

# The adventures of a Suricate in eBPF land

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# What is Suricata

- IDS and IPS engine
- Get it here:  
<http://www.suricata-ids.org>
- Open Source (GPLv2)
- Initially publicly funded now funded by consortium members
- Run by Open Information Security Foundation (OISF)
- More information about OISF at  
<http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/>



# Suricata Features

- High performance, scalable through multi threading
- Advanced Protocol handling
  - Protocol recognition
  - Protocol analysis: field extraction, filtering keywords
  - Transaction logging in extensible JSON format
- File identification, extraction, on the fly MD5 calculation
  - HTTP
  - SMTP
- TLS handshake analysis, detect/prevent things like Diginotar
- Lua scripting for detection
- Hardware acceleration support:
  - Endace
  - Napatech,
  - CUDA
  - PF\_RING

# A typical signature example

## Signature example: Chat facebook

```
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any \
(
  msg:"ET CHAT Facebook Chat about netdev"; \
  flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; \
  content:"/ajax/chat/send.php"; http_uri; content:"facebook.com"; http_host; \
  content:"netdev"; http_client_body; \
  reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/POLICY/POLICY_Facebook_Chat; \
  sid:2010784; rev:4; \
)
```

This signature tests:

- The HTTP method: *POST*
- The page: */ajax/chat/send.php*
- The domain: *facebook.com*
- The body content: *netdev*

# No passthrough

## All signatures are inspected

- Different from a firewall
- More than 15000 signatures in standard rulesets

## Optimization on detection engine

- Tree pre filtering approach to limit the set of signatures to test
- Multi pattern matching on some buffers

# CPU intensive

1	[             100.0%]	5	[     ]	26.5%]	9	[         88.7%]	13	[     ]	35.3%]		
2	[             100.0%]	6	[     ]	18.8%]	10	[         62.9%]	14	[     ]	22.4%]		
3	[     19.7%]	7	[     ]	27.2%]	11	[         58.2%]	15	[     ]	14.9%]		
4	[     35.6%]	8	[     ]	33.8%]	12	[     30.6%]	16	[     ]	23.8%]		
Mem	[             25891/64403MB]	Tasks: 43, 31 thr; 11 running									
Swp	[     50/33377MB]	Load average: 7.40 7.24 7.32									
Uptime: 82 days, 23:13:26											
PID	USER	PRI	NI	VIRT	RES	SHR	S	CPU%	MEM%	TIME+	Command
13679	root	20	0	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	710.	35.7	69h08:07	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13741	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	102.	35.7	6h32:22	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13749	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	90.9	35.7	4h02:18	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13758	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	70.7	35.7	10h00:47	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13750	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	63.3	35.7	3h40:08	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13751	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	57.9	35.7	3h20:58	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13744	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	35.7	35.7	3h22:16	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13753	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	33.7	35.7	3h14:37	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13748	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	33.0	35.7	3h11:43	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13742	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	31.7	35.7	3h37:38	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13752	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	29.6	35.7	3h44:17	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13756	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	25.6	35.7	3h33:02	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13747	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	25.6	35.7	3h10:13	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13745	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	24.9	35.7	3h18:05	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13754	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	22.2	35.7	3h15:22	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13746	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	20.9	35.7	3h19:41	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13755	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	18.9	35.7	3h21:57	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13743	root	18	-2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	R	18.9	35.7	3h12:16	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13760	root	22	2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	2.7	35.7	31:04.81	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya
13761	root	22	2	34.6G	22.4G	5211M	S	2.7	35.7	27:38.31	/usr/local/bin/suricata -c /etc/suricata/regit-ya

# Perf top

Samples: 691K of event 'cycles', Event count (approx.): 256764876818

Overhead	Shared Object	Symbol
64.14%	suricata	[.] SCACSearch
3.20%	suricata	[.] BoyerMoore
1.16%	suricata	[.] SigMatchSignatures
0.90%	libc-2.19.so	[.] memset
0.87%	[kernel]	[k] ixgbe_clean_rx_irq
0.75%	suricata	[.] IPOnlyMatchPacket
0.68%	libpthread-2.19.so	[.] pthread_mutex_unlock
0.64%	[kernel]	[k] __netif_receive_skb_core
0.62%	libpthread-2.19.so	[.] pthread_mutex_lock
0.62%	suricata	[.] AFPReadFromRing
0.61%	[kernel]	[k] irq_entries_start
0.58%	[kernel]	[k] tpacket_rcv
0.55%	libc-2.19.so	[.] __memcmp_sse4_1
0.52%	[kernel]	[k] memcpy
0.42%	[kernel]	[k] ixgbe_poll
0.42%	[kernel]	[k] menu_select
0.40%	suricata	[.] StreamTcpPacket
0.36%	[kernel]	[k] native_write_msr_safe
0.35%	[kernel]	[k] packet_lookup_frame.isra.56

- Bandwidth per core is limited
  - From 150Mb/s
  - To 500Mb/s
- Scaling
  - Using RSS
  - Splitting load on workers


## Linux raw socket

- Raw packet capture method
- Socket based or mmap based

## Fanout mode

- Load balancing over multiple sockets
- Multiple load balancing functions
  - Flow based
  - CPU based
  - RSS based
  - eBPF based

# Suricata workers mode



# Load balancing and hash symmetry


## Stream reconstruction

- Using packets sniffed from network
- to reconstruct TCP stream as seen by remote application

## Non symmetrical hash break

- Out of order packets

## Effect of non symmetrical hash



# Broken symmetry

## History

- T. Herbert introduce asymmetrical hash function in flow
  - Kernel 4.2
- Users did start to complain
- And our quest did begin
- Fixed in 4.6 and pushed to stable by David S. Miller

## Intel NIC RSS hash

- XL510 hash is not symmetrical
- XL710 could be symmetrical
  - Hardware is capable
  - Driver does not allow it
  - Patch proposed by Victor Julien

## Userspace to the rescue

- Program your own hash function in userspace
- Available since Linux 4.3
- Developed by Willem de Bruijn
- Using eBPF infrastructure by Alexei Storovoitov

## eBPF cinematic

- Syscall to load the BPF code in kernel
- Setsockopt to set returned fd as cluster BPF

# The big flow problem

## Ring buffer overrun

- Limited sized ring buffer
- Overrun cause packets loss
- that cause streaming malfunction

## Bypassing big flow

- Limiting treatment time at maximum
- Stopping it earlier as possible
  - local bypass: Suricata limit handling
  - capture bypass: interaction with lower layer

## Attacks characteristic

- In most cases attack is done at start of TCP session
- Generation of requests prior to attack is not common
- Multiple requests are often not even possible on same TCP session

## Stream reassembly depth

- Suricata reassemble TCP sessions till `stream.reassembly.depth` bytes.
- Stream is not analyzed once limit is reached

# Introducing bypass

## Principle

- No need to get packet from kernel after stream depth is reached
- If there is
  - no file store
  - or other operation

## Usage

Set `stream.bypass` option to `yes` in Suricata config file to bypass

# Selective bypass

## Ignore some traffic

- Ignore intensive traffic like Netflix
- Can be done independently of stream depth
- Can be done using generic or custom signatures

## The bypass keyword

- A new `bypass` signature keyword
- Trigger bypass when signature match
- Example of signature

```
alert http any any -> any any (content:"netdevconf.org"; \\
    http_host; bypass; sid:6666; rev:1;)
```

## Suricata update

- Add callback function
- Capture method register itself and provide a callback
- Suricata calls callback when it wants to offload

## Coded for NFQ

- Update capture register function
- Written callback function
  - Set a mark with respect to a mask on packet
  - Mark is set on packet when issuing the verdict

# And now AF\_PACKET

## What's needed

- Suricata to tell kernel to ignore flows
- Kernel system able to
  - Maintain a list of flow entries
  - Discard packets belonging to flows in the list
  - Update from userspace
- nftables is too late even in ingress

## eBPF filter using maps

- eBPF introduce maps
- Different data structures
  - Hash, array, ...
  - Update and fetch from userspace
- Looks good!

## Handling code

- Need to generate code
- Load code
- Address code from Suricata

## Interact with code

- Add elements in hash table
- Query elements
- Delete elements

## From C file to eBPF code

- Write C code
- Use eBPF LLVM backend (since LLVM 3.7)
- Get ELF file
- Extract and load section in kernel

## A complete framework

- Instrument eBPF filter
- Multi language
  - Python
  - Lua
  - C++
- Transparent handling of kernel interaction

## Cinematic

- eBPF C code is a side file or integrated into code
- C code is dynamically built when script is started
- It is injected to kernel
- Post processing is done

# Importing mechanism

- Syscall to load the object inside kernel
- A file descriptor is returned
- It can be used by setsockopt to define the cluster using provided fd

## Initial version

- LLVM backend
- Using libelf to load object

## Time saver

- Debug message from kernel eBPF code
- `bpt_trace_printk()` function
- `cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace`

# AF\_PACKET bypass

## Logic is the same

- Using eBPF filter this time
- Syscall to load eBPF
- Linking via setsockopt
- Need to use a eBPF map of type hash

## Here comes the map

- Map is used by kernel and userspace
- eBPF file can't contain absolute reference
- Maps must be created by userspace
- Relocation must be done in ELF file

**Game Over**

# Switch to libbpf

## Library from tools/lib/bpf

- Provide high level function to load eBPF elf file
- Create maps for user
- Do the relocation

## Sample usage

```
struct bpf_object *bpfobj = bpf_object__open(path);
bpf_object__load(bpfobj);
pfd = bpf_program__fd(bpfprog);
/* store the map in our array */
bpf_map__for_each(map, bpfobj) {
    map_array[last].fd = bpf_map__fd(map);
    map_array[last].name = strdup(bpf_map__name(map));
    last++;
}
```

NETWORKING

# Libbpf implementation

## libbpf is work in progress

- Not network ready
- Missing a few filter types
- Missing functions to interact

## Patchset in progress

- Cleaning of initially proposed code
- Adding missing features

# Kernel code and exchange structure

```
struct pair {
    uint64_t time;
    uint64_t packets;
    uint64_t bytes;
};

struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") flow_table_v4 = {
    .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH,
    .key_size = sizeof(struct flowv4_keys),
    .value_size = sizeof(struct pair),
    .max_entries = 32768,
};

value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&flow_table_v4, &tuple);
if (value) {
    __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->packets, 1);
    __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->bytes, skb->len);
    value->time = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
    return 0;
}
return -1;
```

- Data is updated with stats
- Getting last flow activity time allow Suricata to handle timeout

# Userspace code

```
struct flowv4_keys {
    __be32 src;
    __be32 dst;
    union {
        __be32 ports;
        __be16 port16[2];
    };
    __u32 ip_proto;
};

while (bpf_get_next_key(mapfd, &key, &next_key) == 0) {
    bpf_lookup_elem(mapfd, &key, &value);
    clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &curtime);
    if (curtime->tv_sec * 1000000000 - value.time > BYPASSED_FLOW_TIMEOUT) {
        flowstats->count++;
        flowstats->packets += value.packets;
        flowstats->bytes += value.bytes;
        bpf_delete_elem(fd, key);
    }
    key = next_key;
}
```

Got to be ready

- This is KAME land: <http://www.kame.net/>

## IPv6 is the same as IPv4

- Same algorithm
- Second hash table using IPv6 tuple

## Really ?

- Parsing is a bit different due to next header
- IPv6 hash table is failing to load in kernel

# Let's call a friend

The exercise of adding the egress counterpart and IPv6 support is left to the reader

---

Daniel Borkmann in tc\_bpf.8

# IPv6 bypass

## Two hash tables

- A bug in libbpf
- Invalid offset computation of map definition
- Fixed by mimic tc\_bpf.c code (thanks Daniel Borkmann)

## IPv6 parsing

- For now, sending weird packets to userspace

# Test methodology

## Test setup

- Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 0 @ 2.70GHz
- Intel Corporation 82599ES 10-Gigabit SFI/SFP+
- Live traffic:
  - Around 1Gbps to 2Gbps
  - Real users so not reproducible



## Tests

- One hour long run
- Different stream depth values
- Collected Suricata statistics counters (JSON export)
- Graphs done via Timelion  
(<https://www.elastic.co/blog/timelion-timeline>)



NETWORKS

# Results: bypass at 1mb

Deduplication 40% / Query Time 24ms / Processing Time 6ms



# Results: bypass at 512kb



[Research]


# A few words on graphics

## Tests at 1mb

- Mark show some really high rate bypass
- Potentially a big high speed flow

## Tests at 512kb

- We have on big flow that kill the bandwidth
- Capture get almost null
- Even number of closed bypassed flows is low



# AF\_PACKET bypass and your CPU is peaceful



# Conclusion

## Suricata and eBPF

- A fresh but interesting method
- Bypass looks promising
- More tests to come

## More information

- Suricata: <http://www.suricata-ids.org/>
- Stamus Networks: <https://www.stamus-networks.com/>
- Suricata eBPF code:  
<https://github.com/regit/suricata/tree/ebpf-3.7>

# Questions ?



## Thanks to

- Alexei Storovoitov
- Daniel Borkmann
- David S. Miller

## Contact me

- Mail: [eleblond@stamus-networks.com](mailto:eleblond@stamus-networks.com)
- Twitter: [@regiteric](https://twitter.com/regiteric)

## More information

- Suricata eBPF code: <https://github.com/regit/suricata/tree/ebpf-3.7>