

A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

A COMPENDIUM OF PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION IN SPAIN AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NARRATIVE CHANGE



OXFAM
Intermón

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Why we should care about narratives on migration	4
A brief overview of the contents of <i>A Different Perspective</i>	5

2. THE MYTH OF POLARIZATION: ATTITUDINAL SEGMENTATION STUDIES

In Europe.....	6
Yes, but not here. Venezuelan Migration in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador.....	8

3. PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION IN SPAIN

Some general characteristics.....	9
Attitudinal segments in Spain.....	13
I. Cosmopolitan humanitarians. The 'for' group.....	14
II. Selfish pragmatists. The 'against' group.....	15
III. Sceptics. The ambivalent-'for' group.....	15
IV. Utilitarians. The ambivalent-'against' group.....	16
Main quantitative and qualitative variations from 2017 to 2020.....	18

4. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

The ambivalent group: coexisting fears and values	21
The three fears	22
Think of an elephant.....	23

5. A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NARRATIVE CHANGE

Forget the anti-immigration discourse: think, write, speak in your own terms.....	25
Know your audience and appeal to the values of the ambivalent group.....	26
Some scenarios where we can apply <i>A Different Perspective</i>	27
Promote direct experience and tell a story.....	27

6. CONCLUSIONS..... 28

7. ANNEXES

Note on methodology that accompanies the document available [here](#)

NOTES 30

INDEX OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Visual summary of attitudinal segmentation studies in Europe.....	7
Figure 2. Attitudes showing highest level of agreement.....	11
Figure 3. Attitudes showing lowest level of agreement.....	12
Figure 4. Attitudinal segments in Spain.....	14
Figure 5. Quantitative issues showing greatest variation.....	18
Figure 6. Evolution of attitudinal segments.....	19
Figure 7. Coexisting fears and values.....	22
Figure 8. Putting the invasion discourse into context.....	23

1. INTRODUCTION

WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT NARRATIVES ON MIGRATION

Narratives are the set of interrelated and commonly accepted ideas about a particular subject that are consolidated through the language, stories, images and messages we hear every day from different sources. 'We use narratives to make sense of the world: we rely on them as a means of ordering, simplifying, and attributing meaning to the information we receive and the events we experience.'¹

The way in which migration is narrated, the words, images and concepts associated with it in public discourse, are not just abstract elements that harmlessly land in our common belief system. Rather, they shape the treatment that is dispensed to migrants or persons seeking refuge. 'Narratives are powerful because they have the potential to influence the beliefs and behaviors of individuals and shape institutional practices. They permeate our cultural, social, and political spheres and often play an important role in entrenching inequities. They can, for instance, perpetuate harmful beliefs about particular groups of people as well as inaccurately characterize the root causes of social issues and, as a corollary, what should or can be done about them.'²

Thus, negative narratives directly affect the lives of migrants and refugees, their families, and society as a whole in a very concrete way, because they hinder harmonious co-existence and limit the contribution and participation in the common good that migrants and refugees can make. These narratives can feed distorted perceptions, which in turn prevent much needed economic and social political changes, and encourage hate speech.

Certain narratives serve to perpetuate and justify individual and institutional racism, and also allow migration to be used as a scapegoat to cover up unresolved issues in host communities (inequality, social vulnerability, widespread precarious employment, lack of access to basic social services), thus preventing the spotlight from being placed on the true structural causes of inequality and poverty.

This compendium aims to provide information and a detailed analysis of how migration is perceived in Spain, identifying different groups of people according to their

different perceptions, and the main narratives underpinning them, as well as the frames and fundamental values that have the potential to build alternative narratives to foster public discourse based on evidence, concerns, and common values. Understanding and addressing narratives about migration, migrants and refugees is an essential part of the quest for social justice.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENTS OF A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

The contents of this compendium have been generated and collected in the course of a journey that began in 2017, going through different periods of research, analysis, training, exchanges with various actors, and experimentation in the field of narratives for social justice.

The chapter on *The myth of polarization* identifies a number of recurring patterns in beliefs about migration in different parts of the world, through a review of the conclusions of major European studies on perceptions and attitudinal segmentation. It also examines the content of the report “*Yes, but not here*”, published by Oxfam, on perceptions of Venezuelan migration in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador.

The chapter on *Perceptions of migration in Spain presents*, for the first time, the results of the studies commissioned by Oxfam Intermón on attitudinal segmentations of people in Spain, providing an understanding of the fears and values that coexist in most people with regard to migration. An analysis of the evolution of such perceptions between 2017 and 2020, as well as of similarities with the results of the European studies and those carried out in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, make it possible to draw a series of key conclusions and lessons.

In *Key lessons learned*, this document focuses on three main conclusions that connect the understanding of the perceptions and profiles derived from attitudinal studies with their applicability for the construction of alternative narratives for social justice. This applicability is illustrated through concrete recommendations for communication practices aimed at changing perceptions, as explained in Chapter 5, *Recommendations for a narrative change*.

Finally, the conclusions of this compendium synthesize the key messages and recommendations to be applied in communication practices that seek to pull the terms of the debate back to the field of evidence, addressing common concerns and values.

2. THE MYTH OF POLARIZATION: ATTITUDINAL SEGMENTATION STUDIES


IN EUROPE

Since 2015, Oxfam has been promoting public mobilisation in Spain and Europe to advocate for the rights of refugees and migrants. In that time, a progressive and significant drop in mobilisation advocating for European values associated with the right to asylum has been observed. The situation of refugees has begun to be perceived as chronic, generating a predominant feeling of pity and demobilisation. Only a very small group of highly motivated people have kept public pressure campaigns alive. There is also increasing polarization in the public debate on migration, with more extreme views gradually gaining acceptance.

The structured and evidence-based analyses that shed light on the issue are those known as attitudinal segmentation studies that have been carried out in several European countries. Through a combination of quantitative (self-administered on-line surveys) and qualitative (review of existing literature and in-person discussion groups) methods, these studies allow us to identify different groups or profiles of population based on shared attitudes: what people think and feel about a particular issue, in this case, migration.

Perhaps the most important finding that characterizes these studies is the myth of polarization: the recognition that migration is an emotional issue and most people cannot be simplistically categorized as being either for or against it. Most people stand somewhere in the middle, largely ambivalent, less ideological, less politically committed, and holding opinions and views based on emotions and personal values that can be influenced by external elements.

Figure 1. Visual summary of attitudinal segmentation studies in Europe



Source: More in Common, Purpose Europe et al.³

In all the countries studied, the largest segment falls in between the two groups of people representing the most defined and antagonistic positions with respect to migration (for and against). This is the segment with ambivalent views. Based on common traits and nuances in terms of their views on migration, the attitudinal segmentation studies identify three different

profiles within this ambivalent subgroup in Germany and France, and up to five in the case of Italy. The specific characteristics that allow the grouping of the different profiles vary significantly from country to country.

IN COLOMBIA, PERU AND ECUADOR: YES, BUT NOT HERE⁴

This map of views and opinions on migration is not unique to Europe. In 2018, Oxfam conducted an attitudinal segmentation analysis in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador regarding Venezuelan migration in these countries. The results show similarities not only between the three countries, but also with the patterns identified in the European studies.

The interviews conducted in the three Latin American countries produced mixed results between more open and more 'closed' views with regard to Venezuelan migration, revealing the existence of a broad, ambivalent segment. People understand and sympathize with migrants – more than 85% think they had no choice but to leave their country to seek new opportunities –, but they think it would be better if they returned to their countries when the situation improves (75% or more) and want tighter border controls (around 70% in all three countries). Additionally, there is a strongly entrenched sexism that stigmatizes wom-

en more: almost half of the people consulted in the three countries think that migrant women will end up in prostitution, and assign to them specific roles in care responsibilities.

The three countries also share the self-perception of being the country receiving the greatest number of migrants. This overestimation of the volume of migration is common to all the studies. At the same time, more than 80% of the population is concerned about the rise in racism and xenophobia, yet they hold unsubstantiated atavistic fears that migration brings competition for scarce resources, insecurity, and criminality.

This duality of empathy/rejection, or values/fears, is the distinguishing feature of the ambivalent group. The total number of people with strictly ambivalent profiles sits at around 60% in the three countries.

3. PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION IN SPAIN

Oxfam Intermón commissioned an initial study of perceptions and attitudinal segmentation on migration and refugees in Spain between 2017 and 2018. The purpose of the study was to identify prevailing opinions and emotions, as well as to understand the key elements of the common belief system on migration in Spain and the narratives that underpin it. More than eight hundred online surveys were completed and six discussion groups were held with a representative sample of the adult population. The results made it possible to identify the different attitudinal profiles of the Spanish population, with regard to their opinion on migration.

Between 2019 and 2020, a second study was carried out, based on the previous one, to update quantitative and qualitative data for each profile or attitudinal segment, to better understand the perceptions and stereotypes most prevalent with respect to migrant women, and to establish a pattern in the evolution overtime by comparing the data obtained in the two studies and the results of the Latin American report. This time around, more than a thousand online surveys were completed and two discussion groups held focusing on the bigger segment.⁵

SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. Interaction with migrants or refugees.

Of the people surveyed, 60% state that they have relatives or friends in their inner circle who have emigrated abroad. At the same time, most state there are no foreigners in their closest circle of family members (92%), friends (84%), or fellow students or colleagues (82%). In addition, 14% state they have employees who are migrants. Contact with foreigners in the neighbourhood or place of residence is more significant, with 43% stating that they routinely meet people of other nationalities. These data therefore reveal that factors other than direct experience, whether internal (such as personality, education received, or one's worldview) or external (the media, the opinion of people close to us, or the political discourse), play a key role in defining the perceptions and attitudes of the Spanish population with regard to migration.

2. Countries travelled to.

Almost 80% of the sample has travelled outside the country. However, this has mostly been to destinations they feel are at an equal or higher level of development than Spain, with only 32% stating they have travelled to countries they consider less developed than Spain.

3. Political positioning and racism.

When asked *On a scale of racism, where would you place yourself, with 0 being 'not at all racist' and 10 being 'very racist'?*, the general self-perception of the sample averages 2.5. However, in answer to the same question but with respect to Spanish society as a whole, the average reaches 5.9. In other words, people tend to consider themselves less racist than the rest of society.

4. Consumption of information and media.

The most frequently consulted channel for obtaining information continues to be television news programmes, followed by online newspapers and traditional radio. Social media, mainly Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram, rank next. This means that, taking them in aggregate, social media represent one of the main platforms for news and information consumption.

5. Differences in perception between migrants and refugees.


There is an almost universal perception (97%) that refugees are persons affected by war. Other factors generate greater doubt, although they continue to yield high levels of agreement: 75% believe that refugees are also those affected by discrimination, and 69% include those suffering from local violence (guerrilla or gang violence). Although the level of agreement falls to 55% and 53%, respectively, when asked whether they consider that persons fleeing extreme poverty and climate change are refugees, the figures show a perception among the Spanish population that international protection should be guaranteed.⁶

The concept of refugee is mainly associated with need, while that of migrant or immigrant is associated with the desire for a better life. This means the needs of refugees are essentially seen as more legitimate, but at the same time, there is an overwhelming (80%) sense of pity that is deeply disempowering and associated with apathy. In the case of migrants, their association with desire or a search for something means that, in connection with perceptions, more conditions are put on the legitimacy of their needs – such as integration and economic and social contributions –, whilst at the same time they tend to generate more empowering feelings, such as admiration (27%, or up to 37% when asked about migrant women). Nevertheless, both terms often elicit general feelings of disempowerment, a perception of remoteness, and a sense of 'otherness'.

6. Specific aspects related to perceptions of migrant women.

There are no significant differences in perceptions between migrant women and men: 12% of the people surveyed stated that they perceive migration differently in the case of migrant women and men, and 6% state a preference for migrant women. Although subtle, these differences indicate a more positive view of migrant women in the qualitative analysis: *they are less conflictive, they contribute more, they have more values*. However, aversion to certain origins prevails over the fact of being a woman.

Figure 2. Attitudes showing highest level of agreement



Year 2019: 1009 interviews / % of people who Strongly agree or Agree
 Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

Thinking of migrants and refugees, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

What are we like?

Four main elements stand out from the analysis of statements and attitudes showing the highest level of agreement, and this allows us to characterize the general feelings and perceptions of the Spanish population with regard to migration

We are empathetic and recognize the benefits of migration. We largely recognize the basic right to migrate, not only for those needing protection but also

for those seeking opportunities for a better life. We are concerned about racism and xenophobia and want our children to interact with other cultures because it will be personally enriching for them.


We are aware of our responsibility. We recognize that living in a developed country brings with it a duty to help out those who come from more difficult circumstances. Based on our moral, ethical and/or religious

beliefs and codes, we believe it is imperative to help those in need. We also know that migration is sometimes used as an excuse or that migrants are judged more harshly simply because they are migrants.

We are aware of the needs and obstacles that many migrants face. We believe it is necessary to provide urgent help to refugees who are in extreme danger, we are aware of the vulnerability of unaccompanied child migrants, and we know that migrants often take on the jobs that host country nationals do not want.

We request order. We consider it essential that migrants and refugees 'integrate' in their host country, we believe that reception and asylum laws should be facilitated so that people do not risk their lives in the Mediterranean, and we also believe that migrants and refugees should be cared for from the perspective that they will return to their countries of origin as soon as the situation improves.

Figure 3. Attitudes showing lowest level of agreement



Year 2019: 1009 interviews / % of people who Strongly agree or Agree
Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

Thinking of migrants and refugees,
to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

What are we not like?

We are not frivolous. In general, we do not regard the issue of asylum or refugees as a fashion thing, nor do we look the other way.

We do not feel that migration threatens our culture. This is one of the main points of concern identified in European studies, but it does not appear very prevalent among the attitudes with the highest level of agreement. However, exploring attitudes with a medium level of agreement, there do appear to be relevant indicators that associate migration with loss of identity, as will be seen under analysis of ambivalent groups.

We are not mobilised to advocate for the rights or hosting of refugees. Although we do engage in specific actions to help people in need – providing support with clothes, money, working in feeding centres, volunteering, etc. –, we do not, for the most part, sign petitions advocating for the right to asylum, nor do we think that it is necessary to take in more refugees than we have done to date.

We do not perceive women migrants differently. There are no significant differences in perception between migrant women and men. Of the people surveyed, 12% stated that they perceive migration differently if migrants are women rather than men, and 6% stated a preference for women migrants. Although subtle, these differences show a more positive view of migrant women in general.

Although an overall analysis of the sample is important, the distinctive contribution of segmentation studies lies in grouping people by their common characteristics of perception, opinion and attitude, which allows a deeper insight into the motivations, fears and values of each segment. This offers a more complete and nuanced image of a complex reality, which may seem contradictory and may even conceal relevant concerns and arguments if studied exclusively from the perspective of the population as a homogeneous whole.

ATTITUDINAL SEGMENTS IN SPAIN

The broad analysis of attitudes with higher and lower levels of agreement enables us to establish general trends – a conscious, empathetic, concerned and responsible population that is scarcely mobilised and seeks order – and also sheds light on some contradictions. This is because the perception of migration is rarely homogeneous or monolithic, whether in a so-

ciety as a whole or at the individual level, as we will analyse later. Attitudinal segmentation consists of identifying patterns and grouping people by profiles based on shared attitudes; what they think and feel about migration. This provides us with a finer analysis of trends and contradictions, and a clearer and more diverse picture of different positions and emotions.

Thus, by applying a multi-variant analysis and grouping the people interviewed according to their differential attitudes with regard to the average, four major groups were detected (*see Figure 4 on the following page*).

Figure 4. Attitudinal segments in Spain

COSMOPOLITAN HUMANITARIANS OR 'FOR' GROUP:

A cosmopolitan and multicultural view of the world. Very marked empathy with a vocation to help that translates into a high degree of mobilisation: concrete actions and public pressure for the rights of migrants and refugees.



“ Fight for a better world ”

SELFISH PRAGMATISTS OR 'AGAINST' GROUP:


A clear position against migration and the intake of refugees. Conditioned by an alleged negative effect, they see migration as a threat



“ This will get us nowhere ”



“ They have the right to prosper ”



SCEPTICS OR AMBIVALENT-'FOR' GROUP:

Positive view of migration. They care about 'integration' and verbalize concerns, but also positive stereotypes or beliefs about migrants. However, mobilisation is lacking in this regard; they delegate responsibility and feel unable to bring about change.



“ If they come, they should make ”

UTILITARIANS OR AMBIVALENT-'AGAINST' GROUP:

Rational, empathetic and seeking order. They consider it is essential for migrants to strive to 'integrate' and make a contribution, and express concrete fears related to life, wealth and culture. They delegate responsibility in the authorities and support the provision of aid to

Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

The two groups with the most clearly-defined positions 'for' and 'against' are:

COSMOPOLITAN HUMANITARIANS. THE 'FOR' GROUP.

What are their defining attitudes?

A worldview very much centred on people's needs, where borders are an alien construct and interculturality is seen as very positive.

This is the group with the most positive perception of migration. They have a clear vocation to help others, for their own sense of self-fulfilment, and consistent with their ethical convictions. They are active in this respect, and mobilise through very concrete direct actions and public pressure initiatives. They are particularly sensitive to the situation of refugees, recognizing that more can be done for them than has been done to date, and aware of the urgency of doing so.

They are not convinced by the argument of providing aid in countries of origin to stop people from migrating, seeing this as a way of paying to 'close borders' and not as a real solution to war or poverty.

However, they also recognize that at times they need to make an effort to act in a way that is consistent with their beliefs.

Who are they? What do they do?

A high percentage (72%) are women, and they are younger than the average (41% are aged between 18-34). They are the group claiming to be in the most difficult economic situation today, but the most optimistic about the future economic evolution, both for themselves and in general. They are mainly active salaried workers (64%).

They define themselves as not being racist, but are the group with the highest belief that Spanish society is. Their ideological position is more to the left than the average. This is the group with the highest number of agnostics or atheists.

It is also the group with the highest percentage of foreigners (9%). Within this group, 74% report having people close to them who have migrated (the average is 60%), and higher interaction with people of other nationalities in all areas (family, friends or neighbours) than other groups.

They have travelled more than the average to countries they consider to be less developed than Spain. This group also declares to consume information via social networks more often than the others: Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube.

SELFISH PRAGMATISTS. THE 'AGAINST' GROUP.

What are their defining attitudes?

They have a clear position against migration and the intake of refugees. They are very conditioned by the presumed negative impact of migration on Spanish society. They believe that immigration is a latent threat.

In general, they have a more autarchic view of society, rejecting issues that bring about general agreement among the other groups, such as the right to migrate or the need to provide urgent aid to refugees because of the extreme danger they face.

Likewise, on a more personal level, they seek to avoid contact with migrants, including for family and friends. They are the least sensitive to the vulnerability of un-

accompanied minors, and do not express ethical and/or religious beliefs associated with helping migrants.

Who are they? What do they do?

52% are men, with an average age similar to that of the overall sample. They are slightly above the average in regard to lower levels of education, and also in regard to being self-employed and/or entrepreneurs with employees. They are somewhat more represented in the south of the country. This group believes the current and future economic situation is slightly worse than the sample average. They are the group that most self-identify as religious, together with the group of *sceptics*.

They position themselves as more racist than the average, with their political ideology being in the centre, except for 13% of respondents who consider themselves to be on the extreme right.

People in this group have the least contact with foreign nationals in their group of friends, at work or among neighbours. However, they have had migrants working for them for child-care more than the average. They report the least number of people who have emigrated within their close circle (43%).

They have travelled less than the average, and are the ones who have travelled the least to countries they consider less developed than Spain.

They are the group declaring to using social media the least, although more than 40% report checking Facebook and WhatsApp daily. In general, they are below the average in terms of how frequently they consult any news channels, with the exception of morning television programmes and the consumption of information in public forums.

They are also the ones that least support development NGOs, sign campaigns or attend demonstrations.

The two groups with the most ambivalent positions are:

SCEPTICS. THE AMBIVALENT-'FOR' GROUP.

What are their defining attitudes?

They have a positive perception of migration, but they are not mobilised in favour of refugees, nor do they perceive the urgency of their situation. They recognize the efforts of migrants to 'integrate' and participate in society, and admire this and other positive aspects they associate with migrants (such as religious and family values). They do not share the concerns over

supposed negative cultural impact or other issues expressed by other groups (women discrimination, insecurity, etc.).

Given the feelings of cultural and social connection with migrants expressed by this group, the low level of mobilisation is striking. From the qualitative analysis, it can be inferred that they have accepted the situation and do not feel inclined or able to bring about significant change to improve the lives of migrants or refugees.

Who are they? What do they do?

Of this group, 54% are women; their average age coincides with the average age of the whole sample. They are salaried employees or entrepreneurs without employees. This group defines its current economic situation as somewhat below the average. Geographically, they are more prevalent in the south and in the Canary Islands.

They consider themselves somewhat less racist than the average. Their ideological position is centre-left, and in terms of religious views are above average non-practising believers.

Also above average in nationalities other than Spanish (8%) within the group, but they are average in terms of interaction with foreign nationals, whether in the family or in their personal circle, at work or in their neighbourhood. It is a group that does not travel much, with 26% stating they have never left the country.

This group is the one declaring to get information from television, WhatsApp and Facebook more often.

UTILITARIANS. THE AMBIVALENT-‘AGAINST’ GROUP.

What are their defining attitudes?

This is the largest group: almost half of the people in the sample fall into this category. Their perceptions and attitudes therefore have a major influence on the overall picture of the perceptions and attitudes of the Spanish population.

They have a strongly ambivalent position: they are empathetic and look favourably on helping those in need, but they express a number of very specific fears and concerns regarding what they consider the migratory ‘avalanche’. They are aware of the factors that push people to leave their homes (‘they had no choice but to migrate’), and that rejection of migrants by

host communities is linked to aporophobia (‘they are rejected because they are poor’). At the same time, they consider it a priority for migrants and refugees to ‘make an effort to integrate’ in a way that does not pose a threat to the identity of the host community.

They are also aware that Spain is not yet at the level of intake of migrants and refugees of other countries in Europe.

Though they believe there is a need to help fellow human beings, this belief coexists with latent fears, and they therefore prefer that help be provided in the countries of origin. This preference satisfies their natural tendency towards solidarity without forcing them to confront or rationalize their fears.

They are scarcely mobilised on the issue of migrants and refugees, delegating responsibility to higher bodies (central and local governments, international organizations, development NGOs, etc.).

Who are they? What do they do?

Of this group, 53% are men, and the age profile is slightly higher than the average. In general, they enjoy a social and economic position somewhat above the average, as the group with the highest percentage of people holding university or masters degrees. They are self-employed professionals and middle managers to a greater degree than the rest of the groups. This group considers their current situation as more positive than the average, and their views as to the future are similar to the average.

Geographically, they are somewhat more prevalent in the centre-north, and generally in large population centres.

They declare themselves to be slightly more racist than the ‘for’ and ambivalent-‘for’ groups, and their political ideology is centre or centre-left. After cosmopolitan humanitarians, this is the group with the largest percentage of agnostics and atheists.

This is the group that has had the most foreigners working for them (15%), while with regard to the rest of the areas of interaction (family, friends, work, neighbourhood) and members of their close circle having emigrated, they remain in the average of the sample. It is also the most widely-travelled group, both to countries considered more developed than Spain and those considered less developed.

Along with the sceptics, the people in this group are

the ones that consume the most television news. They also stand out in terms of reading on-line newspapers, listening to the radio and being on Twitter.

They are the ones that contribute most to NGOs (35%), partly because of being economically better off. They express support for providing aid to help countries thrive and avoid people having to migrate.

A closer look at the ambivalent groups: sceptics and utilitarians.

Migration and refuge do not spontaneously appear among their main concerns. They are concerned about the future and job instability, especially for young people, as well as environmental degradation and the deterioration of personal communications due to technology and increasingly virtual interaction.

They have a strong disaffection for the political class, which they feel does not represent them, while at the same time thinking that individual action cannot change much unless the political class takes the lead. They delegate much of their responsibility to the system, which translates into greater passivity or inactivity. They also feel that the system does not address the structural causes of the problems.

Their discourse is permeated by concerns over a perceived loss of values that they consider essential. Among such values, women mention respect, tolerance, and love for others, while men cite freedom of expression, mutual loyalty and trust, honesty and coherence. In general, they consider the family and enjoyment of free time to be fundamental values, and place greater emphasis on tolerance than on solidarity.

They perceive differences between migrants, who are associated with the desire for a better life, and refugees, who they associate with need. They believe that the latter are fleeing extreme situations, which to them feels like a more remote reality that is alien to their lives. However, they feel closer to migrants, as a reality they can more easily relate to.

With regard to migrants, a series of determinants and fears emerge knitting together a utilitarian and ambivalent discourse: it is considered essential for migrants to make an effort to 'integrate', which includes contributing to the growth of host communities, particularly economically (utilitarians) but also socially and culturally (sceptics). They are aware that migration brings economic, labour, and demographic – and even

cultural – benefits, while at the same time showing zero tolerance for foreigners committing a crime.

They are in favour of specific, individualised assistance. Sceptics have a slightly more multicultural view of the world, but it is the utilitarian group that has responded more to mobilisation for social causes.

There are three areas of concern common to sceptics and utilitarians:

- A possible lack of integration associated with the fear of losing one's own identity. Both groups consider 'integration' essential, in the sense that migrants should adapt to the local model, rather than taking integration to mean a mutual exchange or enrichment. Sceptics are more concerned about cultural or social integration, utilitarians about work and economic integration. Sceptics are more optimistic with regard to the current level of integration, and recognize the efforts made by migrants arriving in Spain.

- Presumed exploitation of a system that offers migrants more rights than obligations, associated with the fear of losing or undermining one's own standard of living. Both ambivalent groups feel that foreigners compete with Spanish nationals, in both access to employment and social protection.

- An alleged increase in crime linked to migration, associated with the fear of suffering physical harm. Sceptics do not believe that migration causes an increase in crime, but they do fear the arrival of terrorists infiltrated among refugees.

Although not spontaneously, when specifically asked they mention positive stereotypes or beliefs regarding migrants. Such recognition is greater in the ambivalent-'for' group (sceptics):

- They recognize courage and determination in migrants, as well as a capacity for work, effort, perseverance and saving. They value their desire for improvement and their refusal to conform.

- They admire the speed with which migrants learn the language, both in terms of their intellectual capacity and their desire to integrate.


- As for emotions and values, they believe that, in a way, migrants are acting as guarantors of certain values that are being lost in Spanish society, including family values and respect for the elderly. They also value the respect that migrants show for their own

traditions and cultural identity.

People in the ambivalent groups say they feel tired, sceptical, and powerless. They consider themselves ‘resigned rationals’, somewhere between the ‘for’ group – which they see as very emotional, idealistic, excessively concerned about their own social image, and somewhat hypocritical –, and the ‘against’ group – which they see as irrational and irate.

MAIN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE VARIATIONS FROM 2017 TO 2020⁷

Figure 5. Quantitative issues showing greatest variation



Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

Most indicators remain stable compared to those compiled in 2017. As indicated by other studies,⁸ public views and attitudes toward migration remain relatively stable in the short term. In the last few years in Spain, successive electoral periods have heightened the public relevance of migration by appealing to attitudes and opinions that were already there, but without modifying them substantially, except in a number of areas that we examine below.


Small variations in highly localized indicators. The indicators that have varied the most are those related to the sense of urgency in the response to the refugee’s situation, which has decreased. Certain elements or assertions that can be interpreted in the light of a declining concern for political correctness have also increased slightly.

Migrant women are not perceived as a different group. There are some special considerations that apply to the perception of migrant women. Although the differences are small, migrant women inspire slightly more admiration than migrant men and are perceived less as a threat and as more committed to specific values

that the attitudinal groups consider important. However, aversion to certain origins prevails over the fact of being a woman.

Evolution of attitudinal segments. Using the same segmentation criteria as in 2017, 2019-2020 showed a slight shift in attitudinal groups. The two most positive (‘for’) groups remained practically stable overall (-1%), but with a greater bias towards ambivalence as the less mobilised and ambivalent-‘for’ group (sceptics) grew to the detriment of the ‘for’ group (cosmopolitan humanitarians). The qualitative analysis links this shift to the reduced sense of urgency with regard to the situation of refugees. The two ‘against’ groups also remained stable overall (+1%), although a greater bias towards clearly negative positions is perceived. Qualitative analysis links this shift to a declining concern for political correctness.

Figure 6. Evolution of attitudinal segments



Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

Qualitative variations identified in the surveys and discussion groups

There is a general sense of political weariness, mistrust in governments and lack of representation. A similar situation applies to information: discussion groups recognize that, faced with a proliferation of disinformation and what they term 'data wars', they have the feeling that everything is a hoax, and therefore end up reading only what confirms their previously held opinions.

At the same time, they express a certain liberation from political correctness, a feeling that, increasingly, anything can be said.

They confirm the marked decline in the sense of urgency with regard to the situation of refugees. Refugees are no longer as ubiquitous in the media, and this translates into the conviction that it is no longer so necessary to help them or take them in.

In general, their discourse is more rational and less emotional than in 2017-18 except when it comes to insecurity, which interviewees especially associate with unaccompanied minors (who they term "menas") and Latin American gangs. This issue generates very emotional reactions of rejection and concern that encompass a number of fears: cultural differences, a break-

down of law and order – adolescence is perceived as an age of transgression of established rules, coupled with impunity –, and a spiralling out of control, as they perceive these issues to be on the increase. At the same time, they recognize that their own attitude and the most intolerant attitudes are conditioned by the extensive media coverage of crimes committed by foreigners, which is not balanced by positive news about their contribution or role in society.

Although still present, there has been a decline in the level of agreement on myths or fake news regarding alleged privileges enjoyed by migrants in access to social protection. However, people continue to be very sensitive to any measures that may be interpreted as putting them at a disadvantage compared to migrants.

News or communication approaches highlighting the difficulties faced by migrants and thus seeking to generate empathy do not work, as people feel that many non-migrants also face similar issues.

A very instrumentalist and conditioned view of migrants prevails: 'let them come to contribute and integrate'.

4. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

THE AMBIVALENT GROUP: COEXISTING FEARS AND VALUES

The first important finding of the study confirms the existence of a majority ambivalent group in the case of Spain, in keeping with the pattern observed in other countries and regions of the world.

The public discourse on migration is highly emotional, and yet, in the face of perceived polarization, most people cannot be simply divided into those for and those against migration, being probably somewhere in between. Most do not have a clear or unshakeable position with respect to migration, and have views based on personal values that are susceptible to change depending on external elements or direct experience.


‘What ties this group together is that their views are based on pragmatic concerns rather than ideological commitments. Their positions on issues of identity and belonging are more nuanced and they tend to share both values of openness and anxieties around immigration.’⁹

In Spain, the group considered ambivalent represented 69% of the population in 2017 and 71% in 2019-

2020. Within this group, there are differences and similarities that define two further subgroups. First, those who have an open view of the world but are not prepared to mobilise to advocate for better migration or human rights governance. Second, those who have an instrumentalist view of migration, and will therefore only be in favour if it can be proven that it brings a concrete material contribution, preferably (though not exclusively) of an economic nature.

Analysis of the level of agreement on the various statements included in the survey reveals the most significant characteristic of the ambivalent group: the coexistence within the same persons of fears and values that, activated ones or the others, will shift their attitude on migration toward one side of the spectrum or the other. This coexistence also explains the apparent contradictions that appear in almost all migration opinion surveys and that are the hallmark of the ambivalent group: the absence of homogeneous, monolithic or unshakeable opinions.

Figure 7. Coexisting fears and values



Source: Prepared by the author based on the results of the study on perceptions

All the persons interviewed are very clear on the values and ethical, religious and moral beliefs or convictions that guide their behaviours. 'Personal values are the dominating force in life, and all of a person's activity is directed towards the realization of this values'.¹⁰ Many of these values are shared, as these are people who were born and/or raised in a similar environment. What varies, however, is the priority that every individual person gives to each of these values. A recent study further showed a significant correlation between the values prioritized by an individual, and their perception of migration. Thus, values such as universalism, benevolence or solidarity, stimulation and self-direction are associated with pro-immigration attitudes, while conformity, security, tradition and power are associated with anti-immigration attitudes.¹¹

Most campaigns advocating for the rights of migrants have assumed that the feelings of the pro-immigration group, as well as the values that move them to act, are those of the majority, thus neglecting to address the values and concerns of the majority ambivalent group in their communications.

'Based on an inventory of 135 campaigns analysed [...] few pro-migration campaigns contained value-based messaging, whereas all anti-migration campaigns did. Similarly, very few pro-migration campaigns included values besides "universalism" and "benevolence", whereas anti-migration campaigns included values associated with both pro- and anti-migration attitudes.'¹²

THE THREE FEARS

Whereas the discourse in favour of migrants and the benefits of migration has failed to respond to the fears and values of the ambivalent group, we find that the anti-migration discourse has succeeded in appealing not only to the values, but very specifically to the main fears and areas of concern of the ambivalent group, thus achieving the acceptance of progressively more extreme and even xenophobic ideas in the public debate on migration.


Both in the surveys and in the results of the discussion groups, we found that three basic fears are expressed when interviewees defend positions against migration:

Fear of physical harm.

This fear is at the core of the discourse that claims (without evidence) that there is a link between migration and terrorism or criminality, and also represents migration as a risk of invasion. Appealing to these

emotions makes it possible to disregard and even contradict available data and evidence, given the strong impact on people's beliefs.

Table 8. Putting the invasion discourse into context



Source: Oxfam Intermón (2018)¹³

Fear of loss of standard of living.

This fear is at the heart of the discourse claiming that migrants and host country nationals compete for jobs, or that foreigners have advantages in access to social protection. All of these are again issues that have been disproved by evidence.¹⁴

Fear of loss of cultural identity.

This is at the heart of the discourse predicting an Islamization of Europe or the rejection of local customs and traditions because of the influence of foreigners.

One element that illustrates how the most extreme anti-migration discourse appeals to such fears while disregarding the evidence is an analysis of disinformation on migrants and refugees. Between 2019 and 2020, the study *Disinformation about migration in the EU: Promoting alternative narratives* analysed more than 1,500 articles that could be labelled disinformation about migrants, and concludes that 'the most prominent disinformation narratives framed migration as a threat to health, wealth, or identity. (...) In par-

ticular, Italy and Spain register much higher levels of disinformation related to wealth and health, while in Germany and the Czech Republic narratives are predominantly about identity.¹⁵

THINK OF AN ELEPHANT

The last key lesson of the study relates to the role that well-intentioned discourse and communications practices have played in perpetuating the key elements of the anti-migration rhetoric. In addition to neglecting the uppermost fears and values of the ambivalent group, many communication campaigns advocating for the rights of migrants and refugees have adopted the visual codes and terminology used in the anti-immigration discourse with the aim of negating them: in other words, the anti-immigration discourse has been the one setting the terms of the public debate on migration, structuring the conversation around specific frames that have gained ground in the common belief system through repetition.

Thought frames are 'pre-established ideas that condition people to interpret what they observe in a given way. Becoming aware of this framing enables us

to better understand how people interpret their environment and define their positions based on learning, knowledge, experience, the values that have been instilled in them and those they have developed during their lives.¹⁶ To use a metaphor, frames are the lenses that make two people see the same fact differently, make a different ethical and moral assessment when learning of the same circumstance and, as a consequence, act or think differently.¹⁷

'A characteristic of narrative frames is that any mention or reference to them inevitably evokes them. Negating or arguing against a certain discourse serves to activate it, and forces you to move within the limits of such discourse. If you are told not to think of an elephant, you will automatically think of an elephant.'¹⁸

The anti-migration message has managed to centre the public debate on migrations around its own narrative frames, exacerbating the concerns and fears of ambivalent groups with an essentially emotional ac-

count that appeals to values normally associated with anti-migration attitudes: conformity, security, tradition and power. Pro-migration messages and campaigns, ignoring these fears and values, have failed to develop their own narrative frames to associate migration also with more conservative values, in order to neutralize fears and concerns with a more positive vision.

5. A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NARRATIVE CHANGE¹⁹

FORGET THE ANTI-IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE: THINK, WRITE, SPEAK IN YOUR OWN TERMS

Given that frames are reinforced by repetition, it is imperative that the pro-migration discourse stops reacting to the arguments of the other side and builds its own narrative around its own frames. Words, images, stories, messages and sources are all elements required for constructing a narrative.²⁰ They must have meaning in their own right, and not be built in opposition or as a reaction to the fears exacerbated by the anti-immigration discourse: they must discredit such rhetoric by means of their own messages and visual narrative.

Applying this principle means:

Choosing words, moving from the word cloud encompassing the current hegemonic discourse of exceptionality – problem, crisis, illegal, border, invasion, crisis – to one representing migration in terms of people, our own experience and everyday life – project, family, aspiration, innovation, development, growth.



ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
AUTHORITIES
IRREGULAR
CONTROL **BORDER**
VULNERABILITY **CRISIS**
FOREIGNER
DRAMATIC **DISASTER**
PROBLEM **THOUSANDS**
THREAT



DREAMS PROJECT
ENTREPRENEUR
PERSONS
CULTURE TRIP
SOLUTION **ASPIRATIONS**
WELCOME
INNOVATION **FAMILY**
JOBS **SKILLS**
COMMUNITY **OPPORTUNITY**
NEIGHBOURS **PEOPLE**
CONTRIBUTION

Choosing images, discarding the obligation to resort to the ubiquitous images present in visual accounts of migration – boats, walls, large groups of people making it difficult to think of personal experience, images of poverty and vulnerability, or the threat of

invasion – in order to choose images that represent migration as an individual experience, an experience we can relate to personally or through those close to us, from a vision that reflects our own aspirations, either metaphorically or literally.



Frame the data appropriately, putting data in context and ensuring they create positive emotions. ‘We are suffering from the greatest refugee crisis since World War II’ is a statement that plays to the invasion and threat frames. However, ‘only 3.5% of the world population lives outside their countries of origin’ appeals to the frame of order and conformity. Yet both statements are true.

KNOW YOUR AUDIENCE AND APPEAL TO THE VALUES OF THE AMBIVALENT GROUP

Attitudinal segmentation makes it possible to identify predominant fears, concerns, frames and values in different population groups. In order to promote alternative narratives, the words, images, stories, messages and sources used to talk about migration must be adapted to the characteristics of each audience, paying particular attention to the majority ambivalent group.

Among existing studies and guidelines for communications on migration, there is unanimous agreement on the importance of communication based on values guiding the audience’s behaviour. Additionally, there is some evidence that messages based on values that are consistent with those of the target audience are more likely to generate support, whereas messages based on those that are not may generate antipathy.²¹

The discourse on migration must therefore also be able to appeal to the values of the ambivalent groups, using its own narrative frames to draw such groups toward positions that are more open to migration, so that alternative, evidence-based messages gradually permeate and neutralize fears and promote social justice.

Thus, given the correlation between people’s uppermost values and their attitudes – more open or more closed– toward migration,²² the migratory narrative must be able to appeal not only to the values of the ‘for’ group, but also to those that are important to people with more hesitant or ambivalent positions.

Based on an independent and coherent narrative, attitudinal segmentation makes it possible to develop strategies adapted to the target audience at any given time, knowing that when messages are framed in values of self-direction (universalism, solidarity) or openness to change (multiculturalism), they will be more likely to elicit support from the ‘for’ group. However, when the discourse is framed in values of preservation (family, security, tradition, respect, honesty) or self-improvement (freedom, power, entrepreneurship), it is more likely to mobilise those in the ambivalent group.

SOME SCENARIOS WHERE WE CAN APPLY A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

In addition to appealing to the values that are important to different attitudinal groups, it is important to pull the migration debate away from the frame of exceptionality. To apply our own perspective, whether personal or institutional, based on closeness, direct experience and emotions, valuing the daily encounters and exchanges, relationships, aspirations and projects that migration makes possible. There are some areas that allow the building of a different story on migration, through a literal or metaphorical discourse, far removed from stereotypical and dehumanizing images, and inspired by a wide range of positive values and emotions.

The family. The family environment – whether that is families with members from different origins, families with members living or having lived far away, persons who act like family for those living far from their own – allows the building of stories about migration based on frames such as family, tradition, loyalty and trust.

Friendships / social relations: Friendships and social contacts provide stories of encounters based on the frames of respect, security, and mutual trust.

Work environment: This provides a portrayal of migration based on the frames of entrepreneurship, projects, aspirations or power. It can also address issues such as trust, loyalty and security.

The private and personal: This area makes it possible to explore issues of meaning, such as universality, but also those based on frames of destiny or freedom: migration as a due encounter or the freedom to meet each other.

PROMOTE DIRECT EXPERIENCE AND TELL A STORY

One of the characteristics of the representative sample of the adult population in Spain was the limited extent of close interaction with foreigners and, in particular, with migrants and refugees. This means that it is factors other than direct experience, whether internal (such as personality, the education received, or our own worldview) or external (the media, the opinion of those close to us, or the political discourse), that largely define attitudes and perceptions of migration.

Direct experience is a powerful element for transforming perceptions. Facilitating such experience or encounter is therefore a key strategy for narrative change.

This promotion of direct experience can be complemented by the use of *storytelling*. ‘Storytelling has the unique capacity to unite diverse groups of people through common values and life experiences. Tapping into these elements can help the public to better relate with the experiences of migrants.’²³

Promoting direct experience also means systematically engaging migrants and refugees themselves so that they are able to determine the narratives that affect them and the stories that are told.

6. CONCLUSIONS

- The way in which migration is narrated, the words, images and concepts associated with it in public discourse, are not just abstract elements that harmlessly land in our common belief system. Rather, they shape the treatment that is dispensed to migrants or persons seeking refuge.
- There is a perceived growing polarization in the public debate on migration, with more extreme and xenophobic ideas gradually being accepted.
- However, attitudinal segmentation studies show that most people cannot be categorized in a simplistic way as either for or against migration. Most people stand somewhere in the middle, largely ambivalent, less ideological, less politically committed, and holding opinions and views based on emotions and personal values that can be influenced by external elements.
- The two studies on perceptions of migration and refugees in Spain carried out by Oxfam between 2017 and 2020 show a population that is aware, empathetic, concerned and responsible but, at the same time, scarcely mobilised and expecting order and conformity.
- One of the features of the representative sample of the Spanish population is the limited extent of close interaction with migrants and refugees. This means that it is factors other than direct experience, whether internal (such as personality, education received, or our own worldview) or external (the media, the opinion of those close to us, or the political discourse), that largely define perceptions and attitudes on migration.
- Attitudinal segmentation makes it possible to identify four profiles or groups: two with more clearly defined attitudes or positions (7% 'for' and 22% 'against') and two groups with ambivalent attitudes that represent 71% of the population in 2020.
- The two ambivalent groups include those who have an open view of the world but are not prepared to mobilise to advocate for better migration or human rights governance. And those who have an instrumentalist view of migration, and will therefore only be in favour if it can be proven that it brings a concrete material contribution, preferably (though not exclusively) of an economic nature.
- The values that concern the ambivalent groups include respect, tolerance, love for others, freedom of expression, loyalty and mutual trust, honesty and coherence. Ambivalent groups also consider family and the enjoyment of free time to be fundamental values. They place greater emphasis on tolerance than on solidarity.
- The main concerns of ambivalent groups, which are also present in the other groups, focus on three areas: fear of physical harm, fear of losing standard of living, and fear of losing their cultural identity.
- It is essential to develop an independent narrative on migration that is not built in reaction to the arguments of the anti-immigration discourse, a narrative that, through its own language, also appeals to the values of the ambivalent groups: family, security, tradition, respect, honesty, freedom, power and entrepreneurship, providing a response to their fears and bringing them closer to more open po-

sitions toward migrants and refugees that foster social justice.

- This new narrative must pull the migration debate away from the frame of exceptionality by applying a personal view based on closeness, direct experience and emotions, valuing the daily exchanges and interactions, relationships, aspirations and projects that migration makes possible.
- Direct experience is a powerful element for transforming perceptions. Facilitating this experience directly or through storytelling defined by and with migrants and refugees is therefore a key strategy for the narrative change.

NOTES

- ¹ ORSImpact (2019). *Measuring narrative change*. Available at https://www.orsimpact.com/DirectoryAttachments/7182019_123705_659_Measuring_narrative_Change_FINAL_rev_17July2019.pdf
- ² Kaleta, J. & Carrasco, J. (2019). *Flipping the script: A moral and economic case for narrative change*. Available at <https://www.livingcities.org/blog/1280-flippingthe-script-a-moral-and-economic-case-for-narrative-change>
- ³ More in Common, Purpose Europe et al. *Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees* en varios países. Available at <https://www.moreincommon.com/our-work/publications/>
- ⁴ Oxfam (2019). *Yes, but not here. Perceptions of xenophobia and discrimination towards Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru*. Available at <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620890/bp-si-pero-no-aqui-251019-es.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y>
- ⁵ [Note on methodology for the two studies available here](#) and on Oxfam Intermón's publications website.
- ⁶ Refugees are protected and specifically defined in international law as persons who are outside their country of origin due to a well-founded fear of persecution, conflict, violence or other circumstances that seriously disrupt public order, and therefore require international protection. Source: UNHCR
- ⁷ The surveys of the second study were conducted in December 2019 and the discussion groups were held in February 2020. The results do not, therefore, reflect the impact of COVID-19. Perceptions tend to remain stable with slight variations in the short term, so the impact of the pandemic can be progressively assessed later.
- ⁸ Dempster, H., Leach, A. & Hargrave, K. (2020). *Public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. What people think, why, and how to influence them*. ODI Working Paper. Available at <https://www.odi.org/publications/17333-publicattitudes-towards-immigration-and-immigrants-what-people-think-why-and-how-influence-them>
- ⁹ Global Forum on Migration and Development (2020). *Communications Guide on Shaping Public Narratives on Migration 2020*. Available at <https://www.gfmd.org/gfmd-communications-guide-shaping-public-narratives-migration-2020>
- ¹⁰ Allport, GW. (1961). *Pattern and Growth in Personality*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Cited in Dennison J. (2019).
- ¹¹ Dennison J. (2019). *What policy communication works for migration? Using values to depolarize*. International Center for Migration and Policy Development. Available at https://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/user_upload/202007EMM4_OPAM_3rd_chapter_Using_values_to_depolarise.pdf
- ¹² Ibid
- ¹³ Oxfam Intermón (2018). Origen, tránsito y devolución. *Las personas refugiadas y la crisis política de la UE*. Available at <https://web.oxfamintermon.org/sites/default/files/documentos/files/personas-refugiadas-Origen-transito-devolucion.pdf>
- ¹⁴ <https://migracion.maldita.es/articulos/un-rastreo-de-las-ayudas-sociales-desmonta-el-discurso-de-que-los-inmigrantes-tienen-mas-facilidades-de-acceso-que-los-espanoles/>
- ¹⁵ Butcher, P., & Neidhardt, A. H. (2020), *Disinformation about migration in the EU: promoting alternative narratives*. European Policy Centre.

- ¹⁶ Oxfam (2019). *Yes, but not here. Perceptions of xenophobia and discrimination towards Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru*. Available at <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620890/bp-si-pero-no-aqui-251019-es.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y>
- ¹⁷ Garzón, E. y C. Santamaría (2018). *Comunicación sobre las migraciones*. Oxfam Intermón guide (Spain). Available in Spanish at <https://www.oxfamintermon.org/sites/default/files/documentos/documentos/guia-comunicacion-migraciones.pdf>
- ¹⁸ Velasco, V. & Rodríguez Alarcón, L. (2020). *Nuevas narrativas para reemplazar el discurso del odio*. PorCausa. Available at https://porcausa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Dossier_Nuevas-Narrativas-para-reemplazar-el-discurso-del-odio.pdf citing Lakoff, G. (2017) *Don't Think of an Elephant!*.
- ¹⁹ These recommendations complement the [Oxfam guide Comunicación sobre las migraciones](#) published in 2018
- ²⁰ ORSImpact (2019). *Measuring narrative change*. Available at https://www.orsimpact.com/DirectoryAttachments/7182019_123705_659_Measuring_narrative_Change_FINAL_rev_17July2019.pdf
- ²¹ Dennison, J. (2019). *What policy communication works for migration? Using values to depolarize*. International Center for Migration and Policy Development. Available at https://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/user_upload/202007EMM4_OPAM_3rd_chapter_Using_values_to_depolarise.pdf
- ²² Ibid
- ²³ Global Forum on Migration and Development (2020). *Shaping the public narrative on migration and migrants*. Available at <https://www.gfmd.org/gfmd-communications-guide-shaping-public-narratives-migration-2020>

© Oxfam Intermón, November 2020

This document was written by Eva Garzón. The author wishes to thank Cristina Fernández-Durán, César Santamaría, Zinnia Quirós, María José Gascón, Pablo Rivero, Iñigo Macías, Andrea Aisa and Pablo Fernández for their assistance and comments. The collection of quantitative and qualitative data for the analysis of perceptions and attitudinal segmentation contained in this document was carried out by Asunción Gil, David García and Fernando Padilla, of Estrategia e Innovación Cualígrama. Special thanks go to the organizations involved in Oxfam Intermón's Domestic Programme and all other organizations, experts, academics and journalists who participated in training sessions and discussions on the contents of this report, sharing their time and knowledge with us.

For further information on the issues raised in this document, please email eva.garzon@oxfam.org

This publication is subject to copyright but the text may be free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that any such use be communicated in order to evaluate its impact. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be obtained and a fee may be charged. Please email msambade@oxfamintermon.org. Translation and proofreading by Debbie Greenberg and Natalia Leeland.

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

Oxfam

Oxfam is an international confederation of 20 organizations working together in more than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty. For more information, please write to any of the organizations or go to www.oxfam.org.

