyond our existing knowledge and “mapping” the world. Learning from was focused on building upon the best ideas we found on how to “internationalize” in teaching, research, and service (subsequently altered to learning, discovery, and engagement) by adopting, adapting, and exploring programs on other campuses that appeared to fit best the different disciplines and needs of Purdue. Finally, learning with was directed at trying actively to create partnerships with other universities to cooperate in learning, discovery, and engagement missions. These included not only exchange programs of students and faculty but also joint-degree programs building upon each partner’s complementary strengths.
As I look back today at the arguments that we encountered concerning internationalization, it is remarkable how different the opposition we faced was, despite the fact that some of the same roots were present in the reactions of reluctant citizens and administrators in Indiana, and at the university itself. One argument, for example, concerned how Purdue could balance the need to educate Hoosiers\textsuperscript{19} with expanding the number of international students. Our University President was worried about the reaction of the state legislature and the public. D. Woods Thomas, the Head of International Programs in Agriculture, and I wrote position papers for our Vice President for State Relations to use in briefing legislators. We then prepared an opinion piece for the \textit{Indianapolis Star}, the state and capital city’s most important newspaper. We argued that, firstly, we were not going to reduce the number of Indiana students accepted to Purdue (but by implication would reduce enrollment of non-Indiana resident US students). In addition to all the efforts we would make to increase the chances for Purdue students to study abroad, our strategy was intended to bring the world to Indiana for all those Purdue students who were not able to study abroad. These were among the many ways we would work to internationalize the learning environment.

I, and my colleagues across the Big Ten\textsuperscript{20}, initiated a coordinated campaign within our states directed at our citizens and state legislature and governors throughout the 1990s. We sought to publicize the achievements of our international alumni both at home and in the USA, including Nobel Prize winners, Academy of Science and Engineering fellows, and successful entrepreneurs and investors in our communities and across the nation. We then invited our governors to join us in making the case at the national level and using the ties to our successful alumni to attempt to lead trade delegations to the places where they resided. Further, we invited those alumni who had been successful to invest or create start-ups in the research parks that were springing up around the campuses, and then, of course, we publicized not only the start-ups but the investors and collaborators, thus reinforcing the positive story. We also encouraged our governors to do better than their neighboring governors to try to create healthy competition which would serve to benefit us all.

\textsuperscript{19} Residents of the state of Indiana, USA.

\textsuperscript{20} A group of prominent Midwestern universities known for high academic standards and keen athletic competition.
We all reinvigorated our efforts to establish and celebrate our connections with international alumni (most of whom were frankly not of interest to our alumni associations during that period). One such effort was finalized in a volume entitled *Three Tigers and Purdue* by John Norberg, who we had hired to produce the study (Norberg, 1999). He recounted the experiences of both undergraduate and graduate students from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea during their studies at Purdue and then described their successes after graduation. Both the research for the book which involved interviewing hundreds of the graduates, and its publication, which included presenting the volume to meetings of the Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Korean alumni by our University President and myself, engaged and energized our alumni (and our University President).

None of these previously-employed strategies will be successful without, at the same time, attacking the problems that have brought us back to hostility, fear, and ignorance of the world outside. In the USA, we have to recognize and confront some long existent socio-political currents that have consistently reappeared in our political debates since the beginning of the European presence on this continent. Two of those currents were the subject of extraordinarily perceptive, and still relevant, volumes, both written by historian Richard Hofstadter more than fifty years ago. The first was *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (1952) and the second *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (1965).

Of the many forces arrayed against intellectualism, Hofstadter returns most often to evangelical religion—an almost constantly strong influence through all of American history—and business, especially the cheerleading tendency that produces the enthusiastic type Hofstadter calls the “hundred percenter.” Education, the main institutional countervailing force to anti-intellectualism, has been continually invaded by anti-intellectual ideas, especially the idea that practical training should take precedence over book learning. Hofstadter also argued that American politics has often been an arena for angry minds. Hofstadter called this “the paranoid style” simply because no other word adequately evokes the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that he had in mind.

21 The origin of the term is obscure, but it is used to describe a bellicose, jingoistic nationalist.
Hofstadter gives a long historical survey which details the phenomenon from the early days of the Republic. Suspicions were consistently directed at newly-arrived waves of immigrants and at various nationalities and religions:

The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms—he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization...he does not see social conflict as something to be mediated and compromised, in the manner of the working politician. Since what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, what is necessary is not compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish. Since the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable, he must be totally eliminated (1952: 29–30)

Thus, international educators naturally are astounded by the political situations we find ourselves in within the USA and Europe and wonder what we should do in the face of hostility to our longstanding project of doing more to connect people across the globe. Beyond our astonishment, there is often an accompanying pessimism and angst or depression about the situation. In this context, I have a relatively modest proposal as a beginning, particularly for this readership. It is anchored in the context of the creation of the Forum on Education Abroad. In the years preceding its formation, many of us were frustrated by our inability to engage more fully the NAFSA hierarchy and overall organization; we eventually found continuing unresponsiveness unacceptable. Thus, in May 2000, a group came together to form the Forum on Education Abroad. So, taking a bit of license from labor organizer Joe Hill, let us not waste any more time in mourning. Let us find some new ways to organize and mobilize and work to return to Senator Fulbright’s dreams and do a better job confronting the “damn fools” who do not understand the value of global exchange and education.

22 Joe Hill was a Swedish-American songwriter, itinerant laborer, and union organizer. He gained fame internationally after being falsely convicted of murder in Utah, despite worldwide protests. On the eve of his execution in 1915, he wrote to Bill Haywood, the former President of the Western Federation of Miners and the best-known leader of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, familiarly called the “Wobblies”): “Goodbye Bill: I die like a true rebel. Don’t waste any time mourning, organize!”
Teaching Globalization Through Travel Writing

Leonardo Lastilla, CAPA: The Global Education Network, Florence

As a teacher of many different courses (Italian Language, Literature, Travel Writing, History, Food and Culture), I came to realize that, in each one of those classes, discussions about globalization are inevitable. Whether we like it or not, globalization, with all the difficulties of definitions and the impossibility of narrowing it down to a single clear concept, is the critical element of our times. I will not attempt to provide an encompassing and unique definition; globalization, by its intrinsic nature, rejects the idea of being labeled. Its strength, and novelty, is that it sums up in itself everything and its opposite.

One class where I see great benefits in teaching my students about globalization is travel writing; this paper offers a case study illustrating the significance of the topic in that context:

Globalization is not simply an inevitable, irreversible force shoved down the throat of a resistant world that can do little more than learn how to live with it. On the contrary: empirically, globalization is nothing more (or less) than the accretion of countless millions of individual acts by people who have availed themselves of the potential granted them by technologies that shrink the planet. Our humanity is enriched when we do the mundane things that are now possible—eat new foods, cheer sports heroes from unlikely places, visit towns and villages that but a generation away seemed as close as the far side of the moon, understand at least the surface of unfamiliar faiths. Looked at in that way, globalization is not something of which one should despair; but rather an excuse for celebration. Global is good (Newsweek Staff, 2000: n. p.)

In this liquid age where most people have become software versions of themselves, most of us would share Pico Iyer’s definition of himself as “a global village on two legs” (Iyer, quoted in London (1996: n. p.); see also Iyer (2000)). Travel writing, he argues, can teach students how to build or rebuild a sense of identity though comparison of the cultures they encounter:

I am a multinational soul on a multinational globe on which more and more countries are as polyglot and restless as airports. I am a global village on two legs. More and more people are in this position of having
hundreds of different cultures singing and clashing and conspiring within them. I think that the global village is increasingly internalized within us (Iyer, quoted in London (1996: n. p.))

One basic element of globalization is the power it has to connect people with different cultures, backgrounds, lives etc. which, incidentally is, or should be, also the purpose of study abroad programs such as CAPA’s. The idea of shaping “global citizens” is something that Henry James understood a long time ago:

No kind of person is a very good kind, and still less a very pleasing kind, when its education has not been made to some extent by contact with other kinds, by a sense of the existence of other kinds, and to that degree, by a certain relation with them (James, 1993: 705)

Travel writing is a genre particularly reflective of the modern condition, globalization, in which mobility, travel, and cross-cultural contact are facts of life. Reading or writing about travel can raise awareness about the liquid and mobile reality in which we live. Travel writing reveals:

The reality of globalization, coupled with the ubiquity of the Internet and the growing influence of smartphones. For starters, this makes tons of information available to you, often at an interactive level, and this makes travel a whole lot easier than it used to be. From a writing perspective, this also brings in a whole new level of dialogue and accountability (Potts, quoted in Fromson (2011: n. p.))

In the context of study abroad programs, it is important to teach that globalization can be good when it challenges and disturbs the sense of being at home with oneself and that cultural shock can occur, and must inevitably occur, without necessarily showing disrespect for the local culture:

The term “culture shock” has become passé, replaced by globalization, Americanization, the shrinking planet. We’ve become so fixated on the world’s similarities that we’ve lost touch with—or simply pretended not to see—its differences (Swick, 2017: n. p.)

Travel writing also teaches that a journey (real or imaginary) is always an encounter between the inner and outer world so that individuals can develop emotional literacy: an aptitude often neglected by educators, parents, and mentors. Most travel narratives emphasize the search for authenticity which is merely a response to the generalized anxiety of modernity. In taking this
class, students learn that the idea of “home” is, by necessity, a work in progress. They read old and contemporary accounts of travels and write articles/essays about their own experiences. Why does this work? Because reading and writing about travel exposes them to the fact that the world is bigger than their own self-reflected home, often replicated and filtered through a tablet. The very fact that these students are abroad already gives them a sense of another world and studying travel writing teaches them to experience the world through other people’s eyes by, hopefully, embracing their otherness. The gift of the Other is one of the most precious gifts humans can experience.

Being abroad and studying travel writing at the same time helps students go beyond the rightness or wrongness of other cultures, to understand them better by developing social adapters and cultural converters. They learn how they may be redefined by encounters with the Other and, indeed, may themselves become that Other. By educating their “tourist gaze,” students understand that places are not to be consumed but experienced, thus learning the difference between culture and brand. This is why I encourage my students to learn the very global attitude of “vagabonding” (Potts, 2002; 2008). As Potts observes, “Vagabonding is about gaining the courage to loosen your grip on the so-called certainties of this world” (Potts, 2002: 12). Only this way they can learn flexibility and deal with their fears. Being abroad is a unique chance to find the only kind of happiness that matters, that which derives from identifying the meaning of one’s life (James, 1876: 7).

Travel writing works because it utilizes an interdisciplinary approach where the humanities meet social sciences, unveiling the complexity of geographical and social concepts, ideas of otherness, perceptions of dangers:

While literary studies become the ground on which the politics of identity plays out its aspirations, and while sociology (and, relatedly, anthropology, politics, etc.) addresses identity as both field and object, understanding globalization calls upon the resources of both kinds of approach (Melton, 2004: 95)

Travel writing is also a genre for reluctant readers; it stimulates critical thinking by allowing students to see how often very personal stories lead to and support reflections that can take the shape of a moral or an insight:

Travel writing can serve important pedagogical missions, namely creating a critical awareness for the constructiveness of representations
of other people, their identities, and cultures. The teaching of travel writing can further contribute to understanding the historical roots of past and present biases and prejudices toward one’s personal situation vis-à-vis other culturally constructed identities (Brisson, 2004: 16)

Most importantly for study abroad programs, it makes students reflect on the culture of the host country:

Asking students to write with an awareness of a local audience and making arrangements for them to discuss their writing with local people supports the ultimate purpose of study abroad. We have study abroad programs because we would like our students to understand via direct experience that people in different parts of the world do not have the same habits, customs, expressions and ways of thinking, and to develop sensitivity towards differences (Chen, 2004: 122)

Travel is a great metaphor for globalization; it is actually its manifestation. Travel (and tourism) and writing about travel have grown hugely in the last twenty years and it is no coincidence that this growth parallels that of globalization. One explains the other. Travel has become the key to making sense of globalization. Leaving home is the first step because traveling makes you aware of how small the world has become and how similar people’s needs are once you arrive at a place. To quote Thomas Swick: “The feeling — after all you have heard about globalization, Americanization, the shrinking planet — that you are in another world” (Swick, 2001: n. p.). This global fluidity serves to remake social relations across the world. Students taste things never tasted before. Writing about new streets, new shops, new faces, new facades, new customs, new concepts teaches them the everlasting thrill of the novel (Swick, 2016).

Travel writing is also effective in exposing students to the local. There is no doubt, in the academic context, that globalization has given new life to the local; one of the most important effects of globalization has been the rediscovery of the diversity and uniqueness of local cultures, identities, foods etc. Reading travel writing has taught my students that “The biggest lie in travel — greater than ‘For you my friend a special deal’ — is ‘Every place now looks the same’” (Swick, 2017: n. p.). The movement from the global to the local and backwards is one of the most rewarding aspects of travel writing. The dialogue taking place between the two is testament to our
existence: “The way that, in learning about another country, you inevitably learn about your own” (2017: n. p.).

In writing articles about their experience abroad and their travels, students disconnect, at least temporarily, from the virtual world and its many social media giving them a sense of the real that is so important for the personal growth of an individual. I believe society and most educators have forgotten this vital need. There is still no substitute for “being there.” No technology can ever give a person the understanding of an experience that writing does. Only writing, I believe, can give you the necessary human time to become aware of the sights, sounds, smells, textures, the tastes of a place. Travel writing is about teaching students to get back to their senses.

In my classes, I try to teach my students the art of wandering, of constantly being on the move, of exploring every corner of the city in which they live while abroad. This is how they learn about globalization. They do not have to travel far. Exploring the city in which they live is sufficient.

In the past, the most important quality in a traveler was a sense of adventure; today, it is a sense of wonder. We have all become inundated, the world a little overexposed. But for those who travel wide-eyed in an age of information overload, the revelations are more potent (if not more numerous) for being unexpected. And they still await, for no amount of images and data can shatter the preeminence of the personal encounter (Swick, 2017: n. p.)

Globalization can help you to find home or understand what home is. There is no greater reward than this in life if we agree with Simone Weil that to be rooted is one of the most essential human needs:

I think that what she must have found, and most of us do too, is that home is essentially a set of values you carry around with you and, like a turtle or a snail or whatever, home has to be something that is part of you and can be equally a part of you wherever you are. I think that not having a home is a good inducement to creating a metaphysical home and to being able to see it in more invisible ways (Iyer, quoted in London (1996: n. p.))

While it is true that more and more cities are becoming part of a global culture, I teach my students to pay attention to the differences and go
beyond the superficiality. The paradox of our age of constant interconnect-
edness is that many experience loneliness and a sense of exile. In this
age of globalization, people are migrating away from their homelands and
their native communities, often a kind of voluntary exile. The quest for
identity has become a vital element and almost a form of survival given the
complexity of its acquisition. Writing about travel can feed the process of
cross-cultural communication and can be an incentive to creation. In this
hybrid world, travel writing can help make sense of the shifting borders,
where an abstract canvas can become again a Renaissance painting. Glo-
alization has replaced the future as the site of “utopia”:

A life spent in transit like this is bound up with equal degrees of hope
and fear. On the one hand, artists are now given the possibility of
evading the pressure of prevailing local tastes in a relatively painless
way. Thanks to modern means of communication they can seek out like-
minded associates from all over the world instead of having to adjust
to the tastes and cultural orientation of their immediate surroundings...
Today the utopian impulse has shifted direction: acknowledgment is
no longer sought in time, but in space: Globalization has replaced the
future as the site of utopia (Groys, 2008: 105-106)

Going abroad is not about learning the “ten best” places to drink a capp-
cuccino in Rome but is about developing an awareness of the true reality
of living in situ with the difficulties and insecurities included. When I ask
students to write about their travel, it is not to read how crazy Interlaken
was or how much fun Barcelona was, but to show me that they have devel-
oped a sense of responsibility towards the people and the culture of the
country they visited:

Travel writers, as unreliable documenters of other people and cultures,
have always had a say in the critical reassessment of their own. Travel
writing, after all, is a valuable medium of estrangement, even if it
operates all too frequently through familiar stereotypes and myths.
This book examines the strategies by which contemporary travel writers
attempt to persuade us that the worlds—often mythical ones—they
describe are real. But it also explores the ways in which these writers
address our own world, giving us access to cultural regions that, though
“discovered,” remain mysterious to us, or making strange those very
territories, and the values and attitudes we ascribe to them, that we
might imagine to be most familiar, the closest to our own experience.
(It should be clear from this that the book is addressed primarily to a
Western readership, although from a perspective that is often critical of the pretensions of “the West.”) Travel writing, in this last sense, can be seen as a useful vehicle of cultural self-perception; as a barometer for changing views on other (“foreign,” “non-Western”) cultures; and as a trigger for the informational circuits that tap us in to the wider world. Travel writing, traditionally seen as affording a license for escapism, may yet show its readers the limits of their ambition and remind them of their responsibilities (Holland and Huggan, 1998: xiii)

Writing stories about their experiences can teach students to be humble and to reflect on the manner in which foreigners impose their own paradigm of what they expect a place to be. Writing helps develop awareness about chasing positive expectations about a place and tries to defeat “staged authenticity” which is indeed a very negative aspect of globalization. In today’s world, we wrongly assume we know everything about each other because we can look up people and/or places online. This is why I encourage my students to reflect on the fact that a “global citizen” is, or should be, a traveler and not a tourist. The difference is in the approach. A student traveler will always be motivated by curiosity, honesty, and humility and will soon realize that a guest in foreign countries must avoid the imposition of their values over those of the host:

Modern travel is the hunt for the random mundane. Platonic ideals aside, the world remains a fascinating place for anyone with the awareness to appreciate its nuances. Social critics who proclaim that “real travel” is dead are just too lazy to look for complexities within an interconnected planet... Tourists trying to escape tourism is a major theme in global backpacker circuits, as is the mythology that the “authentic” side of a country is found in the places that has the fewest signs of what foreign backpackers would call familiar—which even extends to the backpackers themselves. There are preconceived expectations in any tourist circle of what a country “should” be like, and anything short of these expectations is labeled unauthentic, corrupted, Westernized, soiled. As for globalization, I’m all for local industry and local color—but I’m also of the opinion that Italians should be able to drink coffee wherever they want, even if it’s a Starbucks (Potts, quoted in Shepard (2011: n. p.))

There is a new art to traveling in the postmodern world. Travel writing speaks of the great truth about globalization (Potts, 2008; Swick, 2016).
Immersion in cultures other than those we were born into allows us to see the world through fresh eyes:

In this sense, they “lead from the front” by teaching us how to appreciate cultural difference and recognise the values common to all of humanity. Unlike their colonial predecessors, these writers frame encounters with others in positive ways. They reveal moments of empathy, recognitions of difference, realisations of equality and insights into shared values. To the extent that travel writers seek to jettison their colonial heritage by focusing on the harmonising effects of globalisation, they employ what I call a cosmopolitan vision (Lisle, 2012: 4)

In a world where identity is conjugated by “always-on devices” and social media (iPad, iPhone, YouTube) and there are selfies but no Self to rely on, travel writing can provide an authentic way to reconnect to one’s inner Self. I would welcome the implementation of more travel writing courses, but also the study of literature of globalization or even simply classes about globalization: “Travel writing, in our view, deserves to develop as a genre; after all, it is a significant and, at its best, effective medium for the global circulation of (trans)cultural information” (Holland and Huggan, 1998: xi).
We are entering an era of creative destruction on steroids
Thomas Friedman

We are moving into an era where cities will matter more than states and supply chains will be a more important source of power than militaries
Parag Khanna

I find that the world is changing much, much faster than I can even bitch about it
Bill Maher

I support freedom and I support a free market economy, but it should be a socially oriented market economy. I support globalization, but it should be globalization with a human face
Mikhail Gorbachev
Power, Politics, and Networks: Confronting the Paradoxes of Globalization


The term “globalization,” as the sociologist Anthony Giddens has observed, is neither attractive nor elegant (Giddens, 2002: 7). The processes it represents touches all our lives; they are also complex and contradictory. It is therefore hardly surprising that although the term has been in common use for more than twenty years, it remains stubbornly slippery to define.\(^{23}\) Globalization is challenging for us to define and to teach; it has become ubiquitous yet remains elusive. Another sociologist, Ulrich Beck, has described it as “fuzzy,” likening our efforts to pin it down as being like trying to nail a blancmange to the wall (Beck, 2000: 20). Everything to do with it is contested in some way.

The term has often been adopted by various commentators in ways suited to their own arguments, or simply deployed as a scare word in reaction to fears about the inexorable rise of global capitalism. Thus, “globalization” has become a catch-all phrase used to describe a wide variety of phenomena and assert the problems or benefits they bring at the local scale — impacts which may themselves be considered too involved to explain in detail.

Indeed, there are now so many versions of “globalization” that it would be a lifetime’s work to try and grasp them all (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Demaine, 2002: 120). What these all have in common though is the key idea that there is an acceleration of different kinds of exchanges across geographical borders, such as the ways in which goods and services are produced and delivered to consumers, the ways in which political ideas and practices are translated across and between different spaces, or the ways

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\(^{23}\) The origins of the term, as with everything else about it, are contested. It was probably coined in the 1960s — although according to Merriam-Webster, “globalization” appears as a noun in 1930, with the verb “to globalize” arriving in 1937, but the term is not widespread until the 1990s. It was in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 — an iconic chapter in the story of globalization which some (historically myopic) theorists identify as its founding moment — that the neoconservative political scientist Francis Fukuyama published his highly influential but also much maligned book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (1992) whose central thesis is often characterized — or caricatured — as the idea that liberal democracy and market capitalism were then triumphing across the world and represented the final, ultimate and utopian form of human government — bringing history literally to an end. For Fukuyama, the model of the post-historical world was not the USA but the European Union — because it represented the ultimate triumph of Enlightenment Reason — manifest at a transnational level in the imposition of European law onto a family of diverse, and previously warring, states.
in which culture is produced, transformed, and consumed, collectively lead-
ing to what Arjun Appadurai has termed a “complex, overlapping, disjunctive order” of economic, cultural, and political flows which impact on localities in “unexpected, counterintuitive ways” (Appadurai, 1990: 296-97). Thus, culture, trade, information, people, and ideas are all networked together at the global scale (Castells, 1996), a process of increasing integration and interdependence involving the “compression of time and space” by communications and transport technologies (Harvey, 1989: 284-307).

Different thinkers have taken almost completely opposite views about the impacts of these processes and the extent to which they are novel phenomena. Some would argue that on balance, globalization is a good thing; this view cuts across political fault lines. From the Left, the Nobel-Prize winning Indian economist and philosopher, Amartya Sen, asserts in his “Ten Theses on Globalization” that “globalization is not in itself a folly: it has enriched the world scientifically and culturally and benefited many people economically as well” (Sen, 2001). From the Right, the Swedish historian Johan Norberg, a fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute, sees economic globalization as a positive force promoting individual freedom, entrepreneurship, and the eventual eradication of global poverty (Norberg, 2003).

Yet, for others, globalization has been attacked for entrenching and exacerbating global inequalities. Such a critique generally focuses on the dominance of free-market, neoliberal economics as the engine of contemporary globalization, which, they would argue, needs to be challenged politically. For example, the economist Ha-Joon Chang views global development as a story in which developed countries are “kicking away the ladder” with which they have climbed to the top, preventing other countries from adopting the policies and institutions that they have used so successfully (Chang, 2003).

In Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), Joseph Stiglitz, drawing on his own experience as Chief Economist at the World Bank, outlines the ways in which globalization has had a “devastating effect” on the developing world, despite its potential to be a force for good. According to The Economist, even the International Monetary Fund has admitted that inequalities in developing countries “may actually have been increased” by the introduction of new technologies and foreign investment (2013). For Stiglitz, this damage has been largely driven by “wrong-headed actions” taken by policy-makers at these institutions “which did not solve the problem at hand but that fit with the interests or beliefs of the people in power” ([2002] 2003: ix-x). More recently, he has noted that the rise
of populism in Europe and the USA shows that “globalization, which was supposed to benefit developed and developing countries alike, is now reviled almost everywhere” (Stiglitz, 2017).

Even the history of globalization is contentious. Some argue that the “discovery” of the Americas in 1492 was crucial (Fernández-Armesto, 2009; Mann, 2011); others focus on nineteenth-century empires (Ferguson, 2003; Magee and Thompson, 2010) or even those of the Ancient World (Jennings, 2010) as antecedents of today’s globalization. Is there really something distinctive about what is happening today? What are its impacts? To try and make progress with such questions, it is perhaps more helpful to consider globalization as a variety of related concepts, which themselves are often contested, misunderstood, or misrepresented.

Some theorists are skeptical of the whole thing. For example, Hirst and Thompson (1996) assert that despite the transformations that the global economy has undergone in recent years, it still is not fundamentally very different from the world economic system that existed previously. They argue that economic exchange is mostly regional rather than truly “global” in character, dominated by a tripolar structure within which the European Union, NAFTA, and ASEAN24 countries mostly trade among themselves. Moreover, in many ways, today’s world economy resembles that of the Pax Britannica (“British Peace”) of the late-nineteenth century when there was already an open global economy with widespread trade. In The Consequences of the Peace (1919), John Maynard Keynes’ figure of the “inhabitant of London” demonstrates that in some ways (at least for some people, some of the time) the world has been here before:

[He] could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth…and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world… He could secure forthwith… cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality…and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference (1919: II.4: 9)

24 NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement; ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Crucially, we are also reminded—with the benefit of hindsight—that such “globalization” is by no means irreversible:

But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable (Keynes, 1919: II.4: 9-10)

Yet, other more radical theorists argue by contrast that contemporary globalization is very real and is qualitatively different from what has gone before. Moreover, its consequences can be felt everywhere across a global marketplace that is much more developed and largely indifferent to national borders, suggesting that nation-states have, as a result, become “mere fictions,” losing much of their sovereignty, and politicians their capability to influence events (Ohmae, quoted in Giddens (2002: 8)). We might ask if the political earthquakes of Brexit and Donald Trump, and their respective slogans “take back control” and “America First,” actually support, or undermine, this thesis.

Thomas Friedman, another radical, asserts in The World is Flat (2005), that the “death of distance” caused by the telecommunications revolution has leveled the playing field across the globe, equalizing opportunities and leading to an accelerated, hyper-mobile “global village” (to use Marshall McLuhan’s famous phrase) with opportunities for all. Following this logic, the “geo-strategist” and commentator Parag Khanna argues in his book Connectography (2016) that it is no longer geography which defines countries’ and regions’ destinies, but connectivity. For Khanna, the key to globalization is the ongoing construction of functional infrastructures across political boundaries as we shift into what he calls a “supply chains” world—one in which commodities, products, energy, and currencies move across boundaries according to supply and demand, with connectivity as the key to their obstruction or enablement. Despite the current backlash against globalization, he suggests that the global future belongs to those who grasp this reality.

The new “Iron Silk Road,” proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, is one harbinger of such a world, signifying a shift in the global balance of power which Gideon Rachman has termed “Easternisation,” currently transforming politics in the world beyond Asia (2016: 6-7). This ambitious project links China’s rail system, via the Trans-Siberian network, to Western Europe. Globalization has long been perceived as synonymous with the
spread of Western, specifically US, culture and products around the world, a process variously labeled “Americanization,” “McDonaldization,” or “Coca-colonization.” In a similar way, the new Silk Road is intended not only as a mechanism for Chinese national rejuvenation, but also to project Chinese economic and cultural “soft” power across Eurasia, linking up with other global networks and confidently asserting a new “Asian Century” ahead (Sidaway and Yuan Woon, 2017). The appropriately named “East Wind,” the first freight train to have traveled directly from Yiwu in Zhejiang Province, China to the UK, arrived at Barking Railway terminal in East London on January 18, 2017 to much fanfare after its 7,456-mile journey across nine countries (McVeigh, 2017). It was loaded with £4 million worth of goods, including bags and wallets destined for London’s souvenir shops, as well as millions of socks, causing the British tabloid newspaper The Sun to give us the inevitable headline: “Great Wool of China” (Stroud, 2017).

The scale and ambition of such projects suggest that notwithstanding the anti-globalization backlash of Trump and Brexit, globalization is currently accelerating rather than going into reverse. Khanna argues persuasively that at the global scale, the volume of infrastructure and interconnectivity worldwide is reaching new and unparalleled heights, and while migration and capital flows may shift year on year according to such “local” factors, the overall capacity to be global continues to increase apace.

For Khanna, the next phase of history entails a reconfiguration of global networks of economic, political, and cultural power, one characterized by transnational interconnectivity, within which a global archipelago of megacities represents the primary concentration of power and economic growth as well as the vast majority of humanity. Such “planetary urbanization” thus operates as the main focus for global migration and knowledge sharing. In this view, “local” political matters, such as Brexit, have little purchase on these global trends. We might note here the increasing political power and influence of city mayors on the world stage (ten current heads of state were previously mayors). For the late Benjamin Barber, city mayors’ pragmatic and creative approach to political problem-solving and penchant for cooperative networking offer potential solutions to some of the world’s most pressing challenges, leading him to call for a “global parliament of mayors” to reinvigorate global governance with grassroots democracy (Barber, 2013: 336-359).
Yet as the case of London demonstrates, the ability of global cities to act as power centers on the global stage is still very much dependent on the policies and politics of the nation-states within which they are embedded. For example, the powers of London’s mayor, Sadiq Khan, to make policy and to raise or allocate funds are relatively limited compared to those of his peers in, say, New York or Tokyo. Moreover, in 2016, cosmopolitan, super-diverse London, the showcase of Britain’s open economy, formed an outlier in a sea of support across England for leaving the EU. Londoners voted in favor of remaining by a clear majority, sixty percent, compared with a national majority of fifty-two percent for leaving. In this context, Sadiq’s initiatives in cooperating directly with the Parisian mayor, as well as his post-referendum mayoral campaign #LondonIsOpen, has reinforced the branding of London as global city perhaps more urgently than ever before while also underlining the divergent trajectories of current London and UK (particularly English) politics.25

One response to the referendum result was a petition advocating “Londependence” from the rest of the UK, which attracted 180,988 signatures,26 swiftly joined by a Twitter campaign, #ScotLond, which called for the capital to join forces with Scotland (which also voted overwhelmingly for Remain) to form an independent city-state. Although perhaps not entirely serious—and certainly of doubtful practicality—these campaigns reflect the very real concerns about maintaining London’s status as a global city after Brexit, as well as contributing to a rising chorus of voices calling for increased devolved powers or a special status for the city (Smith, 2016). However, London’s population itself was also divided in the referendum. Although a clear majority of Londoners voted Remain, forty percent of the city’s population voted Leave, with five boroughs—all on the city’s periphery—having a significant majority of the population support the Leave campaign.27 How, then, are we to understand this phenomenon occurring in the quintessential factory of globalization which is London—one

25 The #LondonIsOpen campaign was initiated by Art on the Underground, Transport for London’s contemporary art program, to celebrate cultural diversity, and continues to develop. Ten artists were commissioned in the initial phase to create work that would show London is “united and open for business” (Mayor of London, 2016).

26 The petition can be found online at https://www.change.org/p/sadiq-khan-declare-london-independent-from-the-uk-and-apply-to-join-the-eu

27 The five boroughs where a majority of the population supported Brexit were Barking and Dagenham, Bexley, Sutton, Havering and Hillingdon.
of the sites where what we would call “global” is manufactured and exported—and what does it reveal about the full complexities of these contested and interconnected processes?

London is a city riddled with the social contradictions of its success: a formidable and highly successful money-making machine, nevertheless the city faces a daunting mix of problems, simultaneously one of the richest cities in the world, and among the most unequal in the Global North. I have outlined elsewhere the social dynamics and political implications of the city’s profound socio-economic disparities which exacerbate burgeoning national inequality across the UK, while also gathering together the inequalities of the wider world as the city continues to act as a magnet for transnational migration and capital investment (Gristwood, 2017). In recent years, the situation has become more acute as the long-term global implications of the global financial crisis have played out at local level across its various neighborhoods and communities.

In many ways, as the late geographer Doreen Massey observed in her World City, London operates, along with other global cities, as laboratories for the global future, and herein lies the origin of what she would describe as its contested “politics of place beyond place” (2007: 188–210). For Massey, globalization is best understood as a series of processes which always operate unevenly to produce radically different results for different people in different places. Time and space are compressed, yes, but the process is more like a global “crumpling” rather than “shrinking,” with some spaces brought into closer proximity to one another (and to concentrations of the levers of power) while others are isolated or by-passed by the currents of globalization. In her view, globalization is best understood as a shifting “power-geometry” which connects distant places with unequal consequences: center and margins, metropole and periphery are co-created as a result of its inexorable logic (Massey, 1994: 146–156).

Saskia Sassen, arguably the leading scholar of globalization today, makes us directly confront the implications of this new geometry of power and powerlessness. For Sassen, the term “globalization” is simply insufficient to explain what is going on—instead, she asks us to consider what she calls “denationalization,” which is by no means the disappearance of the nation-state prophesized by thinkers such as Ohmae, but its transformation by conflicting forces operating within its architecture into what she terms “new global formations” cutting across national boundaries and the tradi-
tional divide between Global North and South in complicated ways (Sassen, 2013). So, for example, elites in Manila or Mumbai share what she calls “geographies of centrality” which connect them comfortably with elites in New York or London, while parallel geographies of poverty and disadvantage again cut across the familiar divides of developed and developing worlds (Leorke, 2009).

Here, in reality, Khanna’s planetary urbanization maps an emergent planet of urban “glamor zones” and “urban slums” which in reality have little to do with poverty or wealth at a national scale and everything to do with the way in which these particular elites or dispossessed people are positioned in relation to systems of political power, labor markets, or spaces of hyper-luxury. One thinks here of the super-rich Qatari, Russians, and Chinese driving “super-gentrification” in London, whose luxury property market provides a convenient safety deposit box and global laundromat for their capital, while the disadvantaged are made subject to a proliferation of forms of exclusion—land grabs, the displacements of gentrification, the deliberate criminalization of those in poverty, and so on.

For Sassen, the shape of future history is not actually about the “local” versus the “global,” but instead about the formation of assemblages of bits and pieces of territories, political authorities, and rights, some “real,” some “virtual,” or digital, some public, some private, which are all globalized to varying degrees (2013). Pre-Trump and Brexit, she had already prophesized that this uncertain future history would be shaped not only by technology and power, but also by the dispossessed, noting that “history has also been made by the excluded, politics even by those who lack power” (Sassen, quoted in Sutherland (2006: n. p.)). Although there is nothing new about anti-globalization protests, recent events certainly highlight the lazy thinking about globalization over the last quarter of a century and forces us to rethink the assumption that the globalized economy necessarily generates widely shared prosperity. Now is the globalization of our discontent: large numbers of people across the US, UK, and the advanced economies have added their voices to those from the Global South to decry a system that has not worked for them and, they would protest, has only benefited a small, privileged elite.

Globalization is thus revealed to be a multi-dimensional set of processes, sometimes operating in concert, sometimes in oppositional ways. To borrow Anthony Giddens’ framework (1990; 2002), globalization “from above” (such as cross-border capital flows) intersects with globalization
“sideways” (the kind of cross-border cooperation and connectivity which excites Parag Khanna so much), while paradoxically generating a centrifugal globalization “from below” which drives novel and renewed nationalisms, populist politics, and fundamentalist movements erupting in response to globalization’s uneven impacts. Instead of just making the world “flatter,” the logic of globalization is creating and sustaining new forms of social and political fragmentation. Its technologies, far from bringing us together, appear instead to have created exclusive tribal “bubbles” of social media rage; while its financial markets have created ever greater concentrations of capital.

Pankaj Mishra argues in his analysis of political populism, *Age of Anger* (2017), that the trajectory of history in this globalizing world has been characterized by a “creeping universal crisis” caused by the collapse of traditional social solidarities and the exclusion of massive numbers of people by global capitalism’s relentless quest for profit. Established forms of authority and political legitimacy have become “hollowed out” by the forces of globalization and are being increasingly challenged by what he calls “history’s losers.” Social and symbolic violence against a range of “othered” scapegoats, such as migrants or the urban poor, have become mainstream positions in what he terms a global turn to authoritarianism (Mishra, 2016; 2017). Truth- and evidence-based argument have seemingly been supplanted by rhetorical persuasiveness and the overt appeal to emotion.28

This trajectory of history is very far from that envisaged by Francis Fukuyama in *The End of History*, in which globalization would be the vehicle for the inevitable spread of liberalism around the world (1992: xiii). Yet, as the political scientist Paul Sagar reminds us, Fukuyama never actually suggested that history would stop happening. Fukuyama makes a critical distinction between “small” and “big H” history—the former continues apace; the latter reflects a dialectical view (derived from Hegel), of a grand narrative of progress in human development, which sees liberal democracy as its endpoint—but only in the sense that it is the least conflictual social formation available (Sagar, 2017).

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28 For Mishra, the origins of this crisis and the rise of anti-intellectualism and radical individualism it reflects is inherent in the legacy of Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and the Romantics (2016). Yet, arguably it is the critique of Enlightenment thinking presented by the nihilism of radical postmodern thought, with its relativist stance and incredulity towards meta-narratives, which best explains the current attractions of demagoguery and “post-truth” (see also Giselda Beaudin’s essay elsewhere in this volume).
What about the other part of Fukuyama’s title, *The Last Man*? The key insight of Sagar’s powerful rereading of *The End of History* is that the conjunction of consumer capitalism, celebrity culture, and secular democracy in Fukuyama’s “post-historical” world would inevitably open up spaces of resentment and unrest among those who felt they had lost their traditional places at the top of social hierarchies, driven by self-interest and populist discontent. In this view, the “new” populism is not only about the politics of class, dispossession, and exclusion, but also about perceptions of relative decline. Perhaps most startlingly of all, Sagar points out that a quarter of a century ago, Fukuyama also identified a suitable model for the “Last Man” (although he did not actually foresee his becoming President of the United States): a developer like Donald Trump! Meanwhile, the “post-history” of globalization unfolds in all its complexity, challenging us and our students to understand, negotiate, and engage with its many contradictions, even as it continues to transform our world.
Education for a Globalizing World

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Introduction: understanding globalization

Since the 1990s, there has been an intensification of challenges to the economic, cultural, and social dimensions of globalization, calling into question a force that has branded the world over the last thirty years. These challenges can be observed in the recent electoral victories of populist parties, referenda calling for secession or independence, as well as anti-refugee movements sweeping continental Europe. In my view, attention to the philosophy and practice of world education is essential to mitigate the negative perceptions and impacts of globalization. This paper proposes actions to be taken by education stakeholders to improve the capacity of future generations to respond to the ever-growing challenges of globalization.

Globalization has existed in different forms and ideological contexts from the Arab empires to the emergence of the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century. Later, in the nineteenth century, the world experienced rapid growth in international trade and investment among European nation-states, their colonies and, later, the United States. Since the 1960s, technological advances and growing capital flows have accelerated the globalization process. Today, globalization is characterized by the integration of markets, nation-states, and the hegemony of market capitalism. Additionally, current realities are being shaped by cultural homogenization, digitalization, ubiquitous information sharing, processes driving innovation within almost every industry.

Contemporary globalization has many positive impacts related to knowledge sharing, technological improvements, and the general development of individuals, organizations, communities, and societies across different countries and cultures (Bakhtiari, 2011). However, it also imposes a certain structure of power (Magsino, 2007). The pace of development is not of equal magnitude across all countries and regions. As Castagna (2010) notes, the decline in competitiveness of some countries is one of the main causes of limits to the pace of their economic growth. This decline has
occurred because necessary innovations and advances in technological knowledge which are required for economic alignment within a globalized market are not sufficiently supported by investment.

Globalization has also negatively impacted countries in the Global South through their political, economic, and cultural colonization, and it has increased disparities between rich and poor across the world. Powerful elites have emerged with access to the knowledge and information which enables them to heavily influence, and in some cases, to control, the policy making of nation-states (Vulliamy, 2010).

**Globalization and education**

Education has always been, is, and will continue to be a major issue for all societies. It is the foundation and motive force for human development, affecting the world not only in the obvious areas of science and technology, but also in cultural, social, and economic growth. However, questions of the accessibility of world education systems, and the extent to which they successfully address the crucial issues arising from globalization, is a source of growing debate (Bakhtiari, 2011). Systems of education have been greatly impacted by the force of globalization. Communities have been motivated to educate their children to be included in the global world, new teaching methodologies have been introduced, and teachers have been exposed to innovative pedagogies (Khan, 2014). Universities have adopted globalization policies to improve their research output, to attain world class status, to contribute to their students’ technological educational advancement, and to raise the quality of study programs to align their curricula with accreditation bodies (Popescu, 2015).

The belief that a nation’s competitive edge is attained and strengthened by economic advancement through the creation of innovative products is integral to these policies which focus on marketing to consumers and the most efficient and cost-effective use of resources. In such an environment, nation-states are under pressure to endorse standardized educational curricula, centered around specialized knowledge emphasizing technological literacy (Spring, 2008). Particularly in Europe, and elsewhere in the West, these policies are translated into eliminating public educational services, the introduction of entrepreneurial teaching philosophies and strategies, and the standardization of curricula and assessments in order to enhance institutional comparisons and the attainment of rewards (Hursh et al., 2011).
Indeed, one can argue that there exists a trend towards standardization of the global curriculum, instruction, and testing. Most intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, such as the World Bank and OECD, support educational strategies for the introduction and establishment of the knowledge economy. In addition, the establishment of English as a common language and the movement of “knowledge capital” in the form of educational professionals moving and teaching overseas contributes to educational standardization. This is because of the imperative for home countries to ensure that local graduates will be successful participants in the global economy (Spring, 2008).

However, there is extensive criticism of this increasing standardization in global education. Critics argue that the process increases the knowledge divide between rich and poor nations, for the latter have to adopt the formers’ educational policies in order to sustain their competitiveness. In addition, uniformity of development ignores the particular needs of local communities, which call for an alternative educational agenda based on human rights, environmental, and socio-political education, underlying local cultures and identity (Spring, 2008).

It is also important to note that the education deficit is not only obvious in the developing world; it is equally noticeable in developed countries. Many industrialized nations face problems of illiteracy, low technical skills, wage inequality, and uneven income distribution. These issues greatly affect the labor force and constitute a great disadvantage within the competitive global marketplace (Bakhtiari, 2011).

**Future trends**

Global citizenship education is one way to help learners integrate Self, national, and international dimensions of identity, to enable them to solve the global problems of today and tomorrow. A “global citizen” is, according to University College London (2018), someone who solves problems, recognizes the complexity and challenges of today’s world, knows their social, ethical, and political responsibilities, and is both a leader and team player.

The roots of global citizenship are to be found in Ancient Greek philosophy; the Stoics described our identity as being inclusive of all, asserting that we all have a moral responsibility to act as a global citizen. This implies acknowledgment of the interdependence of all humans and an appreciation of our own cultural, social, and historical positioning, as well as sensitivity
towards other philosophies and peoples. We also need knowledge of international matters, to be sensitive to issues of social injustice, inequality and racism, and behave in an ethical way towards others (Clifford et al., 2014).

Policy-makers in charge of education should include in their practices elements of global citizenship without ignoring national characteristics. Globally acceptable moral values should be included, addressing the understanding of human rights within a national and international context. Schools play an essential role for society’s future by fostering critical thinking and knowledge of different views about global issues (Takkac et al., 2012). In addition, the research community can assist policy-makers to understand and tackle the issues involving globalization, teaching, and teacher education. These issues include the effect of globalization on schools, teachers, and teacher education, and the ways in which practitioners develop an understanding of theoretical frameworks to explain and address emerging issues and problems, and thus to apply best practice (Wang et al., 2011).

School systems should also change to bring about strategies focusing on the challenges from globalization. Educators should stress and teach the principles of morality and ethics, actions against social injustice, and they should inspire students to become involved in the world in order to improve it. Thus, students’ involvement, guided by principles of citizenship, equality, respect for human rights, and democracy (Magsino, 2007) along with the teaching of reflection and critical thinking, will enable them to be true citizens of the world.

Teachers need to appreciate and understand how social changes brought about by globalization impact schooling and curriculum. Thus, they can improve their practice to grasp the needs and interests of marginalized and oppressed students. In addition, teachers’ education should focus on developing the capacity to generate changes in their culturally and linguistically complex classrooms using their critical personal and professional knowledge along with the knowledge that they gain from their students (Ball, 2009).

Universities must also have clear and defined globalization strategies to capitalize on the opportunities and tackle the challenges that globalization poses to higher education (Popescu, 2015). Indeed, one can say that universities must redefine the idea of educating human beings so that they can truly understand themselves—an essential prerequisite for understanding the new global world—without ignoring their own identity.
and national values. This new citizenship education does not only involve technical knowledge based on signature pedagogies, but also awareness and understanding of globalization’s potential for cooperation rather than confrontation. The way to achieve this is by teaching ways in which to communicate with the Other, to philosophize and reflect on one’s own place in this world, to acknowledge national values and the ways in which they relate to global ones. As Solis-Gadea argues, “universities should give these new world citizens a way not only to perform in this global scenario but to understand this reality” (2010).

Conclusions

Today, the changing economic, social, and cultural environment demands that people are equipped with basic and broad-based skills to enable them to benefit from the positive outputs of globalization, but equally to understand how to overcome its challenges. The agents of educational improvement, such as governments, schools, teachers, parents, and international organizations at local, national, and global scales, have a shared responsibility to introduce and execute sustainable solutions.

The policies and actions discussed here may offer an adequate introduction to fundamental initiatives which will empower the citizens of the world to contribute fully to their local, national, and global communities. All stakeholders should place emphasis on inclusive, equitable, and quality education. Above all, remedial actions should be based on “legal, political, social or moral justification, to provide an account of how they met clearly defined responsibilities” (UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2017/8, 2017).
Global Perspective Through Local Interactions

Lindsay Ortega, Quantum Spatial Inc.

One may think that a “global perspective” can, and most likely would, be gained when your physical location changes from a familiar place to a place where you do not immediately recognize cultural norms or understand the language. The struggle to adapt, understand, and find your footing in this new place would inevitably give way to a feeling of familiarity and comfort in this place that once seemed so “foreign.” Furthermore, we might consider that this cycle of confusion, frustration, and eventual ease and understanding would necessarily cause a shift in perspective that could essentially change one’s life forever. In essence, this is the notion of the study abroad experience that countless people around the world have endured, enjoyed, and learned from over the years.

This study abroad experience was once defined by the feeling of being totally lost and then truly immersed, then, eventually, fully invested in a new community. Yet, with the constant connectivity and immediate information offered by today’s technology, the study abroad experience as we once knew it is at risk of becoming a more benign, long-term travel event and less of a life-altering experience. Being able to bypass the “discomfort” of the unknown and the loneliness of disconnection prohibits the development of a deeper connection to one’s new locale that comes from having to “lean” on this new community to meet your social needs. However, being a member of a community is a reciprocal activity. Simply taking from a community and partaking in its greatness is not enough; one truly becomes part of a community when one gives back and gets fully involved in its dynamics. Then, and only then, can one claim to be part of a community and not just a bystander. Simply having an address in a “cool” neighborhood and going to the market does not a local make you. It takes work to connect, but the benefits will pay dividends for years to come. Community involvement through service and directly encouraging students truly to connect to their new community (by disconnecting from home) are two areas that I feel very strongly are crucial to a successful experience. I will address each of these elements in turn.
Connection through service

The social fabric that once was strong and sturdy has frayed as active community involvement, in the form of social clubs, sports leagues, etc., has been exchanged for more solitary activities and more individualistic attitudes. Now, increasingly, social networks are in a digital space instead of a community center; people tune-out the people and activities around them to keep track and tune in to goings-on thousands of miles away.

Developing social capital and a strong, healthy community is a multi-faceted and long-term process. However, an existing social structure and the benefits that this creates can be felt in the short term when a student is encouraged to develop relationships beyond their academic cohort, through community involvement in the form of volunteerism. Exposure to the issues addressed by local non-profit and volunteer organizations can introduce the students to the challenges experienced by their new neighbors and help them gain a deeper connection to their community through service.

As a former AmeriCorps member and AmeriCorps program manager, I have seen the benefits of service and believe that the best way to learn about, as well as connect to, a community is to “get your hands dirty” with that community. Beyond the specific project at hand, students will have the opportunity to develop relationships with people that they would not necessarily have met in the usual study abroad milieu, such as other volunteers, beneficiaries and community leaders. Through volunteering, students can gain a deeper understanding of the political, economic, and social situation in which they are living and how local situations, and struggles to address them, form part of a larger global narrative. One cannot claim to be a global citizen if one fails to become an active, informed, and contributing member of one’s local community.

Avoidance of the unknown—Google is leading you astray

Maintaining uninterrupted ties to “back home” keeps people skimming across the top of their new “home” or simply using it as a base for a summer or semester of travel to nearby points of interest and neighboring countries that they can show off to their friends in the USA in real time or via posts on their university’s travel blog. While the goals of a study abroad

29 AmeriCorps is a year-long service program that places young adults in organizations that support underserved populations across the United States of America
experience vary significantly from student to student, the opportunity to form a part of a new community is lost on many students, and their time abroad may turn out to be less of a life-altering event (due to language learning, cultural clashes, and learning experiences) and more of a long-term vacation with some course work sprinkled in for good measure.

Exposure to uncertainty and the unknown should lead to curiosity, and this curiosity should lead to exploration of the kind that goes beyond seeking answers from an Internet search. For example, if you need to find where the grocery store is or how to get to your new school and you only walk the shortest route to it every day, you may completely miss a beautiful park that has been transformed into a makeshift home for people on a migration route. You may never pass the fair-trade store that sells your new favorite chocolate. You may miss the community center holding their fundraiser to support local individuals living with HIV/AIDS. You would never pass behind your favorite store and question why on earth there should be so many young women in the alley all speaking different languages—and not quite dressed for a Tuesday afternoon!

One could avoid many situations, places, and people by sticking to the path that one’s phone suggests, while also missing out on new, exciting and at times, uncomfortable experiences that come from exploring beyond one’s comfort zone or pre-determined route. These situations can be experienced and would hopefully spark the same curiosity that leads to the exploration of larger questions: Where are these people from? Why are they sleeping in a park? Where are they going? Why are they going there? Who is helping them here? How can I help? But this curiosity will not be sparked if the technology that is designed to simplify and streamline our daily lives also makes these situations and people avoidable. You would miss passing the panhandlers, but you might also miss a restaurant that becomes your favorite. You may be off the main boulevard, but you are on the alley where you will find the small market that is held every Wednesday.

Another way to stay connected, without being “connected” in the technological sense, is through reading local papers and listening to the radio. With playlists and on-demand music/videos/entertainment, it is all too easy to overlook the newspapers that can provide context and background to the
strike that is happening or the reasons for all the processions that took place last week. This can also be the gateway to community activities which can help a newcomer to understand their new surroundings, as well as the history of their community. Being *hyper-local* in this way can also help one to gain a global perspective as one starts to understand that global issues are in practice “thrashed out” at the local level.

How do we reconcile the fact that the benefits of globalization which allow us to choose an apartment in Madrid from our living room in Baltimore also keeps us from connecting to our local community once in Madrid because we are busy FaceTiming back home? How can we encourage exploration and the seeking-out-of-the-new (and at times uncomfortable), when the temptation to recede into the familiar is always in one’s pocket? How do we encourage curiosity in a time of instant answers? How do we encourage involvement when you can supposedly “make a difference” in one click?

Globalization has removed spatio-temporal barriers in a way that has fundamentally changed the way people interact, but it has not changed the fact that these opportunities to interact in person, in your physical space, at this moment, *still exist* and still provide valuable potential for personal growth and learning. We as a community — educators, as well as involved and concerned citizens — need to lead by example and encourage exploration in ways that would have occurred organically in years past. A generation that has always had the awesome ability to see the world from their screens can still benefit and grow from the basic human interactions that have been taken for granted for centuries. However, now we need to encourage this more directly and more systematically than ever before.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE CREATIVE ARTS: POEMS AND PICTURES

One day there will be no borders, no boundaries, no flags and no countries and the only passport will be the heart
Carlos Santana

The stunning events of our age of anger, and our perplexity before them, make it imperative that we anchor thought in the sphere of emotions
Pankaj Mishra
Selected Poems

Richard James Allen, CAPA: The Global Education Network, Sydney

e-Passport to a Land which has Disappeared

What is this obsession
that love plants in the soul?
It is hard to believe
that for all these years
you might have been
just a few keystrokes away,
when, in my mind,
it has been galaxies.

You have been, for me,
on the other side
of an untraversable ocean,
at the far end
of an unreadable epic,
somewhere hidden
in the last letters
of an undecipherable alphabet.

You have been lost
where no one ever goes:
the land of the past,
where decisions made long ago
— in wisdom and in ignorance,
in foolishness and in foresight,
in fury and in glory—
can never be unmade.

You have existed for me
as murmurs of the living proof of miracles,
and I have become a doctor of strange marvels,
chasing after whispers of wonders,
seeking to dissect long-misplaced curiosities
like a time surgeon;
but my metaphysic is always too late,
the patient is no longer abed.
And yet now technology has caught up with us:
the past concertinas into the present
like the last sigh of a windy accordion,
warping the phrasing and the melody of time;
yesterday becomes today,
and tomorrow is filled with
the possibilities of the new song
of “What if?” and “Perhaps?”

Random Acts of National Identity
I am not sure if where you live
is a statement of intent.
It might be a statement of accident.
Like accidents of the light
reflecting between the eyes of two
soon no longer to be strangers,
followed by accidents of love
or accidents of fear,
and then accidents of birth
or accidents of death.
Don’t take for granted
your passports or your borders.
There are no insurance policies for
the accidents of history.
**Smoke from an Unseen Fire: Global London in Photographs**

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**Editors’ note**: This creative photography project was developed by A.J. Weber in London during his semester abroad in Fall 2017 with the support of a CAPA Student Grant. A.J. also curated an exhibition showcasing his studies of London’s people and streetscapes for the Student Day Conference, Globalization in Action, which was held at the CAPA London Center on November 17, 2017 and involved student, staff, and faculty participants from London, as well as colleagues from Dublin and Florence who participated remotely using CAPA’s globally-networked learning technology. His project abstract and selected photographs from the exhibition are presented below. A.J. writes:

London is a city of dissolution and renewal. It caught fire on the Pentecost of 1135 and was rebuilt, then the Great Fire of 1212 consumed the city again. Four hundred and fifty-four years later, the city experienced a second Great Fire during a hot summer, reducing the city to smoke and ruins, forcing the hand of British author John Evelyn to write in his diary for September 3, 1666, “London was, but is no more.” Despite its continual destruction, London has revived itself time and time again. Iain Sinclair, author of *The Last London* (2018), explains how “London stalls, revives, suffers and renews itself all the time.”

Today the city is burning once again, but we are mistaking suffering for renewal because the fire is now manifested in the spirit of the city itself. We cannot feel its heat because it comes in the form of LED light, burning our retinas in cellphone screens. We cannot see it because the flames are hidden under the white-tarp building plaster of a new corporate high rise. The smoke billows from street windows in the form of advertisements for a new phone plan or suit jacket or designer eyeglasses. Parliament burns under the guise of Brexit—a referendum decision fueled by the old fires of nationalism and a distaste for foreigners—but this does not involve us. We cannot see London burning because we will not see the fire past the smoke.

I took these photographs because I felt the need to share the stories of those living in this smoke. I am writing the fiction to provide dimensionality for the individuals in the photographs and provide the context from which this invisible fire burns. A Thai massage shop owner splits his shop with a
Bureau de Change to afford the rent of South Kensington. An old couple of thirty years break up beneath a social media banner in an independent coffee shop partially owned by Costa. The window of an electronics shop features stickers of Putin for sale next to a collection of brooms and a tin watering can. A nineteenth-century pub features a large Trip Advisor sticker so that customers will rate the joint high enough to keep it appearing in the Google Maps search bar. Unlike the fires that consumed London before, the fire burning between the individual and the city is eroding London’s character and identity.

Smoke From an Unseen Fire is a mixed-media project in which I attempt to point viewers towards particular often-overlooked facets of London’s decay and decline by applying fictional prose to my own captured images of the city. By both contextualizing and characterizing the individual experience, I believe we create a lens through which to view ourselves. The finished narrative will include images that are edited in both black and white and in color as a means of communicating the story of a shared but diminished collective perception; because you and I are also living of the smoke.
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