

No. 16-\_\_

---

---

IN THE  
*Supreme Court of the United States*

BELMORA LLC & JAMIE BELCASTRO,

*Petitioners,*

v.

BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG, BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,  
AND MICHELLE K. LEE, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. PATENT &  
TRADEMARK OFFICE,

*Respondents.*

---

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari  
to the United States Court of Appeals  
for the Fourth Circuit

---

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

---

Ronald D. Coleman  
*Counsel of Record*  
Joel G. MacMull  
ARCHER & GREINER, P.C.  
44 Wall Street Suite 1285  
New York, NY 10005  
(201) 498-8544  
rcoleman@archerlaw.com

---

---

## QUESTION PRESENTED

In *Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388-90 (2014), this Court held that the Lanham Act does not extend a cause of action to every plaintiff with Article III standing, but instead “only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected” by the statute, and only “to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.”

Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), allows certain aggrieved persons to seek cancellation of a U.S. trademark. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), creates causes of action for false association and false advertising. The courts of appeals are divided over whether these provisions extend a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs who have neither registered nor used their trademarks in the United States.

The Question Presented is:

Whether Sections 14(3) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act allow a foreign business that has neither used nor registered its trademark in the United States to sue the owner of a U.S. trademark for conduct relating to the owner’s use of its U.S. mark.

**RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

Petitioner Belmora LLC has no parent company, and no publicly held corporation own 10% or more of its stock.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

QUESTION PRESENTED.....	i
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....	ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	iv
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.....	1
OPINIONS BELOW .....	1
JURISDICTION .....	1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.....	1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .....	11
I. The Circuits Are Divided Over Whether The Lanham Act Allows Foreign Markholders That Do Not Use Their Marks In The United States To Sue The Owners Of U.S. Marks. ....	12
II. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is Contrary To This Court’s Precedents.....	19
III. The Question Presented Is Important. ....	24
IV. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle To Resolve The Question Presented.....	26
CONCLUSION .....	28
APPENDICES .....	1a
APPENDIX A, Court of Appeals Opinion.....	1a
APPENDIX B, District Court Opinion .....	33a
APPENDIX C, TTAB Decision.....	90a
APPENDIX D, Denial of Rehearing .....	128a
APPENDIX E, Relevant Statutory Provisions.....	129a

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Federal Cases

<i>Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc.</i> , 381 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).....	22
<i>B&amp;B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.</i> , 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).....	20, 21, 22
<i>E. Remy Martin &amp; Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc.</i> , 756 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985).....	16
<i>Park ’n Fly v. Dollar Park &amp; Fly</i> , 469 U.S. 189 (1985).....	19
<i>Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo &amp; Co.</i> , 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).....	16, 17, 18
<i>ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.</i> , 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).....	13, 14, 18, 23
<i>Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.</i> , 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).....	22
<i>Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp.</i> , 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2004).....	16
<i>Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.</i> , 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Person’s Co. v. Christman</i> , 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).....	14, 15, 18

### Federal Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).....	5
15 U.S.C. § 1071.....	6
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).....	<i>passim</i>
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).....	1

### Other Authorities

- Bill Donahue, *Trademark Cases to Watch in 2016*, Law360,  
<http://www.law360.com/articles/733773/trademark-cases-to-watch-in-2016> (Dec. 24, 2015) ..... 21
- J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2002) ..... 13
- Emily Stewart, *These 15 Billion-Dollar Brands Are the Most Valuable in the U.S.*, TheStreet,  
<https://www.thestreet.com/story/13174313/1/the-15-most-valuable-billion-dollar-brands-in-the-us.html> (June 4, 2015)..... 24
- Rebecca Tushnet, *No Mark, No False Designation of Origin Is Still the Rule in NY*, Rebecca Tushnet's 43(B) Blog,  
<http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2016/04/no-mark-no-false-designation-of-origin.html> (Apr. 6, 2016)..... 21

## **PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

Petitioners Belmora LLC and Jamie Belcastro respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case.

### **OPINIONS BELOW**

The Fourth Circuit's opinion (Pet. App. 1a-32a) is published at 819 F.3d 697. The district court's opinion (Pet. App. 33a-89a) is also published at 84 F. Supp. 3d 490. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) decision (Pet. App. 90a-127a) is available on the TTAB's website as Cancellation No. 92047741, <https://e-foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=TTABIS&flNm=92047741-04-17-2014>.

### **JURISDICTION**

The Fourth Circuit denied petitioners' timely petition for rehearing en banc on May 23, 2016. Pet. App. 128a. On August 2, 2016, the Chief Justice granted petitioners' timely application to extend the time to file this Petition until September 22, 2016. App. No. 16A116. On September 12, 2016, the Chief Justice granted petitioners' application to further extend time to file this Petition to October 20, 2016. *Id.* This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### **STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

The pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in the appendix to this petition. Pet. App. 129a-31a.

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

1. For more than a decade, petitioner Belmora, with the approval of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), has sold naproxen sodium (an over-the-counter, *i.e.*, non-prescription, pain reliever) in the United States under the name FLANAX.<sup>1</sup> Pet. App. 2a. Respondent Bayer Consumer Care AG (BCC), a Swiss corporation, has sold its own naproxen sodium product, also called FLANAX, in Mexico since the 1970s. *Id.* BCC's affiliate, respondent Bayer Healthcare Corporation LLC (BHC, and together with BCC: Bayer) sells naproxen sodium in the United States under the brand name ALEVE. *Id.* 3a-4a.

By Bayer's own admission in this litigation, it "does not own, or have any interest in, any federal or state trademark registration for the mark FLANAX in the United States." (Bayer's Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim, D.Ct. Dkt. #35, at ¶ 30). Moreover, Bayer does not market or sell any product under the FLANAX name, or use the Mexican Flanax packaging, in the United States. *Id.* at ¶¶ 25, 37-40, 48. Bayer has also never suggested that it benefits from trade in products bearing BCC's Mexican FLANAX mark from Mexico into the United States; indeed, such trade would be illegal as Bayer further admits that it has neither sought nor obtained the necessary FDA approvals to sell or market Mexican Flanax in the

---

<sup>1</sup> The Petition uses all-capitals when referencing a trademark (*e.g.*, FLANAX) and capitalization (*e.g.*, Flanax) when referencing the product itself.



United States. *Id.* at ¶¶ 53-54, 56-61. *See also* Pet. App. 37a-38a.

Consistent with these facts, while Belmora was aware of BCC's Mexican Flanax, it was not aware of any facts indicating that BCC intended to market or sell Flanax in the United States, nor register FLANAX as a trademark in the United States. Belmora thus filed its own application to register the mark in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on October 6, 2003, putting BCC and the rest of the world on notice of Belmora's intended use of the mark in the United States. *Id.* 37a.

Belmora began using the FLANAX mark in the United States in early 2004. The USPTO published Belmora's FLANAX mark for opposition on August 3, 2004. *Id.* BCC did not oppose registration.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Although neither BCC nor BHC opposed Belmora's registration of the FLANAX mark in the USPTO, about six months after Belmora filed its application, BCC's predecessor-in-interest, HLR Consumer Health, Inc., filed an intent-to-use trademark application with the USPTO for the mark FLANAX for "analgesic preparation" (Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principal Register, at Court of Appeals Joint Appendix (JA) 70-72.) On September 19, 2004, the USPTO issued a Notice of Suspension relating to BCC's application, citing Belmora's earlier-filed application. (Notice of Suspension at JA-66 to 67.) On May 16, 2005, the USPTO refused BCC's application because of Belmora's registration. (Office Action at JA-62 to 64.) BCC did not respond to the USPTO office action refusing registration of its purported mark, and its application was deemed abandoned on December 16, 2005. (Notice of Abandonment at JA-60.)

Belmora filed its proof of use of the FLANAX mark with the USPTO on November 11, 2004. (Statement of Use Filing in Court of Appeals Joint Appendix (JA) at 40 to 46.) The packaging consisted of Belmora's word mark FLANAX in a typeface like BCC's Mexican product, the color blue (which is commonly used for analgesics in the United States), bilingual packaging, and medical pictograms. Belmora subsequently changed its typeface and packaging. *See* Pet. App. 4a. Belmora was the first to utilize bilingual packaging and medical pictograms to the United States naproxen sodium pain reliever market. *See id.* 109a.

The USPTO issued Belmora's FLANAX trademark on February 1, 2005 (U.S. Reg. No. 2924440), at which time BCC and the rest of the world were again placed on notice of Belmora's use of the mark. Pet. App. 37a.

2. On June 29, 2007, three years after first being notified constructively of Belmora's filing, BCC filed a Petition to Cancel Belmora's Registration with the USPTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). *See id.* 90a-91a.

The TTAB dismissed the majority of BCC's claims, but permitted BCC to pursue cancellation under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, which provides in relevant part that a petition to cancel a mark may be filed "by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged" by the registration if "the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or

services on or in connection with the mark used.” 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).<sup>3</sup> The TTAB acknowledged that because “existing case law does not address whether [Bayer’s] alleged use [of the FLANAX mark in Mexico] is sufficient to support a claim of misrepresentation of source,” BCC’s interpretation of Section 14(3) would constitute an “extension of existing law.” *See* Pet. App. 94a.

On April 17, 2014, after a trial, the TTAB granted BCC’s petition to cancel Belmora’s FLANAX registration. Appendix C, *infra*. The TTAB based its decision solely on Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, finding that although BCC did not use the mark in the United States, there was evidence of Belmora “invoking the reputation of [BCC’s] foreign product to sell [Belmora’s] own goods domestically under the same mark during the 2006-2009 time frame.” Pet. App. 127a.

3. The parties filed civil actions against each other—Belmora seeking review of the TTAB’s cancellation decision, and Bayer bringing claims against petitioners under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and under state law for unfair competition and false advertising. In essence, Bayer’s complaint alleges that Belmora intentionally copied its

---

<sup>3</sup> Among the claims that the TTAB dismissed were Bayer’s claim that Article 6*bis* of the Paris Convention authorizes cancellation of Belmora’s FLANAX mark. Bayer later abandoned that contention on appeal, and it is not before this Court. Pet. App. 9a n.3.

Mexican FLANAX mark, and that some of Belmora's marketing materials were designed to mislead customers into thinking that they were purchasing the same product that was available in Mexico. The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.<sup>4</sup>

On Belmora's motion, the district court dismissed Bayer's Complaint and Counterclaim and reversed the TTAB's cancellation decision. The court explained that:

The issues in this case can be distilled into one single question: Does the Lanham Act allow the owner of a foreign mark that is not registered in the United States and further has never used the mark in United States commerce to assert priority rights over a mark that is registered in the United States by another party and used in United States commerce?

Pet. App. 35a. The district court determined that "[t]he answer is no" based on the standard this Court set forth in *Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388-90 (2014), which held that a cause of action under Section 43(a) does not extend to every plaintiff that can demonstrate standing under Article III, but instead "only to

---

<sup>4</sup> Belmora initially appealed the TTAB's decision to the Federal Circuit, but the litigation was later transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia after Bayer filed a complaint against Belmora. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1071.

plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected” by the statute, and only “to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.”

Applying *Lexmark* to this case, the district court concluded that Bayer did not fall within the zone of interests protected by Section 43(a) because it did not hold “a protectable interest in a trademark.” Pet. App. 50a. Specifically, Bayer had neither registered nor even used its FLANAX mark in the United States, and therefore had not acquired the goodwill necessary to obtain such a protectable interest. *Id.*<sup>5</sup>

The court held in the alternative that Bayer had “failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that Belmora’s acts were the proximate cause of any economic injury” because, again, recognizing Bayer’s alleged injury (a lessened ability to sell Aleve to immigrants familiar with Mexican Flanax) “would require the Court to extend Lanham Act protections to an international mark that was not used in United States commerce” in a manner that was “contrary to the purposes of the Lanham Act as the economic losses the Lanham Act seeks to prevent are those emanating from infringement of a mark protected in the United States.” Pet. App. 50a-51a.

---

<sup>5</sup> In order to register a trademark in the United States a prospective registrant must demonstrate its use of the mark in interstate commerce. Use is therefore a necessary precondition for registration, as it is for ownership or assertion of any trademark rights.

The district court recognized that other circuits had recognized “two exceptions to this general rule” that the Lanham Act only protects businesses that use or register marks in the United States. *Id.* 52a. The first was the “famous marks doctrine”—a “controversial common-law exception” adopted only by the Ninth Circuit—which holds that “a foreign mark is protectable despite its lack of use in the United States where the mark is so well known or famous as to give rise to a risk of consumer confusion if the mark is used subsequently by someone else in the domestic marketplace.” *Id.* The district court inferred that the Fourth Circuit would not adopt that exception and therefore declined to do so. *See id.* The second was “the diversion-of-sales theory,” which holds that if extraterritorial conduct has “a significant effect on United States commerce” by diverting sales away from American companies to foreign ones, then the conduct may be actionable. *Id.* 53a. The district court concluded that the Fourth Circuit would not recognize that exception either, further noting that in cases where “courts have considered sales diverted from American companies in foreign countries,” the companies in question all “owned United States trademarks,” which Bayer admittedly does not. *Id.* 53a & n.4.

Having rejected these legal exceptions, the district court “expressly decline[d] to find that the loss of potential sales to immigrating consumers is the type of economic loss recognized by the Lanham Act,” and further recognized that such losses were necessarily “speculative” in nature. *Id.* 54a. It further held that

Bayer had failed to plead a cognizable injury to its reputation under the Lanham Act. *Id.* 55a-59a.

In reaching its conclusions, the district court acknowledged that some of Belmora's practices "may seem unfair," but it recognized that the Lanham Act "does not regulate all aspects of business morality," and held that Belmora's conduct vis-à-vis Bayer did not violate the statute. *Id.* 88a.

For these reasons, the district court held that Bayer lacked the ability to sue under the Lanham Act. It reached essentially the same conclusions with respect to Bayer's false advertising and cancellation claims, *id.* 75a-85a, and it dismissed the state law claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, *id.* 61a-62a.

4. Bayer appealed and respondent Lee, the Director of the USPTO, intervened to defend the TTAB's decision to cancel Belmora's mark. Pet. App. 8a. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Bayer was entitled to assert its claims for false association and false advertising under Section 43(a), and its cancellation claim under Section 14(3).

The Fourth Circuit agreed that this Court's decision in *Lexmark* frames the inquiry, but it interpreted that decision very differently from the district court, holding that the "primary lesson" was that "courts must interpret the Lanham Act according to what the statute says." Pet. App. 15a. The court of appeals then interpreted the unfair competition provisions of Section 43(a) far more broadly than the district court to authorize suit even when a plaintiff has not used a mark in the United States at all. *Id.* 15a-17a.

In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit determined that in contrast with provisions addressing trademark infringement, “the plain language of § 43(a) does not require that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce as an element of the cause of action.” *Id.* 11a. Instead, the court held, the statute only required that the defendant “use in commerce . . . an offending ‘word, term, name, symbol, or device’”—in this case, Belmora’s FLANAX mark. *Id.* 12a.

The Fourth Circuit went on to hold that the *Lexmark* zone of interests and proximate cause inquiries were satisfied principally because some Mexican customers might have bought Belmora’s Flanax while visiting the United States instead of buying Mexican Flanax from BCC before departing Mexico. *Id.* 22a.

“For reasons that largely overlap with the preceding § 43(a) analysis,” the Fourth Circuit also “agree[d] with Bayer” that it could pursue cancellation of Belmora’s mark. *Id.* 29a. The court of appeals held that the zone of interests covered by the cancellation provision of the Lanham Act includes any “deceptive and misleading use of marks,” and further held that “neither § 14(3) nor *Lexmark* mandate that the plaintiff have used the challenged mark in United States commerce as a condition precedent to its claim.” *Id.* 31a. The court of appeals thus reversed the district court’s decision and reinstated the portion of the TTAB’s decision canceling Belmora’s registration for FLANAX. *Id.*



After Belmora's petition for rehearing was denied, Pet. App. 128a, this Petition followed.

### **REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT**

The Fourth Circuit's decision in this case deepens a circuit split on a critically important question of federal trademark and unfair competition law.

Federal courts of appeals have generally recognized that the principle of territoriality—*i.e.*, the notion that trademark rights are national in character—is fundamental to trademark law. The Ninth Circuit previously created a circuit split when it recognized a narrow exception to the territoriality principle by extending a Lanham Act trademark infringement cause of action to the owners of a small subset of foreign marks that are well-known in the United States. In this case, the Fourth Circuit deepened the split by abrogating the principle of territoriality altogether in unfair competition cases. Strikingly, it did so in order to hold that Belmora's exercise of its rights as owner of a registered mark under the Lanham Act may have constituted unfair competition under that very same statute.

The decision below rests on a simple but fundamental legal error: the idea that because relevant provisions of the Lanham Act do not expressly address territoriality, that principle is not part of federal unfair competition law. That assumption is backwards, however, because the principle of territoriality predates the Lanham Act, and has informed the statute since its inception. Far from abrogating territoriality or limiting its application only

to specified provisions in the Lanham Act, Congress legislated against that backdrop in enacting it. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit, nothing in the Lanham Act suggests any legislative intent to depart from what had been universally recognized as an axiom of federal unfair competition law.

It is difficult to overstate the practical impact of the Fourth Circuit's decision's invitation to foreign businesses to use the Lanham Act's unfair competition provisions to circumvent the territorial limitations of U.S. trademark law and to undermine the rights of U.S. trademark registrants. If allowed to stand, the decision below will present a grave risk to owners of U.S. marks and to American businesses in particular. This Court's immediate intervention is necessary because, as the lower courts' decisions demonstrate, the controversy in this case flows from uncertainty about the scope and import of this Court's decision in *Lexmark*—a question that only this Court can truly resolve. Certiorari should be granted to restore uniformity in the interpretation of the Lanham Act and to reestablish the primacy of the territoriality principle.

**I. The Circuits Are Divided Over Whether The Lanham Act Allows Foreign Markholders That Do Not Use Their Marks In The United States To Sue The Owners Of U.S. Marks.**

The Fourth Circuit's decision recognizing Bayer's cause of action deepens an existing circuit conflict. Two circuits—the Second and the Federal—have declined to permit foreign markholders to assert

claims against the owners of U.S. marks under the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit alone has recognized an exception to this rule, known as the “famous marks” doctrine, which is narrower than the Fourth Circuit’s rule in this case.

1. In *ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.*, 482 F.3d 135, 154 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit explained that in order to state a claim for unfair competition against the owner of a trademark arising from its use of the mark, “a plaintiff must demonstrate its own right to use the mark or dress in question.” In other words, it must establish “a priority right to the use” of the mark “in the United States.” *Id.*

In determining that a foreign markholder does not have priority over a domestic one, the Second Circuit explained that “[t]he principle of territoriality is basic to American trademark law.” *Id.* at 155.

Precisely because a trademark has a separate legal existence under each country's laws, ownership of a mark in one country does not automatically confer upon the owner the exclusive right to use that mark in another country. Rather, a mark owner must take the proper steps to ensure that its rights to that mark are recognized in any country in which it seeks to assert them.

*Id.* As a result, “absent some use of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark holder generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use.” *Id.* at 156.

In *Punchgini*, the plaintiffs operated four foreign restaurants under the BUKHARA trademark. *Id.* at 143. The defendants, who were former employees of the plaintiffs and thus completely familiar with their name and operations, opened two restaurants in New York City under the name BUKHARA GRILL. *Id.* at 144. The defendants' New York City restaurants not only used a similar mark but also used logos, décor, staff uniforms and menus that were similar to those of the plaintiffs' international restaurants. *Id.* The plaintiffs sued, claiming trademark infringement, unfair competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act, as well as parallel causes of action under state law. *Id.* at 142. Relying on the territoriality principle, and refusing to acknowledge an exception for "famous marks," the Second Circuit held that renown in the United States based solely on use in another country could not be a valid basis for a Lanham Act claim against the owner of a U.S. mark. *See id.* at 165.

The Federal Circuit applied the same principle to the same effect in *Person's Co. v. Christman*, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990), likewise recognizing that "[t]he concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law." There, the plaintiff had registered a mark for apparel in Japan. A U.S. businessman traveled to Japan, purchased clothing from the Japanese markholders, brought that clothing back to the United States, and proceeded to register the logo here and develop a new line of clothing based on it. When the Japanese company expanded and attempted to register its mark in the United States, it discovered that it did not have priority in the United States over its own mark. It sought cancellation of the U.S.

trademark in the TTAB, but its petition was denied under the territoriality principle. *See id.* at 1566-67.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, finding that “foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce and cannot form the basis for a holding that appellant has priority here.” *Id.* at 1568. The court of appeals further rejected the contention that the owner of the U.S. mark had adopted the mark in “bad faith”—a term of art in trademark law, which refers to “a junior user’s adoption and use of a mark with knowledge of another’s prior use.” *Id.* at 1569. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the owner of the U.S. mark was aware of the Japanese mark—indeed, he had copied it. However, the court held that “an inference of bad faith requires something more than mere knowledge of prior use of a similar mark in a foreign country.” *Id.* at 1570. Because the owner of the U.S. mark adopted it “at a time when appellant had not yet entered U.S. commerce,” his decision to “appropriate[e] and us[e] appellant’s mark . . . can hardly be considered unscrupulous commercial conduct.” *Id.* That is because, as the district court also acknowledged in this case: “Trademark rights under the Lanham Act arise solely out of use of the mark in U.S. commerce or from ownership of a foreign registration thereon; [t]he law pertaining to registration of trademarks does not regulate all aspects of business morality.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted).

In addition to these decisions on point, other courts and commentators have recognized the foundational importance of the territoriality principle in federal unfair competition law. *See Kos Pharms.*,

*Inc. v. Andrx Corp.*, 369 F.3d 700, 714 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.”) (quoting *Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha*, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985)); *E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc.*, 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985); J. Thomas McCarthy, *McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition*, § 29:2, at 29-8 (4th ed. 2002) (“[P]riority of trademark rights in the United States depends solely upon priority of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world.”).

2. The Ninth Circuit took a different approach in *Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.*, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004), acknowledging that “the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important doctrine within trademark law,” but crafting “a famous mark exception to the territoriality principle,” which applies “when foreign use of a mark achieves a certain level of fame for that mark within the United States.” The court of appeals rooted its conclusion in a public policy determination that “[a]n absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud” because foreign nationals visiting the United States might be confused as to the nature and source of goods that resemble goods available in their home countries. *Id.*

In *Grupo Gigante*, the plaintiff was a large Mexican grocery store chain whose GIGANTE stores operated in Mexico since the early 1960s. Almost thirty years

after plaintiff opened its first store in Mexico, defendants opened a grocery store across the border in San Diego, California called GIGANTE MARKET. Several years later, plaintiff opened a GIGANTE store in the Los Angeles area. After defendants demanded that plaintiff stop using the GIGANTE mark in the United States, plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment that its use in Mexico entitled it to enforce its trademark in the United States. Defendants asserted the territoriality principle, pursuant to which they would have had superior rights as the prior users of the mark in the United States.

The Ninth Circuit, declined to acknowledge the applicability of the territoriality principle. Instead, it enunciated a public-policy based exception for famous marks. To fall within this exception in the Ninth Circuit, a foreign mark must have secondary meaning in the United States, *and* “the court must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a *substantial* percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark.” *Id.* at 1098 (emphasis in original). The court further explained that “such factors as the intentional copying of the mark by the defendant” and “whether customers of the American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the same firm that uses the mark in another country” would be “relevant” but “not necessarily determinative” of the inquiry. *Id.*

3. There can be no doubt that the circuits are divided. In *Punchgini*, the Second Circuit discussed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Grupo Gigante* in detail before rejecting its conclusion that there is any famous

marks exception to territoriality in federal trademark law. *See* 482 F.3d at 160. And *Grupo Gigante*, in turn, acknowledged the holding in *Person's* that “[e]arlier use in another country usually just does not count” before it determined that the territoriality principle is not absolute. 391 F.3d at 1093 & n.10.

In this case, the Fourth Circuit adopted a third rule for unfair competition and cancellation claims, essentially sweeping away notions of territoriality, domestic priority of use, and goodwill to decide that the false association and false advertising portions of Section 43(a) apply whether the defendant is the senior U.S. markholder or not. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit recognized that BCC does not have “any specific trademark rights to the FLANAX mark in the United States” because “Belmora owns that mark.” Pet. App. 27a. But despite that acknowledgment, the court of appeals neither respected Belmora’s priority of use nor applied the Ninth Circuit’s narrow exception for allegations concerning famous marks—indeed, it never used the word “territoriality” or even cited *Grupo Gigante*. Thus, while the Ninth Circuit cracked open the door to foreign markholders to sue U.S. registrants who use competing marks in U.S. commerce in the unusual circumstance that the foreign mark was sufficiently well-known to a substantial percentage of the target market in the United States, the Fourth Circuit kicked the door open, allowing a foreign markholder that admittedly had never taken any steps to use its mark in the United States to challenge a U.S. registration without



even alleging that the foreign mark had acquired secondary meaning in the United States.

Because this case simply could not have come out the same way under the law of the Second and Federal Circuits—or even the Ninth Circuit, for that matter—the Fourth Circuit’s ruling deepens the existing conflict over interpretation of the Lanham Act.

## **II. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is Contrary To This Court’s Precedents.**

Certiorari is also warranted because the Fourth Circuit’s decision is contrary to this Court’s precedents and relies on a misreading of this Court’s decision in *Lexmark*.

1. In *Park ’n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly*, 469 U.S. 189 (1985), this Court acknowledged the territorial nature of trademark rights, explaining that the Lanham Act “provides *national* protection of trademarks in order to *secure to* the owner of the mark *the goodwill of his business* and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” *Id.* at 198 (emphasis added). Ignoring that language, the Fourth Circuit effectively read the Lanham Act as providing supra-national protection to the owner of a foreign trademark.

The Fourth Circuit reached this conclusion based on a misinterpretation of this Court’s decision in *Lexmark*. In that false advertising case, the Court asked whether the plaintiff fell “within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue under” Section 43(a). 134 S. Ct. at 1387. The Court determined that a cause of action is available only to

plaintiffs that can allege “an injury to a commercial interest in reputation and sales,” and only to those who can “show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising,” *i.e.*, that the “deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.” 134 S. Ct. at 1390-91. But *Lexmark* itself involved only two domestic businesses, and did not involve allegations of trademark abuse. The Court thus never commented on principles or territoriality or priority, let alone suggested that Congress intended to allow foreign markholders with no goodwill in the United States to sue the holders of registered U.S. marks.

That distinction matters. As this Court recognized very recently in *B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.*, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015):

Registration is significant. The Lanham Act confers “important legal rights and benefits” on trademark owners who register their marks. 3 McCarthy §19:3, at 19-21 *see also id.*, §19:9, at 19-34 (listing seven of the “procedural and substantive legal advantages” of registration). Registration, for instance, serves as “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership” of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1072. It also is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate.” § 1057(b). And once a mark

has been registered for five years, it can become “incontestable.” §§ 1065, 1115(b).

*Id.* at 1300. In light of the strong preference given to the owners of U.S. marks—codified in the Lanham Act itself—it was wrong for the Fourth Circuit to hold that by exercising its rights under the Lanham Act the owner of a registered U.S. trademark might have simultaneously violated the Lanham Act’s unfair competition provisions. The Fourth Circuit’s rationale for doing so—that the allegations made out a claim of possible harm to the business of a foreign entity that had not even claimed to use its own mark in the United States—cannot possibly justify the holding below.

Put another way, there is no indication anywhere that when it enacted Section 43(a), Congress intended to include foreign markholders who do not register or use their marks in the United States “within the class of plaintiffs whom [it] has authorized to sue” for unfair competition of any kind. *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1387. And in light of the axiom of territoriality, there is every reason to believe that Congress intended the opposite.

2. The Fourth Circuit never discussed the irony of its holding, but instead justified it based on its observation that the “plain text” of Section 43(a) does not expressly incorporate the territoriality principle. That was a mistake because the Fourth Circuit adopted the wrong default presumption regarding territoriality—assuming that if Congress had not expressly codified it, it did not exist. But this Court has held, in the trademark context, that absent some

indication of contrary Congressional intent, the Lanham Act should be interpreted consistently with the common law trademark principles that predated it. *See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (“[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.”) (quotation marks omitted); *B&B Hardware, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. at 1303 (holding that “courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with the expectation that” well established common law principles “will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident”).

Based on those precedents, the Fourth Circuit should have recognized the importance of the territoriality principle to interpretation of the Lanham Act. As Judge Rakoff has explained:

Although it might be argued that the Lanham Act itself, while referring to use in commerce, *see, e.g.*, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), does not specify the “territorial principle” *in haec verba*, the principle was long established before enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 and was already so basic to trademark law that it may be presumed to be implied in the Lanham Act.

*Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc.*, 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Second Circuit reinforced that analysis in *Punchgini*, when, in rejecting the abrogation of territoriality urged by the foreign plaintiffs, it observed that “Congress has not hesitated to amend the Lanham Act to effect its intent with respect to trademark protection, having done so

almost thirty times since the statute took effect in 1947.” 482 F.3d at 164. “In light of these legislative efforts,” the Second Circuit determined that the courts’ role is to “wait for Congress to express its intent more clearly” before “constru[ing] the Lanham Act to include such a significant departure from the principle of territoriality” rather than adopt the famous marks rule. *Id.*

Nothing in *Lexmark* suggests a different approach. The Court granted certiorari in *Lexmark* because the circuits had adopted three different approaches to determine who was entitled to sue for false advertising, resulting in a doctrinal muddle that involved reliance on slippery concepts such as “prudential standing.” *Lexmark* is thus best understood as a case where the Court created a uniform rule to resolve confusion over standing. There is no basis for relying on it to justify a judicial overhaul of the law of trademarks and unfair competition by jettisoning the territoriality principle.

3. Despite Bayer’s allegations of unfair competition, it is undisputed that Belmora is the only entity approved by the FDA to sell naproxen under the FLANAX name in the United States. There is no allegation that Belmora’s analgesics are of an inferior quality or otherwise unsuitable for consumers. Bayer’s principal complaint about Belmora’s FLANAX mark is purportedly based on an association with BCC’s Flanax—but Bayer has acknowledged that its real purpose in bringing this action is to protect BHC’s domestic sales of Aleve, the naproxen-branded product that competes with Belmora’s Flanax. *See* Pet. App.

51a. By using the Lanham Act to eliminate one of its principal competitors in the U.S. market for branded naproxen, Bayer seeks to convert the unfair competition statute into an anti-competition statute by which it would be granted a domestic monopoly in that category. That is a result that Congress could not have intended.

### **III. The Question Presented Is Important.**

The impact of the Fourth Circuit’s decision cannot be overstated, as it stands to influence the use and ownership of thousands upon thousands of trademarks in industries whose collective worth to the U.S. economy has been valued at more than \$2.5 trillion dollars.<sup>6</sup> Foreign mark owners will no doubt take the Fourth Circuit’s ruling as a wide-ranging permit to litigate against supposed U.S. infringers of their foreign marks—including those that have, like Belmora, secured their exclusive U.S. trademark rights through registration—establishing standing, for the first time, merely by alleging unfair competition. The result will be the imposition of grave risk and massive costs to U.S. businesses. Moreover, select U.S. jurisdictions are now subject to be transformed into worldwide trademark tribunals in which any entity anywhere may plead a “reputational injury” notwithstanding their complete lack of trademark use

---

<sup>6</sup> See Emily Stewart, *These 15 Billion-Dollar Brands Are the Most Valuable in the U.S.*, TheStreet, <https://www.thestreet.com/story/13174313/1/the-15-most-valuable-billion-dollar-brands-in-the-us.html> (June 4, 2015).

in the United States, an historic disconnection between goodwill and use. Such an outcome threatens to seriously undermine the right of priority under the Lanham Act, would unnecessarily burden trademark registrants and would-be applicants with near endless exposure to foreign claimants, and eviscerates the power of the executive and legislative branches to negotiate treaties that address the treatment of foreign trademarks in the U.S.

That is why commentators have described this case as “one of the must-watch trademark stories of 2016,” recognizing that “[i]f Bayer wins, this could give owners of trademarks in China or Europe new claims against their U.S. competitors.” Bill Donahue, *Trademark Cases to Watch in 2016*, Law360, <http://www.law360.com/articles/733773/trademark-cases-to-watch-in-2016> (Dec. 24, 2015). They have further recognized that the decision below “did more than create protection for foreign marks in the US; it created a conflict with a number of other doctrines about who can sue for trademark infringement,” sowing uncertainty about the scope of trademark protection and the value of a U.S. registration. See Rebecca Tushnet, *No Mark, No False Designation of Origin Is Still the Rule in NY*, Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B) Blog, <http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2016/04/no-mark-no-false-designation-of-origin.html> (Apr. 6, 2016) (highlighting the ongoing circuit conflict by citing a district court case in the Second Circuit that “clearly should come out the other way under *Belmora*”).

This Court should intervene now to ensure that the future cases implicating the issue of

territoriality—an inevitability in the increasingly globalized market for goods and services—are resolved under a clear and uniform standard consistent with the statute, the law interpreting it, and Congress’s intent.

#### **IV. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle To Resolve The Question Presented.**

As the district court explained, the issues in this case can all be distilled down to a single legal question. This case thus provides a unique opportunity to address the relevance of territoriality to Section 43(a) claims as well as claims seeking cancellation of a U.S. mark under Section 14(3).

The particular allegations in Bayer’s complaint also make this case a good vehicle to consider these legal questions. Bayer alleges that Belmora blatantly copied its mark and engaged in unethical conduct to coopt BCC’s foreign goodwill to drive U.S. sales of Belmora’s Flanax. At the same time, Bayer has acknowledged that prior to Belmora’s registration, it had no intention of ever registering or using the FLANAX mark in the United States. The case thus presents precisely the public policy conflict that has divided the courts of appeals. The Ninth Circuit determined in indistinguishable circumstances that the longstanding principle of territoriality should yield to a particular set of public policy concerns; the Second and Federal Circuits determined that, even where a complaint alleges bad faith, such equitable concerns do not justify taking on a legislative role and rewriting the Lanham Act by creating an exception to territoriality.



Importantly, this Court is the only body that can resolve this issue because the Fourth Circuit's decision rests on its understanding of the scope and meaning of this Court's decision in *Lexmark*. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit attempted to apply that decision, but reached diametrically opposing results. Only this Court has the power to authoritatively interpret *Lexmark* and explain whether it has any bearing on principles of territoriality or priority.

Given the importance of uniformity in this area of federal law, further percolation of this question in the courts of appeals cannot be justified. The Fourth Circuit's radical expansion of the class of potential plaintiffs under the Lanham Act has exposed U.S. business to a heretofore unprecedented breadth of possible liability based on exposure to overseas-based trademark claims. At the same time, it has introduced great uncertainty regarding the integrity of the trademark registration regime enacted by Congress—in the process aggravating a split over the existence of the famous marks doctrine that has persisted for more than a decade now, has been acknowledged by the courts of appeals, and is not going anywhere. The Second and the Ninth Circuits are on opposite sides. The Fourth Circuit's decision in this case thus threatens to disrupt the administration of trademark law and undermines the capacity of businesses to make critical business decisions about the use of trademarks still further. The new level of uncertainty introduced by this decision calls out for this Court's swift intervention.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Ronald D. Coleman  
*Counsel of Record*  
Joel G. MacMull  
ARCHER & GREINER, P.C.  
44 Wall Street Suite 1285  
New York, NY 10005  
(201) 498-8544  
rcoleman@archerlaw.com

October 20, 2016

## **APPENDIX**

1a

**APPENDIX A**

819 F.3d 697

United States Court of Appeals,  
Fourth Circuit.

BELMORA LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG, a Swiss corporation;  
Bayer Healthcare LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability  
Company, Defendants-Consolidated Plaintiffs-  
Appellants,

v.

Belmora LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability Company;  
Jamie Belcastro, an individual; Does, 1-10, inclusive,  
Consolidated Defendants-Appellees,

and

Michelle K. Lee, Undersecretary for Intellectual  
Property and Director of the United States Patent  
and Trademark Office (Director), Intervenor.

No. 15-1335.

|

Argued: Oct. 27, 2015.

|

Decided: March 23, 2016.

**Opinion**

Vacated and remanded by published opinion.  
Judge AGEE wrote the opinion, in which Judge  
FLOYD and Judge THACKER joined.

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

In this unfair competition case, we consider whether the Lanham Act permits the owner of a foreign trademark and its sister company to pursue false association, false advertising, and trademark cancellation claims against the owner of the same mark in the United States. Bayer Consumer Care AG (“BCC”) owns the trademark “FLANAX” in Mexico and has sold naproxen sodium pain relievers under that mark in Mexico (and other parts of Latin America) since the 1970s. Belmora LLC owns the FLANAX trademark in the United States and has used it here since 2004 in the sale of its naproxen sodium pain relievers. BCC and its U.S. sister company Bayer Healthcare LLC (“BHC,” and collectively with BCC, “Bayer”) contend that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product.

BCC successfully petitioned the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel Belmora’s registration for the FLANAX mark based on deceptive use. Belmora appealed the TTAB’s decision to the district court. In the meantime, BCC filed a separate complaint for false association against Belmora under § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and in conjunction with BHC, a claim for false advertising. After the two cases were consolidated, the district court reversed the TTAB’s cancellation order and dismissed the false association and false advertising claims.

Bayer appeals those decisions. For the reasons outlined below, we vacate the judgment of the district

court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

### **I. Background**

This appeal comes to us following the district court's grant of Belmora's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Bayer's complaint and Belmora's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings on the trademark cancellation claim. In both circumstances, we "assume all well-pled facts to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of" Bayer as the plaintiff. *Cooksey v. Futrell*, 721 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 2013).<sup>1</sup>

#### **A. The FLANAX Mark**

BCC registered the trademark FLANAX in Mexico for pharmaceutical products, analgesics, and anti-inflammatories. It has sold naproxen sodium tablets under the FLANAX brand in Mexico since 1976. FLANAX sales by BCC have totaled hundreds of millions of dollars, with a portion of the sales occurring in Mexican cities near the United States border. BCC's FLANAX brand is well-known in Mexico and other Latin American countries, as well as to Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics in the United States, but BCC has never marketed or sold its FLANAX in the United States. Instead, BCC's sister company, BHC, sells naproxen sodium pain

---

<sup>1</sup> We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and throughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted.

4a

relievers under the brand ALEVE in the United States market.

Belmora LLC began selling naproxen sodium tablets in the United States as FLANAX in 2004. The following year, Belmora registered the FLANAX mark in the United States. Belmora's early FLANAX packaging (below, left) closely mimicked BCC's Mexican FLANAX packaging (right), displaying a similar color scheme, font size, and typeface.



J.A. 145. Belmora later modified its packaging (below), but the color scheme, font size, and typeface remain similar to that of BCC's FLANAX packaging.



*Id.*

In addition to using similar packaging, Belmora made statements implying that its FLANAX brand

was the same FLANAX product sold by BCC in Mexico. For example, Belmora circulated a brochure to prospective distributors that stated,

For generations, Flanax has been a brand that Latinos have turned to for various common ailments. Now you too can profit from this highly recognized topselling brand among Latinos. Flanax is now made in the U.S. and continues to show record sales growth everywhere it is sold. Flanax acts as a powerful attraction for Latinos by providing them with products they know, trust and prefer.

J.A. 196. Belmora also employed telemarketers and provided them with a script containing similar statements. This sales script stated that Belmora was “the direct producers of FLANAX in the US” and that “FLANAX is a very well known medical product in the Latino American market, for FLANAX is sold successfully in Mexico.” *Id.* Belmora’s “sell sheet,” used to solicit orders from retailers, likewise claimed that “Flanax products have been used [for] many, many years in Mexico” and are “now being produced in the United States by Belmora LLC.” *Id.*

Bayer points to evidence that these and similar materials resulted in Belmora’s distributors, vendors, and marketers believing that its FLANAX was the same as or affiliated with BCC’s FLANAX. For instance, Belmora received questions regarding whether it was legal for FLANAX to have been imported from Mexico. And an investigation of stores selling Belmora’s FLANAX “identified at least 30 [purchasers] who believed that the Flanax products



... were the same as, or affiliated with, the Flanax products they knew from Mexico.” J.A. 416.

## **B. Proceedings Below**

### **1.**

In 2007, BCC petitioned the TTAB to cancel Belmora’s registration for the FLANAX mark, arguing that Belmora’s use and registration of the FLANAX mark violated Article 6bis of the Paris Convention “as made applicable by Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act.” J.A. 89. BCC also sought cancellation of Belmora’s registration under § 14(3) of the Lanham Act because Belmora had used the FLANAX mark “to misrepresent the source of the goods ... [on] which the mark is used.” *Id.*; *see also* Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

The TTAB dismissed BCC’s Article 6bis claim, concluding that Article 6bis “is not self-executing” and that § 44 of the Lanham Act did not provide “an independent basis for cancellation.” J.A. 95. However, the TTAB allowed Bayer’s § 14(3) claim to proceed. In 2014, after discovery and a hearing, the TTAB ordered cancellation of Belmora’s FLANAX registration, concluding that Belmora had misrepresented the source of the FLANAX goods and that the facts “d [id] not present a close case.” J.A. 142. The TTAB noted that Belmora 1) knew the favorable reputation of Bayer’s FLANAX product, 2) “copied” Bayer’s packaging, and 3) “repeatedly invoked” that reputation when marketing its product in the United States. J.A. 143-45.

### **2.**

Shortly after the TTAB’s ruling, Bayer filed suit in the Southern District of California, alleging that 1)

BCC was injured by Belmora's false association with its FLANAX product in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A), and 2) BCC and BHC were both injured by Belmora's false advertising of FLANAX under § 43(a)(1)(B). The complaint also alleged three claims under California state law.

Belmora meanwhile appealed the TTAB's cancellation order and elected to proceed with the appeal as a civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia.<sup>2</sup> It argued that the TTAB erred in concluding that Bayer "had standing and/or a cause of action" under § 14(3) and in finding that Belmora had misrepresented the source of its goods. J.A. 218. Belmora also sought a declaration that its actions had not violated the false association and false advertising provisions of Lanham Act § 43(a), as Bayer had alleged in the California district court proceeding. Bayer filed a counterclaim challenging the TTAB's dismissal of its Paris Convention treaty claims.

The California case was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia and consolidated with Belmora's pending action. Belmora then moved the district court to dismiss Bayer's § 43(a) claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) on the § 14(3) claim. On February 6,

---

<sup>2</sup> A party to a cancellation proceeding who is dissatisfied with the TTAB's decision may either "appeal to" the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a), or elect to "have remedy by a civil action" in the district court, *id.* § 1071(b). Belmora chose the latter option.

2015, after two hearings, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order ruling in favor of Belmora across the board.

The district court acknowledged that “Belmora’s FLANAX ... has a similar trade dress to Bayer’s FLANAX and is marketed in such a way that capitalizes on the goodwill of Bayer’s FLANAX.” J.A. 475. It nonetheless “distilled” the case “into one single question”:

Does the Lanham Act allow the owner of a foreign mark that is not registered in the United States and further has never used the mark in United States commerce to assert priority rights over a mark that is registered in the United States by another party and used in United States commerce?

J.A. 476. The district court concluded that “[t]he answer is no” based on its reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). J.A. 476. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Bayer’s false association and false advertising claims for lack of standing. At the same time, it reversed the TTAB’s § 14(3) cancellation order.

Bayer filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) intervened to defend the TTAB’s decision to cancel Belmora’s registration and to argue that the Lanham Act

conforms to the United States' commitments in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.<sup>3</sup>

## II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court's decision to dismiss a proceeding under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), accepting as true all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff's favor. *Priority Auto Grp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 757 F.3d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 2014); see also *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, "a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint." *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.*, 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011).

### A. False Association and False Advertising Under Section 43(a)

The district court dismissed Bayer's false association<sup>4</sup> and false advertising claims because, in its view, the claims failed to satisfy the standards set

---

<sup>3</sup> The district court had agreed with the TTAB that Article does not create an independent cause of action for the cancellation of Belmora's FLANAX registration. Because Bayer appears to have abandoned its treaty claims on appeal and their resolution is not necessary to our decision, we do not address any issue regarding the Paris Convention arguments.

<sup>4</sup> As the district court pointed out, we have sometimes denominated Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) claims as "false designation" claims. We think it preferable to follow the Supreme Court's terminology in *Lexmark* and instead refer to such claims as those of "false association," although the terms can often be used interchangeably.

forth by the Supreme Court in *Lexmark*. At the core of the district court’s decision was its conclusion that 1) Bayer’s claims fell outside the Lanham Act’s “zone of interests”—and are not cognizable—“because Bayer does not possess a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark in the United States,” J.A. 485, and 2) that a “cognizable economic loss under the Lanham Act” cannot exist as to a “mark that was not used in United States commerce.” J.A. 488-89.

On appeal, Bayer contends these conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law because they conflict with the plain language of § 43(a) and misread *Lexmark*.

### 1.

“While much of the Lanham Act addresses the registration, use, and infringement of trademarks and related marks, § 43(a) ... goes beyond trademark protection.” *Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2003). Written in terms of the putative defendant’s conduct, § 43(a) sets forth unfair competition causes of action for false association and false advertising:

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—

(A) [False Association:] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another

person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or

(B) [False Advertising:] in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Subsection A, which creates liability for statements as to “affiliation, connection, or association” of goods, describes the cause of action known as “false association.” Subsection B, which creates liability for “misrepresent[ing] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods, defines the cause of action for “false advertising.”

Significantly, the plain language of § 43(a) does not require that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce as an element of the cause of action. Section 43(a) stands in sharp contrast to Lanham Act § 32, which is titled as and expressly addresses “infringement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (requiring for liability the “use in commerce” of “any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation *of a registered mark* ” (emphasis added)). Under § 43(a), it is the defendant's use in commerce—whether of an offending “word, term, name, symbol, or device” or of a “false or misleading description [or representation] of fact”—that creates the injury under the terms of the statute. And here the alleged

offending “word, term, name, symbol, or device” is Belmora’s FLANAX mark.

What § 43(a) does require is that Bayer was “likely to be damaged” by Belmora’s “use[ ] in commerce” of its FLANAX mark and related advertisements. The Supreme Court recently considered the breadth of this “likely to be damaged” language in *Lexmark*, a false advertising case arising from a dispute in the used-printer-cartridge market. 134 S. Ct. at 1383, 1388. The lower courts in *Lexmark* had analyzed the case in terms of “prudential standing”—that is, on grounds that are “prudential” rather than constitutional. *Id.* at 1386. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the real question in *Lexmark* was “whether Static Control has a cause of action under the statute.” *Id.* at 1387. This query, in turn, hinged on “a straightforward question of statutory interpretation” to which it applied “traditional principles” of interpretation. *Id.* at 1388. As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court noted that courts must be careful not to import requirements into this analysis that Congress has not included in the statute:

We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress *should* have authorized Static Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so. Just as a court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.

*Id.* The Court concluded that § 43(a)’s broad authorization—permitting suit by “any person who

believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged”—should not be taken “literally” to reach the limits of Article III standing, but is framed by two “background principles,” which may overlap. *Id.*

First, a plaintiff’s claim must fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the statute. *Id.* The scope of the zone of interests is not “especially demanding,” and the plaintiff receives the “benefit of any doubt.” *Id.* at 1389. Because the Lanham Act contains an “unusual, and extraordinarily helpful” purpose statement in § 45, identifying the statute’s zone of interests “requires no guesswork.” *Id.* Section 45 provides:

The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.



Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.<sup>5</sup>

The Supreme Court observed that “[m]ost of the enumerated purposes are relevant to a false-association case,” while “a typical false-advertising case will implicate only the Act’s goal of ‘protecting persons engaged in commerce within the control of Congress against unfair competition.’” *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1389. The Court concluded “that to come within the zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under [§ 43(a)], a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.” *Id.* at 1390.

The second *Lexmark* background principle is that “a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.” *Id.* The injury must have a “sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.” *Id.* In the § 43(a) context, this means “show[ing] economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the

---

<sup>5</sup> In the same section, the Lanham Act defines “commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. We have previously construed this phrase to mean that the term is “coterminous with that commerce that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.” *Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco*, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003). “Commerce” in Lanham Act context is therefore an expansive concept that “necessarily includes all the explicitly identified variants of interstate commerce, foreign trade, and Indian commerce.” *Id.* at 364 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); see also *infra* n. 6.

defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.” *Id.* at 1391.

The primary lesson from *Lexmark* is clear: courts must interpret the Lanham Act according to what the statute says. To determine whether a plaintiff, “falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue,” we “apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation.” *Id.* at 1387. The outcome will rise and fall on the “meaning of the congressionally enacted provision creating a cause of action.” *Id.* at 1388.

We now turn to apply these principles to the case before us.

## 2.

### a.

We first address the position, pressed by Belmora and adopted by the district court, that a plaintiff must have initially used its own mark in commerce within the United States as a condition precedent to a § 43(a) claim. In dismissing BCC’s § 43(a) claims, the district court found dispositive that “Bayer failed to plead facts showing that it used the FLANAX mark in commerce in [the] United States.” J.A. 487. Upon that ground, the district court held “that Bayer does not possess a protectable interest in the [FLANAX] mark.” *Id.*

As noted earlier, such a requirement is absent from § 43(a)’s plain language and its application in *Lexmark*. Under the statute, the *defendant* must have “use[d] in commerce” the offending “word, term, name, [or] symbol,” but the *plaintiff* need only “believe[ ] that he or she is or is likely to be damaged

by such act.” Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

It is important to emphasize that this is an unfair competition case, not a trademark infringement case. *Belmora* and the district court conflated the Lanham Act’s infringement provision in § 32 (which authorizes suit only “by the registrant,” and thereby requires the plaintiff to have used its own mark in commerce) with unfair competition claims pled in this case under § 43(a). Section 32 makes clear that Congress knew how to write a precondition of trademark possession and use into a Lanham Act cause of action when it chose to do so. It has not done so in § 43(a). *See Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).

Given that *Lexmark* advises courts to adhere to the statutory language, “apply[ing] traditional principles of statutory interpretation,” *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1388, we lack authority to introduce a requirement into § 43(a) that Congress plainly omitted. Nothing in *Lexmark* can be read to suggest that § 43(a) claims have an unstated requirement that the plaintiff have first used its own mark (word, term, name, symbol, or device) in U.S. commerce before a cause of action will lie against a defendant who is breaching the statute.

The district court thus erred in requiring Bayer, as the plaintiff, to have pled its prior use of its own mark in U.S. commerce when it is the defendant’s use

of a mark or misrepresentation that underlies the § 43(a) unfair competition cause of action. Having made this foundational error, the district court's resolution of the issues requires reversal.<sup>6</sup>

Admittedly, some of our prior cases appear to have treated a plaintiff's use of a mark in United States commerce as a prerequisite for a false association claim. See *Lamparello v. Falwell*, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) ("Both infringement [under § 32] and false designation of origin [under § 43(a)] have [the same] five elements."); *People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney*, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); *Int'l Bancorp*, 329 F.3d at 361 n. 2 ("[T]he tests for trademark

---

<sup>6</sup> Even though the district court's error in transposing § 43(a)'s requirements for a defendant's actions upon the plaintiff skews the entire analysis, the district court also confused the issues by ill-defining the economic location of the requisite unfair competition acts. As noted earlier, *supra* n. 5, a defendant's false association or false advertising conduct under § 43(a) must occur in "commerce within the control of Congress." Such commerce is not limited to purchases and sales within the territorial limits of the United States as the district court seems to imply at times with regard to § 43(a) and § 14(3) claims. See J.A. 483, 506 (as to § 14(3), stating that "Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States"); J.A. 487 (as to § 43(a), stating that "Bayer failed to plead facts showing that it used the FLANAX mark in commerce in [the] United States"). Instead, as we explained in *International Bancorp*, Lanham Act "commerce" includes, among other things, "foreign trade" and is not limited to transactions solely within the borders of the United States. *Int'l Bancorp*, 329 F.3d at 364. Of course, any such "foreign trade" must satisfy the *Lexmark* "zone of interests" and "proximate cause" requirements to be cognizable for Lanham Act purposes.

infringement and unfair competition ... are identical.”); *Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., Inc.*, 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]o prevail under §§ 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition, respectively, a complainant must demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible trademark[.]”). However, none of these cases made that consideration the *ratio decidendi* of its holding or analyzed whether the statute in fact contains such a requirement. *See, e.g.*, 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, *Trademarks and Unfair Competition* § 29:4 (4th ed.2002) (observing that *International Bancorp* merely “assumed that to trigger Lanham Act § 43(a), the plaintiff’s mark must be ‘used in commerce’ ”). Moreover, all of these cases predate *Lexmark*, which provides the applicable Supreme Court precedent interpreting § 43(a). *See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.*, 983 F.2d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A decision by a panel of this court, or by the court sitting en banc, does not bind subsequent panels if the decision rests on authority that subsequently proves untenable.”).

Although the plaintiffs’ use of a mark in U.S. commerce was a fact in common in the foregoing cases, substantial precedent reflects that § 43(a) unfair competition claims come within the statute’s protectable zone of interests without the preconditions adopted by the district court and advanced by *Belmora*. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, § 43(a) “goes beyond trademark protection.” *Dastar Corp.*, 539 U.S. at 29. For example, a plaintiff whose mark has become generic—and therefore not protectable—may plead

an unfair competition claim against a competitor that uses that generic name and “fail[s] adequately to identify itself as distinct from the first organization” such that the name causes “confusion or a likelihood of confusion.” *Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found.*, 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989); *see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co.*, 305 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1938) (requiring the defendant to “use reasonable care to inform the public of the source of its product” even though the plaintiff’s “shredded wheat” mark was generic and therefore unprotectable); *Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.*, 163 U.S. 169, 203-04 (1896) (same, for “Singer” sewing machines).

Likewise, in a “reverse passing off” case, the plaintiff need not have used a mark in commerce to bring a § 43(a) action.<sup>7</sup> A reverse-passing-off plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) that the work at issue originated with the plaintiff; (2) that origin of the work was falsely designated by the defendant; (3) that the false designation of origin was likely to cause consumer confusion; and (4) that the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s false designation of origin.” *Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.*, 618 F.3d 417, 438 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, the plaintiff in a reverse passing off case must

---

<sup>7</sup> Reverse passing off occurs when a “producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his own,” in other words, when the defendant is selling the plaintiff’s goods and passing them off as originating with the defendant. *Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.*, 618 F.3d 417, 438 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Dastar Corp.*, 539 U.S. at 28 n. 1).

plead and prove only that the work “originated with” him—not that he used the work (which may or may not be associated with a mark) in U.S. commerce. *Id.*

The generic mark and reverse passing off cases illustrate that § 43(a) actions do not require, implicitly or otherwise, that a plaintiff have first used its own mark in United States commerce. If such a use were a condition precedent to bringing a § 43(a) action, the generic mark and reverse passing off cases could not exist.

In sum, the Lanham Act’s plain language contains no unstated requirement that a § 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim. The Supreme Court’s guidance in *Lexmark* does not allude to one, and our prior cases either only assumed or articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed. Thus, the district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon Bayer’s claims.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> A plaintiff who relies only on foreign commercial activity may face difficulty proving a cognizable false association injury under § 43(a). A few isolated consumers who confuse a mark with one seen abroad, based only on the presence of the mark on a product in this country and not other misleading conduct by the mark holder, would rarely seem to have a viable § 43(a) claim.

The story is different when a defendant, as alleged here, has—as a cornerstone of its business—intentionally passed off its goods in the United States as the same product commercially available in foreign markets in order to influence purchases by American consumers. *See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews*, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[E]vidence of intentional, direct

As Bayer is not barred from making a § 43(a) claim, the proper *Lexmark* inquiry is twofold. Did the alleged acts of unfair competition fall within the Lanham Act's protected zone of interests? And if so, did Bayer plead proximate causation of a cognizable injury? We examine the false association and false advertising claims in turn.

**b.**

**i.**

As to the zone of interests, *Lexmark* advises that “[m]ost of the [Lanham Act’s] enumerated purposes are relevant to false-association cases.” 134 S. Ct. at 1389. One such enumerated purpose is “making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” in “commerce within the control of Congress.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; *see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.*, 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Trademark law protects the public by making consumers confident that they can identify brands they prefer and can purchase those brands without being confused or misled.”). As pled, BCC’s false association claim advances that purpose.

---

copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary meaning sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant on that issue.”). Such an intentional deception can go a long way toward establishing likelihood of confusion. *See Blinded Veterans*, 872 F.2d at 1045 (“Intent to deceive ... retains potency; when present, it is probative evidence of a likelihood of confusion.”).



The complaint alleges Belmora's misleading association with BCC's FLANAX has caused BCC customers to buy the Belmora FLANAX in the United States instead of purchasing BCC's FLANAX in Mexico. For example, the complaint alleges that BCC invested heavily in promoting its FLANAX to Mexican citizens or Mexican-Americans in border areas.<sup>9</sup> Those consumers cross into the United States and may purchase Belmora FLANAX here before returning to Mexico. And Mexican-Americans may forego purchasing the FLANAX they know when they cross the border to visit Mexico because Belmora's

---

<sup>9</sup> Bayer alleges in its complaint that:

11. [BCC] has sold hundreds of millions of dollars of its FLANAX medicines in Mexico. This includes substantial sales in major cities near the U.S.-Mexico border.

12. [BCC] has spent millions of dollars promoting and advertising the FLANAX brand in Mexico, including in major cities near the U.S.-Mexico border.

13. As a result of [BCC's] extensive sales and marketing, the FLANAX brand is extremely well known in Mexico and to Mexican-American consumers in the United States.

....

30. Defendants have marketed Belmora's FLANAX products by targeting Hispanic consumers likely to be familiar with [BCC's] FLANAX products and deliberately attempting to deceive those consumers into believing that Belmora's FLANAX products are the same thing as the FLANAX medicines they know and trust from Mexico.

J.A. 156, 159 (Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, 30).

alleged deception led them to purchase the Belmora product in the United States.

In either circumstance, BCC loses sales revenue because Belmora's deceptive and misleading use of FLANAX conveys to consumers a false association with BCC's product. Further, by also deceiving distributors and vendors, Belmora makes its FLANAX more available to consumers, which would exacerbate BCC's losses. *See* J.A. 196 (stating in a brochure for distributors that "Flanax is now made in the U.S." and "acts as a powerful attraction for Latinos"); J.A. 410 (noting a distributor's concern that the product "is legal to sell in the US"). In each scenario, the economic activity would be "within the control of Congress" to regulate. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

We thus conclude that BCC has adequately pled a § 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong. Its allegations reflect the claim furthers the § 45 purpose of preventing "the deceptive and misleading use of marks" in "commerce within the control of Congress."

**ii.**

Turning to *Lexmark's* second prong, proximate cause, BCC has also alleged injuries that "are proximately caused by [Belmora's] violations of the [false association] statute." 134 S. Ct. at 1390. The complaint can fairly be read to allege "economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant's" conduct. *Id.* at 1391. As previously noted, BCC alleges "substantial sales in major cities near the U.S.-Mexico border" and "millions of dollars promoting and advertising" its

FLANAX brand in that region. J.A. 156 (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12). Thus, BCC may plausibly have been damaged by Belmora's alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark in at least two ways. As reflected in the zone of interests discussion, BCC FLANAX customers in Mexico near the border may be deceived into foregoing a FLANAX purchase in Mexico as they cross the border to shop and buy the Belmora product in the United States. Second, Belmora is alleged to have targeted Mexican-Americans in the United States who were already familiar with the FLANAX mark from their purchases from BCC in Mexico. We can reasonably infer that some subset of those customers would buy BCC's FLANAX upon their return travels to Mexico if not for the alleged deception by Belmora. Consequently, BCC meets the *Lexmark* pleading requirement as to proximate cause.

BCC may ultimately be unable to prove that Belmora's deception "cause[d] [these consumers] to withhold trade from [BCC]" in either circumstance, *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1391, but at the initial pleading stage we must draw all reasonable factual inferences in BCC's favor. *Priority Auto Grp.*, 757 F.3d at 139. Having done so, we hold BCC has sufficiently pled a § 43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The district court erred in holding otherwise.

**c.**

BCC and BHC both assert § 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claims against Belmora. BHC's claim represents a "typical" false advertising case: it falls within the Act's zone of interests by "protecting persons engaged in commerce within the control of

Congress against unfair competition.” *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). As a direct competitor to Belmora in the United States, BHC sufficiently alleges that Belmora engaged in Lanham Act unfair competition by using deceptive advertisements that capitalized on BCC’s goodwill. *See* J.A. 163 (Compl. ¶ 54) (asserting that Belmora was deceptive with “claims in their marketing materials and communications with distributors”); Appellees’ Br. 77 (acknowledging that “BHC is a competitor of Belmora’s in the United States naproxen sodium market” and “can in theory bring a false advertising action against a competitor”). If not for Belmora’s statements that its FLANAX was the same one known and trusted in Mexico, some of its consumers could very well have instead purchased BHC’s ALEVE brand. These lost customers likewise satisfy Lexmark’s second prong: they demonstrate an injury to sales or reputation proximately caused by Belmora’s alleged conduct.

BCC’s false advertising claim is perhaps not “typical” as BCC is a foreign entity without direct sales in the territorial United States. Nonetheless, BCC’s claim advances the Act’s purpose of “making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. As alleged, Belmora’s advertising misrepresents the nature of its FLANAX product in that Belmora implies that product is the same as consumers purchased in Mexico from BCC and can now buy here.

To be sure, BCC’s false advertising claim overlaps to some degree with its false association claim, but the two claims address distinct conduct

within the two subsections of § 43(a). Belmora’s alleged false statements go beyond mere claims of false association; they parlay the passed-off FLANAX mark into misleading statements about the product’s “nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin,” all hallmarks of a false advertising claim. Lanham Act 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B).<sup>10</sup>

Belmora’s alleged false statements intertwine closely with its use of the FLANAX mark. The FLANAX mark denotes history: Belmora claims its product has been “used [for] many, many years in Mexico” and “Latinos have turned to” it “[f]or generations.” J.A. 196. FLANAX also reflects popularity: Belmora says the product is “highly recognized [and] top-selling.” *Id.* And FLANAX signifies a history of quality: Belmora maintains that Latinos “know, trust and prefer” the product. *Id.* Each of these statements by Belmora thus directly relates to the “nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of its FLANAX as being one and the same as that of BCC. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Because these statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark, we are satisfied that BCC’s false advertising claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s zone of interests. As we can comfortably infer that the alleged advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, the

---

<sup>10</sup> Because each of these claims is anchored as a factual matter to the FLANAX mark’s history “in the Latino American market,” we disagree with Belmora’s argument that the statements amount to mere puffery. *See* J.A. 160.

claim also satisfies *Lexmark's* proximate cause prong (for the same reasons discussed above regarding the false association claim).

**d.**

We thus conclude that the Lanham Act permits Bayer to proceed with its claims under § 43(a)—BCC with its false association claim and both BCC and BHC with false advertising claims. It is worth noting, as the Supreme Court did in *Lexmark*, that “[a]lthough we conclude that [Bayer] has *alleged* an adequate basis to proceed under [§ 43(a) ], it cannot obtain relief without *evidence* of injury proximately caused by [Belmora’s alleged misconduct]. We hold only that [Bayer] is entitled to a chance to prove its case.” 134 S. Ct. at 1395.

In granting Bayer that chance, we are not concluding that BCC has any specific trademark rights to the FLANAX mark in the United States. Belmora owns that mark. But trademark rights do not include using the mark to deceive customers as a form of unfair competition, as is alleged here. Should Bayer prevail and prove its § 43(a) claims, an appropriate remedy might include directing Belmora to use the mark in a way that does not sow confusion. *See* Lanham Act § 34(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (authorizing injunctions based on “principles of equity”). Of course, the precise remedy would be a determination to be made by the district court in the first instance upon proper evidence.<sup>11</sup> We leave any

---

<sup>11</sup> For example, a remedy might include altering the font and color of the packaging or the “ready remedy” of attaching the manufacturer’s name to the brand name. *Blinded Veterans*,

potential remedy to the district court's discretion should this case reach that point. We only note that any remedy should take into account traditional trademark principles relating to Belmora's ownership of the mark.

### **B. Cancellation Under Section 14(3)**

The TTAB ordered the cancellation of Belmora's FLANAX trademark under § 14(3), finding that the preponderance of the evidence "readily establishe[d] blatant misuse of the FLANAX mark in a manner calculated to trade in the United States on the reputation and goodwill of petitioner's mark created by its use in Mexico." J.A. 142. In reversing that decision and granting Belmora's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court found that BCC, as the § 14(3) complainant, "lack[ed] standing to sue pursuant to *Lexmark* " under both the zone of interests and the proximate cause prongs. J.A. 505. The district court also reversed the TTAB's holding that Belmora was using FLANAX to misrepresent the source of its goods "because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States." J.A. 505-06.

---

872 F.2d at 1047. Another option could be for the packaging to display a disclaimer—to correct for any deliberately created actual confusion. *See id.* ("The district court could, however, require [Blinded American Veterans Foundation] to attach a prominent disclaimer to its name alerting the public that it is not the same organization as, and is not associated with, the Blinded Veterans Association.").

On appeal, Bayer argues that the district court erred in overturning the TTAB's § 14(3) decision because it "read a use requirement into the section that is simply not there." Appellants' Br. 49. For reasons that largely overlap with the preceding § 43(a) analysis, we agree with Bayer.

1.

Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act creates a procedure for petitioning to cancel the federal registration of a mark that the owner has used to misrepresent the source of goods:

A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may ... be filed as follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged ... by the registration of a mark ...

....

(3) At any time ... if the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.

Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). The petitioner must establish that the "registrant deliberately sought to pass off its goods as those of petitioner." *See 3 McCarthy*, § 20:30 (4th ed.2002).

If successful, the result of a § 14(3) petition "is the cancellation of a registration, not the cancellation of a trademark." *Id.* § 20:40. Cancellation of registration strips an owner of "important legal rights and benefits" that accompany federal registration, but it "does not invalidate underlying common law rights in the trademark." *Id.* § 20:68; *see*



also *B & B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.*, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015).

To determine what parties § 14(3) authorizes to petition for cancellation, we again apply the *Lexmark* framework. The relevant language in § 14(3) closely tracks similar language from § 43(a) that the Supreme Court considered in *Lexmark*: “[A]ny person who believes that he is or will be damaged” by the mark’s registration may petition for cancellation under § 14(3), just as “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” may bring an unfair competition action under § 43(a). The same two-prong inquiry from *Lexmark* provides the mode of analysis.

To determine if a petitioner falls within the protected zone of interests, we note that § 14(3) pertains to the same conduct targeted by § 43(a) false association actions—using marks so as to misrepresent the source of goods. Therefore, “[m]ost of the [Lanham Act’s] enumerated purposes are relevant” to § 14(3) claims as well. *See Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1389. As for proximate cause, we once again consider whether the plaintiff has “show[n] economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s [conduct].”<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

---

<sup>12</sup> The USPTO suggests that § 14(3) might require a lesser showing of causation because it sets forth an *administrative* remedy, whereas the Supreme Court based its *Lexmark* analysis on common law requirements for *judicial* remedies. *See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.*, 753 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“A petitioner is authorized by statute to seek cancellation of a mark where it has both a real interest in the proceedings as well as a reasonable basis for its belief of

at 1391. As with § 43(a), neither § 14(3) nor *Lexmark* mandate that the plaintiff have used the challenged mark in United States commerce as a condition precedent to its claim. *See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.*, 753 F.3d 1270, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In the proceedings before the Board, however, Cubatabaco need not own the mark to cancel the Registrations under [Section 14(3)].”).

## 2.

Applying the framework from *Lexmark*, we conclude that the Lanham Act authorizes BCC to bring its § 14(3) action against Belmora. BCC’s cancellation claim falls within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests because it confronts the “deceptive and misleading use of marks.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. And BCC has also adequately pled a proximately caused injury to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(c) motion for the same reasons previously discussed for the false association and false advertising claims. The district court thus erred in reversing the TTAB’s decision cancelling the registration of Belmora’s FLANAX mark.

## III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Bayer is entitled to bring its unfair competition claims under Lanham Act § 43(a) and its cancellation

---

damage.”). We need not resolve this issue for purposes of the current decision.

32a

claim under § 14(3). The district court's judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*VACATED AND REMANDED*

**APPENDIX B**

United States District Court,  
E.D. Virginia,  
Alexandria Division.  
BELMORA LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG & Bayer Healthcare  
LLC, Defendants-Consolidated Plaintiffs,

v.

Belmora, LLC, Jamie Belcastro, & Does 1-10,  
Inclusive, Consolidated Defendants.  
Case No. 1:14-cv-00847-GBL-JFA.

|

Signed Feb. 6, 2015.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

GERALD BRUCE LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Belmora LLC's ("Belmora") Motion to Dismiss Bayer Consumer Care AG and Bayer Healthcare's Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss Complaint") (Doc. 36), Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer CC AG's Counterclaim ("Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim") (Doc. 45), and Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 55). This case arises from Bayer Consumer Care AG and Bayer Healthcare's (collectively "Bayer") claims that Belmora's FLANAX trademark should be cancelled because Belmora deceives consumers into thinking that its FLANAX brand of pain relief medicine is the same FLANAX

brand under which Bayer has sold pain relief medicine in Mexico for decades. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) cancelled Belmora’s trademark. The parties seek review of that decision and bring additional causes of action.

There are six issues before the Court. The first issue is whether the Court should dismiss Count I of Bayer’s Complaint, alleging that Belmora violated Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), which prohibits the false designation of origin, because Bayer lacks standing to bring the statutory cause of action. The second issue is whether the Court should dismiss Count II of Bayer’s Complaint, alleging that Belmora violated Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), which prohibits false advertising, because Bayer lacks standing to bring the statutory cause of action. The third issue is whether the Court should dismiss Bayer’s California state law claims. The fourth issue is whether the Court should dismiss Bayer’s Article *6bis* counterclaim and affirm the TTAB’s dismissal of Bayer’s Article *6bis* claim because Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), which implements the Paris Convention, does not protect foreign mark owners beyond the protections already afforded by the Lanham Act. The fifth issue is whether the Court should grant Belmora’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and affirm the TTAB’s holding that Bayer had standing to bring a misrepresentation of source action under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), because Bayer is not within the class of plaintiffs Congress sought to protect under Section 14(3). The sixth issue is whether the Court should grant

Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and affirm the TTAB's holding that Belmora misrepresented the source of FLANAX under Section 14(3) because there is a use requirement in a misrepresentation of source action.

This may be a case of first impression which presents novel questions about the reach of the Lanham Act. Belmora's FLANAX, trademarked and sold in the United States, has a similar trade dress to Bayer's FLANAX and is marketed in a way that capitalizes on the goodwill of Bayer's FLANAX, which is trademarked and sold in Mexico. The Court has grappled with whether Belmora's FLANAX mark deceives the public in a manner prohibited by the Lanham Act. The issues in this case can be distilled into one single question: Does the Lanham Act allow the owner of a foreign mark that is not registered in the United States and further has never used the mark in United States commerce to assert priority rights over a mark that is registered in the United States by another party and used in United States commerce? The answer is no. Accordingly, the TTAB's decision cancelling the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark is REVERSED and Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim, and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are GRANTED.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Complaint for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false designation of origin claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act pursuant to *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 1377, (2014),

as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 43(a)(1)(A) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false advertising claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act as Bayer did not sufficiently plead an injury to commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's alleged misrepresentations as required by *Lexmark*. Furthermore, the Court DISMISSES Bayer's state law claims because they have no federal claim to attach to as both of the federal claims are dismissed.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim and AFFIRMS the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article *6bis* claim because Bayer's claim that it can bring an action under Article *6bis* against Belmora is implausible as the Paris Convention is not self-executing and Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and (h), do not make Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention a ground for contesting trademark registration.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Bayer had standing to seek cancellation of the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark under Section 14(3) because Bayer lacks standing to sue pursuant to *Lexmark* as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to

protect under Section 14(3) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent source because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.

### I. BACKGROUND

Belmora is a Virginia limited liability company formed in 2002. It is owned and operated by Jamie Belcastro. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9-10.) Belmora operates in the United States and sells over-the-counter pain relief products under the FLANAX brand name. (*Id.* ¶ 10.) FLANAX was originally an "analgesic tablet that contained naproxen sodium as its active ingredient," but the brand has since grown to encompass liniment and lozenges. (*Id.* ¶¶ 11-12.) On October 6, 2003, Belmora filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to register the FLANAX mark for the analgesic tablets. (*Id.* ¶ 13.) This application was published for opposition on August 3, 2004, and the PTO issued the registration for the FLANAX mark on February 1, 2005. (*Id.* ¶¶ 14-15.) Belmora has used the FLANAX mark in interstate commerce in the United States since March 1, 2004. (*Id.* ¶ 17.)

Bayer Consumer Care AG, a Swiss corporation, Bayer Healthcare LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and predecessors have sold analgesics in Mexico under the Mexican-registered trademark



FLANAX since the 1970s. Bayer Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 9, 14. Bayer does not possess a trademark for FLANAX in the United States. (*Id.* ¶¶ 26-31.) Bayer attempted to register FLANAX in the United States in 2004 but the PTO rejected the application based on Belmora's preexisting efforts to register the mark. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 32-36.) Bayer has sold hundreds of millions of dollars of FLANAX products in Mexico. Bayer Compl. ¶ 11. Bayer promotes FLANAX in Mexico, including in major cities near the United States-Mexico border, but has never marketed or sold FLANAX in the United States. (*Id.* ¶ 12; Doc. 35 ¶¶ 56-57.) Bayer has never received approval from the FDA through a New Drug Application to market or sell FLANAX in the United States. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 53-61.)

Belmora's early packaging of FLANAX was "virtually identical" to that of Bayer's FLANAX, including a similar color scheme, font size, and typeface.<sup>1</sup> Bayer Compl. ¶¶ 21-25. Belmora has since changed its packaging, but this modified scheme remains similar to that of Bayer's FLANAX. (*Id.* ¶ 26.) Belmora's marketing messages often suggested a historical connection between its FLANAX and Latino customers. (*Id.* ¶¶ 30-35.)

On June 29, 2007, Bayer petitioned the TTAB to cancel the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark. (Doc. 37 at 2.) After several years of litigation, on April 14, 2014, the TTAB issued a ruling canceling

---

<sup>1</sup> The TTAB found that Belmora copied the logo and trade dress of Bayer's FLANAX. See *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*11 (T.T.A.B. 2014).

Belmora's FLANAX registration pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146 (T.T.A.B. 2014). On June 3, 2014, Belmora filed a Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit with the TTAB; however, on June 13, 2014, Bayer filed its Notice of Election to Have Review by Civil Action with the TTAB. (Doc. 37 at 3-4.)

On June 6, 2014, Bayer sued Belmora in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora, LLC*, No. 3:14-cv-01395 (S.D. Cal.). Shortly thereafter, Bayer filed a notice of voluntary dismissal because "the case was filed in the wrong district." (Doc. 37 at 3 n. 2.) On June 9, 2014, Bayer refiled its complaint in the Central District of California. See *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora, LLC*, No. 2:14-cv-04433 (C.D. Cal.). On June 12, 2014, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued an order to show cause as to why the case should not be transferred either to the District of New Jersey or the Eastern District of Virginia. (Doc. 37 at 3-4.) The Central District of California case was eventually transferred and consolidated with the present action. (*Id.* at 4.)

## **II. DISCUSSION**

### **A. Standards of Review**

#### **1. Motion to Dismiss**

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move for dismissal by challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted where the plaintiff has failed to "state a plausible

claim for relief” under Rule 8(a). *Walters v. McMahan*, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). To be facially plausible, a claim must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville*, 708 F.3d 549, 554 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which if taken as true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “nudg[e] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” *Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co.*, 708 F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).

The requirement for plausibility does not mandate a showing of probability but merely that there is more than a possibility of the defendant’s unlawful acts. *Francis v. Giacomelli*, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678). As a result, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions” and “unadorned conclusory allegations” and requires some “factual enhancement” in order to be sufficient. *Id.* (citing *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678; *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557). In addition to the complaint, the court will also examine “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,” as well as those matters properly subject to judicial notice. *Clatterbuck*, 708 F.3d at 557 (citations omitted); *Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc.*, 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir.

2009) (quoting *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).

A court's Rule 12(b)(6) review involves separating factual allegations from legal conclusions. *Burnette v. Fahey*, 687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must give all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true. *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.*, 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Though a court must accept the truthfulness of all factual allegations, it does not have to accept the veracity of bare legal conclusions. *Burnette*, 687 F.3d at 180 (citing *Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc.*, 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011)).

A court must grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where a complaint fails to provide sufficient nonconclusory factual allegations to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference of the defendant's liability. *Giacomelli*, 588 F.3d at 196-97 (citing *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678-79; *Gooden v. Howard County*, 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).

## **2. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings**

Rule 12(c) provides that, "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c). "A Rule 12(c) motion tests only the sufficiency of the complaint and does not resolve the merits of the plaintiff's claims or any disputes of fact." *Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.*, 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing *Butler v. United States*, 702 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 2012)). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is

assessed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” *Occupy Columbia v. Haley*, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing *Edwards v. City of Goldsboro*, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. *See Massey v. Ojaniit*, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). However, a court is not required to “accept allegations that represent unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments, or that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing *Blankenship v. Manchin*, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2006)).

### **3. De Novo Review of TTAB Decision**

15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) “permits a party in a trademark suit to initiate a civil action in the place of an appeal of the TTAB’s determination to the Federal Circuit.” *Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC*, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014). “In a § 1071(b) action, the district court reviews the record de novo and acts as the finder of fact. The district court has authority independent of the PTO to grant or cancel registrations and to decide any related matters such as infringement and unfair competition claims.” *Id.* (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); *Durox Co. v. Duron Paint Mfg. Co.*, 320 F.2d 882, 883-84 (4th Cir. 1963)).

### **B. Analysis**

The Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss the false designation of origin claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue

under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), pursuant to *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 1377, (2014), as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 43(a)(1)(A) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false advertising claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), as Bayer did not sufficiently plead an injury to commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's alleged misrepresentations as required by *Lexmark*. Furthermore, the Court DISMISSES Bayer's state law claims because they have no federal claim to attach to as both of the federal claims are dismissed.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim and AFFIRMS the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article *6bis* claim because Bayer's claim that it can bring an action under Article *6bis* against Belmora is implausible as the Paris Convention is not self-executing and Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and (h), do not make Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention a ground for contesting trademark registration.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Bayer had standing to seek cancellation of the

registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), because Bayer lacks standing to sue pursuant to *Lexmark* as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 14(3) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent source because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.

*A. False Designation of Origin*

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false designation of origin claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The Supreme Court's decision in *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 1377, (2014), provides this Court with guidance in determining whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a claim under the Lanham Act. In *Lexmark*, supplier Static Control alleged that manufacturer Lexmark engaged in false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act. Static Control supplied remanufacturers with a microchip that allowed them to refurbish and resell Lexmark toner cartridges. *Id.* at 1383. Static Control claimed that Lexmark "disparaged its business and products by asserting that Static Control's business was illegal," and that it designed, manufactured, and sold microchips whose

only use/purpose was to refurbish Lexmark toner cartridges. *Id.* at 1393-94. The Court held that Static Control had standing because it “*alleged* an adequate basis to proceed under § 1125(a).” *Id.* at 1395 (emphasis in original). In so doing, the Court created a two-pronged test to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a statutory cause of action.

In *Lexmark*, the Supreme Court “establish[ed] the zone-of-interests test and proximate causality requirement as the proper analysis for analyzing standing to allege a claim under the Lanham Act.” *Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc.*, 773 F.3d 58, 64 (8th Cir. 2014). First, the plaintiff’s allegations must demonstrate that the plaintiff is in the statute’s zone of interests. Second, the complaint must allege injuries tying the harm suffered to the defendant’s conduct.

Under the zone-of-interests test, a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. This test is not “especially demanding.” *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When applying the zone of interests test, the plaintiff receives the “benefit of *any* doubt.” *Id.* (emphasis added). Furthermore, the zone-of-interests test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Lost sales and damage to business reputation are “injuries to precisely the sorts of commercial interests the [Lanham] Act



protects.” *Id.* at 1393; *see also Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co.*, 682 F.3d 292, 310 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co.*, 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e have reasoned that the archetypal injury contemplated by the Act is harm to the plaintiff’s ‘trade reputation in United States markets.’ ”)).

The proximate cause requirement requires a plaintiff bringing a claim under Section 43(a) to show “economic or reputational injury flowing directly” from the defendant’s alleged violation of the statute. *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1391. The Supreme Court identified injuries flowing from an audience’s belief in disparaging remarks and equating a product with an inferior product as examples of reputational harm. *Id.* at 1393 (citing *McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.*, 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (disparaging statements); *Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.*, 799 F.2d 6, 7-8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (equating with inferior product); *PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc.*, 746 F.2d 120, 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (same)); *see also PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.*, 639 F.3d 111, 127 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that a mailer deterring consumers from using a manufacturer’s product damaged the manufacturer’s reputation); *Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp.*, 618 F.3d 441, 453 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing *Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.*, 816 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987)) (“[P]laintiff’s reputation would suffer damage if the shirt appeared to be of poor quality.”).

### 1. Zone of Interests

The Court holds that Bayer’s interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to

protect under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because Bayer does not possess a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark in the United States. Whether a plaintiff comes within “the zone of interests” is an issue that requires the Court to interpret the statute to determine “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Section 43(a)(1)(A) imposes civil liability on:

[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, ... uses in commerce any word ... name ..., or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Congress described the purposes of the Lanham Act as follows:

The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception

in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.

Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The Supreme Court observed that “[m]ost of the enumerated purposes are relevant to false-association cases.”<sup>2</sup> *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1389. The Supreme Court has previously explained that the Lanham Act “provides *national protection of trademarks* in order to secure to *the owner of the mark* the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” *Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.*, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (emphasis added).

Congress, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court have all recognized that a key purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect the interests of those with a protectable interest in a mark. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1127; *Park ‘N Fly*, 469 U.S. at 198; *Am. Petroleum Inst. v.*

---

<sup>2</sup> In *Lexmark*, the Supreme Court referred to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) actions as “false association” cases. The Fourth Circuit refers to these actions as “false designation of origin” cases. *See, e.g., Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.*, 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010); *Lamparello v. Falwell*, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005). This Court follows the lead of our circuit and uses the term “false designation of origin.”

*Cooper*, 718 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 2013); *Mobil Oil Corp. v. Va. Gasoline Marketers & Auto. Repair Ass'n, Inc.*, 34 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, in order to prevail under a false designation of origin cause of action, the *trademark holder* must prove:

(1) that it *possesses a mark*; (2) that the [opposing party] used the mark; (3) that the [opposing party's] use of the mark occurred "in commerce"; (4) that the [opposing party] used the mark "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising" of goods or services; and (5) that the [opposing party] used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.

*Lamparello v. Falwell*, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); *Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va.*, 43 F.3d 922 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff must first prove it has a protectable mark in prevail in a Section 43(a) claim).

The Court holds that Bayer does not possess a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark. Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act protects "qualifying" unregistered trademarks. *Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.*, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 (explaining that the aim of the 1988 amendments to the Act was to extend the protections given to registered marks under Section 43(a) to unregistered marks). However, that unregistered mark must be used in commerce in the United States. *See Two Pesos*, 505 U.S. at 768 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127); *Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco*, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th

Cir. 2003); *Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc.*, 205 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, Bayer failed to plead facts showing that it used the FLANAX mark in commerce in United States. See Bayer Compl. ¶¶ 9, 43 (explaining that Bayer Consumer Care AG has a Mexican trademark for FLANAX); (Doc. 35 ¶ 26) (“Bayer admits that Bayer Healthcare LLC *does not own any trademark rights for the mark FLANAX in any country.*” (emphasis added)). Consequently, the Court holds that Bayer does not possess a protectable interest in the mark.

Possession of a protectable interest in a trademark is a dispositive issue in false designation of origin claims and Bayer lacks this key element. After reviewing Congress’ statutory pronouncement regarding the purposes of the Lanham Act, as well as both Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court case law analyzing the Act, the Court holds that Bayer is not “within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue under” Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), for false designation of origin because it does not own a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark in the United States. *Lexmark*, 134 S. Ct. at 1387. Because Bayer is not within the class of plaintiffs Congress sought to protect under Section 43(a)(1)(A), the Court holds that Bayer fails the zone-of-interests test.

## 2. Proximate Cause

Even if Bayer had satisfied the zone-of-interests test prong, the Court finds that Bayer failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that Belmora’s alleged violation of Section 43(a)(1)(A) was the proximate cause of Bayer’s economic or reputational injury.

a. *Economic Injury*

First, the Court finds that Bayer failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that Belmora's acts were the proximate cause of any economic injury. Although never explicitly stated in its Complaint, Bayer makes several allegations suggesting that it lost sales in the United States as it was not able to convert immigrating Mexican FLANAX consumers to American consumers of ALEVE, Bayer's American counterpart to its Mexican FLANAX brand. See, e.g., Bayer Compl. ¶¶ 14-17.

It must again be emphasized that a core purpose of the Lanham Act is to "help assure a trademark's owner that it will reap the financial and reputational rewards associated with having a desirable name or product." *Tire Eng'g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co.*, 682 F.3d 292, 310 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Bayer's argument that it suffered cognizable economic loss under the Lanham Act because it could not convert immigrating consumers from its Mexican-trademarked brand of FLANAX to its United States-trademarked brand of ALEVE would require the Court to extend Lanham Act protections to an international mark that was not used in United States commerce. Doing so would run contrary to the purposes of the Lanham Act as the economic losses the Lanham Act seeks to prevent are those emanating from infringement of a mark protected in the United States. See *id.*; *Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman*, 470 F.3d 162, 167 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2006); *Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco*, 329 F.3d 359, 363-66 (4th Cir. 2003) (affording Lanham Act

protections to a foreign mark that was used in United States commerce).

There are two exceptions to this general rule, neither of which have been adopted by the Fourth Circuit. First, there is the famous marks doctrine. In *De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc.*, the district court described the famous marks doctrine as follows:

The famous marks doctrine is a controversial common-law exception to the principle that the use of a mark overseas cannot form the basis for a holding of priority trademark use. Under the doctrine, a foreign mark is protectable despite its lack of use in the United States where the mark is so well known or famous as to give rise to a risk of consumer confusion if the mark is used subsequently by someone else in the domestic marketplace.

440 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has not yet recognized the famous marks doctrine and appears inclined to reject its application.<sup>3</sup> See *Int'l Bancorp*, 329 F.3d at 389 n. 9 (Motz, J., dissenting); *Maruti.com v. Maruti Udyog Ltd.*, 447 F. Supp. 2d 494, 500 (D. Md. 2006). Consequently, the Court holds that it does not apply.

---

<sup>3</sup> The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that has recognized the famous marks doctrine. See *Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.*, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).

Second, there is the diversion-of-sales theory. The diversion-of-sales theory allows extraterritorial conduct to be brought under the purview of the Lanham Act if courts find a significant effect on United States commerce as sales to foreign consumers may jeopardize the income of an American company. *See McBee v. Delica Co.*, 417 F.3d 107, 126 (1st Cir. 2005). The diversion-of-sales theory is inapplicable here because: (1) the Fourth Circuit has not recognized the diversion-of-sales theory; and (2) even if it did, Belmora is selling products under the FLANAX mark to consumers in the United States and not foreign consumers—thus the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act in that sense is not at issue.<sup>4</sup> *See Tire Eng'g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co.*, 682 F.3d 292, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2012).

Because neither exception to the general rule regarding the economic losses suffered by the person or entity with a protectable interest in a trademark applies, the Court expressly declines to find that the loss of potential sales to immigrating consumers is the type of economic loss recognized by the Lanham

---

<sup>4</sup> There are several instances where courts have considered sales diverted from American companies in foreign countries in determining whether American commerce was affected by alleged trademark infringement. *See, e.g., Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne*, 14 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994); *Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n*, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983). However, those cases are easily distinguished from this case as the plaintiffs there owned United States trademarks while Bayer does not. *See Totalplan*, 14 F.3d at 826; *Am. Rice*, 701 F.2d at 411.



Act as they are speculative. *See Natural Answers, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, 529 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (declaring as speculative allegations that defendant’s conduct “might” cause the value of plaintiff’s mark to weaken in the future if plaintiff were to reintroduce the mark into the market); *Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 497 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[S]ome indication of actual injury and causation is necessary to satisfy Lanham Act standing requirements and to ensure the plaintiff’s injury is not speculative.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); *Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine*, 318 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that speculative damages are not sufficient to state claim under Lanham Act), *overruled on other grounds by Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari*, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010); *Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc.*, 266 F.3d 164, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that alleged damages—“the profits that Joint Stock would have made if it had sold its vodka in the United States without using the Smirnov name and had not faced the defendants’ allegedly false designation of origin and false advertising”—were “extremely speculative” and were thus not cognizable under the Lanham Act). Accordingly, because Bayer did not plead sufficient facts showing that it suffered an economic loss cognizable under the Lanham Act, the Court finds that Bayer failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that Belmora’s acts were the proximate cause of any cognizable economic injury.

*b. Reputational Injury*

Second, the Court finds that Bayer failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that Belmora's acts were the proximate cause of any cognizable injury to its reputation. Mere confusion by itself does not amount to reputational injury—there must also be evidence of harm resulting from the use of the allegedly infringing product.<sup>5</sup> See *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC*, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the

---

<sup>5</sup> In trademark infringement cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that they have a valid and protectable trademark and that the defendant's use of a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" thereof creates a likelihood of confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); *Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC*, 739 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing *Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc.*, 130 F.3d 88, 91 (4th Cir. 1997)). In cases like this case, that confusion/likelihood of confusion exists is an inherent prerequisite in determining whether a party's reputation has been harmed. Indeed, it would be illogical for a mark holder to claim that its reputation was harmed by the acts of another business if there was not any potential confusion due to the use of the marks. See *Swatch*, 739 F.3d at 158 ("A likelihood of confusion exists between two marks if the defendant's actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services in question." (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

What *Haute Diggity Dog* and *Beacon Mutual* represent is the idea that for a court to find that a party's reputation has been harmed, there must be some showing of something about the alleged infringer's use of a mark other than confusion, be it blatantly negative or deleterious, such that a mark owner's business or reputation would be harmed as a result of such use.

reputation of LOUIS VUITTON's mark was harmed because there was no evidence that any dogs choked on a "Chewy Vuiton" toy made by alleged-infringer Haute Diggity Dog); *Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp.*, 376 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing that evidence of misdirected premium payments, claims forms, and communications on behalf of OneBeacon harm Beacon Mutual's reputation).

Bayer suggests that its reputation was harmed because Belmora's alleged deceptive marketing caused actual confusion among consumers. *See* Bayer Compl. ¶¶ 38-39, 43. In its Complaint, Bayer explained how Belmora's marketing strategy confused distributors, vendors, and others. For example, Bayer claimed that telemarketers hired by Belmora called potential distributors and suggested to them that Belmora's FLANAX products were the same as those offered by Bayer in Mexico. (*Id.* ¶ 33.) Furthermore, in a different marketing effort Belmora allegedly tried to link itself with Bayer's FLANAX by saying that Belmora's FLANAX was a brand that Latinos had turned to "for generations," and that "FLANAX acts as a powerful attraction for Latinos by providing them with products they know, trust, and prefer." (*Id.* ¶ 32.)

Despite these allegations of confusion, Bayer failed to plead sufficient facts showing any cognizable injury to its reputation resulting from Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Here, Bayer pleaded no facts showing harm analogous to the "choking dog" referenced in *Haute Diggity Dog*, or the evidence of misdirected premium payments and claims forms presented in *Beacon Mutual*. *See Haute Diggity Dog*,

*LLC*, 507 F.3d at 268; *Beacon Mut. Ins. Co.*, 376 F.3d at 17. Without more, mere confusion by itself does not constitute reputational injury.

Additionally, Bayer's contention that its reputation is harmed because it cannot control the quality of goods sold under the FLANAX brand demonstrates a fundamental misapprehension of the protections of the Lanham Act. In a classic trademark infringement case brought under a predecessor to the Lanham Act, Judge Learned Hand explained the idea that trademark law gives mark owners the right to control the quality of goods produced thereunder:

However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. *If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.* And so it has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful.

*Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson*, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (emphasis added). Courts have long since adhered to this doctrine and agree that the Lanham

Act protects the ability of *trademark holders* to control the quality of their goods. See *Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp.*, 618 F.3d 441, 455 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing *Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp.*, 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2009); *Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc.*, 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1991)). The Court finds that this doctrine is inapplicable here as the “quality control” injury is typically actionable as a trademark infringement claim. See *Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc.*, 43 F.3d 922, 939 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e have recognized that ... trademark infringement primarily represents an injury to reputation.”); see also, e.g., *Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods.*, 618 F.3d 441; *Shell Oil Co.*, 928 F.2d 104. Here, Bayer did not bring a trademark infringement claim, which includes a requirement that the plaintiff owns a valid mark. See *Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a); *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC*, 507 F.3d 252, 259 (4th Cir. 2007); *PETA v. Doughney*, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Thus, in order to assert its Lanham Act right to control the quality of its goods, Bayer must not only plead facts showing actual reputational injury under *Lexmark*, but Bayer must also show that it has a protectable interest in a mark. Here, the Court finds that Bayer did not plead facts sufficient to satisfy either requirement. Instead, Bayer simply asserted that there was confusion among consumers and vendors. That is not enough. Consequently, the Court finds that Bayer failed to sufficiently plead facts

showing that it suffered economic injury due to Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark.

3. *Bayer Lacks Standing to Sue Under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act*

The Court holds that Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), because it fails the zone-of-interests test and fails to meet the proximate cause requirement under *Lexmark*. Bayer fails the zone-of-interests test because its lack of a protectable mark renders it outside of the class of plaintiffs Congress sought to protect under Section 43(a)(1)(A). Bayer fails to meet the proximate cause requirement because it failed to sufficiently plead facts showing that it suffered economic or reputational injury resulting from Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Accordingly, because Bayer lacks standing to sue for false designation of origin under Section 43(a)(1)(A), Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false designation of origin claim must be GRANTED.

B. *False Advertising*

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss the false advertising claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), as Bayer did not sufficiently plead an injury to commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's alleged misrepresentations as required by *Lexmark*. The Lanham Act "creates a federal remedy 'that goes beyond trademark protection' " by allowing competitors to sue for false advertising. *POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.*, -- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014) (quoting

*Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003)). The Lanham Act imposes civil liability for false advertising on any person who:

uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities.

Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). However, “the private remedy may be invoked only by those who ‘allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.’ “ *POM Wonderful*, 134 S. Ct. at 2234 (quoting *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014)); see also *Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc.*, 365 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Lanham Act is a private remedy [for a] commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving that its commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor’s false advertising.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). As discussed above in the false designation of origin analysis (Part A), Bayer failed to sufficiently plead these elements. Accordingly, the Court holds that Bayer lacks standing to sue for false advertising under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), and Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss the false advertising claim must be GRANTED.

*C. Counts III-V: The California Claims*

The Court DISMISSES Bayer's state law claims because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction since the underlying federal claims are dismissed. Bayer's remaining claims are state law claims. Bayer alleges that Belmora violated the California Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.* (unfair competition) and § 17500 *et seq.* (false advertising), as well as California common law prohibiting unfair competition.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that a district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. *See Shanaghan v. Cahill*, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should consider "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." *Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill*, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (internal citations omitted). "When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, *as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain*, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case...." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Here, upon consideration of the *Cohill* factors, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Bayer's state law claims of unfair competition and false advertising. Since the Court dismisses Bayer's federal claims under Sections 43(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B), Bayer's state law claims cannot attach



to any federal claim. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Bayer's state law claims.

*D. Article 6bis Counterclaim*

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim and AFFIRMS the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article *6bis* claim because Bayer's claim is implausible as the Paris Convention is not self-executing and Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and (h), do not render Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention a ground for contesting trademark registration.

On June 29, 2007, Bayer petitioned the TTAB to cancel the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark registration. Belmora moved to dismiss Bayer's petition for cancellation, arguing that Bayer did not have standing to bring a claim under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), because it had made no use of the mark in commerce. On April 26, 2009, the TTAB issued an order granting the motion in part, and denying the motion in part. The motion was granted as to Bayer's Section 2(d), Article *6bis*, and fraud claims, and was denied as to the Section 14(3) claim.

Regarding the Article *6bis* claim, the TTAB held that Article *6bis* does not afford an independent cause of action for parties in TTAB proceedings. *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*2 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (citation omitted). The TTAB further held that Section 44 of the Lanham Act does not "provide the user of an assertedly famous foreign trademark with an independent basis for cancellation in a [TTAB] proceeding, absent the use of the mark in the United

States.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In its Answer to Belmora’s Complaint (Doc. 35), Bayer asserted a counterclaim seeking judicial review of the TTAB’s ruling on Belmora’s alleged violation of Article *6bis*.

The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property established “a Union for the protection of industrial property.” Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Sept. 5, 1970, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (“Paris Convention”). Under Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention, members must:

ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.

Paris Convention art. *6bis* (providing statutory basis for the “famous marks” or “world mark” exception/doctrine).

Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act is titled “Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is a party to convention or treaty,” and provides:

Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section *under the conditions expressed herein* to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, *in addition to* the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.

15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (emphasis added). Section 44(h) of the Lanham Act “Protection of foreign national against unfair competition,” and provides:

Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.

15 U.S.C. § 1126(h).

1. *The Paris Convention is Not Self-Executing*

First, the Court holds that Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention is not self-executing and that Congress implemented the Paris Convention by

enacting Section 44 of the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court “has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—while they constitute international law commitments—do not by themselves function as binding federal law.” *Medellin v. Texas*, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008). Although treaties “may comprise international commitments ... *they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.*” *Id.* at 505 (emphasis added) (quoting *Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States*, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also *Bond v. United States*, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014). A treaty may contain both self-executing and non-self-executing provisions. *ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC*, 685 F.3d 376, 387 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that some of the provisions of the Paris Convention dealing with patents are self-executing. See *Medellin*, 552 U.S. at 574. Other courts and scholars have found that the Paris Convention is not at all self-executing and was implemented by Congress with the enactment of Section 44 of the Lanham Act. See *In re Rath*, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Paris Convention is not a self-executing treaty and requires congressional implementation.”); *Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentísimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona*, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th Cir. 2003); *Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.*, 296 F.3d 894, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2002); *Int’l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc.*, 252 F.3d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2001); *BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre*

*Corp.*, 229 F.3d 254, 259 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2000); *Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A.*, 203 F.3d 116, 134 (2d Cir. 2000); *Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash*, 878 F.2d 659, 679 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The Paris Convention is the law in the United States by virtue of Article VI of the Constitution and is explicitly implemented by the Lanham Act in section 44(b)...”); *Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics*, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A.1973); Anne Gilson LaLonde, *Don’t I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used There*, 98 Trademark Rep. 1379, 1391-92 (2008). Based on the overwhelming weight of authority the Court similarly holds that Article 6bis of the Paris Convention is not self-executing and that Congress implemented the Paris Convention by enacting Section 44 of the Lanham Act.

2. *Article 6bis, Through Section 44 of the Lanham Act, Does Not Create an Independent Cause of Action*

Second, the Court holds that to the extent Congress implemented the Paris Convention, Article 6bis does not confer additional substantive rights to international mark holders through Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act because Congress did not explicitly implement Article 6bis when it enacted Section 44. The enactment of Section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris Convention into United States law but only “to provide foreign nationals with rights under United States law *which are coextensive* with the substantive provisions of the treaty involved.” *Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona*, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co.*, 958 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1992)); *see*

*Int'l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc.*, 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he rights articulated in the Paris Convention do not exceed the rights conferred by the Lanham Act”); *Maruti.com v. Maruti Udyog Ltd.*, 447 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (D.Md.2006). Bayer’s argument that its Mexican FLANAX mark should be afforded the protection of a “well-known” or “famous” mark<sup>6</sup> under Article 6bis has been rejected by the Fourth Circuit. See *Barcelona.com*, 330 F.3d at 628 (“[T]he Paris Convention creates nothing that even remotely resembles a ‘world mark’ or an ‘international registration.’” (citation omitted)). The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in *Punchgini. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini*, 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).

In *Punchgini*, ITC, an Indian corporation, began operating a restaurant in New Delhi, India, called “Bukhara” in 1977. *Id.* at 143. Bukhara acquired “a measure of international renown.” *Id.* ITC obtained a registered United States trademark for restaurant services for the Bukhara mark in 1987 and operated restaurants in the United States under that mark until 1997. *Id.*

In 1999, Punchgini, Inc. (“Punchgini”), opened a restaurant in New York City called “Bukhara Grill.” *Id.* at 144. After some success, Punchgini later opened a second restaurant in New York City. *Id.* It appeared that the Punchgini restaurants in New York City copied the Bukhara restaurants in New Delhi. See *id.* (“Quite apart from the obvious

---

<sup>6</sup> The Court shall refer to the doctrine describing this term as the “famous marks exception.”

similarity in name, defendants' restaurants mimic the ITC Bukharas' logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checked customer bibs.”).

In 2003, ITC sued Punchgini for unfair competition under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act. *Id.* at 145. Punchgini asserted that ITC had abandoned the Bukhara mark and filed a counterclaim seeking cancellation of ITC's registration of the mark. *Id.* The district court found that the defendants successfully established abandonment as a matter of law, “warranting both summary judgment in their favor and cancellation of ITC's registered mark.” *Id.* at 146. The Second Circuit affirmed. Rejecting the argument that the plain language of Sections 44(b) and (h) incorporated Article 6*bis* into the Lanham Act as a valid ground for cancellation, the court first discussed the territoriality principle. *Id.* at 154.

Under the territoriality principle, “trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.” *Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman*, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Explaining the territoriality principle, the Second Circuit in *Punchgini* noted that “United States trademark rights are acquired by, and dependent upon, priority of use.” 482 F.3d at 155; *see* 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration [arms the registrant with] prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the [registrant's] ownership of the mark, and of the [registrant's] exclusive right to use the registered mark....”). It follows that “absent some use of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark holder generally may not assert priority rights under

federal law, even if a United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use.” *Punchgini*, 482 F.3d at 156 (citing *Person’s Co. v. Christman*, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also *Paeteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C.V.*, No. CV 11-1623(RC), 69 F.Supp.3d 175, 201, 2014 WL 4759945, at \*12 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (“It also is a basic tenet of American trademark law that foreign use of a mark creates no cognizable right to use that mark within the United States.” (citation omitted)).

In *Punchgini* the Second Circuit went on to examine the language of Section 44 to determine Congress’ intent. The court held that Congress did not intend to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal law. *Punchgini*, 482 F.3d at 163. The court explained that “we do not ourselves discern in the plain language of sections 44(b) and (h) a clear Congressional intent to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal unfair competition law.” *Id.* The court looked to Congress’ amendments to the Lanham Act in an effort to ascertain congressional intent, stating that “Congress has not hesitated to amend the Lanham Act to effect its intent with respect to trademark protection, having done so thirty times since the statute took effect in 1947...” *Id.* at 164. The absence of a statutory provision incorporating either the famous mark doctrine or Article 6bis, as well as the long-standing territoriality principle, were important factors in the court holding that “Congress has not incorporated the substantive protections of the famous marks doctrine set forth in the Paris Convention Article 6bis ... into the relevant federal law...” *Id.* at 163-64, 172.



This Court similarly holds that Article *6bis* does not confer additional substantive rights to international mark holders through Sections 44(b) and (h) and that there is no cause of action under Article *6bis* because Congress has not acted to implement it through amendments or other statutory provisions. *See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.*, 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967) (finding that the Lanham Act did not allow for counsel fees because the original text did not provide for them, nor did any subsequent amendments to the statute); *cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (“When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of ‘origin.’”). Furthermore, this case is distinguishable from *The Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas*, 506 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2007).

One issue in *Last Best Beef* was whether Congress created an irreconcilable conflict between the Lanham Act and Section 206 of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006. *Id.* at 339. In holding that Congress had created such a conflict, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that Section 206, by its plain language, directly contradicted the Lanham Act as it prohibited one very specific phrase from being trademarked. *Id.* In upholding the challenged statute, the court found that Congress intended to enact a “discrete and narrow exception to the Lanham Act...” *Id.*

Although this case does not involve two irreconcilable statutes, *Last Best Beef* is still

instructive when looking at the scope of the exception being presented. Here, Bayer is asking the Court to infer, from uncertain terms in the Lanham Act, a declaration from Congress adopting the famous marks exception captured in Article 6bis, thus creating a cause of action therein. That exception is not the same type of “narrow and discrete” exception presented by the conflict between Section 206 and the Lanham Act in *Last Best Beef* See *id.* Instead it is an exception that would eviscerate the territoriality principle of trademark law; a principle that has been accepted by the Supreme Court for nearly one hundred years and remains essentially unassailable in each circuit court except for the Ninth Circuit. See *Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.*, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). Without a more definite statement from Congress, the Court declines to interpret the Lanham Act in that fashion. See *Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentísimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona*, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th Cir. 2003) (“It follows from incorporation of the doctrine of territoriality into United States law through Section 44 of the Lanham Act that United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights that exist only under foreign law.”); cf. J. Thomas McCarthy, *Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake*, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 49 (1996) (“These other circuits reasoned that if Congress really intended to make such a *far-reaching change* as to make a federal question of any and all acts of unfair competition in interstate commerce, *it would have done so in plain and unequivocal language*, which admittedly it did not do.” (emphasis added)).

Consequently, the protections provided by Article *6bis* remain coextensive with, not supplemental to, those of the Lanham Act. *See In re Rath*, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“... Congress generally intended section 44 of the Lanham Act to implement the Paris Convention. But this does not mean that Congress intended to do so in every respect or that it actually accomplished that objective in all respects....”). Again, such a stark departure from the well-established principle of territoriality would require a much clearer expression of congressional intent mandating such a departure than is present before the Court here. *See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc.*, 381 F.Supp.2d 324, 327 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“[T]he [territoriality] principle was long established before enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 and was already so basic to trademark law that it may be presumed to be implied in the Lanham Act.”); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:51 (4th ed.2014) (observing that in *A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel*, 260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923), the Supreme Court accepted the principle of “territoriality” and moved away from the principle of “universality” with trademarks). Accordingly, the Court holds that there is no cause of action under Article *6bis* because Congress has not acted to implement it.

### 3. *Bayer’s Counterclaim Must Be Dismissed*

The Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss Bayer’s Counterclaim AFFIRMS the TTAB’s dismissal of Bayer’s Article *6bis* claim because Bayer has failed to plead facts showing that its claim that Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act incorporate Article *6bis* is plausible. The Paris Convention is not

self-executing and Congress has not amended the Lanham Act to make Article *6bis* a ground for contesting a trademark registration. The lack of a legal foundation for such a claim renders it implausible. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim is GRANTED and the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article *6bis* claim is AFFIRMED.<sup>7</sup>

*E. Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings*

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Bayer had standing to seek cancellation of the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark under Section 14(3) because Bayer lacks standing to sue pursuant to *Lexmark* as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 14(3) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent source because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and

---

<sup>7</sup> Because the Court finds that there is no independent cause of action under Article *6bis*, the Court does not reach the parties' arguments concerning whether Bayer has sufficiently plead priority, or the requisite level of fame, prior to 2003.

Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.

Belmora moved the TTAB to dismiss Bayer's second amended petition, which sought, among other things the cancellation of the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark. On April 26, 2009, the TTAB issued an order granting the motion in part, and denying the motion in part. The motion was granted as to Bayer's Section 2(d), Article 6*bis*, and fraud claims, and was denied as to the Section 14(3) claim. Regarding the Section 14(3) claim, first the TTAB found that Bayer had standing to bring the claim because Bayer alleged injury stemming from Belmora's use of "strikingly similar packaging." *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*2 (T.T.A.B. 2014). Second, the TTAB found that Bayer had sufficiently pleaded the claim because Bayer "alleged clearly and specifically that respondent copied petitioner's mark, including its particular display, and virtually all elements of its packaging, in order to 'misrepresent to consumers, including especially consumers familiar with Petitioner's FLANAX mark,' that respondent's product is from the same source as petitioner's product." *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. *Bayer Does Not Have Standing to Assert a  
Misrepresentation of Source Claim*

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Bayer had standing to seek cancellation of the registration of Belmora's mark under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), because Bayer lacks standing to sue

pursuant to *Lexmark* as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 14(3) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark.

The TTAB cancelled Belmora's registration pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act. Section 14(3) provides, in pertinent part, that:

A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged, including as a result of dilution under section 1125(c), by the registration of a mark on the principal register established by this Act, or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905:

(3) ... if the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant *so as to misrepresent the source* of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used....

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (emphasis added). As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 1377, (2014), provides this Court with guidance in determining whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a misrepresentation of source claim under the Lanham Act. The TTAB's analysis of

standing did not apply *Lexmark*.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the Court conducts the standing analysis with the benefit of that decision.

The Court holds that Bayer fails the zone-of-interests-test as Bayer is not within the class of plaintiffs Congress sought to protect in the misrepresentation of source provision of the Lanham Act because Bayer never used the FLANAX mark in United States commerce. *See H.H. Scott, Inc. v. Annapolis Electroacoustic Corp.*, 195 F. Supp. 208 (D.Md.1961) (ruling in favor of plaintiff in misrepresentation of source action who possessed a mark and used it in commerce); *see also Willis v. Can't Stop Prods., Inc.*, 497 Fed. Appx. 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of misrepresentation of source claim because defendant “at all times owned the marks at issue”); *Hill Holliday Connors Cosmopolos, Inc. v. Greenfield*, 433 Fed. Appx. 207,

---

<sup>8</sup> The TTAB’s legal framework for standing analysis is set forth below:

“The Federal Circuit has enunciated a liberal threshold for determining standing. *Alcatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc.*, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d 1750, 1760 (T.T.A.B. 2013). To establish standing, petitioner must prove that it has a “real interest” in this cancellation proceeding and a “reasonable basis” for its belief in damage. To prove a “real interest” in this case, petitioner must show that it has a “direct and personal stake” in the outcome herein and is more than a “mere intermeddler.” *See Ritchie v. Simpson*, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”

*Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*9 (T.T.A.B. 2014).

218 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing *Gen. Healthcare Ltd. v. Qashat*, 364 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2004)) (finding that plaintiff “failed to establish the necessary factual predicate for his trademark-cancellation claim” because he had never used the challenged mark in commerce).<sup>9</sup> Second, for the reasons set forth earlier in this opinion, the Court holds that Bayer cannot meet the proximate cause requirement of *Lexmark*. Accordingly, the Court holds that Bayer lacks standing to pursue a misrepresentation of source claim under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), and that Belmora’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the TTAB’s decision regarding this claim must be GRANTED. The Court further holds that the TTAB’s holding as to Bayer’s standing to bring a Section 14(3) claim must be REVERSED.

*2. Section 14(3) Requires Use of the Mark in United States Commerce*

The Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB’s holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent source because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.

A party may, pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, petition to cancel a registration of a mark if the mark “is being used by, or with the

---

<sup>9</sup> See *infra* Part E(1) for a discussion of the inherent “use requirement” of Section 14(3).



permission of, the respondent so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.” 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). The term “misrepresentation of source,” as used in Section 14(3), “refers to situations where it is deliberately misrepresented by or with the consent of the respondent that goods and/or services originate from a manufacturer or other entity when in fact those goods and/or services originate from another party.” *Osterreichischer Molkerei-und Kasereiverband Registrierte GmbH v. Marks & Spencer Ltd.*, 203 U.S.P.Q. 793, 1979 WL 25355, at \*1 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (citation omitted); *see also Global Maschinen GmbH v. Global Banking Sys., Inc.*, 227 U.S.P.Q. 862, 864 n. 3, 1985 WL 71943, at \*2 n. 3 (T.T.A.B. 1985).

According to the TTAB, in order to prevail a petitioner must show that respondent took steps to deliberately pass off its goods as those of petitioner. That is, petitioner must establish “blatant misuse of the mark by respondent in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of petitioner.” *Otto Int’l Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH*, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1861, 1863, 2007 WL 1577524, at \*3 (T.T.A.B. 2007). *See generally* 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20:60 (4th ed. 2014); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., *Cancellation Under Section 14(3) for Registrant Misrepresentation of Source*, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 67 (1995). Thus, in reviewing the record, courts look for evidence reflecting respondent’s deliberate misrepresentation of the source of its product, “blatant misuse” of the mark, or conduct amounting to the deliberate passing-off of respondent’s goods. Willful use of a confusingly

similar mark is insufficient. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat'l Data Corp.*, 228 U.S.P.Q. 45, 47, 1985 WL 71955, at \*2-4 (T.T.A.B. 1985).

The parties dispute whether a Section 14(3) claim requires that petitioner bringing an action to cancel a registration actually use a trademark in commerce. Belmora argues that Section 14(3) imposes a trademark use requirement “because there cannot be a source represented without at least one trademark recognized by United States law.” (Doc. 56 at 11.) Bayer contends that use is not required because of the plain language of the statute and because such a reading is consistent with other provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of deceptive marks. (Doc. 64 at 4.) The Court finds that Section 14(3) contains a use requirement based on case law and a comparison of similar Lanham Act provisions.

The TTAB cited three cases in defining the rule for misrepresentation of source: (1) *Otto Int'l Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH*, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1861, 1863, 2007 WL 1577524, at \*3 (T.T.A.B. 2007); (2) *Global Maschinen GmbH v. Global Banking Sys., Inc.*, 227 U.S.P.Q.862, 864 n. 3, 1985 WL 71943, at \*2 n. 3 (T.T.A.B. 1985); and (3) *Osterreichischer Molkerei-und Kasereiverband Registrierte GmbH v. Marks & Spencer Ltd.*, 203 U.S.P.Q. 793, 794, 1979 WL 25355, at \*1 (T.T.A.B. 1979). See *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*10 (T.T.A.B. 2014). In *Otto Int'l*, the petitioner owned several marks and moved to cancel respondent's mark through a misrepresentation of source claim but the allegation was insufficiently plead as to “blatant misuse.” 2007 WL 1577524, at \*3 (citing *E.E.*

*Dickinson Co. v. T.N. Dickinson Co.*, 221 U.S.P.Q. 713, 715, 1984 WL 63740, at \*2-3 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (finding plaintiff had properly pleaded a claim of misrepresentation of source where it pleaded that registrant marked its goods in a way that imitated petitioner's mark)). In *Global*, the petitioner "established ownership rights in the mark" and the respondent's registration was cancelled on other grounds. 1985 WL 71943, at \*5. Ownership rights in a mark were present in two of the cases for misrepresentation of source and the TTAB was silent on whether the petitioner in *Marks & Spencer* owned or used a mark in commerce. See *Marks & Spencer*, 203 U.S.P.Q. 793, 1979 WL 25355.

Furthermore, Bayer's reliance on *Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.*, 753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for the idea that Section 1064(3) has no use requirement is misplaced because of the unique nature of that case. *Empresa* involved a dispute over the COHIBA mark between the Cuban company Cubatabaco, which owned the mark in Cuba, and the American company General Cigar, which owned the mark in the United States. *Id.* at 1271. One issue before the Federal Circuit was whether Cubatabaco had standing to initiate a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB. *Id.* at 1274. Reversing the TTAB, the Federal Circuit held that Cubatabaco had standing. See *id.* First, the court emphasized that 31 C.F.R. § 515.527 specifically authorizes Cuban entities to engage in transactions "related to the registration and renewal" of trademarks in the [PTO] and "may be relied on ... to petition to cancel a prior registration of a trademark where these actions relate to the protection of a

trademark in which Cuba or a Cuban national general license has an interest.” *Id.* at 1275 (citation omitted). The court further reasoned that this regulation, and the related proceedings at the TTAB, gave Cubatabaco a “legitimate commercial interest” in the COHIBA mark such that a finding of standing before the TTAB was appropriate. *Id.*

The existence of 31 C.F.R. § 515.527 renders *Empresa* easily distinguishable from this case as there is no regulatory or statutory pronouncement conferring standing upon plaintiffs who possess a foreign mark but do not use it in United States commerce like Bayer. Moreover, the Court finds that the regulation at issue in *Empresa* specifically confers standing on Cuban entities for matters at the PTO and the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”). *See* 31 C.F.R. § 515.527. Though the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in the *Empresa* case was silent on the issue of whether the regulation would similarly confer standing before an Article III tribunal, *see Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.*, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), a plain reading of its language leads this Court to find that § 515.527’s grant of standing is limited only to matters before the PTO and Copyright Office. *See Crespo v. Holder*, 631 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2011) (“When interpreting statutes we start with the plain language. It is well established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds that *Empresa* is not persuasive authority on this issue.

Belmora sought to distinguish Bayer's argument that Section 14(3) "imposes no use requirement" in two ways: (1) by pointing out that Bayer relied on Section 2(d), which unlike Section 14(3), explicitly requires domestic use of a mark, *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) ("Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned..."); and (2) stating that although Section 43(a)(1)(A) has no reference to use, in *Lamparello* the Fourth Circuit held that to establish a claim under that section a party must, among other things, prove that it "possesses a mark." (Doc. 56 at 11) (citing *Lamparello v. Falwell*, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005)). A further analysis of Section 43(a)(1)(A) is warranted.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> The Court must look to other statutes because of the sparse number of Section 14(3) actions brought in federal courts. "As a vehicle for canceling federal registrations, Section 14(3)'s misrepresentation of source prong has been invoked infrequently, much less successfully used." Theodore H. Davis, *Cancellation Under Section 14(3) for Registrant Misrepresentation of Source*, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 67, 88 (1995). This may be due, in part, to the expansion of the meaning of "origin" in Section 43(a) false designation of origin claim to include "*origin of source, sponsorship, or affiliation...*" J. Thomas McCarthy, *Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake*, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 58 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing *Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff*, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963)). As offered by McCarthy:

This seemingly simple new spin put on the word "origin" raised the curtain on a whole new chapter in federal unfair competition law. It heralded the

Section 43(a)(1)(A) prohibits false designations of origin and false descriptions. It provides that a civil action may be brought by:

[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person....

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Although not explicitly stated in the plain language of the statute, courts have consistently found that plaintiff's use of a trademark in United States commerce is a threshold element of any Section 43(a)(1)(A) claim.

---

beginning of a new dimension of section 43(a) as a vehicle to assert in federal court a traditional case of infringement of an unregistered mark, name, or trade dress.

McCarthy, *supra* at 58; *see, e.g., Vuitton Et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags*, 492 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (stating that Section 43(a) was enacted “to protect consumers and competitors alike against all forms of misdescription or misrepresentation of products and services in commerce”); Davis, *supra* at 86 (declaring that a “confused” body of case law has arisen from misrepresentation of source claims).

In *Punchgini*, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot be successful on a Section 43(a)(1)(A) claim without first demonstrating its “own right to use the mark” in question. 482 F.3d 135, 154 (2d Cir. 2007). Because ITC had abandoned its mark and Punchgini was thereafter using the Bukhara mark in United States commerce, the court found that ITC did not have a “priority right” to use the mark because it had abandoned the mark and thus could not succeed on a Section 43(a)(1)(A) claim.

In *International Bancorp*, the Fourth Circuit found that a foreign entity had a protectable interest in its foreign mark related to casino services and could thus bring a trademark infringement claim under Section 43(a) against a domestic actor because it used the mark in United States commerce when it advertised its foreign casino in the United States. *Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Société des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Étrangers a Monaco*, 329 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 2003); *see also Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp.*, 151 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that to receive protection under Section 43(a) a trademark must be used in commerce); *Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc.*, 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) (declaring that trademark infringement under Section 43(a) requires that plaintiff prove it has a protectable mark that is used in commerce).

These cases make it is clear to the Court that although Section 43(a)(1)(A), by its terms, does not require use of the mark, courts have consistently required a plaintiff to use the mark in United States commerce in order to state a claim under that statute.

“The intent of [the Lanham Act] is to regulate *commerce* within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce...” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). With that in mind, after comparing the language of Sections 14(3) and 43(a), and reviewing both TTAB decisions and case law, this Court finds it appropriate to read a use requirement into Section 14(3). Accordingly, because Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States, its Section 14(3) action must fail and Belmora’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to misrepresentation of source is GRANTED. Further, the TTAB’s holding as to misrepresentation of source must be REVERSED.

### III. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss the false designation of origin claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), pursuant to *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 1377, (2014), as Bayer’s interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 43(a)(1)(A) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora’s use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora’s Motion to Dismiss the false advertising claim because Bayer lacks standing to sue under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), as Bayer did not sufficiently plead an injury to commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by Belmora’s



alleged misrepresentations as required by *Lexmark*. Furthermore, the Court DISMISSES Bayer's state law claims because they have no federal claim to attach to as both of the federal claims are dismissed.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion to Dismiss Bayer's Counterclaim and AFFIRMS the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article *6bis* claim because Bayer's claim that it can bring an action under Article *6bis* against Belmora is implausible as the Paris Convention is not self-executing and Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and (h), do not make Article *6bis* of the Paris Convention a ground for contesting trademark registration.

The Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Bayer had standing to seek cancellation of the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), because Bayer lacks standing to sue pursuant to *Lexmark* as Bayer's interests do not fall within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect under Section 14(3) and Bayer did not sufficiently plead economic injury or an injury to business reputation proximately caused by Belmora's use of the FLANAX mark. Second, the Court GRANTS Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and REVERSES the TTAB's holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent source because Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.

The TTAB decision found that Belmora not only copied the logo and trade dress of Bayer's FLANAX, but also made statements inferring an association between Bayer's FLANAX and Belmora's FLANAX. *See Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 2014 WL 1679146, at \*11-12 (T.T.A.B. 2014) ("I'm with *Belmora LLC*, we're the direct producers of FLANAX in the US. FLANAX is a well-known medical product in the Latino American market, for FLANAX is sold successfully in Mexico, Centre [sic] and South America." (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The TTAB found that retail customers and consumers exposed to Belmora's statements "would draw the logical conclusion that [Belmora's] U.S. product is licensed or produced by the source of the same type of product sold under the FLANAX brand for decades south of the border." *Id.* at \*12 (citations omitted).

Assuming these facts to be true, the Court notes that Belmora applied to register the FLANAX mark in 2003. Bayer asserts that it has been using the FLANAX mark in Mexico since the 1970's. Bayer attempted to register FLANAX in the United States in 2004 but the PTO rejected the application based on Belmora's preexisting efforts to register the mark. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 32-36.) The PTO issued Belmora the registration for the FLANAX mark on February 1, 2005. By registering the FLANAX mark and using it in United States commerce, Belmora established priority rights over the mark. Bayer, an entity that possesses a foreign FLANAX mark but has never used that mark in United States commerce, cannot usurp these rights.

In sum, the Court holds that the Lanham Act does not permit Bayer, the owner of a foreign FLANAX mark that is not registered in the United States and further has never used the mark in United States commerce, to assert priority rights over Belmora's FLANAX mark that is registered in the United States and used in United States commerce. Though Belmora's practices may seem unfair, the Lanham Act "does not regulate all aspects of business morality." *Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc.*, 579 F.2d 75, 79 (C.C.P.A.1978). Consequently, the TTAB's decision cancelling the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark must be reversed.

Accordingly, it is hereby

**ORDERED** that Belmora LLC's Motion to Dismiss Bayer Consumer Care AG and Bayer Healthcare's Complaint (Doc. 36) is **GRANTED**; it is further

**ORDERED** that Belmora LLC's Motion to Dismiss Bayer CC AG's Counterclaim (Doc. 45) is **GRANTED** and that the TTAB's dismissal of Bayer's Article 6bis claim is **AFFIRMED**; it is further

**ORDERED** that Belmora's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 55) is **GRANTED** and that the TTAB's holdings that (1) Bayer had standing to bring a misrepresentation of source claim, and (2) that Belmora misrepresented the source of FLANAX under Section 14(3) are **REVERSED**; and it is further

**ORDERED** that the TTAB's April 17, 2014, decision cancelling the registration of Belmora's FLANAX mark, Registration No. 2924440, is

89a

**REVERSED and the mark is ORDERED to be reinstated.**

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

90a

**APPENDIX C**

THIS OPINION IS A  
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Hearing:

October 23, 2013

Mailed:

April 17, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND  
TRADEMARK OFFICE

---

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

---

*Bayer Consumer Care AG*

*v.*

*Belmora LLC*

---

Cancellation No. 92047741

---

Bradley L. Cohn, Phillip Barengolts, Alexis E. Payne, Ian J. Block, Scott T. Lonardo, Seth I. Appel, and Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger, Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, for Bayer Consumer Care AG.

Marsha G. Gentner, Philip L. O'Neill, and Leesa N. Weiss, Jacobson Holman PLLC, for Belmora LLC.

---

Before Seeherman, Taylor, and Hightower, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Hightower, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Bayer Consumer Care AG petitions to cancel Belmora LLC's registration for the mark FLANAX, in

standard characters, for “orally ingestible tablets of Naproxen Sodium for use as an analgesic” in International Class 5.<sup>1</sup> Petitioner alleges that the registered mark is being used by the respondent to misrepresent the source of the goods on or in connection with which the mark is used pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

We grant the petition to cancel.

#### Summary of Proceeding

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel on June 29, 2007,<sup>2</sup> asserting a likelihood of confusion. After respondent moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that petitioner had not properly alleged standing or prior use in the United States, petitioner amended its pleading to allege that its mark FLANAX had been used in the United States,<sup>3</sup> and respondent’s motion to dismiss was denied as moot.<sup>4</sup> In addition to a

---

<sup>1</sup> Registration No. 2924440, issued February 1, 2005. A declaration of use pursuant to Section 8 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058, was accepted December 16, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> This proceeding thus was not subject to the modified disclosure and conferencing regime applicable to inter partes proceedings commenced after November 1, 2007. *See* Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) § 401 (3d ed. rev. 2 June 2013).

<sup>3</sup> As discussed *infra*, petitioner has not used the FLANAX mark in the United States.

<sup>4</sup> Board Order of September 26, 2007, 10 TTABVUE. Citations to the record include the TTABVUE number of the public (and English-language) entry where available, and,

Section 2(d) claim, the amended petition also asserted as grounds for cancellation that the registration violated (1) Article 8 of the General Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection of Washington, 1929 (“Pan American Convention”), and (2) Article V of the Convention for the Protection of Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural Trademarks and Commercial Names of Santiago, 1923 (“Santiago Convention”). In lieu of a responsive pleading, respondent moved to dismiss the amended petition, again alleging that petitioner failed to state a claim and lacked standing. The Board granted respondent’s motion to dismiss but allowed petitioner time to replead.<sup>5</sup> Petitioner filed a second amended pleading.

For a third time, respondent moved to dismiss the amended petition for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Board granted the motion in part in the precedential decision *Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC*, 90 USPQ2d 1587 (TTAB 2009).<sup>6</sup> The four claims in the second amended petition, and their disposition, were as follows:

1. Likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d):  
Dismissed with prejudice for failure to allege that goods bearing petitioner’s FLANAX mark were manufactured or distributed in

---

where relevant, to the electronic page number where a cited document or testimony appears.

<sup>5</sup> Board Order of July 29, 2008, 17 TTABVUE.

<sup>6</sup> Board Order of April 6, 2009, 25 TTABVUE.

the United States prior to respondent's filing date by petitioner or on its behalf. *Id.* at 1591.

2. Violation of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"), as made applicable by Sections 44(b) and (h) of the Trademark Act: Dismissed with prejudice. The Board stated that Article 6bis does not afford an independent cause of action for parties in Board proceedings, and that Trademark Act Section 44 does not "provide the user of an assertedly famous foreign trademark with an independent basis for cancellation in a Board proceeding, absent use of the mark in the United States." *Id.*<sup>7</sup>

3. Misrepresentation of source under Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act: Motion to dismiss denied. The Board found that petitioner had "alleged clearly and specifically that respondent copied petitioner's mark, including its particular display, and virtually all elements of its packaging, in order to 'misrepresent to consumers, including especially consumers familiar with Petitioner's FLANAX mark,' that respondent's product is from the same source

---

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Fiat Group Automobiles S.p.A. v. ISM Inc.*, 94 USPQ2d 1111, 1115 (TTAB 2010) ("We must, however, at least recognize the possibility that, in an unusual case, activity outside the United States related to a mark could potentially result in the mark becoming well-known within the United States, even without any form of activity in the United States.").



as petitioner's product.” *Id.* at 1592. The claim was therefore sufficiently pled. Furthermore:

While respondent argues that petitioner does not have “standing” to bring a misrepresentation of source claim given its failure to allege use in the United States, petitioner has alleged that it is damaged by respondent’s use of strikingly similar packaging “to misrepresent the source of” respondent’s goods. This is enough to sufficiently allege petitioner’s standing in this proceeding. Although existing case law does not address whether petitioner’s alleged use is sufficient to support a claim of misrepresentation of source, we find that at a minimum the claim is pled sufficiently to allow petitioner to argue for the extension of existing law. Moreover, respondent’s focus solely on petitioner’s extra-territorial use fails to take account of the fact that respondent’s use is in the United States and to the extent such use may be misrepresenting to consumers making purchases in the United States that petitioner is the source of respondent’s products, the misrepresentation is alleged by petitioner to be occurring in the United States. The Lanham Act provides for the protection of consumers as well as the property rights of mark owners.

*Id.*

4. Fraud: Dismissed with prejudice. Because petitioner did not sufficiently allege prior use

of its mark in the United States, it also did not sufficiently allege that it had legal rights superior to respondent's; therefore, petitioner's claim that respondent falsely declared that no other person, firm, corporation, or association had the right to use the FLANAX mark in commerce was untenable. *Id.* at 1592-93.

Thus, after the Board's order of April 6, 2009, petitioner's only remaining claim was misrepresentation of source pursuant to Trademark Act Section 14(3).

Respondent filed an answer denying petitioner's allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses on June 5, 2009, then moved for summary judgment three months later, asserting that petitioner lacked standing and that respondent had not misrepresented the source of its products as a matter of law. The Board denied respondent's motion for summary judgment on petitioner's standing and granted petitioner's cross-motion for discovery pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f), deferring consideration of respondent's motion for summary judgment on the merits.<sup>8</sup> Respondent's motion for summary judgment on the merits of petitioner's misrepresentation of source claim was denied on January 10, 2011, and the parties proceeded to trial.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Board Order of February 2, 2010, 43 TTABVUE. The rule governing discovery in response to a summary judgment motion is now found at FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).

<sup>9</sup> Board Order of January 10, 2011, 60 TTABVUE. Discussion of various other discovery and trial motions not

The case is fully briefed, and an oral hearing was held on October 23, 2013.

Evidence and Objections

Each party has moved to strike evidence proffered by the other party. Because of the volume of objections, we address only the objections to the evidence on which the parties relied and that may be relevant to the claim before us. We also discuss only in general terms the portions of the record that the parties have submitted under seal and have not disclosed in their public briefs.

A. Respondent's Motion to Strike Exhibits to Petitioner's Notice of Reliance<sup>10</sup>

Respondent moves to strike Exhibit B, Parts I and II, to petitioner's notice of reliance, i.e., excerpts from the *Dictionary of Pharmaceutical Specialties of Mexico* and advertisements for Petitioner's FLANAX products from printed publications circulated in Mexico on the basis that they were not shown to be in general circulation in the United States, and also that the advertisements were insufficiently identified and may be made of record only through witness testimony.<sup>11</sup> Respondent's motion is denied. The

---

before us on final decision is omitted. Also, because respondent did not brief its affirmative defenses as such at trial, they are deemed waived. *See, e.g., Miller v. Miller*, 105 USPQ2d 1615, 1616 n.3 (TTAB 2013). However, to the extent they serve to amplify respondent's defense – including its assertion that petitioner lacks standing – they have been considered.

<sup>10</sup> 90 and 97 TTABVUE; Corrected Appendix 1 to Respondent's Brief, Exhibits A and B, 128 TTABVUE 7-21.

<sup>11</sup> 80 TTABVUE 216-37 and 238-46.

documents are admissible by notice of reliance pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(e), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e), for petitioner's stated purpose of showing the FLANAX mark and packaging in Mexico. In addition, the sources of the materials in Exhibit B, Part II are sufficiently identified.

B. Petitioner's Objections and Motion to Strike Respondent's Evidence<sup>12</sup>

1. Counter-Designations from Belcastro Deposition (Exhibit C to Respondent's Amended Notice of Reliance)<sup>13</sup>

Petitioner objects to respondent's proffered counter-designated excerpts from the discovery deposition of respondent's owner, Jamie Belcastro, on the ground that respondent has failed to sufficiently explain why it needs to rely on each additional excerpt. Respondent does not address its 26 non-consecutive pages of counter-designations individually, but states that they "are offered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(6), which allows an adverse party to offer other parts of a deposition that in fairness should be considered with the parts already introduced," to provide context to the "snippets" of testimony designated by petitioner.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> 115, 117, and 122 TTABVUE; Appendix to Petitioner's Brief, 125 TTABVUE; Appendix to Petitioner's Reply Brief, 132 TTABVUE.

<sup>13</sup> 112 TTABVUE 87-124. Respondent also filed an amended notice of reliance, without exhibits, on December 10, 2012. *See* 116 TTABVUE.

<sup>14</sup> Respondent's notice of reliance, 116 TTABVUE 4-6.

Petitioner's objection is governed by Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(4):<sup>15</sup>

If only part of a discovery deposition is submitted and made part of the record by a party, an adverse party may introduce under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition which should in fairness be considered so as to make not misleading what was offered by the submitting party. *A notice of reliance filed by an adverse party must be supported by a written statement explaining why the adverse party needs to rely upon each additional part listed in the adverse party's notice, failing which the Board, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional parts.* (emphasis added).

We agree with petitioner that respondent's blanket statements fail to explain why respondent needs to rely on each additional proffered excerpt. Nonetheless, in our discretion, we have reviewed the excerpts and find that each introduces new testimony rather than makes the testimony designated by petitioner not misleading. We therefore grant petitioner's motion to strike Exhibit C to respondent's notice of reliance.

2. Counter-Designations from Belcastro Declaration (Exhibit D to Respondent's Corrected Amended Notice of Reliance)<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Inter partes proceedings before the Board are governed, in part, by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as otherwise provided in the Trademark Rules of Practice. Trademark Rule 2.116(a).

Petitioner attempted to submit by notice of reliance portions of a declaration by respondent's owner in support of respondent's motion for summary judgment, arguing that these statements from Mr. Belcastro's declaration are admissible as statements by a party-opponent pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Declarations are not among the types of evidence admissible by notice of reliance. Trademark Rule 2.122(e). Respondent, however, did not object on this basis, but rather submitted the entire declaration with all exhibits as an exhibit to its own notice of reliance. Respondent argues that petitioner effectively consented to submission of the full declaration into evidence; failing that, respondent argues that the declaration is admissible in the interests of justice under the "residual" hearsay exception embodied in FED. R. EVID. 807(a).

Because both parties submitted (in whole or in part) Mr. Belcastro's declaration, we deem them to have stipulated the declaration into the record, and we hereby consider the entire declaration for whatever evidentiary value it may have and deny petitioner's motion to strike respondent's Exhibit D.

### 3. Testimony of Expert Witness Benjamin L. England<sup>17</sup>

Petitioner objects to the testimony deposition of Benjamin L. England, offered by respondent as an expert witness, because Mr. England was not timely disclosed and did not submit a written report.

---

<sup>16</sup> 111 TTABVUE 9-67 (redacted).

<sup>17</sup> 119-21 TTABVUE.

Although this case predates the Board's pretrial and expert witness disclosure requirements, petitioner's Interrogatory No. 20 sought disclosure of any expert on whose opinion respondent intended to rely pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A) and (B). Respondent responded during discovery that it "has not yet identified any expert witness that it expects to call to testify on its behalf."<sup>18</sup>

General discovery closed February 9, 2011. Respondent states that it "determined to elicit Mr. England's testimony only after reviewing the record following the close of Petitioner's testimony period" in response to petitioner's decision not to introduce a paragraph of the Belcastro Declaration.<sup>19</sup> However, petitioner's testimony period closed on October 14, 2012, and respondent did not identify Mr. England as a potential witness until November 28, 2012, approximately halfway through its testimony period.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, petitioner's notice of reliance introducing portions of the Belcastro Declaration was filed more than a year before respondent identified Mr. England, on August 24, 2011. We also point out

---

<sup>18</sup> Annex 1 to Petitioner's Brief, 124 TTABVUE 55 (redacted). It appears that respondent identified Mr. England in a supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 20 in the text of an email to petitioner on December 3, 2012, during respondent's testimony period. Appendix 1 to Respondent's Brief, 127 TTABVUE 51.

<sup>19</sup> Appendix 1 to Respondent's Brief, respondent's opposition to petitioner's objections to its evidence, at 1-2, 127 TTABVUE 3-4.

<sup>20</sup> England Transcript at 33:22-34:25, 119 TTABVUE 36-37.

that, although respondent states that it identified Mr. England “shortly after he was engaged,” Mr. England testified that he was contacted during the first or second week of November 2012 and agreed to testify shortly thereafter, well before he was identified on November 28.<sup>21</sup>

We find that respondent’s failure to promptly identify and disclose its expert witness and provide a written report was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and petitioner’s objection is sustained. We therefore strike the England testimony due to untimely disclosure pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). *See also* Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) § 414(7) (2d ed. rev. 2004)<sup>22</sup> (“A party need not, in advance of trial, specify in detail the evidence it intends to present, or identify the witnesses it intends to call, except that the names of expert witnesses intended to be called are discoverable.”); TBMP § 414(7) & n.13 (3d ed. rev. 2 June 2013) (“For proceedings commenced prior to November 1, 2007, a party need not, in advance of trial, identify the witnesses it intends to call, except that the names of expert witnesses intended to be called are discoverable.”). We point out, however, that the entire Belcastro Declaration has been admitted into evidence, obviating respondent’s rationale for the England testimony.

---

<sup>21</sup> This was the operative edition of the TBMP at the time this proceeding commenced.

<sup>22</sup> This was the operative edition of the TBMP at the time this proceeding commenced.



4. Cross-Examination Testimony of Pascal Bürgin<sup>23</sup>

We sustain petitioner's objections to cross-examination questions six through 57 and Exhibits A through E from the deposition on written questions of petitioner's witness Pascal Bürgin, on the ground that the cross-examination exceeded the scope of the direct examination pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 611(b).

5. Exhibits G and H to Respondent's Amended Notice of Reliance<sup>24</sup>

Finally, for the sake of completeness, we note that previous orders of the Board in the same proceeding (including respondent's Exhibit G) are automatically of record. Also, because the document in Exhibit H – displaying respondent's annotations to the operative pleading – is not admissible by notice of reliance, we grant petitioner's motion to strike it.

We hasten to add that consideration of any of the excluded evidence would not have affected the outcome.

C. Description of the Record

The file of the subject registration for FLANAX is automatically of record. Trademark Rule 2.122(b). Pursuant to the evidentiary rulings *supra*, a summary of the evidence made of record by the parties follows.

---

<sup>23</sup> 109 TTABVUE 9-24 (testimony) and 133-84 (exhibits) (redacted).

<sup>24</sup> 112 TTABVUE 159-77.

1. Petitioner's Evidence

Petitioner introduced testimony depositions, with exhibits, of the following six individuals:

- Karla Fernandez Parker, president and CEO of K. Fernandez & Associates, a Hispanic and multicultural marketing and advertising agency in San Antonio, Texas that did work for respondent in 2007;<sup>25</sup>
- Eduardo Gonzalez Machado, a former contractor for K. Fernandez & Associates who performed work for respondent;<sup>26</sup>
- Paul Currao, an account executive of packaging firm Disc Graphics, which produces cartons and labels for respondent;<sup>27</sup>
- Lisa Halprin Fleisher, former global brand director for petitioner's naproxen sodium brands, including FLANAX and ALEVE;<sup>28</sup>
- Pascal Bürgin, head of law and compliance for petitioner, who was deposed on written questions;<sup>29</sup> and
- Juan Jose Bandera, marketing director for Bayer de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> 78 TTABVUE.

<sup>26</sup> 94 TTABVUE.

<sup>27</sup> 99 TTABVUE (Exhibit 29 filed under seal at 100 TTABVUE 54).

<sup>28</sup> 91 TTABVUE.

<sup>29</sup> 106 and 109 TTABVUE. Mr. Bürgin's business address is in Basel, Switzerland.

<sup>30</sup> 92 TTABVUE (filed under seal).

Petitioner submitted the following evidence by notice of reliance:

- Publications showing the FLANAX mark and packaging in Mexico;<sup>31</sup>
- Printouts from the website of the Department of Homeland Security showing data on numbers of Mexican immigrants to the United States;<sup>32</sup>
- Printouts from websites accessible in the United States, including
- YouTube.com and Google.com, showing petitioner's FLANAX mark;<sup>33</sup>
- Excerpts from pharmacology reference books;<sup>34</sup>
- Printouts from the Aleve.com website and electronic records of the ALEVE trademark registration from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office database;<sup>35</sup>
- A copy of petitioner's second set of requests for admission and respondent's responses, admitting the authenticity of certain documents produced by respondent in response to petitioner's discovery

---

<sup>31</sup> Petitioner's Exhibit B, 80 TTABVUE 216-46.

<sup>32</sup> Exhibit C, 80 TTABVUE 247-75.

<sup>33</sup> Petitioner's Exhibit D, 80 TTABVUE 276 to 81 TTABVUE 69.

<sup>34</sup> Exhibit E, 81 TTABVUE 70-151.

<sup>35</sup> Petitioner's Exhibit F, 81 TTABVUE 152-65.

requests and identified as Exhibits 1 through 420;<sup>36</sup>

- Printouts from the electronic records of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office showing:
  - the current status and title of respondent's Registration No. 3094431 (DAYAMINERAL);<sup>37</sup>
  - the current status and title of respondent's Registration No. 2712285 (GOYA), and electronic records from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board concerning Goya Foods, Inc.'s petition to cancel that registration;<sup>38</sup> and
  - the current status and title of respondent's Registration No.

---

<sup>36</sup> Exhibit G, 84 TTABVUE 127 through 88 TTABVUE 102 (redacted). It should be noted that, although documents produced in response to document production requests generally cannot be made of record by notice of reliance, *see* Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(3)(ii), serving requests for admission as to the authenticity of the documents on the producing party, and then submitting those admissions by notice of reliance, is a proper way to make the documents of record. *See* TBMP § 704.11(1). We further note that the parties stipulated that these exhibits could be made of record during each party's testimony period by notice of reliance. Although petitioner could make the documents of record pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(3)(i) without such a stipulation because they were respondent's responses to petitioner's requests for admission, the stipulation also allowed respondent to submit the responses/documents, even if petitioner had elected not to submit them.

<sup>37</sup> Exhibit H(1), 82 TTABVUE 14-46.

<sup>38</sup> Exhibit H(3), 82 TTABVUE 55-99.

3243061 (ANA-DENT TODO  
DOLOR);<sup>39</sup>

- A Spanish-language printout from GrupoTeramed.com relating to the analgesic ANA-DENT;<sup>40</sup>
- Certain of respondent's responses to petitioner's interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production (the latter indicating that no documents responsive to those requests exist);<sup>41</sup>
- Documents showing respondent's FLANAX mark on its goods, including printouts from respondent's current and former websites (FlanaxUSA.com and ElMedicoFlanax.com, respectively) and Facebook page<sup>42</sup> and third-party websites showing respondent's FLANAX products offered for sale;<sup>43</sup>
- Excerpts from the discovery deposition of respondent's owner Jamie Belcastro, with exhibits and errata sheet;<sup>44</sup> and
- Excerpts from a declaration of Mr. Belcastro submitted with respondent's

---

<sup>39</sup> Exhibit H(4), 82 TTABVUE 100-43.

<sup>40</sup> Exhibit H(5), 82 TTABVUE 144-45.

<sup>41</sup> Exhibit "I," 88 TTABVUE 235 to 89 TTABVUE 12 (filed under seal).

<sup>42</sup> Exhibit J, 82 TTABVUE 201-39.

<sup>43</sup> Exhibit K, 82 TTABVUE 240-53.

<sup>44</sup> Exhibit L, 89 TTABVUE 76-173 (filed under seal; certain exhibits also at 82 TTABVUE 254-74).

reply in support of its motion for summary judgment on August 10, 2010.<sup>45</sup>

Petitioner also filed a supplemental notice of reliance containing (1) a certified copy of the file for Bayer's Mexican Trademark Registration No. 224,435 for FLANAX, admissible as an official record under Trademark Rule 2.122(e),<sup>46</sup> and (2) printouts from the website of Abbott Laboratories translated from Spanish to English identifying DAYAMINERAL as one of its products offered for sale outside the United States in the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean.<sup>47</sup>

## 2. Respondent's Evidence

Respondent made the following evidence of record by notice of reliance:

- Certain of petitioner's responses to respondent's interrogatories and requests for admission;<sup>48</sup>
- Declaration of Jamie Belcastro, with exhibits;<sup>49</sup> and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations regarding labeling of over-the-counter drugs.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Exhibit M, 89 TTABVUE 174-90 (redacted), the admissibility of which is discussed *supra*.

<sup>46</sup> Exhibit "O," 96 TTABVUE 5-208 (previously submitted as Exhibit A to petitioner's notice of reliance).

<sup>47</sup> Exhibit P, 96 TTABVUE 209-19.

<sup>48</sup> Exhibit A, 112 TTABVUE 10-61.

<sup>49</sup> Respondent's Exhibit D, 111 TTABVUE 9-67 (redacted), the admissibility of which is discussed *supra*.

Both parties also attempted to introduce samples of packaging for respondent's FLANAX products via notice of reliance. Although product packaging is not among the types of documents admissible by notice of reliance under Trademark Rule 2.122(e), because both parties treated such packaging as being of record, we deem the parties to have stipulated it into the record. We also note that examples of respondent's original and redesigned packaging are in evidence by other means, including as exhibits to the Belcastro Deposition and the Belcastro Declaration.

#### Parties

Respondent Belmora LLC was formed in 2002 by Virginia pharmacist Jamie Belcastro, its sole employee.<sup>51</sup> Its original product, and the one at issue in this case, is an analgesic tablet containing 220 mg. of naproxen sodium sold over the counter. Respondent began offering this product under the mark FLANAX in 2003 or 2004.<sup>52</sup> Mr. Belcastro states in part that:

---

<sup>50</sup> Respondent's Exhibit F, 112 TTABVUE 152-58.

<sup>51</sup> Exhibit L, Belcastro Transcript at 18, 89 TTABVUE 89; Exhibit M, Belcastro Decl. ¶ 9, 89 TTABVUE 178.

<sup>52</sup> The evidence in the trial record does not permit us to make a finding as to the date of first sale. Respondent's FLANAX Registration, No. 2924440, identifies the date of first use as on or before March 1, 2004. Some evidence, designated confidential, indicates that marketing began in 2003, while there is other evidence that sales started in "mid-2004." *See also* Respondent's Brief, 126 TTABVUE at 5 (first use in commerce was on or before March 1, 2004), 9 (respondent commenced use

Belmora's business model is to provide a user-friendly menu of OTC drug products for common ailments to U.S. residents of Hispanic background. When I refer to Hispanics, I mean persons in the U.S. whose personal or family backgrounds involve either a Spanish-speaking culture or a Spanish-speaking country.<sup>53</sup>

According to Mr. Belcastro, there are more than 48 million Hispanics in the United States, constituting the country's largest and most rapidly growing minority ethnic group.<sup>54</sup> Respondent's packaging is bilingual, in Spanish and English, and its original website ElMedicoFlanax.com was in Spanish.<sup>55</sup>

Petitioner Bayer Consumer Care AG owns a Mexican registration for the trademark FLANAX for pharmaceutical products, analgesics and antiinflammatories.<sup>56</sup> The registration issued to a company named Syntex in 1978 and was renewed November 9, 2003.<sup>57</sup> Syntex was purchased by

---

of the mark on March 1, 2004); *but see id.* at 4, 24, 25 (indicating that marketing and sales began in mid-2004).

<sup>53</sup> Exhibit M, Belcastro Decl. ¶ 10, 89 TTABVUE 179.

<sup>54</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 12, 89 TTABVUE 180.

<sup>55</sup> See Exhibit L, Belcastro Transcript at 21-22, 89 TTABVUE 90-91; *id.*, deposition exhibit 5, 82 TTABVUE 262-66; 82 TTABVUE 206-34 (website printouts).

<sup>56</sup> Bürgin Transcript ¶ 9 and Trial Exhibit 23, 106 TTABVUE 7, 31; *see also* Exhibit O, 96 TTABVUE 5-208.

<sup>57</sup> Bürgin Transcript, Trial Exhibit 23, 106 TTABVUE 38-39.



Hoffman-la Roche AG in 1994, and petitioner took over OTC businesses from Roche in 2005.<sup>58</sup> The FLANAX registration was assigned from Syntex to petitioner in September 2005.<sup>59</sup>

FLANAX brand analgesic has been sold in Mexico since 1976.<sup>60</sup> Bayer de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., distributes FLANAX products in Mexico via a licensing agreement with petitioner.<sup>61</sup> Sales and advertising figures are designated confidential, but petitioner presented evidence that FLANAX is the top-selling pain reliever in Mexico and the number one brand for Bayer de Mexico.<sup>62</sup> Although the dosages differ from respondent's FLANAX analgesic, petitioner's Mexican FLANAX contains the same active ingredient: naproxen sodium.

Petitioner's FLANAX analgesic is not sold in the United States. However, an affiliate of petitioner, Bayer Healthcare LLC, sells a naproxen sodium-based analgesic in the United States under the brand name ALEVE.<sup>63</sup> The same employee of Bayer Healthcare, based in Morristown, New Jersey, was,

---

<sup>58</sup> *Id.*, ¶¶ 10-11, 106 TTABVUE 7.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*, Trial Exhibit 23, 106 TTABVUE 41, 45.

<sup>60</sup> Bandera Transcript 8:8-9:3, 92 TTABVUE 12-13. Respondent's objections to this answer as hearsay and lacking foundation are denied.

<sup>61</sup> Bürgin Transcript ¶¶ 13, 19, 106 TTABVUE 7-8.

<sup>62</sup> Bandera Transcript 12:19-15:9, 92 TTABVUE 16-19; *see also* Petitioner's Brief at 7.

<sup>63</sup> *See* Petitioner's Brief at 9, 125 TTABVUE 14; Fleisher Transcript 4:15-5:23, 91 TTABVUE 7-8; Exhibit F, 81 TTABVUE 152-65.

until eight days before her deposition, global brand director for both the ALEVE product and the FLANAX product in Mexico.<sup>64</sup>

#### Analysis

Section 14 of the Trademark Act allows for cancellation of a registration on the Principal Register “by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the registration.” 15 U.S.C. § 1064. The party seeking cancellation must prove two elements: (1) that it has standing, and (2) that there are valid grounds for canceling the registration. *Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.*, 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

#### A. Petitioner’s Standing

The Federal Circuit has enunciated a liberal threshold for determining standing. *Alcatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc.*, 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1760 (TTAB 2013). To establish standing, petitioner must prove that it has a “real interest” in this cancellation proceeding and a “reasonable basis” for its belief in damage. To prove a “real interest” in this case, petitioner must show that it has a “direct and personal stake” in the outcome herein and is more than a “mere intermeddler.” *See Ritchie v. Simpson*, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Respondent has contested petitioner’s standing at every stage of this proceeding, including trial. In its brief, respondent makes several arguments why petitioner allegedly lacks standing to bring this

---

<sup>64</sup> Fleisher Transcript 7:25-8:24, 91 TTABVUE 11-12.

proceeding, grounded in the fact that petitioner does not own a registration for the mark FLANAX in the United States, has not used that mark in this country, and does not plan to use the mark here. Respondent argues that “[g]oodwill exists only in connection with actual commercial use, and Petitioner admits that it does not conduct business in or earn profits from sales in the U.S.”<sup>65</sup> Respondent contends that:

In short, the parties’ respective uses of the mark are two ships passing in the night: an international border completely walls off their respective spheres of economic activity, and neither party has any motive or intention to sell its product on both sides of that border. Thus, the territorial principle of U.S. trademark law is dispositive of standing: “Trademark rights under the Lanham Act arise solely out of use of the mark in U.S. commerce.” *Person’s Co. v. Christman*, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570, [14 USPQ2d 1477] (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).<sup>66</sup>

Petitioner, in turn, argues that Section 14 of the Trademark Act imposes no use requirement, distinguishing it (and other provisions of the Trademark Act) from Section 2(d).<sup>67</sup>

As we noted in both *Bayer Consumer Care AG*, 90 USPQ2d at 1592, and the Board’s Order of

---

<sup>65</sup> Respondent’s Brief at 15, 126 TTABVUE 23.

<sup>66</sup> *Id.*

<sup>67</sup> Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 8, 132 TTABVUE 11.

February 2, 2010, respondent's focus solely on *petitioner's* commercial activities within the United States overlooks the fact that *respondent's own use* is in the United States. Petitioner has established that it owns a registration for the mark FLANAX for pain relievers in Mexico and licenses its corporate affiliate to sell pain relievers containing the active ingredient naproxen sodium under that mark in Mexico. The registration petitioner seeks to cancel is for the identical mark for identical goods, namely, "Orally ingestible tablets of Naproxen Sodium for use as an analgesic." Thus, in terms of standing, petitioner has shown that it has an interest in protecting its Mexican FLANAX mark. If respondent is using the FLANAX mark in the United States to misrepresent to U.S. consumers the source of respondent's products as petitioner's Mexican products, it is petitioner who loses the ability to control its reputation and thus suffers damage. As we will explore in the next section, the record in this case clearly establishes that the reputation of the Mexican FLANAX mark does not stop at the Mexican border.<sup>68</sup> *Cf. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.*, 344 U.S. 280, 95 USPQ 391, 394 (1952) (stating that infringing goods bearing the BULOVA mark made in Mexico "could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's trade

---

<sup>68</sup> This case is thus distinguishable from *Person's Co.*, 14 USPQ2d 1477, on which respondent relies. In that case, the Japanese mark PERSON'S was neither used nor known in the United States: "The Person's Co. had no goodwill in the United States and the 'PERSON'S' mark had no reputation here." *Id.* at 1480.

reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as well as abroad”).

Petitioner therefore is no mere intermeddler, but has a real interest in this proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief that it is or will be damaged by the registration. Thus, it has satisfied the relatively low threshold to establish its standing. *See Cunningham*, 55 USPQ2d at 1844.

#### B. Misrepresentation of Source

A party may, pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act, petition to cancel a registration of a mark if the mark “is being used by, or with the permission of, the respondent so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.” The term “misrepresentation of source,” as used in Section 14(3), “refers to situations where it is deliberately misrepresented by or with the consent of the respondent that goods and/or services originate from a manufacturer or other entity when in fact those goods and/or services originate from another party.” *Osterreichischer Molkerei-und Kasereiverband Registrierte GmbH v. Marks & Spencer Ltd.*, 203 USPQ 793, 794 (TTAB 1979); *see also Global Maschinen GmbH v. Global Banking Sys., Inc.*, 227 USPQ 862, 864 n.3 (TTAB 1985).

In order to prevail, petitioner must show that respondent took steps to deliberately pass off its goods as those of petitioner. That is, petitioner must establish “blatant misuse of the mark by respondent in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of petitioner.” *Otto Int’l Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH*, 83 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2007). *See*

*generally* 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20:60 (4th ed. 2014); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., *Cancellation under Section 14(3) for Registrant Misrepresentation of Source*, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 67 (Jan.-Feb. 1995). Thus, in reviewing the record, we look for evidence reflecting respondent's deliberate misrepresentation of the source of its product, "blatant misuse" of the mark, or conduct amounting to the deliberate passing-off of respondent's goods. Willful use of a confusingly similar mark is insufficient. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat'l Data Corp.*, 228 USPQ 45, 47 (TTAB 1985).

Although the facts before us present a matter of first impression, they do not present a close case. The preponderance of the evidence before us readily establishes blatant misuse of the FLANAX mark in a manner calculated to trade in the United States on the reputation and goodwill of petitioner's mark created by its use in Mexico.

First, we find that respondent was aware that the FLANAX trademark was in use in Mexico in association with naproxen sodium-based analgesics when it adopted the FLANAX mark in the United States. Although most of the facts and arguments on which this finding is based are designated confidential by respondent, the evidence establishes that Mr. Belcastro asked a graphic designer to create the following document just two months before his discovery deposition on August 18, 2009—when respondent had been using the FLANAX mark for

more than five years—and testified untruthfully about its genesis and role in his adoption of the mark:<sup>69</sup>



---

<sup>69</sup> Exhibit L, Belcastro Transcript Exhibit 4, 82 TTABVUE 261. Mr. Belcastro attempted to significantly alter some of the statements in his six-page errata sheet. Such material changes are impermissible in a testimony deposition before the Board. TBMP § 701.03(n). This, however, was a discovery deposition. Although some courts do not allow witnesses to change their transcripts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) to directly contradict their examination testimony on material matters, others do, preferably with the original answers remaining in the record. See 8A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2118 (3d ed. April 2013). Assuming without deciding that we would allow substantive changes to a discovery deposition transcript, we find Mr. Belcastro's explanations of these misstatements in the errata so lacking in credibility that they only serve to strengthen the conclusion that his discovery deposition testimony was untruthful.

In relevant part, Mr. Belcastro's e-mail instructions to the graphic designer on June 17, 2009 were as follows:<sup>70</sup>

Subject: Urgent Request

---

Hi Dan

I am giving a presentation on Tuesday and I need a piece of artwork as follows. One pdf file that shows the current Flanax word as it appears in our packaging on the bottom of the file and show it evolving into the word Further Lasting Analgesia Naproxen on the top of the pdf file. Stick with our normal blues and whites and fonts. Don't put your identifiers on the file since I am using it in a presentation.

So it should be something like this:

Further Lasting Analgesia Naproxen

FLANAP

FLANCXEN

FLANXEN

FLANAX

Just show derivatives of the word Flanax from the slogan on the top so it covers a normal page in a pdf file and show different formats and fonts with each derivate.

Please contact me on my cell if you have questions.

Sincerely,

---

<sup>70</sup> Exhibit L, 82 TTABVUE 274.



Jamie Belcastro  
Belmora LLC

Based on this fabricated evidence and additional facts and argument designated as confidential, we find that respondent knowingly selected the identical mark FLANAX, used by petitioner's Mexican licensee on naproxen sodium-based painkillers, for use in the United States on the same type of goods.

Second, the evidence establishes that respondent's initial packaging copied petitioner's FLANAX logo as used in Mexico (demonstrated *supra* and *infra*, with white letters progressing from thick to thin) and other elements of petitioner's Mexican packaging. These include very similar (if not identical) shades of sky blue and blue-and-white striping along the bottom, approximately as follows, with petitioner's packaging on the left and respondent's on the right.



Respondent's packaging changed in 2008,<sup>71</sup> but it continued to use the FLANAX mark in the same manner, as shown below:



Respondent thus adopted petitioner's identical source-identifying mark and log, and a highly similar package design.

Third, perhaps the most important and telling fact that distinguishes this case from a Section 2(d) claim, the evidence shows that respondent's owner and agents repeatedly invoked the reputation of petitioner's FLANAX mark when marketing respondent's FLANAX product in the United States. Although nearly all of this evidence was filed under seal, the following three examples filed publicly on the TTABVUE website are representative:

- A brochure in both English and Spanish, with a bullet point titled "*Increase Your Profits*" that states: "For generations, Flanax has been a brand that Latinos have turned to for various common

---

<sup>71</sup> Respondent's Exhibit D, Belcastro Decl. ¶ 7, 111 TTABVUE 53.

ailments. Now you too can profit from this highly recognized top-selling brand among Latinos. Flanax is now made in the U.S. and continues to show record sales growth everywhere it is sold. Flanax acts as a powerful attraction for Latinos by providing them with products they know, trust and prefer.”<sup>72</sup>

- A telemarketing script prepared by Mr. Belcastro stating in part: “I’m with *Belmora LLC*, we’re the direct producers of FLANAX in the US. FLANAX is a very well known medical product in the Latino American market, for FLANAX is sold successfully in Mexico, Centre [sic] and South America.”<sup>73</sup>
- A “sell sheet” often used to solicit orders from retailers, stating in part: “Flanax products have been used from [sic] many, many years in Mexico, Central and South America. Flanax products are now being produced in the United States by Belmora LLC.”<sup>74</sup>

While respondent argues that these statements are true, we have no doubt that retail customers and consumers exposed to them would draw the logical conclusion that respondent’s U.S. product is licensed or produced by the source of the same type of product

---

<sup>72</sup> Exhibit L, Exhibits 23 and 24 to Belcastro Transcript, 82 TTABVUE 269-70. Although the text of this exhibit appears to contain no references to respondent, other versions (filed under seal) do, including to “Belmora, LLC Proud Makers of Flanax.”

<sup>73</sup> Exhibit M, Belcastro Declaration ¶ 30, 82 TTABVUE 285.

<sup>74</sup> See *id.*, Belcastro Declaration ¶ 33, 82 TTABVUE 286.

sold under the FLANAX brand for decades south of the border. *Cf. West Fla. Seafood Inc. v. Jet Rests. Inc.*, 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ2d 1660, 1663 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating, with respect to establishing prior use, that evidence should be considered as a whole, “as if each piece of evidence were part of a puzzle”); *All England Lawn Tennis Club (Wimbledon) Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, Inc.*, 220 USPQ 1069, 1072 (TTAB 1983) (sustaining Section 2(d) refusal for the



following composite mark: concluding that “purchasers of applicant’s cologne would incorrectly believe that said product was approved by or otherwise associated with the Wimbledon tennis championships”). Nor do we have any doubt based on the record that respondent deliberately and intentionally encouraged its customers to reach such a conclusion. These documents thus operate as an admission by respondent that petitioner’s mark FLANAX is known among the U.S. retailers and Hispanic consumers to whom respondent markets its products. With their repeated references to the “brand” Flanax, these documents also undercut respondent’s argument that FLANAX is generic for naproxen sodium in Mexico,<sup>75</sup> as too does petitioner’s Mexican trademark registration.

---

<sup>75</sup> See argument in Respondent’s Brief at 26, 126 TTABVUE 34: “Flanax” in this context is like “aspirin” (which started out as a trademark) or ibuprofen – it identifies for those

Respondent's statements are consistent with the observations of Eduardo Gonzalez Machado, a contractor with the K. Fernandez & Associates advertising agency who researched opinions of distributors on respondent's behalf in 2007. Mr. Gonzalez Machado testified that the distributors he interviewed were familiar with petitioner's FLANAX brand and aware of its popularity in Mexico.<sup>76</sup> When queried on cross-examination whether any distributors asked him "Who's Belmora?" Mr. Gonzalez Machado testified: "I don't remember getting a question. I think that the – what immediately made the connection was the word Flanax."<sup>77</sup> In fact, one of his questions for the distributors was: "When you visit a new store owner, are they familiar with the brand and with how popular the brand is in Mexico?"<sup>78</sup> As Mr. Gonzalez Machado testified:

A. And I also remember saying to myself what a very interesting situation [respondent] has, because apparently this is [a] fantastic product and to get the – to be able to sell this in the United States for the Hispanic market.

---

who previously may have been exposed to it outside the U.S., a type of pain relief product as distinct from other types of analgesics.

<sup>76</sup> See Gonzalez Machado Transcript 33:5-17, 36:12-24 and Exhibits 9-11, 94 TTABVUE 36, 39, 116-20.

<sup>77</sup> Gonzalez Machado Transcript 73:7-14, 94 TTABVUE 76.

<sup>78</sup> Trial Exhibit 10 to Gonzalez Machado Transcript, 94 TTABVUE 118.

You have to remember right now we're 50,000,000 people in the United States Hispanics, and 60 percent – over 60 percent of those are from Mexico. Mexican descent. So the potential is huge for any product that relates to Mexico [ ] and that is known by Mexicans.<sup>79</sup>

Respondent argues that because it did not use the name “Bayer” on its packaging or in its marketing efforts, and because its own name “Belmora” was present on its packaging and used in its marketing, it could not have misrepresented the source of its products. We disagree. In denying respondent’s motion for summary judgment, the Board found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether respondent’s self-identification on its packaging was sufficient to defeat petitioner’s misrepresentation of source claim, explaining:

Indeed, in applying other sections of the Act, even where there are clear disclaimers of nonaffiliation, courts often find that confusion or deception is nevertheless likely. *See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato*, 469 F.3d 534, 81 USPQ2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 2006); *Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.*, 290 F.3d 578, 62 USPQ2d 1757, 1770 (3d Cir. 2002); *Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distributions, Inc.*, 832 F.2d 1317, 4 USPQ2d 1778, 1784 (2d Cir. 1987); *University of*

---

<sup>79</sup> Gonzalez Machado Transcript 17:9-20, 94 TTABVUE 20.

*Georgia Athletic Ass'n v. Laite*, 756 F.2d 1535, 225 USPQ 1122, 1131 (11th Cir. 1985). Here, of course, and by contrast, there is only a self identification in relatively small print, without any disclaimer of affiliation with petitioner, and respondent cites no authority for the proposition that self-identification alone is necessarily sufficient to defeat a misrepresentation of source claim in circumstances such as these.<sup>80</sup>

“The function of a trademark is to identify a single, albeit anonymous, source of commercial sponsorship of the goods to which it pertains.” *Johnson & Johnson v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 181 USPQ 790, 791 (TTAB 1974). Respondent therefore need not use the Bayer name to affirmatively misrepresent the source of its FLANAX-brand products. Respondent purposely achieved the same result by not only copying petitioner’s mark and logo – and, for several years, significant aspects of its packaging – but also by repeatedly holding itself out as the source in the United States of the product sold for decades under the same mark in the bordering country of Mexico. We find that respondent’s specific acts and conduct were “aimed at deceiving the public into thinking that [respondent’s] goods actually emanate from petitioner.” *Otto Int’l Inc.*, 83 USPQ2d at 1864.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Board Order of January 10, 2011, at 7 n.3, 60 TTABVUE 7.

<sup>81</sup> We further note that courts have found that, in certain circumstances, use of a defendant’s own name or mark can lead

We have carefully considered all of respondent's arguments and specifically address two others. First, respondent contends that petitioner's claim of misrepresentation was "stale" because respondent changed its packaging shortly before petitioner amended its petition for cancellation to add a misrepresentation of source claim, and also because its marketing is now handled by a third-party distributor. Respondent cites no case law in support of its staleness argument. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) defines a "stale claim" as: "A claim that is barred by the statute of limitations or the defense of laches." The facts of this case do not fall under that definition; neither is at

---

consumers to believe that the defendant is either the successor to or the licensee of the senior mark owner. *See Jacobs v. Beecham*, 221 U.S. 263, 272 (1911) (Holmes, J.) ("The statement that the defendant makes [the pills defendant sells using plaintiff's name] does not save the fraud. That is not what the public would notice or is intended to notice, and, if it did, its natural interpretation would be that the defendant had bought the original bus[*i*]ness out and was carrying it on. It would be unfair, even if we could assume, as we cannot, that the defendant uses the plaintiff's formula for his pills."); *A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.*, 470 F.2d 689, 176 USPQ 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.) (noting that use of trade name or house mark on box "does not save the day; a purchaser could well think plaintiff had licensed defendant as a second user and the addition is thus 'an aggravation, and not a justification'" (quoting *Menendez v. Holt*, 128 U.S. 514, 521 (1888))). We think customers could draw the same conclusions here, and note in particular that respondent's marketing material clearly contemplates, and seeks to capitalize on, its targeted consumers' familiarity with and recognition of petitioner's well-known brand in Mexico.



issue here. In addition, we agree with petitioner that because its misrepresentation claim arises from the same conduct as its earlier claim under Section 2(d), respondent had adequate notice of petitioner's objection to its conduct, and the misrepresentation claim relates back to the date of the original pleading, citing *Korody-Colyer Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 828 F.2d 1572, 4 USPQ2d 1203, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In any event, we do not view respondent's continued use of the copied packaging as essential to petitioner's misrepresentation claim. For at least four years, respondent marketed its product in a similar package while deliberately misrepresenting its analgesic as the U.S. version of petitioner's foreign FLANAX product. Respondent built its business on this heritage of misrepresentation, and petitioner suffers damage today due to respondent's continued use of the identical FLANAX mark on the same type of product, even though its packaging and marketing may have changed.

Finally, respondent argues that its marketing efforts to link its FLANAX product to petitioner's FLANAX product continued only for a limited number of years: "To be sure, in the beginning limited efforts were made to market to native Spanish speaking U.S. consumers who might have been exposed to 'Flanax' in Mexico."<sup>82</sup> Yet the evidence does not support a finding that respondent's misleading marketing was limited or short-lived. The trial record includes numerous instances of respondent's founder, Mr. Belcastro, as well as his

---

<sup>82</sup> Respondent's Brief at 26, 126 TTABVUE 34.

agents, deliberately invoking the reputation of petitioner's foreign product to sell his own goods domestically under the same mark during the 2006-2009 time frame. The record contains insufficient evidence from which we could conclude that respondent did not make such misrepresentations in its marketing before or after these years.<sup>83</sup> Even if respondent did not, its continued use of the FLANAX mark, coupled with its earlier deceptive marketing over several years as it built its business, constitutes misrepresentation of the source of respondent's goods within the meaning of Section 14(3).

#### Conclusion

Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act, we find that respondent is using the mark FLANAX so as to misrepresent the source of the goods on which the mark is used.

*Decision:* The petition to cancel is granted. Registration No. 2924440 will be cancelled in due course.

---

<sup>83</sup> In 2007, after this proceeding was filed, Mr. Belcastro donated the computer used in his business to charity, and therefore petitioner was prevented from obtaining any requested documents that resided only on that computer. *See* Board Order of February 16, 2010 at 4 n.3, 45 TTABVUE 5 (noting that respondent does not dispute that, "after petitioner initiated this proceeding, Mr. Belcastro donated an old computer containing relevant information to charity and deleted certain apparently relevant e-mails").

**APPENDIX D**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

---

No. 15-1335

(1:14-cv-00847-GBL-JFA)

---

BELMORA LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG, a Swiss corporation;  
Bayer Healthcare LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability  
Company, Defendants-Consolidated Plaintiffs-  
Appellants,

v.

Belmora LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability Company;  
Jamie Belcastro, an individual; Does, 1-10, inclusive,  
Consolidated Defendants-Appellees,

and

Michelle K. Lee, Undersecretary for Intellectual  
Property and Director of the United States Patent  
and Trademark Office (Director), Intervenor.

---

**ORDER**

---

The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court denies the petition for rehearing en banc.

For the Court

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

**APPENDIX E**

**RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS**

**Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1064, provides:**

**§ 1064 CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION**

A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged, including as a result of a likelihood of dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title, by the registration of a mark on the principal register established by this chapter, or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905:

...

(3) At any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or is functional, or has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 1054 of this title or of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 1052 of this title for a registration under this chapter, or contrary to similar prohibitory provisions of such prior Acts for a registration under such Acts, or if the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used. If the registered mark becomes the generic name for less than all of the goods or services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel the registration for only those goods or services may be filed. A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the

generic name of goods or services solely because such mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.

**Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, provides:**

**§1125 FALSE DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN, FALSE DESCRIPTIONS, AND DILUTION FORBIDDEN**

(a) Civil action

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

(2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.

(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.